Flynn v. Love

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided October 19, 2021·No. 3:19-cv-00239·Unknown

Opinion

* * * MICHAEL J. FLYNN, et al., Case No. 3:19-CV-00239-MMD-CLB

Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL AND GRANTING v. DEFENDANTS’ COUNTERMOTION FOR MICHAEL E. LOVE, et al., SANCTIONS

Defendants. [ECF Nos. 161, 166]

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Michael J. Flynn and Philip Stillman’s (collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs”) motion to compel, (ECF Nos. 161, 159).1 Defendants Michael E. Love, Jacquelyne Love, and Meleco, Inc., (collectively referred as to “Defendants”) filed an opposition to the motion to compel, which included a countermotion for sanctions. (ECF Nos. 165, 166, 167.)2 Plaintiffs replied to the opposition to the motion to compel and responded to the countermotion for sanctions. (ECF No. 168.)34 For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion to compel, (ECF No. 161), and grants Defendants’ countermotion for sanctions. (ECF No. 166). This action arises from contractual disputes pertaining to a settlement involving the copyrights of 35 songs and events surrounding these songs, dating back to the

1 ECF No. 159 is a declaration in support of the motion to compel. 2 While docketed separately, ECF Nos. 165 and 166 are identical documents. ECF No. 167 is a manually filed exhibit regarding Defendants’ opposition to the motion to compel, (ECF No. 165), and countermotion for sanctions, (ECF No. 166).

3 Plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion for sanctions was included with Plaintiffs’ reply to the opposition to the motion to compel at ECF No. 168. (See ECF No. 176). 4 The motions are properly resolved without a hearing. See LR 78-1. 1960s. Plaintiffs initially filed their complaint on May 10, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) On April 14, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their Fourth Amended Complaint, which is the operative Complaint in this case. (ECF No. 121.) Plaintiffs assert claims against Defendants for: (1) fraud; (2) breach of contract; (3) accounting; (4) quantum meruit; (5) intentional interference with contractual and business relations; (6) unjust enrichment; (7) declaratory judgment; (8) fraudulent transfers; and (9) imposition of constructive trust. (Id.) On February 10, 2020, Plaintiffs served their first set of discovery requests on Defendants. (See ECF No. 159-2 at 2-28.) The parties agreed to a “rolling production” and on August 10, 2020, September 11, 2020, May 7, 2021, June 5, 2021, and July 14, 2021, Defendants provided five total productions responsive to Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents (Set One) (“RPD”). (ECF Nos. 159 at 2; 165 at 4-5.) Discovery in this case has already proven to be contentious. To assist the parties with discovery issues, the Court has held several case management conferences (“CMC”) since August of 2020. (See ECF Nos. 72, 98, 107, 118, 137, 150.) On June 28, 2021, this Court held a CMC in which Plaintiffs first raised the issue with the Court about their inability to review the Defendants’ document production. (See ECF Nos. 150, 151.) On July 30, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to compel. (ECF Nos. 161, 159.) Defendants filed an opposition to the motion to compel, which included a countermotion for sanctions. (ECF Nos. 165, 166, 167.) Plaintiffs replied to the opposition to the motion to compel and responded to the countermotion for sanctions. (ECF No. 168.) Plaintiffs seek an order to compel production of documents by Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents (Set One) (“RPD”) in “a reasonably usable form or forms” and to pay Plaintiffs’ reasonable expenses—in the amount of $7,500—in compelling Defendants to produce these documents. (ECF No. 161 at 2, 6.) Plaintiffs claim Defendants have responded to their RPD with “a ‘document dump’ of 36,986 pages delivered in an electronic format that is not usable, reasonably or at all, by Plaintiffs, their experts and consultants in reviewing these documents in preparation for trial.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiffs assert “[h]aving to open thousands of pages one by one rather than in bulk is unduly burdensome and time-consuming.” (Id. at 4.) In their response and countermotion for sanctions, (ECF Nos. 165, 166), Defendants assert that they have produced all discovery in this matter “in an electronic format, easily accessible and capable of being viewed by a laymen or, if desired, by using any number of standard discovery software or vendors readily available.” (ECF Nos. 165, 166 at 12.) Further, Defendants request that the Court award Defendants their reasonable fees and costs incurred in having to respond to Plaintiffs’ motion. (Id.) In reply, Plaintiffs reiterate that Defendants are obligated to produce documents in a form which does not “make it more difficult or burdensome for the requesting party to use information efficiently in litigation.” (ECF No. 168.) “Discovery is supposed to proceed with minimal involvement of the Court.” V5 Tech. v. Switch, Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 297, 301 (D. Nev. 2019) (quoting F.D.I.C. v. Butcher, 116 F.R.D. 196, 203 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)). “Counsel should strive to be cooperative, practical, and sensible, and should seek judicial intervention only in extraordinary situations that implicate truly significant interests.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “[B]road discretion is vested in the trial Court to permit or deny discovery.” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 751. The “scope of discovery” encompasses “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevance is to be construed broadly to include “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on” any party's claim or defense. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (citation omitted). When a party fails to provide discovery and the parties' attempts to resolve the dispute without Court intervention are unsuccessful, the opposing party may seek an order compelling that discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). However, the party moving for an order to compel discovery bears the initial burden of informing the Court: (1) which discovery requests are the subject of the motion to compel; (2) which of the responses are disputed; (3) why the believes the response is deficient; (4) why defendants’ objections are not justified; and (5) why the information he seeks through discovery is relevant to the prosecution of this action. Harris v. Kernan, No. 2:17-cv-0680-TLN-KJN- P, 2019 WL 4274010, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2019); see also Ellis v. Cambra, No. 1:02-cv-05646-AWI-SMS-PC, 2008 WL 860523, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (“Plaintiff must inform the court which discovery requests are the subject of his motion to compel, and, for each disputed response, inform the court why the information sought is relevant and why defendant's objections are not justified.”). Thereafter, the party seeking to avoid discovery bears the burden of showing why that discovery should not be permitted. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). The party resisting discovery must specifically detail the reasons why each request is irrelevant or otherwise objectionable, and may not rely on boilerplate, generalized, conclusory, or speculative arguments. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. AMG Servs., Inc., 291 F.R.D. 544, 552 (D. Nev. 2013). Arguments against discovery must be supported by “specific examples and articulated reasoning.” U.S. E.E.O.C., 237 F.R.D. at 432. Plaintiffs’ motion to compel essentially asserts that the form in which Defendants provided responses to their RPDs is unsatisfactory. In short, whi

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