ACCEPTED 14-15-00238-CV FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 8/31/2015 12:00:00 AM CHRISTOPHER PRINE CLERK
No. 14-15-00238-CV
FILED IN IN THE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS 14th COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS HOUSTON, TEXAS 8/31/2015 10:38:00 AM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk GEORGE FLEMING,
Appellant,
v.
CHARLES KIRKLIN, STEPHEN KIRKLIN, PAUL KIRKLIN AND THE KIRKLIN LAW FIRM, P.C.
Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
On Appeal from the 234th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2014-53135, Hon. Wesley Ward, Presiding
CROSS-APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
Paul S. Kirklin pkirklin@kirklinlaw.com State Bar No. 24070063 THE KIRKLIN LAW FIRM, P.C. 12600 N Featherwood, Suite 225 Houston, TX 77034 (713) 571-8300 (281) 922-6240 – Fax Counsel for Appellees/Cross- Appellants
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
1|Page TABLE OF CONTENTS
Index of Authorities .........................................................................................3
Attorneys' Fees Incurred by The Kirklin Law Firm, P.C. ...............................5
Segregation of Attorneys' Fees as Between the Kirklin Defendants ........... 11
Segregation of Attorneys' Fees as Between the Fleming Plaintiffs ............. 12
Sanctions ...................................................................................................... 15
Prayer ............................................................................................................ 17
2|Page INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Air Routing Intern. Corp. (Canada) v. Britannia Airways, Ltd., 150 S.W.3d 682, 693 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) ....... 12
Am. Heritage Capital, LP v. Gonzalez, 436 S.W.3d 865 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2014, no pet.) ................................ 7, 8, 15
Avila v. Larrea, 05-14-00631-CV, 2015 WL 3866778 (Tex. App.--Dallas June 23, 2015, pet. filed) ............... 10, 11, 16
Dell Dev. Corp. v. Best Indus. Unif. Supply Co., Inc., 743 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.App-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied) ............... 5
Fitzmaurice v. Jones, 417 S.W.3d 627 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) .................. 10
Garcia v. Gomez, 319 S.W.3d 638 (Tex. 2010) ............................................................................ 9
Globe Leasing, Inc. v. Engine Supply and Mach. Service, 437 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Civ. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1969) ................................. 5
In re Cash Media Systems, Inc., 326 B.R. 655 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) ............................................................. 5
Kennedy v. Kennedy, 222 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. App. Austin 2006) .......................................................... 5
KSNG Architects, Inc. v. Beasley, 109 S.W.3d 894 (Tex. App. Dallas 2003) ........................................................ 5
Nelson v. Britt, 241 S.W.3d 672 (Tex. App. Dallas 2007) ........................................................ 5
Nevada Gold & Silver, Inc. v. Andrews Independent School Dist., 225 S.W.3d 68 Ed. Law Rep. 924 (Tex.App. El Paso 2005) ........................... 5
3|Page Rauhauser v. McGibney, 2014 WL 6996819 (Tex.App.—For Worth Dec. 11, 2014, no pet.) .............. 10
Schimmel v. McGregor, 438 S.W.3d 847 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied.) ........... 10
Sierra Club v. Andrews Cnty., 418 S.W.3d 711 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2013) .................................................. 10
Sullivan v. Abraham, 2014 WL 5140289 (Tex.App.—Amarillo Oct. 13, 2014, Pet. filed) ............. 10
Statutes
Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Chapter 27....................................... passim
4|Page REPLY
A. Attorneys' Fees Incurred by The Kirklin Law Firm, P.C.
George Fleming ("Fleming") bases his Brief of Cross-Appellee
primarily on the argument that defendants The Kirklin Law Firm, P.C.,
Charles Kirklin, Stephen Kirklin, and Paul Kirklin defended themselves pro
se, and that because they defended themselves pro se, they didn't "incur" any
attorneys' fees as is required by the TCPA. This argument is correct in the
case of defendants Charles Kirklin, Stephen Kirklin, and Paul Kirklin, but
it's incorrect in the case of defendant The Kirklin Law Firm, P.C.
In Texas, a corporation cannot defend itself pro se.1 It must be
represented by a licensed attorney,2 and a corporation cannot be a licensed
attorney. In this case, The Kirklin Law Firm, P.C. was represented by
Charles Kirklin, Stephen Kirklin, and Paul Kirklin (all licensed attorneys),
and it offered undisputed evidence that The Kirklin Law Firm, P.C. incurred
attorneys' fees to them:
The reasonable, usual and customary value of the reasonable and necessary legal services of Charles Kirklin, Stephen R.
1 Dell Dev. Corp. v. Best Indus. Unif. Supply Co., Inc., 743 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied); In re Cash Media Systems, Inc., 326 B.R. 655 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (applying Texas law); Globe Leasing, Inc. v. Engine Supply and Mach. Service, 437 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Civ. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1969). 2 Nelson v. Britt, 241 S.W.3d 672 (Tex. App. Dallas 2007); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 222 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. App. Austin 2006); Nevada Gold & Silver, Inc. v. Andrews Independent School Dist., 225 S.W.3d 68, 221 Ed. Law Rep. 924 (Tex. App. El Paso 2005); KSNG Architects, Inc. v. Beasley, 109 S.W.3d 894 (Tex. App. Dallas 2003). 5|Page Kirklin and Paul Kirklin incurred by the Kirklin Defendants in defending the Kirklin Defendants [defined to include The Kirklin Law Firm, P.C. @ 7 RR 2584] against this legal action brought by George Fleming is $53,950.00 through March 30, 2015....3
The Kirklin Defendants then itemized these incurred attorneys' fees,
beginning with the following statement:
The following represents reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees incurred by the Kirklin Defendants in defending against the legal action....4
After itemizing the hourly charges, the Kirklin Defendants confirmed
that The Kirklin Law Firm, P.C. agreed to pay their attorneys' was a fixed
hourly fee: "...the fee is a fixed hourly fee as shown above."5
Charles Kirklin testified in detail that The Kirklin Law Firm, P.C. was
billed for the charges listed in the itemization.6 He concluded by testifying
that "...we billed what time we took on each of these projects, yes."7
Texas courts have held that the foregoing evidence is more than
sufficient to prove that attorneys' fees were incurred by a party. For example,
3 1 RR 92 (March 30, 2015 Hearing) (emphasis added) 4 1 RR 92 - 96 (March 30, 2015 Hearing) (emphasis added) 5 1 RR @ 93 (March 30, 2015 Hearing) 6 See, for example, 1 RR 107 (March 30, 2015 Hearing); 1 RR 36 (March 30, 2015 Hearing) @ 14 – 17; 1 RR 39 (March 30, 2015 Hearing ) @ 12 – 14; 1 RR 41 – 42 (March 30, 2015 Hearing); 1 RR 44 (March 30, 2015 Hearing) @ 16 – 18; 1 RR 44 – 45 (March 30, 2015 Hearing); 1 RR 45 (March 30, 2015 Hearing) 7 1 RR 58 (March 30, 2015 Hearing) 6|Page in the American Heritage Capital case, a litigant offered the following
affidavit evidence from the representing attorney:
My services and the services of [his firm] were and are necessary and the expenses incurred are reasonable in that Plaintiff ... filed suit against Defendants and it was reasonable and necessary for Defendants to retain legal counsel to represent and defend them in this action, as well as to assert their statutory rights under the Texas Anti-SLAPP statute....8
The court held that this was evidence that the litigants incurred attorneys'
fees:
To this evidence we may add [the attorney's] subsequent description of the legal work he and others actually performed on the case and the existence of the invoices directed to [the litigants]. The evidence, viewed as a whole, gives rise to a reasonable inference that [the litigants] did in fact "retain," i.e., make an agreement to pay, [the attorney and his firm] for their legal services.
We also agree...that the evidence adequately supports the proposition that [the litigant] also incurred liability for and paid for the legal services of [the attorney and his firm]. In his affidavit, [the attorney] explains what services were performed by members of his law firm, how much time was spent on those services, and what the relevant hourly rates were. Coupled with his previous testimony indicating that [the litigants] retained [the attorney and his firm] to furnish those services, [the attorney's] testimony is some evidence that [the litigant] actually incurred—became liable to pay—fees for those services.9
8 Am. Heritage Capital, LP v. Gonzalez, 436 S.W.3d 865, 878 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) 9 Id. 7|Page Like the litigants in American Heritage Capital, after offering
evidence that it incurred attorneys' fees to its attorneys, The Kirklin Law
Firm, P.C. offered evidence that explained what services were performed by
its attorneys,10 how much time was spent on those services,11 and what the
relevant hourly rates were.12 This constituted evidence that The Kirklin Law
Firm, P.C. incurred attorneys' fees and in what amounts.
Fleming cross-examined Charles Kirklin about the number of hours
that were performed in carrying out various tasks for which The Kirklin Law
Firm, P.C. was billed, but he failed to cross-examine Charles Kirklin on The
Kirklin Law Firm, P.C.'s evidence of the basic fact that it incurred attorneys'
fees, at least in some amount. He also failed to offer any evidence that would
prove otherwise. Thus, the evidence that The Kirklin Law Firm, P.C.
incurred attorneys' fees stands unrebutted.
Even if the Kirklin Defendants had not submitted the foregoing
evidence, the Texas Supreme Court has held that trial courts can infer that
attorneys' fees were incurred from circumstantial evidence:
The record reflects...that services were performed on the doctor's behalf. The attorney filed an answer, a plea in abatement, a motion to dismiss, and a notice of appeal. The attorney also appeared, argued, and gave testimony regarding
10 1 RR 94 – 96 (March 30, 2015 Hearing) 11 Id. 12 Id. 8|Page the motion to dismiss. While there is no evidence about what Dr. Garcia (or perhaps his insurance carrier) agreed to pay for these services, it blinks reality to assume that the attorney was a volunteer or that Dr. Garcia did not incur attorney's fees for this work.... Because there is some evidence in this case that attorney's fees were both incurred and reasonable, the trial court should have awarded attorney's fees to Dr. Garcia.13
In this case, there is direct evidence that The Kirklin Law Firm, P.C.
incurred attorneys' fees as explained above, but there is also plenty of
circumstantial evidence from which attorneys' fees can be inferred as well.
Just as in the Garcia case, The Kirklin Law Firm, P.C.'s attorneys filed an
answer, a motion to dismiss, and took other actions on behalf of their client.
According to the Garcia case, this circumstantial evidence alone is evidence
that The Kirklin Law Firm, P.C. incurred attorneys' fees.
The $53,950 in attorneys' fees sought by The Kirklin Law Firm, P.C.
is a reasonable amount. Charles Kirklin testified in support of these
attorneys' fees in detail, and the trial court held that "$53,950 appears to me
to be a reasonable and necessary fee."14 Nevertheless, the trial court
awarded the Kirklin Defendants zero in attorneys' fees at the trial level.
This was an abuse of discretion because Texas courts have held that
when a case is dismissed under the TCPA, if any attorneys' fees were
13 Garcia v. Gomez, 319 S.W.3d 638, 643 (Tex. 2010) 14 1 RR 88 (March 30, 2015 Hearing) 9|Page incurred (as has been proven in this case), the trial court must award
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in an amount above zero:
Certain of our sister courts have reached the conclusion that an award of court costs, attorney's fees, and other expenses incurred in defending against the action is mandatory under section 27.009(a)(1) of the TCPA. See Schimmel v. McGregor, 438 S.W.3d 847, 863 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (because movant established his entitlement to dismissal under the TCPA, he was entitled to “court costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and other expenses incurred in defending against the legal action as justice and equity may require” under section 27.009(a)(1)); Sierra Club v. Andrews Cnty., 418 S.W.3d 711, 720 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2013) (award of attorney's fees is mandatory under section 27.009(a)(1) of the TCPA if motion for dismissal granted), rev'd on other grounds, No. 14–0214, ––– S.W.3d ––––, 2015 WL 2148029 (Tex. May 8, 2015); Fitzmaurice v. Jones, 417 S.W.3d 627, 634 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (trial court erred by not awarding appellants reasonable attorney's fees as requested by appellants and “required by section 27.009(a)”), disapproved on other grounds by In re Lipsky, No. 13–0928, –– –S.W.3d ––––, ––––, 2015 WL 1870073, at *4 (Tex. Apr. 24, 2015) (orig. proceeding); see also Sullivan v. Abraham, No. 07– 13–00296–CV, –––S.W.3d ––––, ––––, 2014 WL 5140289, at *1 (Tex.App.—Amarillo Oct. 13, 2014, pet. filed) (section 27.009(a)(1) specifies trial court “shall award” fees and expenses to moving party if suit is dismissed; those two words “connote a lack of discretion”); Rauhauser v. McGibney, No. 02–14–00215–CV, –––S.W.3d ––––, ––––,2014 WL 6996819, at *8 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth Dec. 11, 2014, no pet.) (award of court costs, attorney's fees, and expenses mandatory under section 27.009(a) of the TCPA)....15
15 Avila v. Larrea, 05-14-00631-CV, 2015 WL 3866778, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 23, 2015, pet. filed) 10 | P a g e The plain language of section 27.009(a)(1) mandates that appellants, as successful movants for dismissal, are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses incurred in defending against the action that is supported by the evidence. See Cruz, 452 S.W.3d at 522. While the statute affords the trial court discretion to adjust downward reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses incurred in defending against the action as justice and equity may require, the statute does not afford discretion to award no attorney's fees and other expenses when the amount of reasonable fees and other expenses incurred in defending against the action are supported by record evidence. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 27.009(a)(1). On this record, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by awarding no attorney's fees and other expenses incurred in defending against the action to appellants.16
The trial court ruled that $53,950 in attorneys' fees was a reasonable
and necessary fee. It had the discretion to award that amount, or something
less than that, but it was an abuse of discretion to award no attorneys' fees.
B. Segregation of attorneys' fees as between the Kirklin Defendants
It was unnecessary to segregate the attorneys' fees as between each of
the Kirklin Defendants because all attorneys' fees at issue in this appeal were
for legal services performed on behalf of all the Kirklin Defendants,
including The Kirklin Law Firm, P.C. Thus, the Kirklin Defendants' claims
for attorneys' fees and sanctions were "inextricably intertwined" as between
each of the Kirklin Defendants. As stated by the 14th Court of Appeals:
16 Avila @ 5 (emphasis added) 11 | P a g e ...if a party proves that the claims arise out of the same transaction and are so interrelated that their prosecution or defense entails proof or denial of essentially the same facts, then the fees are deemed to be "intertwined to the point of being inseparable," and the party seeking attorney's fees may recover the entire amount of fees covering all claims.17
At the trial level, all the legal issues applied to all the Kirklin
Defendants equally, and they offered evidence that every single one of the
itemized attorneys' fees entries were performed on behalf of all the Kirklin
Defendants.18
It would be impossible to segregate these "inextricably intertwined"
attorneys' fees as between the Kirklin Defendants, and Texas law doesn't
require segregation between the parties that are seeking attorneys' fees in
such a situation.
C. Segregation of Attorneys' Fees as between the Fleming Plaintiffs
There were two plaintiffs in this litigation at the trial level, Fleming
and Fleming & Associates, LLP ("F&A") (or collectively "Fleming
Plaintiffs"). But only Fleming is a plaintiff in this appeal, and the Kirklin
Defendants are seeking attorneys' fees against only him. The Kirklin
Defendants' attorneys did engage in activities that related to only Fleming
and not to Fleming & Associates, LLP and vice versa. Thus, the Kirklin
17 Air Routing Intern. Corp. (Canada) v. Britannia Airways, Ltd., 150 S.W.3d 682, 693 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) 18 1 RR 92 (March 30, 2015 Hearing) 12 | P a g e Defendants were required to segregate their attorneys' fees as between
Fleming and Fleming & Associates, LLP, and they did.
But Fleming argues in his Brief of Cross-Appellee that the Kirklin
Defendants failed to segregate attorneys' fees as between the Fleming
Plaintiffs:
Last, despite losing one of the two TCPA motions they copied, the Kirklins still sought almost $54,000 in trial-level fees at higher hourly rates than the other attorneys had billed. Overall, the Kirklins' times sheets demonstrate their lack of "a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.19
With respect to factor (4), the U.S. Supreme Court has held "the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained...." Little need be said on the subject. Even with the benefit of copying other attorneys' ideas and work product, the Kirklins managed to succeed in just one of the two motions they filed.... Therefore, if the Court does not affirm the denial of attorneys' fees due to the Kirklins' pro se attorney status...It should begin with a 50% fee reduction to reflect the Kirklins' limited success.20
This argument is misleading and incorrect. The Kirklin Defendants
segregated the attorneys' fees as between the Fleming Plaintiffs, and they are
only seeking the attorneys' fees attributable to work performed in connection
with Fleming's claims (on which they were successful). The Kirklin
Defendants specifically excluded the attorneys' fees attributable to work
19 Brief of Cross-Appellee @ 23 20 Id. @ 26 13 | P a g e performed in connection with F&A's claims (on which they were initially
unsuccessful in their anti-SLAPP motion, but ultimately successful in
summary judgment).
This segregation was laid out clearly in Charles Kirklins' declaration
when the attorneys' fees were separated into two categories:
(1) "LEGAL SERVICES RE: FLEMING & ASSOCIATES, LLP,"21 and
(2) "LEGAL SERVICES RELATED TO MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS BY GEORGE FLEMING"22
The Kirklin Defendants excluded the first category from their
attorneys' fees damages calculation, as can be seen at 1 RR 96 (March 30,
2015 Hearing), which calculates only the "TOTALS FOR LEGAL
SERVICES RELATED TO MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS OF
GEORGE FLEMING 1/12/15 – 3/30/15" at $53,950.00. This is the total
amount that the Kirklin Defendants are seeking in this appeal for attorneys'
fees at the trial level.
Thus, The Kirklin Law Firm, P.C. segregated its calculation of
attorneys' fees as between the Fleming Plaintiffs, and they are only seeking
attorneys' fees for work performed in connection with the claims asserted by
Fleming, individually.
21 1 RR 93 (March 30, 2015 Hearing) 22 1 RR 94 (March 30, 2015 Hearing) 14 | P a g e D. Sanctions
According to the TCPA Sec. 27.009:
(a) If the court orders dismissal of a legal action under [Chapter 27 of the CPRC], the court shall award to the moving party:
(1) court costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and other expenses incurred in defending against the legal action as justice and equity may require; and
(2) sanctions against the party who brought the legal action as the court determines sufficient to deter the party who brought the legal action from bringing similar actions described in this chapter.23
The American Heritage Capital court concluded that evidence of
previous litigation could be considered "along with all the other evidence in
determining, as a matter of discretion, how large the sanction needed to be to
accomplish its statutory purpose."24 But it held that even if there were no
prior litigation, an award of sanctions is still required under the TCPA.25
Thus, the Kirklin Defendants aren't required to prove that Fleming engaged
in previous litigation against them to be entitled to sanctions.
In his Brief of Cross-Appellee, Fleming quibbles with the Kirklin
Defendants' characterization of his previous lawsuits against them. The
Kirklin Defendants disagree with Fleming's description of these lawsuits and
23 (emphasis added) 24 Am. Heritage Capital, LP v. Gonzalez, 436 S.W.3d 865, 881 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) 25 Id. 15 | P a g e believe their characterization is accurate, but since sanctions are still
required even in the absence of any previous lawsuits, such quibbling is
irrelevant in this appeal.
The TCPA requires the trial court to award attorneys' fees and
sanctions to the prevailing party. The Avila case didn't reach the issue of
sanctions, but it held that the TCPA's requirement regarding attorney's fees
means the trial court must award an amount in excess of zero:
While the statute affords the trial court discretion to adjust downward reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses incurred in defending against the action as justice and equity may require, the statute does not afford discretion to award no attorney's fees...26
Although we haven't found a case that specifically applies this same
reasoning to sanctions, the logic is exactly the same, and it should extend to
sanctions. In a dismissal under the TCPA, sanctions are required, just as
attorneys' fees are required. The trial court has discretion over the amount of
sanctions and attorneys' fees, but it doesn't have discretion over whether
sanctions and attorneys' fees should be awarded. Thus, the trial court must
award some amount of sanctions and attorney's fees in excess of zero, or else
it is a violation of the TCPA and an abuse of discretion.
26 Avila v. Larrea, 05-14-00631-CV, 2015 WL 3866778, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 23, 2015, pet. filed) 16 | P a g e The TCPA language is actually even stronger in the case of sanctions
because it states that the trial court must award sanctions "sufficient to deter
the party who brought the legal action from bringing similar actions." Such
an amount would have to be greater than zero because it would be
impossible to deter anyone from doing anything by imposing a penalty of
zero.
The trial court held that sanctions of "$75,000 sounds about right for
an amount to – to prevent this from going on in the future,"27 but it chose to
award zero in sanctions anyway. This was an abuse of discretion because the
TCPA requires sanctions, and an award of zero sanctions is no sanction at
all.
PRAYER
Cross-Appellants pray that the trial court's March 30, 2015 Order on
Attorneys' Fees and Sanctions as to the Kirklin Defendants be reversed and
rendered to require Fleming to pay:
(1) Attorneys' fees for the trial level in the amount of $53,950; and
(2) Sanctions in the amount of $75,000.
Alternatively, Cross-Appellants pray that the trial court's March 30,
2015 Order on Attorney's Fees and Sanctions be reversed and remanded to
27 1 RR 88 (March 30, 2015 Hearing) 17 | P a g e the trial court for entry of sanctions and attorney's fees in accordance with
this Court's opinion.
Cross-Appellants pray that the trial court's March 30, 2015 Order on
Attorneys' Fees and Sanctions be in all other things sustained.
Respectfully Submitted,
THE KIRKLIN LAW FIRM, P.C.
/s/ Paul S. Kirklin Paul S. Kirklin pkirklin@kirklinlaw.com Texas State Bar No. 24070063 12600 N Featherwood Dr, Suite 225 Houston, TX 77034 (713) 571-8300 (281) 922-6240 Fax Attorney for Cross-Appellants
18 | P a g e CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
(1) This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4 because it contains 3,600 words as determined by the computer software's word-count function, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1).
(2) This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2007 in 14 point Times New Roman font.
Dated: August 30, 2015
/s/ Paul S. Kirklin Paul S. Kirklin
19 | P a g e CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this 30th day of August, 2015, a true and correct copy of the Cross-Appellants' Reply Brief was served electronically on all attorneys of record as listed below in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Sylvia Davidow sylvia_davidow@fleming-law.com George M. Fleming george_fleming@fleming-law.com J. Ken Johnson ken_johnson@fleming-law.com Kelsey Stokes kelsey_stokes@fleming-law.com FLEMING, NOLEN & JEZ, LLP 2800 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 4000 Houston, TX 77056-6109
20 | P a g e