FISCUS v. CITY OF GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. North Carolina
DecidedSeptember 14, 2020
Docket1:18-cv-01010
StatusUnknown

This text of FISCUS v. CITY OF GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA (FISCUS v. CITY OF GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
FISCUS v. CITY OF GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, (M.D.N.C. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

LARRY FISCUS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) 1:18-cv-1010 ) CITY OF GREENSBORO, North Carolina, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER LORETTA C. BIGGS, District Judge. Presently before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion To Seal Plaintiff’s Response to and Brief in Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 20); and Defendant’s Motion To File Three Exhibits Under Seal, (ECF No. 24). For the reasons that follow, the Plaintiff’s motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Defendant’s motion is granted. This Order is filed contemporaneously with this Court’s Order addressing Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement “It is well settled that the public and press have a qualified right of access to judicial documents and records filed in civil and criminal proceedings.” Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 265 (4th Cir. 2014). “The right of public access springs from the First Amendment and the common-law tradition that court proceedings are presumptively open to public scrutiny.” Id. (citation omitted). “The common law,” however, “does not afford as much substantive protection to the interests of the press and the public as does the First Amendment.” Rushford v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988). “The common-law presumptive right of access extends to all judicial documents and records, and the presumption can be rebutted only by showing that ‘countervailing interests heavily outweigh the public interests in access.’” Doe, 749 F.3d at 265–66 (quoting Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253). The First Amendment

presumptive right of access, in contrast, extends “only to particular judicial records and documents.” Id. at 266 (quoting Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1988). However, it may only be restricted upon a showing that such a restriction is “necessitated by a compelling government interest and . . . narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “When presented with a request to seal judicial records or documents, a district court

must comply with certain substantive and procedural requirements.” Va. Dep’t of State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 576 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253). Substantively, a district court must “first ‘determine the source of the right of access with respect to each document.’” Doe, 749 F.3d at 266 (quoting Va. Dep’t of State Police, 386 F.3d at 576). The Fourth Circuit has “squarely held that the First Amendment right of access attaches to materials filed in connection with a summary judgment motion.” Id. at 267. Therefore, the

First Amendment right of access applies in this case, as the documents which are the subject of the motion to seal were filed with the Court in support of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Procedurally, a district court presented with a sealing request must (1) provide public notice of the sealing request and a reasonable opportunity for the public to voice objections to the motion; (2) consider less drastic alternatives to closure; and (3) if it determines that full access is not necessary, it must state its reasons—with specific findings—supporting closure and its rejections of less drastic alternatives. Id. at 272. Local Rule 5.4 outlines similar requirements.1 LR 5.4. The burden rests on the party seeking to keep information sealed. Va. Dep’t of State Police, 386 F.3d at 575. I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal

Plaintiff’s motion, filed on April 29, 2020, includes a blanket request to seal his Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, its eleven attached exhibits, and his brief in support of his Response. (ECF No. 20 at 1.) In his motion, Plaintiff considers and rejects one alternative to full closure of the documents by stating that changing or redacting the names of individuals appearing in the files would nevertheless “reveal who these individuals were, even if monikers were used in place of identifiers.” (ECF No. 20 ¶ 2.) In

addition, he asserts that these exhibits contain private personnel information protected by state law under N.C.G.S. § 160A-168. (ECF No. 20 ¶ 1.) Defendant filed its Response to Plaintiff’s Motion To Seal on May 13, 2020. (ECF No. 27.) The Court finds that the public notice requirement as well as a reasonable opportunity for the public to object has been satisfied in that Plaintiff filed his motion on ECF in April and Defendant its response in May of this year.

The Court further finds that Plaintiff’s limited consideration of alternatives to closure and reasons given are sufficient to support the sealing of three of the requested documents: Exhibits 9, 10, and 11, (ECF Nos. 21-9, 21-10, 21-11). These exhibits are personnel files of Greensboro police officers. They are confidential and, under N.C.G.S. § 160A-168, are not considered public records. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-168(c), (c1)(1), (4) (2020). Two of these

1 These requirements are: (1) stating “the reasons why sealing is necessary;” (2) explaining “why less drastic alternatives to sealing will not afford adequate protection;” (3) “[a]ddress[ing] the factors governing sealing of documents reflected in governing case law;” and (4) stating “whether permanent sealing is sought and, if not, stat[ing] how long the document should remain under seal and how the document should be handled upon files belong to non-parties in this case, (ECF Nos. 21-9, 21-10), and “the privacy interests in a non-party’s personnel file constitute a compelling interest which would outweigh the First Amendment public right of access.” Johnson v. City of Fayetteville, 2014 WL 7151147, at *10

(E.D.N.C. December 11, 2014) (citing Robinson v. Bowser, 2013 WL 3791770, at *6–8 (M.D.N.C. July 19, 2013)). The third personnel file, Exhibit 11, belongs to Plaintiff. (See ECF No. 21-11.) Some courts have understandably distinguished non-party personnel files from those that contain information about a Plaintiff who places his own record at issue. See Robinson, 2013 WL 3791770, at *8. In cases concerning adverse employment actions, this follows from the fact

that one’s personnel file is typically “highly relevant and, indeed, critical to whether liability lies against Defendants.” Id. However, that is not the case here. Instead, the Court has found that the information in Plaintiff’s file is not material to the disposition of the case. Additionally, the file is primarily a compilation of comments written by supervisors against whom Plaintiff has not alleged any conduct that would violate his rights. (See ECF No. 21- 11.) Thus, the Court finds that the privacy interests in Plaintiff’s file also outweigh the First

Amendment public right of access and grants the motion to seal Exhibits 9, 10, and 11 in their entirety. In addition, the Court partially grants a motion to seal excerpts of three additional documents Plaintiff has entered. The first of these is Exhibit 1, which is Plaintiff’s affidavit with accompanying material. (ECF No. 21-1.) In this affidavit, Plaintiff largely restates his theory of the case by pointing to non-confidential information. (See id.) However, Plaintiff

makes an assertion regarding a personnel matter of a non-party in Paragraph 10, and thus the Court finds that Plaintiff should file a new version of this exhibit with Paragraph 10 redacted. The Court also partially grants a motion to seal a section of Exhibits 1 and 5 that include the affidavit of retired officer John Wolfe. (ECF Nos.

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