[714]*714NEELY, Justice:
Teresa Frymier (Ms. Frymier) appeals a 28 March 1989 decision of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County reversing a 9 December 1985 Human Rights Commission decision in favor of Ms. Frymier and against FMC Corporation. The Human Rights Commission had found that FMC discharged Ms. Frymier because she filed sex discrimination charges.
On 10 November 1975, Ms. Frymier went to work at FMC in South Charleston. After working for two years as an operator in the Carbon Dioxide Unit, she exercised her “bidding” rights under a collective bargaining agreement to obtain a janitorial position. Ms. Frymier’s tenure at FMC was relatively uneventful until March of 1983 when she was moved from the evening shift to the day shift. In the wake of the shift change, Ms. Frymier complained a great deal, filing grievances regarding the change and FMC’s alleged refusal to process her written grievances. Ms. Frymier claimed that the shift change as well as other changes that followed the shift change constituted sex discrimination, and that FMC’s alleged refusal to process her grievances was also sex discrimination.
On 26 April 1983, Ms. Frymier was discovered out of her work area making unauthorized use of company property. Specifically, she was typing on a company typewriter. A male co-worker, also out of his work area, sat in the same room and drank a soda. Ms. Frymier admitted to the Human Rights Commission hearing examiner that she was out of her work area, but claimed that she was on union business. The man in the room with her testified, however, that Ms. Frymier was working on personal business, and, further, that when Ms. Frymier’s supervisor entered the room and wanted to know whether Ms. Frymier had FMC documents in her briefcase, Ms. Frymier responded that it was none of his business, and threatened him with “big trouble” if he pursued the matter.
It appears from the record that the man in the room with Ms. Frymier received a less severe form of discipline than Ms. Fry-mier received. However, we believe that the circuit court could reasonably have concluded that making unauthorized use of company equipment while out of one’s work area and threatening one’s supervisor when discovered merits greater discipline than merely being out of one’s work area, and drinking a soda.
On 8 August 1983, Ms. Frymier reported to work and was assigned to help Mr. O’Daniel on the floor crew. Ms. Frymier allegedly could not find Mr. O’Daniel for over four hours, and after receiving a call from Mr. O’Daniel, a supervisor found Ms. Frymier in an office using a telephone for personal business. Ms. Frymier admitted to the hearing examiner that she made no attempt during the four hours to contact supervisory personnel to find Mr. O’Daniel. For her conduct on this occasion, Ms. Fry-mier was suspended for three days.
On 16 August 1983, Ms. Frymier docketed a charge of sex discrimination against FMC. From this time until she was fired nearly one year later, Ms. Frymier received only the mildest form of discipline, in the form of “reminders” about work performance and attendance, one of which was retracted.
On 26 June 1984, Ms. Frymier left FMC’s premises without permission at about 5:50 P.M. and drove her own car to a house on Ninth Avenue in South Charleston, only a stone’s throw from the FMC east plant. Before leaving FMC premises, Ms. Frymier had neither “clocked out”, nor had she performed the janitorial services that were her responsibility. Over two hours later, at 8:00 P.M., Ms. Frymier left the house and returned to FMC. When confronted in the parking lot by FMC’s industrial relations manager David Dick, Ms. Frymier lied and said that she had gone to Kentucky Fried Chicken for dinner, and had not been gone for more than half an hour to forty-five minutes.
Mr. Dick then told Ms. Frymier that he and another person had followed her when she left the plant; that she was gone for over two hours; and that she was not seen going to Kentucky Fried Chicken. Mr. Dick then indicated to Ms. Frymier that she was probably going to be in trouble, and [715]*715that she might want a union steward there because there could be discipline involved.
At a fact-finding conference later that evening, with her union steward present, Ms. Frymier asserted that she had gone to Kentucky Fried Chicken for dinner; that she had been gone for no longer than forty-five minutes; that she did not go into a house on 9th Avenue; and that she had performed janitorial duties before leaving FMC’s premises. Unfortunately for Ms. Frymier, she had been followed when she left the plant, because FMC had received an anonymous tip. Therefore, because of the surveillance, FMC knew that Ms. Fry-mier was testifying to events that had not transpired.
Because of her conduct on the evening of 26 June 1984, and in light of her disciplinary record, Ms. Frymier was discharged by FMC on 2 July 1984. It was stipulated before the HRC hearing examiner that Ms. Frymier would have been laid off on 16 September 1985. Thus, Ms. Frymier claimed back pay and estimated overtime for the period from 2 July 1984 to 16 September 1985.
Ms. Frymier claims that other people who engaged in similar “out of plant without permission” incidents were punished less severely. The Human Rights Commission found that Ms. Frymier made out a prima facie case of discrimination based on disparate treatment,1 and that the employer failed to meet its burden of establishing a nondiscriminatory basis for firing Ms. Frymier. The Commission found that, although Ms. Frymier had engaged in conduct justifying discipline, she did not deserve to be fired. The Commission decided that if Ms. Frymier had not filed complaints and grievances alleging discrimination by FMC, she would have received a 30 day suspension and that such a punishment would be justified by the record.
I
FMC appealed the Commission’s decision to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. In Syl. Pt. 2, Shepherdstown V.F.D. v. W. Va. Human Rights Com’n, 172 W.Va. 627, 309 S.E.2d 342 (1983), we set out the standards for judicial review in circuit court of cases under the Administrative Procedures Act:
Upon judicial review of a contested case under the West Virginia Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 29A, Article 5, Section 4(g), the circuit court may affirm the order or decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The circuit court shall reverse, vacate or modify the order or decision of the agency if the substantial rights of the petitioner or petitioners have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, decisions or order are: “(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or (2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or (3) Made upon unlawful procedures; or (4) Affected by other error of law; or (5) Clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative or substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”
Thus, the standard of review is the “clearly wrong” or “abuse of discretion” standard. The circuit court found the Commission’s decision to be “clearly wrong” and we affirm.
II
Filing complaints of sex or race discrimination clearly is protected activity. If Ms.
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[714]*714NEELY, Justice:
Teresa Frymier (Ms. Frymier) appeals a 28 March 1989 decision of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County reversing a 9 December 1985 Human Rights Commission decision in favor of Ms. Frymier and against FMC Corporation. The Human Rights Commission had found that FMC discharged Ms. Frymier because she filed sex discrimination charges.
On 10 November 1975, Ms. Frymier went to work at FMC in South Charleston. After working for two years as an operator in the Carbon Dioxide Unit, she exercised her “bidding” rights under a collective bargaining agreement to obtain a janitorial position. Ms. Frymier’s tenure at FMC was relatively uneventful until March of 1983 when she was moved from the evening shift to the day shift. In the wake of the shift change, Ms. Frymier complained a great deal, filing grievances regarding the change and FMC’s alleged refusal to process her written grievances. Ms. Frymier claimed that the shift change as well as other changes that followed the shift change constituted sex discrimination, and that FMC’s alleged refusal to process her grievances was also sex discrimination.
On 26 April 1983, Ms. Frymier was discovered out of her work area making unauthorized use of company property. Specifically, she was typing on a company typewriter. A male co-worker, also out of his work area, sat in the same room and drank a soda. Ms. Frymier admitted to the Human Rights Commission hearing examiner that she was out of her work area, but claimed that she was on union business. The man in the room with her testified, however, that Ms. Frymier was working on personal business, and, further, that when Ms. Frymier’s supervisor entered the room and wanted to know whether Ms. Frymier had FMC documents in her briefcase, Ms. Frymier responded that it was none of his business, and threatened him with “big trouble” if he pursued the matter.
It appears from the record that the man in the room with Ms. Frymier received a less severe form of discipline than Ms. Fry-mier received. However, we believe that the circuit court could reasonably have concluded that making unauthorized use of company equipment while out of one’s work area and threatening one’s supervisor when discovered merits greater discipline than merely being out of one’s work area, and drinking a soda.
On 8 August 1983, Ms. Frymier reported to work and was assigned to help Mr. O’Daniel on the floor crew. Ms. Frymier allegedly could not find Mr. O’Daniel for over four hours, and after receiving a call from Mr. O’Daniel, a supervisor found Ms. Frymier in an office using a telephone for personal business. Ms. Frymier admitted to the hearing examiner that she made no attempt during the four hours to contact supervisory personnel to find Mr. O’Daniel. For her conduct on this occasion, Ms. Fry-mier was suspended for three days.
On 16 August 1983, Ms. Frymier docketed a charge of sex discrimination against FMC. From this time until she was fired nearly one year later, Ms. Frymier received only the mildest form of discipline, in the form of “reminders” about work performance and attendance, one of which was retracted.
On 26 June 1984, Ms. Frymier left FMC’s premises without permission at about 5:50 P.M. and drove her own car to a house on Ninth Avenue in South Charleston, only a stone’s throw from the FMC east plant. Before leaving FMC premises, Ms. Frymier had neither “clocked out”, nor had she performed the janitorial services that were her responsibility. Over two hours later, at 8:00 P.M., Ms. Frymier left the house and returned to FMC. When confronted in the parking lot by FMC’s industrial relations manager David Dick, Ms. Frymier lied and said that she had gone to Kentucky Fried Chicken for dinner, and had not been gone for more than half an hour to forty-five minutes.
Mr. Dick then told Ms. Frymier that he and another person had followed her when she left the plant; that she was gone for over two hours; and that she was not seen going to Kentucky Fried Chicken. Mr. Dick then indicated to Ms. Frymier that she was probably going to be in trouble, and [715]*715that she might want a union steward there because there could be discipline involved.
At a fact-finding conference later that evening, with her union steward present, Ms. Frymier asserted that she had gone to Kentucky Fried Chicken for dinner; that she had been gone for no longer than forty-five minutes; that she did not go into a house on 9th Avenue; and that she had performed janitorial duties before leaving FMC’s premises. Unfortunately for Ms. Frymier, she had been followed when she left the plant, because FMC had received an anonymous tip. Therefore, because of the surveillance, FMC knew that Ms. Fry-mier was testifying to events that had not transpired.
Because of her conduct on the evening of 26 June 1984, and in light of her disciplinary record, Ms. Frymier was discharged by FMC on 2 July 1984. It was stipulated before the HRC hearing examiner that Ms. Frymier would have been laid off on 16 September 1985. Thus, Ms. Frymier claimed back pay and estimated overtime for the period from 2 July 1984 to 16 September 1985.
Ms. Frymier claims that other people who engaged in similar “out of plant without permission” incidents were punished less severely. The Human Rights Commission found that Ms. Frymier made out a prima facie case of discrimination based on disparate treatment,1 and that the employer failed to meet its burden of establishing a nondiscriminatory basis for firing Ms. Frymier. The Commission found that, although Ms. Frymier had engaged in conduct justifying discipline, she did not deserve to be fired. The Commission decided that if Ms. Frymier had not filed complaints and grievances alleging discrimination by FMC, she would have received a 30 day suspension and that such a punishment would be justified by the record.
I
FMC appealed the Commission’s decision to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. In Syl. Pt. 2, Shepherdstown V.F.D. v. W. Va. Human Rights Com’n, 172 W.Va. 627, 309 S.E.2d 342 (1983), we set out the standards for judicial review in circuit court of cases under the Administrative Procedures Act:
Upon judicial review of a contested case under the West Virginia Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 29A, Article 5, Section 4(g), the circuit court may affirm the order or decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The circuit court shall reverse, vacate or modify the order or decision of the agency if the substantial rights of the petitioner or petitioners have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, decisions or order are: “(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or (2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or (3) Made upon unlawful procedures; or (4) Affected by other error of law; or (5) Clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative or substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”
Thus, the standard of review is the “clearly wrong” or “abuse of discretion” standard. The circuit court found the Commission’s decision to be “clearly wrong” and we affirm.
II
Filing complaints of sex or race discrimination clearly is protected activity. If Ms. Frymier had been fired because of her complaints, she would be entitled to relief. However, the circuit court found, and we agree, that management had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to fire Ms. Frymier — she lied.
Ms. Frymier’s claim that she was disciplined more severely than other employees who had engaged in “out of plant without permission” behavior, at least with regard to the 16 June 1984 incident, is particularly [716]*716weak, because her conduct differed from the other absent employees’ conduct in one important regard. When confronted about her conduct, she responded with a boldfaced lie, and stuck to it even when she should have realized she was caught in the lie. When other employees who were absent without authorization were confronted, they admitted what they had done.2 Even the Human Rights Commission, which found for Ms. Frymier below, noted that:
Ms. Frymier’s lying when confronted with her actions on June 26, 1984, will justify a more severe discipline than meeted [sic] out to other employees for similar offenses.
(Commission Decision and Order, P. 7., Rec. p. 15.) Nevertheless, the Commission went on to say, “[h]owever, lying to an employer under this set of circumstances does not justify discharge.” Id. We disagree. Lying to an employer about a work-related matter, under any circumstances, but particularly in such a boldfaced manner, is the kind of breach of trust that makes an employee completely without value to an employer. The circuit court held the Commission’s finding that the firing was not justified to be “clearly in error and abuse of discretionary authority of the Human Rights Commission.” The court said, “Ms. Frymier was fired because she lied to management, and because the culmination of her prior employment history progressively supported a discharge upon violation of the company’s rules on the evening in question. The West Virginia Human Rights Act does not limit an employer in this instance.” (Cir.Ct. Final Order (Rec. p. 52)). We agree.
Ill
The Human Rights Commission has broad remedial powers under W.Va. Code, 5-11-10 [1987], but it has no authority to moderate the disciplinary action taken by an employer regarding an errant employee. If an employer fires an employee for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the Commission cannot reduce the discharge to a 30-day suspension simply because the Commission perceives some showing of disparate treatment. Likewise, if the employer lacked a legitimate reason for the firing, the Human Rights Commission cannot impose punishment on the employee after finding that she was fired illegally.
IV
Ms. Frymier contended in the circuit court that she would need a remand to present evidence to rebut the employer’s evidence. The circuit court stated:
Regarding necessity for remand as asserted by Ms. Frymier in her cross-appeal, the Court disagrees with the contention that full and fair opportunity to proffer rebuttal evidence was not met in this case and deems remand unnecessary here. Albeit, Ms. Frymier’s counsel began the evidentiary hearing(s) by stating his intent to only put on evidence relating to the prima facie case; this intent was, however, contradicted both in opening and closing remarks of counsel and in the 4 days of hearing and approximately 650 pages of testimony taken at hearing. Clearly all that could have been offered in this case was, in fact, said during evidentiary hearing before the Commission, and any material evidence which could possibly be submitted on remand would certainly only tend to constitute cumulative evidence of testimony already on record with respect to rebuttal of the employer’s “non-discriminatory” rationale for discharge. [Emphasis added.]
(Cir.Ct. Final Order, Rec., p. 52-3.) We agree that any evidence taken on remand would be cumulative, and would, in any case, be unlikely to show that Ms. Frymier’s lying was not a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for her firing.
V
Ms. Frymier sought in the circuit court to amend her pleadings to state a [717]*717cause of action for damages. The circuit court correctly held that such an amendment would be improper because the action was before it pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, W.Va.Code, 29A-5-1 [1964], et seq., and not as a civil matter. (Cir.Ct. Order (Rec., p. 47)). As the circuit court said, “Clearly, Ms. Frymier cannot transform this appellate proceeding into an action at law for damages simply by seeking to amend her petition for review.” Id.
The general rule is that one must exhaust her administrative remedies before going into a court of law or equity to enforce a right created by statute. However, because the administrative process created by the Human Rights Act has fallen far short of achieving the purposes of the Act, we have allowed claimants under the Human Rights Act to proceed in circuit court as an alternative to initiating an administrative action. In Syl. Pt. 1, Price v. Boone County Ambulance Authority, 175 W.Va. 676, 337 S.E.2d 913 (1985), we said:
A plaintiff may, as an alternative to filing a complaint with the Human Rights Commission, initiate an action in circuit court to enforce rights granted by the West Virginia Human Rights Act. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, Ms. Frymier could have elected to file a civil action in circuit court, but chose instead to avail herself of the services of the Human Rights Commission. In Price, we noted that, “[t]hese two avenues are, of course, mutually exclusive, as § 5-ll-13(a) makes clear.” 175 W.Va. at 679, 337 S.E.2d at 916. Ms. Frymier chose one avenue of redress; she cannot now pursue the other.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
MILLER, C.J., and McHUGH, J., concur in part and dissent in part and reserve the right to file concurring and dissenting opinions.