Fluery v. Union Pacific Railroad Company

District Court, N.D. Illinois·Decided June 23, 2021·No. 1:20-cv-00390·Unknown

Opinion

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID FLEURY, individually and on ) behalf of those similarly situated., ) ) No. 20 C 390 Plaintiff, ) ) Judge Jorge L. Alonso v. ) ) UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, ) a Delaware corporation, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff David Fleury filed this putative class action against Defendant Union Pacific, alleging that Defendant violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. (“BIPA”). The Court previously lifted the stay of discovery in this case. Presently before the Court is Defendant’s renewed motion to stay. Having now had the benefit of full briefing on the issue and for the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion to stay [50]. Because of this ruling, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to compel [61]. BACKGROUND Defendant operates a network of railroads in North America that includes facilities located in Illinois. Defendant is a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in Nebraska. [1 at ¶8]. Plaintiff worked as a truck driver and visited rail yards in Illinois owned and operated by Defendant. Plaintiff is a citizen of the state of Illinois, who is suing under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §1322(d) et seq., for an amount more than $5,000,000.00 [29 at ¶ 14]. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant required him to scan his “biometric identifiers and/or biometric information” into certain “identity verification kiosks” when Plaintiff visited Defendant’s facilities. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant collected and stored this biometric information without informing him or others in writing that it was doing so in violation of the BIPA. At a status hearing on April 9, 2021, the Court questioned Defendant’s counsel as to the

basis for its contemplated motion to stay (identified by the parties in a joint status report). Counsel provided an off-the-cuff argument as to why discovery should be stayed. Over objection, the Court lifted the stay on discovery. Defendant has now filed a renewed, written motion to stay. LEGAL STANDARD Courts “have inherent power to stay proceedings and ‘to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.’” Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 411 (1995) (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). Orders staying proceedings must both be “[]moderate” and within “reasonable limits.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 257. In evaluating a motion to stay, courts consider whether the stay will: (1)

“simplify the issues in question and streamline the trial,” (2) “reduce the burden of litigation on the parties and on the court[,]” and (3) “unduly prejudice or tactically disadvantage the non- moving party[.]” Genzyme Corp. v. Cobrek Pharm., Inc., No. 10-cv-00112, 2011 WL 686807, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 2011); Tap Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Atrix Labs., Inc., No. 03-cv-7822, 2004 WL 422697, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2004). “The proponent of a stay bears the burden of establishing its need.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997). DISCUSSION Defendant argues that this case should be stayed pending the outcome in three pending appeals that will have significant impact on this litigation: (1) Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc., No. 1-28-0563 (Ill. App. Ct., 1st Dist.); (2) Marion v. Ring Container Technologies, LLC, No. 3- 20-0184 (Ill. App. Ct., 3rd Dist.); and (3) Cothron v. White Castle Sys., Inc., Case No. 20-3202 (7th Cir.). Plaintiff opposes the motion to stay. In Tims and Marion, two separate Illinois Appellate Court panels (in the First and Third Districts) are set to decide whether a one-year,

two-year, or five-year statute of limitations applies to BIPA claims. See Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc., No. 1-20-0562; Marion v. Ring Container Techs., LLC, No. 3-20-0184; see also Herron v. Gold Standard Banking, Inc., No. 20-cv-07469, 2021 WL 1340804, at *2 (N.D. Ill. April 9, 2021). Relatedly, in White Castle, the Seventh Circuit is set to decide when a BIPA claim accrues, and more specifically whether a private entity violates the BIPA only when it first collects or discloses an individual’s biometric data without making the required disclosures, or whether a violation occurs each time the entity collects or discloses the data. See Cothron v. White Castle Sys., Inc., No. 19-cv-00382, Dkt. 141 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2020). For the sake of streamlining the analysis, the Court considers the simplicity and burden factors together, and then finally the undue prejudice factor.

I. Simplifying-the-Issues and Reducing-the-Burden To stay this case, Defendants must first show that a stay will simplify the issues in dispute and reduce the burden of litigation on the parties. Genzyme Corp., 2011 WL 686807, at *1. Defendant argues that each appeal could significantly impact the instant case, or, at a minimum, narrow the issues for discovery, summary judgment, and/or trial. This argument has merit. If the Seventh Circuit decides in White Castle that a BIPA claim accrues on first use, and if the Illinois Appellate Courts decide in Tims and Marion that BIPA is subject to a one-year statute of limitations, then Plaintiff’s claim may be time barred, although discovery will certainly still be needed on that issue. If, however, those claims are not decided in Defendant’s favor, or in a manner otherwise beneficial to it in this case, then those defenses fall by the wayside. Equally important, these decisions will have a significant impact on class certification issues—most obviously on the size of the prospective class. Plaintiff counters by pointing out that even if these decisions come down in Defendant’s

favor, this case will not be over because (1) the Illinois Supreme Court has the final say and decisions of lower courts indicate that the Supreme Court would find that a five-year statute of limitations applies and (2) Plaintiff would still be entitled to discovery to oppose any motion for summary judgment. First, Plaintiff’s argument that lower court decisions signal how the Illinois Supreme Court would rule is unpersuasive. Although Plaintiff correctly notes that most lower courts have found that the statute of limitations for BIPA claims is five years, the appellate courts may disagree. See Herron, No. 20-cv-07469, 2021 WL 1340804, at *4. And those appellate court decisions would likely be controlling here since this Court is sitting in diversity and applying Illinois law here. See Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co. v. Dugan, 810 F.3d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Where the Illinois Supreme Court has not ruled on an issue, decisions of

the Illinois Appellate Courts control, unless there are persuasive indications that the Illinois Supreme Court would decide the issue differently”). The Court is not convinced that lower court rulings provide any indication that the Illinois Supreme Court would conclude that a five-year statute of limitations applies to BIPA claims. Indeed, the court in Donet v. Vivid Seats LLC addressed an analogous argument, but still found that a stay was warranted. See Donets, No. 20- cv-3551, Dkt. 37, at p.3 (N.D. Ill.

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Related

Landis v. North American Co.
299 U.S. 248 (Supreme Court, 1936)
Stone v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
514 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court, 1995)
Clinton v. Jones
520 U.S. 681 (Supreme Court, 1997)
Nationwide Agribusiness Insura v. Toni Dugan
810 F.3d 446 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)