FLAME-BEY v. WEXFORD OF INDIANA, LLC

District Court, S.D. Indiana·Decided March 22, 2024·No. 1:21-cv-01986·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

YOHAN BIC FLAME-BEY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 1:21-cv-01986-SEB-TAB ) WEXFORD OF INDIANA, LLC, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MEDICAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING OFFICER MOORE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Yohan Flame-Bey is currently incarcerated at New Castle Correctional Facility. He alleges in this civil rights case that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to various medical conditions. Specifically, Mr. Flame-Bey contends that Dr. Talbot, FNP Purdue, Dr. Mitcheff, Nurse Steelmon, Dr. Knieser, Nurse Jones, Dr. Nwannunu, Nurse Greene, R. Schilling, and Nurse Foy (the "medical defendants") refused to treat his parasites, that Dr. Nwannunu failed to treat his headaches, that Dr. Talbot refused to treat his "heart issues," and that Nurse Jones failed to treat his injured ankle. He also contends that Nurses Jones and Foy and Officer Moore retaliated against him for filing grievances and that Officer Moore confiscated his legal and religious property. For the reasons that follow, the medical defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt. [176], is granted in part and denied in part and Officer Moore's motion for summary judgment, dkt. [167], is denied. In addition, Mr. Flame-Bey's motion to reply, dkt. [174], and motions to take judicial notice, dkt. [203], and dkt. [209], are each denied. I. Standard of Review A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because

those tasks are left to the fact-finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A court only has to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it need not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the basis for its motion and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions,

documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The Court notes that Mr. Flame-Bey filed two responses to the medical defendants' motion for summary judgment. The first was filed on November 16, 2023, along with a motion to excuse the late filing of his summary judgment response. Dkt. 201. The Court granted that motion to the extent that the Court permitted filing of the attachments as the response to the motion for summary judgment and motion to take judicial notice. Dkt. 202. Then, on December 4, 2023, Mr. Flame- Bey filed a further response, which is 124 pages long and references 156 pages of exhibits. Dkt.

207, 208. Because the further response is not permitted by this Court's rules and additionally that response exceeds the Court's page limits, these subsequent filings have not been considered. McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2019) (district court may strictly enforce local summary judgment rules).1 II. Motions to Take Judicial Notice

Mr. Flame-Bey has filed two motions to take judicial notice of facts in support of his response to summary judgment. Rule 201(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a court to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is "not subject to reasonable dispute" because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. "Judicial notice is premised on the concept that certain facts or propositions exist which a court may accept as true without requiring additional proof from the opposing parties. It is an adjudicative device that substitutes the acceptance of a universal truth for the conventional method of introducing evidence." GE Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 1997). Mr. Flame-Bey largely focuses his motions for judicial notice on evidence regarding

1 In addition, Mr. Flame-Bey filed a motion for leave to reply to the defendants' response to his motion to compel while the motions for summary judgment were pending. That motion, dkt. [174], which discusses only general concerns with the defendants' discovery responses, is denied because it is not sufficient to show that those discovery responses were inadequate. defendant Wexford's liability for his claim that Wexford maintained a policy, practice, or custom that caused his injuries. To support these claims, Mr. Flame-Bey cites filings in other cases in this Court. He further submits evidence he wishes the Court to consider, specifically, that a Vitamin B12 deficiency is a serious medical need and is caused by a parasitic infection, and that

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