First Trust & Savings Bank of Davenport, Iowa v. United States

206 F.2d 97, 44 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 239, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 4128
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedJuly 13, 1953
Docket14717_1
StatusPublished
Cited by50 cases

This text of 206 F.2d 97 (First Trust & Savings Bank of Davenport, Iowa v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
First Trust & Savings Bank of Davenport, Iowa v. United States, 206 F.2d 97, 44 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 239, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 4128 (1st Cir. 1953).

Opinions

_. , , ’ lrcmt Juc St-

This action was brought by Henry A. Kraftmeyer in his lifetime to recover amounts paid by him on accounts of 50 percent fraud penalties that he claimed were . , . ... wrongfully assessed against him in respect to deficiencies in his income taxes. On the trial to the court without a jury there was judgment of dismissal at the costs of tile plaintiff and he appealed. He died on JalMary 24) 1953, and the administrator of his estate has been substituted as appellant.

The 50 percent “fraud penalties” were assessed on the ground that deficiencies in his income taxes for the years 1937, 1938, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945, were “due to [his] fraud with intent to evade tax” J , , _ , _ _ , ^ denounced by Internal Revenue Code, 26 L.o.C.A. § 293(b), which provides:

“(b) Fraud. If any part of any deficiency is due to fraud with intent to [98]*98evade tax, then 50 per centum of the total amount of the deficiency (in addition to such deficiency) shall be so assessed, collected, and paid, in lieu of the 50 per centum addition to the tax provided in section 3612(d) (2).”

The appellant does not claim that there were no deficiencies in Mr. Kraftmeyer’s income taxes for the years in question. Such deficiencies were determined and assessed against him and were paid by him with interest, together with 25 per cent addition assessed for failure to file returns, but it is insisted that the conclusion of the trial court that such deficiencies “were due in whole or in part to fraud with intent to evade tax” was not supported by substantial evidence, was contrary to the evidence, and was induced by erroneous view of the law. Appellant’s position is that the taxpayer’s civil liability for addition to tax was limited to the 5 per cent and 25 percent additions prescribed by 26 U.S.C.A. § 293 (a) and 291(a), which read:

“§ 293(a) Negligence. If any part of any deficiency is due to negligence, or intentional disregard of rules and regulations but without intent to defraud, 5 per centum of the total amount of the deficiency (in addition to such deficiency) shall be assessed, collected,' and paid in the same manner as if it were a deficiency, except that the provisions of section 272(i), relating to the prorating of a deficiency, and of section 292, relating to interest on deficiencies, shall not be applicable.”
“§ 291(a) In case of any failure to make and file return required by this chapter, within the time prescribed by law or prescribed by the Commissioner in pursuance of law, unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be added to the tax: 5 per centum if the failure is for not more than thirty days with an additional 5 per centum for each additional thirty days or fraction thereof during which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 per centum in the aggregate. The amount so added to any tax shall be collected at the same time and in the same manner and as a part of the tax unless the tax has been paid before the discovery of the neglect, in which case the amount so added shall be collected in the same manner as the tax. The amount added to the tax under this section shall be in lieu of the 25 per centum addition to the tax provided in section 3612(d) (1).”

There was no conflict in the evidence at the trial and the testimony of Mr. Kraftmeyer in his own behalf was apparently frank and candid. He lived at Bettendorf, Iowa, and although he had long received taxable income, he attained the age of 70 years without ever filing any income tax return. The only testimony as to how that came about was the account that he gave himself.

He was in his 71st year when he gave his testimony in this case to the effect that he knew nothing about bookkeeping and had never kept business records and no one ever told him that he had to file an income tax return. He heard of income tax prior to 1945, but thought that he “wasn’t making any income” and that “he had no income.” He figured that he was paying a general county and city tax and that based on what he had invested the investment wasn’t making any particular return. He did not know that he owed any tax; did not know how to figure it out or how to go about it. He never had any fraudulent intent to evade taxes.

Mr. Ryan of the Internal Revenue Collector’s office (a witness for the government) first brought the matter of failing to file income tax returns to his attention in a telephone call in which Mr. Ryan asked him to come down and see him. Not knowing what it meant and not realizing the importance of the matter, Mr. Kraftmeyer said he didn’t have time. Mr. Ryan advised him that he better have time. So he went.

In the ensuing interview he told Mr. Ryan that he had never filed an income tax return and the seriousness of his predicament was apparently brought home to him. He employed an attorney and cooperated with the revenue agents to produce a full showing of all his money transactions [99]*99through the years in question. As Mr. Ryan testified, “he made no effort to conceal”. It was shown that the way in which he had made money was that he had from time to time through the years acquired pieces of vacant land close to town and had carried on the buying and selling of cattle which he ran for short periods on the lands. He never farmed. Some time before Mr. Ryan telephoned him he had sold one of his pieces of land to the Aluminum Company of America for $66,000, which was much more than it had cost him. That seems to have been his first business transaction likely to attract the attention of the tax authorities. But he had carried on all of his business dealings through banks. He had his cancelled checks and the deposit records were available at the banks. He had never done anything to conceal or disguise the true nature of any of his transactions or hidden anything away, and a record of his income that was 90 percent complete was readily made up. He was duly taxed and statutory interest was added. Twenty-five percent was also added for his failure to make and file returns. He was also informed against criminally under 26 U.S. C.A. § 145(a) for wilfully failing to make the income tax return required of him for the year 1945 and on his plea of guilty was fined and paid $10,000 and was sentenced to imprisonment but was released on probation.

The further 50 percent addition to taxes in the sun of $8,153 assessed against him on the ground that the deficiencies were “due to [his] fraud with intent to evade tax” is the only part of the $32,203 tax, interest and additions then collected from the taxpayer which was in issue and sought to be recovered in this action.

There was no proof of any wilful commission of any affirmative act of fraud on the part of the taxpayer to evade the taxes which he admitted he owed and ought to have filed return for during the years in question.1 His plea of guilty to the charge of wilfully failing to make and file return was of course evidence against him of the elements of that charge. It was compatible with all the other evidence in the case that his dereliction consisted only in wilful omission and passive neglect to perform the duty of making returns imposed upon him by law.

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Bluebook (online)
206 F.2d 97, 44 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 239, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 4128, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/first-trust-savings-bank-of-davenport-iowa-v-united-states-ca1-1953.