FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 2, 2018 _________________________________ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court JOHN PATRICK FLETCHER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 18-1013 (D.C. No. 1:17-CV-01576-LTB) CELIA SCHWARTZ; DENT; EDWIN (D. Colo.) HERNDON; HANSEN; DAVID LISAC; JASON LENGERICH; RICK RAEMISCH,
Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before MATHESON, EID, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
John Patrick Fletcher, a Colorado prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint
against several prison officials alleging violations of his rights under the First,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. On screening, the district court dismissed his
federal claims as legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and declined to exercise
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291,1 we affirm the district court’s judgment.
I. Background
Mr. Fletcher’s second amended complaint is the operative complaint.2
Because all of his federal claims ultimately stem from his allegation that
Celia Schwartz, a legal assistant in the prison library, violated his right to freedom of
speech under the First Amendment, we repeat those allegations in their entirety:
g. On or about May 09, 2017, at approximately 09:50 a.m., in the prison law library, Defendant Schwartz and Mr. Fletcher had a disagreement over whether Mr. Fletcher was allowed to print a motion he needed to file with the court. h. Defendant Schwartz stated that she was busy and was not willing to listen to Mr. Fletcher’s rebuttal of her reasoning; further instructing him to sit down and stop engaging in his right to Freedom of Speech. i. Mr. Fletcher immediately sat down and faced the computer monitor, as ordered. j. Mr. Fletcher then, in a[] calm and measured manner, reminded Defendant Schwartz that the Freedom of Speech he was engaging in, was a constitutionally protected right, and Defendant Schwartz’s order to stop engaging in such protected conduct, was a federal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 242, deprivation of rights under color of law. k. Having been informed upon the premises of the unlawful nature of her actions – Defendant Schwartz repeated her unlawful order for
1 Section 1291 provides, in relevant part: “The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .” 2 After Mr. Fletcher filed his original complaint and a first amended complaint, a magistrate judge ordered him to file a second amended complaint that provided a short and plain statement of his claims in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 2 Mr. Fletcher to stop engaging in the protected right to Freedom of Speech. l. Further warning Mr. Fletcher that if he did not stop engaging in such protected conduct, Defendant Schwartz would retaliate against Mr. Fletcher, by calling for first-responders, (with both parties fully aware of the disciplinary consequences and punitive sanctions which would result). m. Despite Defendant Schwartz’s threat of retaliation, Mr. Fletcher continued to exercise his protected right to Freedom of Speech, by reexplaining to Defendant Schwartz, in a calm and measured manner, that her order to stop engaging in the right to Freedom of Speech, was a federal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 242. n. Having been so informed, Defendant Schwartz followed through with her threat of retaliation against Mr. Fletcher, for engaging in the protected right to Freedom of Speech, and called for first-responders. o. (The facility security video footage of the law library shows that at no time during this exchange, did any of the prisoners present stop quietly working on their cases; as each prisoner was seemingly oblivious to Defendant Schwartz’s unlawful conduct. As such, this particular usage of such power and authority, was not for any reasonable, neutral government/penological interest, but exercised solely for the personal reason of silencing a dissenting voice Defendant Schwartz did not want to hear.) R. at 139-40 (footnote and emphasis omitted).
Mr. Fletcher alleged that Ms. Schwartz’s conduct constituted “criminal
victimization,” id. at 142, which violated not only his First Amendment free speech
rights (including his right not to be subject to retaliation for exercising his First
Amendment rights), but also his rights to due process and equal protection, and his
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Mr. Fletcher further alleged that the other defendants, ranging from
correctional officers to the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of
Corrections, each violated his constitutional rights by failing or refusing to notify law 3 enforcement of his criminal victimization by Ms. Schwartz, specifically her violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 242, which provides in relevant part:
Whoever, under color of any law . . . willfully subjects any person in any State . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both[.] The district court dismissed Mr. Fletcher’s second amended complaint as
legally frivolous because “none of the forty claims set forth a violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.” R. at 167.
II. Discussion
“We generally review a district court’s dismissal for frivolousness under
§ 1915 for abuse of discretion. However, where the frivolousness determination
turns on an issue of law, we review the determination de novo.” Fogle v. Pierson,
435 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir 2006) (citation omitted). “A district court may deem
an in forma pauperis complaint frivolous only if it lacks an arguable basis either in
law or in fact.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[The] term ‘frivolous,’ when
applied to a complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also
the fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Thus, frivolous claims are those “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or
“describing fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28. But a complaint is not
automatically frivolous because it fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. Id. at 331.
4 Applying these standards, we respectfully disagree with the district court’s
conclusion that Mr. Fletcher’s federal claims are frivolous. His claims are not based
on fanciful factual allegations. Nor does he assert unrecognizable legal theories or
“infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Id. at 327. But we
agree with the district court that the facts he alleged do not set forth violations of the
constitutional rights that he asserted. As such, his federal claims are subject to
dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state claims on which relief can be
granted, rather than for frivolousness under subsection (e)(2)(B)(i). Thus, we affirm
the dismissal of Mr. Fletcher’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B).3
A. Claims Against Ms. Schwartz
Mr. Fletcher’s primary contention is that Ms. Schwartz violated his First
Amendment right to freedom of speech. The Supreme Court has “adopted a unitary,
deferential standard for reviewing prisoners’ constitutional claims: When a prison
regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S.
223, 229 (2001) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The same
reasonable-relation test applies when a prisoner challenges an action by a particular
official, rather than a prison regulation. See Boles v. Neet, 486 F.3d 1177, 1181 n.4
(10th Cir. 2007) (“Although plaintiff is not challenging a prison regulation per se, but
3 Mr. Fletcher does not challenge the district court’s decision not to assert supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state-law claims. 5 rather [the warden’s] individual actions, [the reasonable-relation test] is no less
applicable.”).
To avoid dismissal, Mr. Fletcher’s First Amendment claim against
Ms. Schwartz “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d
1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In making this
plausibility determination, context matters. Id. at 1185.
Nowhere in the law does context have greater relevance to the validity of a claim than prisoner civil-rights claims. Prisons are a unique environment, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the role of the Constitution within their walls is quite limited. Government conduct that would be unacceptable, even outrageous, in another setting may be acceptable, even necessary, in a prison. Consequently, a prisoner claim will often not be plausible unless it recites facts that might well be unnecessary in other contexts. For example, . . . a prisoner claim may not be plausible unless it alleges facts that explain why the usual justifications for the complained-of acts do not apply. Id. Although we will liberally construe a pro se complaint, “conclusory allegations
without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief
can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Liberally construing Mr. Fletcher’s non-conclusory allegations, his First
Amendment claim against Ms. Schwartz asserts the following facts: at a particular
date and time, Ms. Schwartz stated she was busy and would not permit Mr. Fletcher
to print a motion that he needed to file with a court. When he voiced his
6 disagreement with her decision, Ms. Schwartz was not willing to listen. She instead
ordered him to sit down and stop repeating his complaint. Despite Ms. Schwartz’s
warning that she would call first responders, Mr. Fletcher persisted in voicing his
disagreement with her order, asserting his right to do so under the First Amendment
and informing Ms. Schwartz that her conduct violated 18 U.S.C. § 242.
Ms. Schwartz eventually called first responders, who escorted Mr. Fletcher out of the
prison library. During his exchange with Ms. Schwartz, Mr. Fletcher remained calm,
and other prisoners in the library continued to quietly work on their cases.
These allegations fail to state a plausible First Amendment claim against
Ms. Schwartz. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “In a prison context, an inmate
does not retain those First Amendment rights that are inconsistent with his status as a
prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.”
Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (internal
quotation marks omitted). And it is Mr. Fletcher’s burden to demonstrate through his
allegations that there was no legitimate basis for Ms. Schwartz’s conduct. See
Al-Owhali v. Holder, 687 F.3d 1236, 1240-41 (10th Cir. 2012) (upholding dismissal
of First Amendment challenge to limitations on prisoner’s communications with
relatives because he failed to plead facts showing defendants lacked a legitimate
penological interest in limiting his correspondence). Mr. Fletcher’s allegations that
he remained calm and did not disrupt the other prisoners’ legal work do not
demonstrate that Ms. Schwartz had no legitimate basis to order him to cease arguing
with her. Nor did Mr. Fletcher plead any other facts showing that the usual
7 justification for not permitting a prisoner to repeatedly question a staff member’s
decision—the need to maintain order in a prison setting— did not apply in this case.
See Gee, 627 F.3d at 1185 (requiring prisoners to allege facts explaining “why the
usual justifications for the complained-of acts do not apply”). In sum, he failed to
plead that Ms. Schwartz’s conduct was not “reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).4
Mr. Fletcher’s other claims against Ms. Schwartz are based on the same facts
as her alleged violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. He
therefore also failed to plead a plausible claim that Ms. Schwartz retaliated against
him for exercising his First Amendment rights. Nor do these facts plead plausible
claims that Ms. Schwartz violated his rights to due process or equal protection, or
subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment. Consequently, all of Mr. Fletcher’s
claims against Ms. Schwartz were properly dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B).
4 We note, as well, that Mr. Fletcher did not plead any facts showing that he lacked alternative means, such as the prison grievance system, to lodge his complaint about Ms. Schwartz’s decision not to allow him to print his motion. See Jones, 433 U.S. at 130 & n.6 (noting “First Amendment speech rights are barely implicated in this case,” in part, because “[t]he State has not hampered the ability of prison inmates to communicate their grievances to correctional officials” through a grievance procedure). Nor did Mr. Fletcher plead facts showing that accommodation of a prisoner’s right to verbally voice such complaints, without restriction, would have no significant impact on guards and other inmates. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (“When accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant ‘ripple effect’ on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections officials.”). The absence of such allegations further demonstrates that Mr. Fletcher failed to set forth a plausible First Amendment claim against Ms. Schwartz. See Gee, 627 F.3d at 1185 (noting “a prisoner claim will often not be plausible unless it recites facts that might well be unnecessary in other contexts”). 8 B. Claims Against the Other Defendants
All of Mr. Fletcher’s claims against the other defendants are based upon their
failure or refusal to report to law enforcement authorities his so-called criminal
victimization, specifically Ms. Schwartz’s alleged criminal violation of his First
Amendment rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242. But having failed to plead a plausible
civil claim of a constitutional violation against Ms. Schwartz, Mr. Fletcher likewise
did not plead facts showing that her conduct amounted to a criminal violation of his
constitutional rights. Like 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 242 requires a deprivation of a
constitutional right under color of law. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (“Whoever, under color
of any law . . . willfully subjects any person in any State . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution . . . shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both[.]”); see also
United States v. LaVallee, 439 F.3d 670, 687 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Section 242 makes it
criminal to act (1) willfully and (2) under color of law (3) to deprive a person of
rights protected by the Constitution . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Berry
v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1501 n.17 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting § 242 is the
“criminal civil rights act counterpart” of § 1983). Thus, absent facts supporting a
plausible criminal violation by Ms. Schwartz, Mr. Fletcher’s claims against the other
9 defendants likewise fail to plausibly assert constitutional violations based on their
failure or refusal to report his alleged “criminal victimization” by Ms. Schwartz.
C. Other Contentions on Appeal
Mr. Fletcher raises several contentions regarding the district judge and
magistrate judge who presided in this case. He fails to demonstrate that either judge
was biased in deciding any of his motions or in dismissing his second amended
complaint. Nor does he show that either judge “knowingly concealed the actual
commission of multiple federal felonies from discovery by federal law enforcement.”
Aplt. Opening Br. at 11. Mr. Fletcher’s request for a change of venue on remand is
mooted by this court’s affirmance of the district court’s judgment.
Lastly, Mr. Fletcher argues that 18 U.S.C. § 4 is unconstitutional.5 It is
unclear how this contention relates to Mr. Fletcher’s claims of error in the district
court’s dismissal of his second amended complaint. But in any event, we do not
address this argument because Mr. Fletcher did not raise it in the district court. “An
issue is preserved for appeal if a party alerts the district court to the issue and seeks a
ruling.” Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC Holding Co., 497 F.3d 1135, 1141
(10th Cir. 2007). Mr. Fletcher did not include a claim challenging § 4 in his second
amendment complaint. And he fails to cite any other place in the record where this
5 This statute provides: “Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 4. 10 contention was raised and then ruled on by the district court. See 10th Cir. R.
28.2(C)(2); Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc., 497 F.3d at 1141-42. Nor has he argued
for plain error review. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1130-31
(10th Cir. 2011) (noting appellant’s failure to assert plain error “surely marks the end
of the road for an argument for reversal not first presented to the district court”).
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Mr. Fletcher’s motion for leave
to proceed on appeal without prepayment of fees and costs and his motion for leave
to amend his appeal brief are granted. All other pending motions are denied.
Entered for the Court
Joel M. Carson Circuit Judge