Sharon Bayus, Individually and Derivatively on Behalf of Innovative Alternatives, Inc. v. Dennis Stetzel, Individually, Amber Cyr, Individually, Stacy Dickson, Individually, Sean Armistead, Individually and Constance Austin, Individually

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: October 29, 2024
• Docket: 01-24-00721-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued October 29, 2024

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00721-CV ——————————— SHARON BAYUS, INDIVIDUALLY AND DERIVATIVELY ON BEHALF OF INNOVATIVE ALTERNATIVES, INC., Appellant V. DENNIS STETZEL, AMBER CYR, STACY DICKSON, SEAN ARMISTEAD, AND CONSTANCE AUSTIN, Appellees

On Appeal from the 80th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2024-30979

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Sharon Bayus, individually and derivatively on behalf of

Innovative Alternatives, Inc., filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s August

19, 2024 order granting the motion to dismiss of appellees, Dennis Stetzel, Amber Cyr, Stacy Dickson, Sean Armistead, and Constance Austin, filed pursuant to the

Texas Citizens Participation Act (the “TCPA”). In its order granting appellees’

TCPA motion to dismiss, the trial court ordered appellees to present affidavits

supporting their request for an award of attorney’s fees and costs.

On October 7, 2024, appellees filed a “Motion to Dismiss Appeal,” arguing

that this Court lacks jurisdiction over appellant’s appeal because appellant has

appealed “from an unappealable interlocutory order.”

We grant appellees’ motion and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This Court generally has jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments

and specific interlocutory orders that the Legislature has designated as appealable

orders. See CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447–48 (Tex. 2011); see also

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014. Notably, section 51.014(a)(12) of the

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes an interlocutory appeal from an

order denying a motion to dismiss under the TCPA. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(12). However, the statute provides no such authorization

for an immediate, interlocutory appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss

under the TCPA. See Trane US, Inc. v. Sublett, 501 S.W.3d 783, 786 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2016, no pet.) (dismissing appeal from order granting TCPA motion to

dismiss where trial court had not yet ruled on request for mandatory attorney’s fees);

see also Fleming & Assocs., L.L.P. v. Kirklin, 479 S.W.3d 458, 460 (Tex. App.—

2 Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (“[T]he courts of appeals do not have

jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss

under chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.”).

The trial court’s order appealed by appellant did not dispose of appellees’

requests for attorney’s fees and costs, and therefore is not a final, appealable order.

Because appellant has appealed from an interlocutory trial court order and has not

identified a statute—and we have found none—that would authorize an interlocutory

appeal from the trial court’s August 19, 2024 order, we conclude that we lack

jurisdiction over the appeal.

Appellees filed their motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on

October 7, 2024. More than ten days have passed and appellant has not filed a

response to the motion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.3(a).

Accordingly, we grant appellees’ motion and dismiss the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). All pending motions are dismissed

as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Guerra, and Gunn.