Reinecke v. Spalding

280 U.S. 227, 50 S. Ct. 96, 74 L. Ed. 385, 1930 U.S. LEXIS 752, 1 C.B. 305, 8 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 10255, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 452
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJanuary 6, 1930
Docket59
StatusPublished
Cited by202 cases

This text of 280 U.S. 227 (Reinecke v. Spalding) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reinecke v. Spalding, 280 U.S. 227, 50 S. Ct. 96, 74 L. Ed. 385, 1930 U.S. LEXIS 752, 1 C.B. 305, 8 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 10255, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 452 (1930).

Opinion

Mr. Justice McReynolds

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The respondent owns a one-sixth interest in several leases executed 1901, 1902, 1903, and 1905, which authorize the lessee to take iron ore from certain Minnesota lands for twenty-five, forty-five and fifty years from their respective dates. These leases require payments quarterly of 25 cents royalty per ton upon all ore extracted; provide for minimum annual production and termination under specified circumstances.

During the year 1917 she received out of such royalties $260,072.30; during 1918, $219,940.43. For 1917 she was allowed $99,561.20 as depletion; for 1918, $84,979.55. Income tax was assessed against her upon the balances and payment exacted. Thereafter she unsuccessfully claimed refunds because the sums allowed for depletion were insufficient. The present suit followed.

*229 The Revenue Act of 1918, c. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1066, 1067, (approved February 24, 1919) provides—

“Sec. 214. (a) That in computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
* * * * *
“(10) In the case of mines, oil and gas wells, other natural deposits, and timber, a reasonable allowance for depletion and for depreciation of improvements, according to the peculiar conditions in each case, based upon cost including cost of development not otherwise deducted: Provided, That in the case of such properties acquired prior to March 1, 1913, the fair market value of the property (or the taxpayer’s interest therein) on that date shall be taken in lieu of cost up to that date: Provided further, That in the case of mines, oil and gas wells, discovered by the taxpayer, on or after March 1, 1913, and not acquired as the result of purchase of a proven tract or lease, where the fair market value of the property is materially disproportionate to the cost, the depletion allowance shall be based upon the fair market value of the property at the date of the discovery, or within thirty days thereafter; such reasonable allowance in all the above cases to be made under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary. In the case of leases the deductions, allowed by this paragraph shall be equitably apportioned between the lessor and lessee.”

Section 5, Revenue Act of 1916, c. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 759, is in the margin. 1 Neither party suggests that this dif *230 fers from the corresponding provision in the act of 1918, supra, in any way here material.

In her claim presented to the tax officer for refund of overpayment for 1917 respondent said—

“Tax as assessed is based upon income received from royalties from iron ore mines. Depletion amounting to $99,561.20 was allowed to taxpayer, whereas depletion amounting to $203,510.86 should be allowed. The latter amount is the present worth of the ore mined in 1917, as of March 1, 1913, and is arrived at by discounting the amount received in 1917 at 5% to March 1, 1913.”

A like statement appears in her claim concerning overpayment for 1918.

The declaration has two counts. The first, relating to payments for 1917, alleges—

That the value or market price of said ore in the ground untouched and unextracted on March 1, 1913, and on all dates subsequent thereto, exceeded the sum of twenty-five cents per ton, so that every ton of ore paid for under said leases in the year 1917 was disposed of at a price actually less than the market price of the ore, and if then sold free of said lease, would have realized more than twenty-five cents per ton. The actual deple *231 tion of the mines by each ton of ore extracted was more than twenty-five cents when extracted.
“ That under the terms of the law the depletion for ore extracted or considered to be extracted was fixed at the market value of the ore in place in the mine at the time and place of extraction, but if such depletion allowance per ton exceeded the amount fixed as the royalty per ton in the lease, the depletion allowance to the plaintiff could not exceed such royalty, but since the royalty when paid included an amount of interest on' the payment considered as deferred from March 1, 1913 to the date of actual payment of royalty and (sic) the allowance of such depletion .in successive years could never exceed the market value of the ore in the mine on March 1, 1913.
That each payment for ore extracted consisted of two parts, one of which was interest on the deferred payment and the other of which was the actual present worth of the payment deferred from March 1, 1913'. Said actual present worth is accurately represented for each ton by that sum which put at interest on March 1, 1913, would produce at the date of payment for ore the royalty paid per ton; to put it in another way, the actual present worth of the ore extracted is accurately ascertained by taking from the royalty per ton paid, the part of the royalty, when and as paid, which represented interest on the deferred payment from March 1, 1913.
“ That such an allowance of depletion in successive years and in the year 1917 did not and could not exceed the market value of such ore on March 1, 1913.
* * * * ' *
“ That if of each payment for each ton of ore extracted, the amount of such payment which represents interest on the payment as deferred and actually paid, be figured, the income of the owner will be accurately *232 determined as that part of the twenty-five cents, which represents interest.
“ That for the year 1917 a correct calculation under the rule above shows that upon the tons of ore extracted and paid for on January 14,1917, of the payment of 25‡ per ton $0.2095 was for selling price or principal and $0.0405 was interest on the deferred payments and that on the 330,507 tons extracted the plaintiff was entitled to depletion of $69,251.05; that upon the ore paid for on April 10, 1917, $0.2074 was for selling price or principal and $0.0426 was interest , on the deferred payments and that on the 48,958 tons extracted the plaintiff was entitled to depletion of $10,153.29; that on the ore paid for on July 10, 1917, $0.2053 was for selling price or principal and $0.0447 was interest on the deferred payments and that on the 231,090 tons extracted plaintiff was entitled to depletion of $47,434.55; that upon the ore paid for on October 10, 1917, $0.2032 was for selling price or principal and $0.0468 was interest on the deferred payments and that on the 432,120 tons extracted the plaintiff was entitled to depletion of $87,791.42; that plaintiff is entitled to depletion amounting for the year 1917 to $214,630.31.”

Count two contains similar allegations concerning the payment for 1918.

In the trial court, after.

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280 U.S. 227, 50 S. Ct. 96, 74 L. Ed. 385, 1930 U.S. LEXIS 752, 1 C.B. 305, 8 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 10255, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 452, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reinecke-v-spalding-scotus-1930.