Greene, J.:
Craig Alan Fischer appeals the district court’s denial of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, arguing that he was prejudiced by not being present for an evidentiary hearing on his motion. We agree, vacate the district court’s order, and remand for an evidentiary hearing with Fischer present.
Factual and Procedural Background
In March 2001, Fischer was convicted after a jury trial of attempted first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, attempted rape, and criminal possession of a firearm. On direct appeal of his convictions, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sup[765]*765port his conviction of attempted rape, and he argued the trial court erred in rejecting his challenge to the jury under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). A panel of our court affirmed his convictions. State v. Fischer, case No. 87,740, unpublished opinion filed July 16, 2004, rev. denied 278 Kan. 848 (2004).
In September 2005, Fischer filed his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He alleged his trial counsel was ineffective in five regards: (1) He failed to investigate and interview alibi witnesses Robert Steen, Sally Steen, Barry Steen, Antolin Corona, Enrique Romero, Miguel Delgado, Horencia Garcia, and two coworkers — Corona and Romero, (2) he failed to object to judicial misconduct when the district court made reference to the Court of Appeals, (3) he failed to present evidence that would have established a Batson claim, (4) he failed to present key alibi witnesses in his defense, and (5) he failed to object to the use of a photo lineup.
The district court determined that an evidentiary hearing was in order but denied Fischer’s request to be present. Over his objection, Fischer was permitted to participate in the hearing by phone. Based on this hearing, the district court denied Fischer’s motion, concluding that Fischer was not entitled to relief. Fischer appeals.
Did the District Court Err in Conducting the Evidentiary Hearing Without Fischer Being Present?
Fischer argues that the district court erred in permitting him to participate in the evidentiary hearing by telephone rather than in person, relying on Bellamy v. State, 285 Kan. 346, 357, 172 P.3d 10 (2007), and Lujan v. State, 270 Kan. 163, 170, 14 P.3d 424 (2000). The parties suggest that the question framed is one of due process rights based on statutory or constitutional interpretation and application, thus framing questions of law over which we have unlimited review. State v. Kirkpatrick, 286 Kan. 329, 351, 184 P.3d 247 (2008); State v. Gary, 282 Kan. 232, Syl. ¶ 1, 144 P.3d 634 (2006).
We note at the outset that the district court denied Fischer’s request to be present “due to his two previous convictions for mur[766]*766der and the conviction in the underlying case of attempted murder.” Nothing further is reflected in the record as to the basis for the ruling. We also note the record reflects substantial difficulty with Fischer s telephonic participation, including episodes where Fischer complained that he could not hear the proceedings, and Fischer’s inability to answer questions about one of the prior witnesses because he claimed that he was unable to hear that witness. These difficulties may have been compounded by the need for a translator for two of the witnesses. The State argues this difficulty “falls remarkably short of establishing a level of prejudice which would require reversal.”
K.S.A. 60-1507(b) does not require the production of the movant at a hearing on the motion.
“Hearing and judgment. Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice drereof to be served upon the county attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. The court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.” (Emphasis added.)
Supreme Court Rule 183(h) provides, however, that the movant should be produced at a hearing' where substantial issues of fact involving die movant are to be explored:
“The prisoner should be produced at the hearing on a motion attacking a sentence where there are substantial issues of fact as to events in which the prisoner participated.” (Emphasis added.) 2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. at 248.
In Bellamy, our Supreme Court outlined the options available to the district court in addressing a motion under 60-1507. Although the case did not frame the precise issue before us here, the court’s explanation of the option of a full evidentiary hearing clearly contemplates that the hearing be conducted “ ‘with the presence of the petitioner.’ ” 285 Kan. at 353. Moreover, the court ruled that “[bjecause the factual issues involve events in which Bellamy participated, he must be present at the hearing.” 285 Kan. at 357.
In Lujan, our Supreme Court similarly outlined the option of a full evidentiary hearing “with the presence of the petitioner” but [767]*767held that “presence” was not a question subject to the court’s discretion, but rather a matter of legal entitlement.
“[I]t is clear that where such a hearing is conducted and substantial issues of fact exist as to events in which the petitioner had participated, the petitioner must be allowed to be present. Prior to the hearing, Lujan asked to be present. The district court-denied his motion. However, this denial was not based on the district court’s conclusion that no substantial factual issues had been raised regarding events in which Lujan had participated. Rather, the district court decided that Lujan’s presence was unnecessary because an affidavit regarding his testimony would suffice. Under the circumstances of this case, the presence of the petitioner was not a question subject to the court’s discretion. The petitioner was entitled to be present under the law of this state.’’ (Emphasis added). 270 Kan. at 171.
Although the State suggests there is no constitutional right to be physically present at postconviction proceedings in federal court, we need not explore this question because the right to be present at such proceedings in Kansas is based in Kansas law and has been clearly articulated by our Supreme Court. We are obligated to follow controlling precedent from our Supreme Court. State v. Singleton, 33 Kan. App. 2d 478, 488, 104 P.3d 424 (2005).
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Greene, J.:
Craig Alan Fischer appeals the district court’s denial of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, arguing that he was prejudiced by not being present for an evidentiary hearing on his motion. We agree, vacate the district court’s order, and remand for an evidentiary hearing with Fischer present.
Factual and Procedural Background
In March 2001, Fischer was convicted after a jury trial of attempted first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, attempted rape, and criminal possession of a firearm. On direct appeal of his convictions, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sup[765]*765port his conviction of attempted rape, and he argued the trial court erred in rejecting his challenge to the jury under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). A panel of our court affirmed his convictions. State v. Fischer, case No. 87,740, unpublished opinion filed July 16, 2004, rev. denied 278 Kan. 848 (2004).
In September 2005, Fischer filed his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He alleged his trial counsel was ineffective in five regards: (1) He failed to investigate and interview alibi witnesses Robert Steen, Sally Steen, Barry Steen, Antolin Corona, Enrique Romero, Miguel Delgado, Horencia Garcia, and two coworkers — Corona and Romero, (2) he failed to object to judicial misconduct when the district court made reference to the Court of Appeals, (3) he failed to present evidence that would have established a Batson claim, (4) he failed to present key alibi witnesses in his defense, and (5) he failed to object to the use of a photo lineup.
The district court determined that an evidentiary hearing was in order but denied Fischer’s request to be present. Over his objection, Fischer was permitted to participate in the hearing by phone. Based on this hearing, the district court denied Fischer’s motion, concluding that Fischer was not entitled to relief. Fischer appeals.
Did the District Court Err in Conducting the Evidentiary Hearing Without Fischer Being Present?
Fischer argues that the district court erred in permitting him to participate in the evidentiary hearing by telephone rather than in person, relying on Bellamy v. State, 285 Kan. 346, 357, 172 P.3d 10 (2007), and Lujan v. State, 270 Kan. 163, 170, 14 P.3d 424 (2000). The parties suggest that the question framed is one of due process rights based on statutory or constitutional interpretation and application, thus framing questions of law over which we have unlimited review. State v. Kirkpatrick, 286 Kan. 329, 351, 184 P.3d 247 (2008); State v. Gary, 282 Kan. 232, Syl. ¶ 1, 144 P.3d 634 (2006).
We note at the outset that the district court denied Fischer’s request to be present “due to his two previous convictions for mur[766]*766der and the conviction in the underlying case of attempted murder.” Nothing further is reflected in the record as to the basis for the ruling. We also note the record reflects substantial difficulty with Fischer s telephonic participation, including episodes where Fischer complained that he could not hear the proceedings, and Fischer’s inability to answer questions about one of the prior witnesses because he claimed that he was unable to hear that witness. These difficulties may have been compounded by the need for a translator for two of the witnesses. The State argues this difficulty “falls remarkably short of establishing a level of prejudice which would require reversal.”
K.S.A. 60-1507(b) does not require the production of the movant at a hearing on the motion.
“Hearing and judgment. Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice drereof to be served upon the county attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. The court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.” (Emphasis added.)
Supreme Court Rule 183(h) provides, however, that the movant should be produced at a hearing' where substantial issues of fact involving die movant are to be explored:
“The prisoner should be produced at the hearing on a motion attacking a sentence where there are substantial issues of fact as to events in which the prisoner participated.” (Emphasis added.) 2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. at 248.
In Bellamy, our Supreme Court outlined the options available to the district court in addressing a motion under 60-1507. Although the case did not frame the precise issue before us here, the court’s explanation of the option of a full evidentiary hearing clearly contemplates that the hearing be conducted “ ‘with the presence of the petitioner.’ ” 285 Kan. at 353. Moreover, the court ruled that “[bjecause the factual issues involve events in which Bellamy participated, he must be present at the hearing.” 285 Kan. at 357.
In Lujan, our Supreme Court similarly outlined the option of a full evidentiary hearing “with the presence of the petitioner” but [767]*767held that “presence” was not a question subject to the court’s discretion, but rather a matter of legal entitlement.
“[I]t is clear that where such a hearing is conducted and substantial issues of fact exist as to events in which the petitioner had participated, the petitioner must be allowed to be present. Prior to the hearing, Lujan asked to be present. The district court-denied his motion. However, this denial was not based on the district court’s conclusion that no substantial factual issues had been raised regarding events in which Lujan had participated. Rather, the district court decided that Lujan’s presence was unnecessary because an affidavit regarding his testimony would suffice. Under the circumstances of this case, the presence of the petitioner was not a question subject to the court’s discretion. The petitioner was entitled to be present under the law of this state.’’ (Emphasis added). 270 Kan. at 171.
Although the State suggests there is no constitutional right to be physically present at postconviction proceedings in federal court, we need not explore this question because the right to be present at such proceedings in Kansas is based in Kansas law and has been clearly articulated by our Supreme Court. We are obligated to follow controlling precedent from our Supreme Court. State v. Singleton, 33 Kan. App. 2d 478, 488, 104 P.3d 424 (2005).
We conclude that “presence” of a 60-1507 movant at a full evidentiary hearing does not include mere telephonic participation where: (1) the record fails to cite any basis for denial of physical presence other than the nature of the movant’s conviction; and (2) the record reflects substantial difficulty in the movant’s ability to hear the proceedings. First, we note that Rule 183(h) does not contemplate mere telephonic participation; the Rule states that the movant “should be produced.” Production of the movant clearly means physical presence.
Second, we do not believe the term “presence” includes mere telephonic participation. “Presence” is “the fact or condition of being present.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1793 (1993). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “presence” as “the state or fact of being in a particular place and time.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1221 (8th ed. 2004). Although telephonic participation has been deemed sufficient in other proceedings, we believe that the movant’s due process interest in an evidentiary hearing in a habeas corpus proceeding to determine whether he or she has been [768]*768subject to a constitutional deprivation is too significant to justify an appearance by telephone. See, e.g., In re Adoption of J.M.D., 41 Kan. App. 2d 157, 202 P.3d 27, 36 (2009).
We are persuaded that mere telephonic participation in an evidentiary hearing does not enable the movant to hear and observe witnesses, attorneys, or the judge, and certainly does not enable the manner of assistance to his or her own counsel that could be critical to such a hearing. We acknowledge that Fischer was consulted by his attorney on several occasions during the hearing, but the record seems to reflect that these consultations were made with his attorney s side of the conversation spoken in open court. If the movant is entitled to be present at such a hearing, telephonic participation is a poor substitute.
Although the parties have not cited Rule 145, we believe it consistent with our analysis in this case. The Rule provides:
“The court, in its discretion, may use a telephone or other electronic conference to conduct any hearing or conference, other than a trial on the merits. The court may require the parties to malee reimbursement for any charges incurred by the court.” 2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 233.
Obviously, an evidentiary hearing on a 60-1507 motion is the trial on the merits in that proceeding. In conducting Fischers hearing by telephonic participation, the district court violated the spirit if not the letter of this Rule. By negative implication, the Rule does not permit the substitution of telephonic participation for presence in a trial on the merits. The policy underpinning for excluding trials on the merits from permissible telephone hearings is identical to the reasons cited above that make telephonic participation in such a hearing a poor substitute for physical presence.
This leaves only the question whether “substantial issues had been raised regarding events in which Fischer had participated,” thus entitling him to be present. We examine the issues raised by Fischer s motion and conclude that they included events in which he participated, thus requiring his presence. Specifically, at least two of the issues raised regarded such events: (1) failure of trial counsel to investigate, interview, and present a host of alibi witnesses, all of whom had allegedly been identified by Fischer to his [769]*769trial counsel; (2) failure of trial counsel to object to use of a photo taken after Fischer was charged with the offenses. The extent to which alibi witnesses known to Fischer could have been helpful to Fischer s defense was clearly an issue involving Fischer’s direct participation and knowledge. The photo issue was apparently rather confusing, and we note that there was uncertainty regarding the precise photo at issue and how it was used; clearly, this was an issue that had Fischer been present, he might have clarified. As noted by our Supreme Court in Lujan, the presence of the movant might have been helpful in cross-examining or rebutting his trial counsel’s testimony on these issues, and his telephonic participation was not a proper substitute under these circumstances. 270 Kan. at 172.
Our decision here is based in part on the lack of any stated basis for denying Fischer’s physical presence other than the nature of his convictions. We decline to speculate as to any such basis, and specifically we refuse to assume from the nature of Fischer’s convictions that he is either “dangerous” or “an escape risk.” We also decline to make assumptions regarding the cost of Fischer’s presence or the difficulty in his transportation to a suitable venue, because we believe such considerations are not relevant to our analysis where they did not play any apparent role in the district court’s decision. We decline to criticize the applicable rule suggesting that a movant “should” be present at such hearing, and we respect and apply our Supreme Court’s decision to honor a movant’s right to be present at a hearing of this nature. We decline to observe how we might have handled the matter if we were the district court; our function is to review the decision of the district court, not to compare how we might have handled the matter if we were district judges. And, finally, we decline to defer a decision in this case to a legislative committee; to the extent policy is implicit in the Lujan ruling, our Supreme Court has spoken, and we must honor and apply that controlling precedent.
The State urges us to conclude that telephonic participation was sufficient under these circumstances, but we fear that our embrace of this position would likely result in terminating the right of 60-1507 movants to be physically present at evidentiary hearings. [770]*770Clearly, the statute and the rule do not contemplate that movants can be routinely denied presence through telephonic substitute. In fact, the applicable rule provides to the contrary in stating that the movant “should” be produced under these circumstances. Rule 183(h) (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 248).
We express no opinion on the merits of Fischer s motion. We limit our holding to his entitlement to be present at any evidentiary hearing on his motion, and we remand with directions that the district court conduct a full evidentiary hearing on his motion with Fischer physically present for the proceeding.
Reversed and remanded with directions.