Floyd v. Santa Clara Department of Correction

Opinion

1 2 3 4 7 8 MICHAEL DEVIN FLOYD, Case No. 22-cv-00750-CRB

9 Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 10 v. DISMISS, DENYING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DENYING 11 SANTA CLARA DEPARTMENT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL CORRECTION, et al., JUDGMENT 12 Defendants. 13 Pro se Plaintiff Michael Devin Floyd alleges that his constitutional rights were 14 violated at two county holding facilities where he was detained after his arrest in August 15 2021. Floyd alleges that he was denied adequate access to the bathroom and to a phone 16 call and was forcibly placed into a wheelchair and stripped naked. See Third Amended 17 Compl. (“TAC”) (dkt. 78) at 9–12. Floyd brings suit against the Santa Clara Department 18 of Correction, the County of Santa Clara, the County of Santa Clara Office of the Sheriff, 19 Elmwood Correctional Facility, and employees of these institutions in their official and 20 individual capacities. See TAC at 17–18. 21 The County of Santa Clara moves to dismiss the proposed defendants: Agustin, 22 Barajas, Cabrera, Campos, Cofferati, Cortez, Dias, Evans, Hernandez, Hiles, Patino, 23 Quadros, Reyes, Serrano-Alvarez, Silos, Stokes, and Tran, arguing Floyd fails to plead 24 with enough specificity to articulate each defendant’s participation in the alleged 25 constitutional violations.1 See Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”) (dkt. 80) at 1. In addition, Floyd 26

27 1 The individual defendants listed are officers and other staff at the Santa Clara County 1 moves for the Court to enter final judgment on the Court’s Order denying him leave to 2 amend to incorporate his state law claims into the complaint. See Mot. for Entry of Final 3 Judgment (dkt. 79). Floyd also moves to strike the County’s motion to dismiss and seeks 4 sanctions against the County. See Mot. to Strike (dkt. 82); Mot. for Sanctions (dkt. 83). 5 As explained below, finding this matter suitable for resolution without oral 6 argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court DENIES the County’s motion to 7 dismiss, DENIES Floyd’s motion for entry of final judgment, and DENIES Floyd’s motion 8 for sanctions. 10 A. Factual Allegations 11 On August 18, 2021 at 9:30 p.m., Floyd was arrested by SJPD. TAC at 8. Prior to 12 this, he had taken a “concoction that would empty [his] bowels.” Id. After he arrived at 13 the first holding facility, Santa Clara County Main Jail, he used the toilet twice. Id. at 8. 14 The officers refused when he asked to use the toilet for the third time. Id. at 9. Floyd also 15 asked to make a phone call to his family pursuant to California Penal Code section 851.5, 16 which entitles arrestees to three phone calls immediately upon booking and no later than 17 three hours after arrest, except where physically impossible. Id. The officers again 18 rejected his request and informed him that he needed to wait until he arrived at the second 19 holding facility. Id. The officers—specifically Tran, Silos, Hiles, Agustin, Stokes, and 20 Reyes—surrounded him and demanded he leave the jail without using the restroom or 21 making a phone call. Id. at 4, 9. 22 On August 19 at approximately 4:00 a.m., Floyd arrived at Elmwood Correctional 23 Facility, the second holding facility. Id. at 4. He was again denied access to phone calls 24 and bathroom by other staff members. Id. After Floyd waited for several hours, he was 25 allowed to use the bathroom, but was informed by officers at Elmwood—specifically 26 Cofferati, Dias, and Evans—that he could only make phone calls after he changed into 27 1 prison clothes. Id. at 5, 10. Floyd refused to change his clothes, worried that he would 2 never get a chance to call his family. Id. at 10. Several different officers and psychiatrists 3 came and asked Floyd to follow the commands. Id. at 10–11. Several officers at 4 Elmwood allegedly made fake attempts to call the number Floyd provided and told Floyd 5 that the number was disconnected. Id. at 11. Afterward, officers Evans, Cabrera, Quadros, 6 Serrano-Alvarez, Barajas, Patino, Cortez, Campos, Dias, Hernandez, and Reagan used 7 force to restrain him and put shackles on his feet and put him in a helpless position, with a 8 boot on his lower back.2 Id. at 5, 11–12. At this point, Floyd had been detained for more 9 than 20 hours. Id. at 12. Floyd felt desperate and decided to cooperate. Id. He was put in 10 a wheelchair and rolled into a jail cell. Id. Eight officers—specifically Evans, Cabrera, 11 Quadros, Serrano-Alvarez, Barajas, Patino, Cortez, and Campos—stripped him naked. Id. 12 at 6, 12. Floyd again asked to use the phone, and the officers told him to wait 24 hours due 13 to COVID. Id. at 12. Floyd was informed of his Miranda rights shortly thereafter. Id. at 14 13. He was finally allowed to use the phone at 8:30 a.m. on August 20. Id. 15 Floyd appears to allege Section 1983 claims for: (1) a violation of his Fifth and 16 Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process when the staff at both facilities denied him 17 timely access to the bathroom and to phone calls; (2) a violation of the Eighth Amendment 18 prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment when the staff at Elmwood took him to a jail 19 cell and stripped him naked; (3) a Monell claim based on the related customs and policies 20 at the Elmwood facility. Id. at 13-15. 21 B. Procedural History 22 After the parties completed discovery, Floyd moved to amend his complaint to 23 allege his claims against individual defendants and allege additional state-law claims. See 24 dkt. 71-2. On March 3, 2023, the Court found that Floyd unduly delayed in adding the 25

26 2 The County does not move to dismiss seven individual defendants: Garcia, Reagan, Sanchez-Perez, Cote, Vorpahl, Dickson, and Newton. See TAC at 5–7. Although Reagan 27 is tied to this group allegation, Floyd alleges other factual matters wherein Reagan is the 1 state-law claims and failed to allege, with specificity, the actions taken by the individual 2 defendants in the alleged misconduct, and thus, the Court denied leave to amend. See 3 Order (dkt. 75) at 1. However, the Court provided Floyd the opportunity to revise his third 4 amended complaint to allege the precise actions the defendants took to deny Floyd a phone 5 call, a visit to the bathroom, or to exert excessive force against him. Id. 6 On March 19, 2023, in accordance with the Court’s order, Floyd filed his third 7 amended complaint. See TAC. Shortly thereafter, Floyd moved for entry of final judgment 8 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) in connection with the state-law claims the 9 Court denied leave to amend to add. See Mot. for Entry of Final Judgment. On April 3, 10 2023, the County moved to dismiss defendants in the TAC for failure to allege, with 11 specificity, the actions of each individual defendant. See MTD at 1. Ten days later, Floyd 12 moved to strike the County’s MTD because the County did not represent the individual 13 defendants and the individual defendants had not been served. See Opp’n to Mot. to 14 Dismiss & Mot. to Strike at 4. That same day, Floyd also moved for sanctions against the 15 County for not moving forward with contacting their employees to inform the individual 16 defendants of their participation in the suit and request their waiver of service. See Mot. 17 for Sanctions at 3–4. 18 The Court addresses the parties’ motions in turn: first, the County’s motion to 19 dismiss; second, Floyd’s motion for entry of final judgment; and third, Floyd’s motion for 20 sanctions. 22 A. Legal Standard 23 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a complaint 24 for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dismissal may be based on 25 either “the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under 26 a cognizable legal theory.” Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th 27 Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). A complaint must plead “sufficient factual matter, accepted as 1 678 (200) (cleaned up). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 2 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 3 misconduct alleged.” Id. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court “must presume 4 all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in 5 favor of the nonmoving party.” Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 6 1987). “Courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts 7 ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, 8 documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may 9 take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 10 (2007). 11 If a court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim, it should “freely give 12 leave” to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). A court has 13 discretion to deny leave to amend due to “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the 14 part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, 15 undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] 16 futility of amendment.” Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 17 2008). 18 B. Discussion 19 To bring a § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by 20 the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation 21 was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 22 48 (1988) (citations omitted). Liability attaches when “[a] person deprives another ‘of a 23 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, 24 participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally 25 required to do that causes the deprivation.’” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 26 1988) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). A defendant cannot 27 be held liable merely because of his participation in a group without “a showing of 1 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Nor can the defendant be held liable under § 1983 as a bystander. 2 See Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th 877, 889 (9th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). In other 3 words, it is essential to establish the integral participation of each defendant in the alleged 4 constitutional violation. Id. 5 To allege group participation without alleging the individual’s precise actions, 6 courts often look to whether it is “facially plausible” that each person in the group engaged 7 in the same allegedly unlawful conduct. Isakhanova v. Muniz, No. 15-cv-03759-TEH, 8 2016 WL 362397, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2016) (citing DeLuca v. County of Los 9 Angeles, No. 15-00344-DMG, 2015 WL 4451420, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2015)). Given 10 the 12(b)(6) standard, when plaintiffs put each defendant on notice as to the claims against 11 them and the allegations are facially plausible as to each individual’s participation in the 12 group conduct, the plaintiff meets their burden at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Isakhanova, 13 2016 WL 362397, at *4 (alleging “only that [defendant] participated in the unlawful search 14 and seizure of Plaintiff” without any factual allegations is insufficient); Hughey v. 15 Camacho, No. 13-cv-2665-TLN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113473, at *10-11 (E.D. Cal. 16 Aug. 24, 2015) (holding that “[p]laintiffs are not required to know which of the eight 17 officers performed every act throughout the altercation”); Ruiz v. United States, No. 18 EDCV 20-699-JGB, 2021 WL 5993531, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2021) (“Should Plaintiff 19 have taken notes during [the severe beating]? . . . Plaintiff filed . . . a short and plain 20 statement describing his allegations; he amended the Complaint to substitute the names of 21 Individual Defendants for Doe Defendants as those names were revealed to him. Plaintiff 22 has met [his] pleading burden[].”) 23 By way of screenshots of video footage obtained through discovery, Floyd connects 24 the individual officers to the events that occurred during his detention at the Santa Clara 25 County Main Jail and Elmwood Correctional Facility. See TAC at 4–13. In each 26 encounter with the officers, he describes his alleged deprivation and the officers allegedly 27 involved in that deprivation. Id. Floyd’s allegations are of two types: physical altercations 1 comprise Floyd’s excessive force claim include “attempt[ing] to remove the Plaintiff by 2 force from the lobby” and “remov[ing] the Plaintiff by force from the lobby of Elmwood 3 [and] subjecting the Plaintiff to dress in prison clothes” and “apply[ing] enough force on 4 the Plaintiff’s arm to signal that the arm would be broken if the Plaintiff struggled with the 5 SWAT dressed officers.” Id. 5–6, 11–12. While not specific enough to pinpoint each 6 exact movement of each officer, Floyd’s allegations are facially plausible and provide 7 enough detail as to the time, place, and specific actions to ensure the officers understand 8 the charges against them. At this stage, that is sufficient. The Court therefore declines to 9 dismiss the claims against Evans, Cabrera, Quadros, Serrano-Alvarez, Bajaras, Patino, 10 Cortez, Campos, Dias, and Hernandez. 11 The second type of allegation relates to Floyd’s deprivations of a phone call and the 12 restroom at the two facilities. Like the physical altercation allegations, Floyd describes a 13 series of play-by-play interactions with the officers who denied him the opportunity to use 14 the restroom and make a phone call. See TAC 4–5. The County argues that Plaintiff does 15 not allege with specificity because he merely provides a narrative, followed by a listing of 16 any officers involved in the narrative. See MTD at 4. Floyd counters that these officers 17 were specifically listed as each “elected to deny the Plaintiff of a phone call.” See Opp’n 18 to Mot. to Dismiss at 6. Floyd elaborates on this point, explaining that other officers were 19 present but did not engage in these conversations or assist the named defendants, and so 20 are not party to the suit. Id. By connecting the officers to the exact deprivation, the 21 officers are put on notice as to their actions and the claims against them. Given that courts 22 must construe pro se pleadings liberally, Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 23 2002), and the notice pleading standard is met, the Court also declines to dismiss the 24 claims against Tran, Silos, Hiles, Agustin, Stokes, Reyes, Cofferati, Evans and Dias. 25 Because the Court denies the County’s motion to dismiss, the Court need not reach 26 Floyd’s motion to strike.3 27 III. MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT 1 A. Legal Standard 2 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), “when an action presents more than 3 one claim for relief . . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of 4 a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court 5 expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Rule 54(b) was adopted 6 “specifically to avoid the possible injustice of delay[ing] judgment o[n] a distinctively 7 separate claim [pending] adjudication of the entire case.” Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 810 8 F.3d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 9 Entering final judgment on an individual claim in a multiple-claim suit requires that 10 the Court first determine that it is dealing with a judgment “in the sense that it is a decision 11 upon a cognizable claim for relief” and final in that “it is an ‘ultimate disposition of an 12 individual claim.’” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980) (citing 13 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956)). Once the Court determines 14 the judgment is final, the Court will determine whether there is “any just reason for delay.” 15 Id. at 8. The court exercises discretion to determine whether an entry of final judgment is 16 in “the interests of sound judicial administration and justice to the litigants.” Id. at 5. 17 “[S]ound judicial administration does not require that Rule 54(b) requests be granted 18 routinely.” Id. at 10. 19 B. Discussion 20 Floyd requests entry of final judgment on the Court’s denial of leave to amend his 21 complaint to incorporate Floyd’s state law claims, arguing there is no just reason to delay 22 final judgment. See Mot. for Entry of Final Judgment at 3. Specifically, Floyd contends 23 that delaying the action would require him to wait to appeal the denial of leave to amend, 24 which would prolong his case further and may have implications if remanded. See id. 25 26 1983) (“Under the express language of the rule, only pleadings are subject to motions to strike.”); 27 Morton v. Twitter, Inc., No. CV 20-10434-GW, 2022 WL 2101912, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 1 Because these “additional claims do not require further discovery nor involve new theories 2 of recovery,” Floyd argues the Court should enter final judgment. Id. at 4. 3 Floyd’s contention rests on the faulty assumption that a Court’s denial of leave to 4 amend is a final judgment. The Court’s Order denying leave to amend is not final. See 5 Strasburg v. M/Y JUST A NOTION, No. 08-CV-21-JLS, 2010 WL 3420794, at *3 (S.D. 6 Cal. Aug. 30, 2010). Thus, “[a]n order denying leave to amend a complaint is not 7 appealable.” Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 8 Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc’y of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1981)). “Such 9 orders, as a class, contemplate further proceedings in district court, and . . . [thus] review is 10 available after the final judgment, into which [the non-final orders] merge.” Bradshaw, 11 662 F.2d at 1304 (citation omitted). “The opportunity to amend, if erroneously denied, 12 may be effectively protected after final judgment on the merits.” Id. Therefore, at this 13 time, the Court cannot enter final judgment on Floyd’s state law claims. If he wishes to 14 appeal the Court’s denial of leave to amend, he may do so after a final judgment on the 15 merits of his remaining claims. 17 A. Legal Standard 18 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, a party may move for sanctions by 19 describing the opposing party’s specific conduct that violates Rule 11(b). Rule 11(b) 20 requires that pleadings, motions, or other papers (1) are “not being presented for any 21 improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the 22 cost of litigation; (2) the claims . . . are warranted by existing law . . . (3) [that] the factual 23 contentions have evidentiary support or . . . will likely have evidentiary support after . . . 24 further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted 25 on the evidence or . . . are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.” 26 B. Discussion 27 Floyd contends that the County is unduly wasting the Court’s and his time by not 1 || email conversation with opposing counsel discussing whether the County would ask the 2 || individual defendants to waive service and agree to the County accepting service on their 3 || behalf once Floyd filed an amended complaint. See dkt. 82 Ex. 1 at 3. When Floyd filed 4 || the amended complaint and alerted the County as to its filing, the County stated they 5 || would not help effectuate service until the pleadings were settled. See id. at 4. 6 Floyd cites to two cases to support his request for sanctions: Wiley v. Kern High 7 || Sch. Dist., No. 22-CV-0881-AWI, 2022 WL 7105941 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2022); Birks v. 8 Smith, Strege, Fredericksen, Butts, & Clark, Ltd., No. 19-cv-44-LIB, 2019 WL 5622486 9 || (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 2019). Both are inapposite. The first concerns sanctions for 10 || unnecessary pleadings on a motion to remand, while the latter concerns a request for 11 sanctions that was stricken for not complying with the local rules. While the Court 12 || recognizes Floyd’s frustration with the delay, the County’s conduct is not sanctionable. 13 || Vv. CONCLUSION C 14 For the foregoing reasons, the County’s motion to dismiss is DENIED, Floyd’s 3 15 || motion for sanctions is DENIED, and Floyd’s motion for entry of final judgment is 16 |} DENIED. 5 18 Dated: July 21, 2023 x / CHARLES R. BREYER 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28