Fields v. Tompkins-Johnston Plumbing Co.

32 S.E.2d 623, 224 N.C. 841, 1945 N.C. LEXIS 235

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: January 3, 1945
• Status: Published

Opinion

Stacy, O. J.

The question for decision is whether the record permits the inference that the death of Fields resulted from an injury by accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment. An affirmative answer would uphold the judgment below; a negative response would reverse it.

The rule generally recognized is, that where the employment subjects a workman to a special or particular hazard from the elements, such as excessive beat or cold, likely to produce sunstroke or freezing, death or disability resulting from suck cause usually comes within the purview of the compensation acts. Collett v. Com., 116 W. Va., 213, 179 S. E., 657; Anno. 83 A. L. E., 234; 71 C. J., 760. On the other hand, where the employee is not by reason of his work peculiarly exposed to injury by sunstroke or freezing, such injuries are not ordinarily compensable. Walker v. Wilkins, 212 N. 0., 627, 194 S. E., 89; Wax v. Des Moines Asphalt Paving Corp., 220 Iowa, 864, 263 N. W., 333; 28 E. O. L., 806. The test is whether the employment subjects the workman to a greater hazard or risk than that to -which he otherwise would be exposed. Lockey v. Cohen, Goldman Co., 213 N. 0., 356, 196 S. E., 342; Miskowiak v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 156 Md., 690,-145 Atl., 199; Kripplaben v. Iron <& Steel Co., 227 Mo. App., 161, 50 S. W. (2d), 752; 25 Cornell L. E., 645; Harvard L. E., 153. The decisions in Neely v. Statesville, 212 N. C., 365, 193 S. E., 664 (death from heart failure), and Slade v. Hosiery Mills, 209 N. Ó., 823, 184 S. E., 844 (death from pneumonia), are not at variance with this position, since these were cases free from “injury by accident.” The general test was not there presented, as it is here. Hence, any expressions in- the latter case on the general subject were obiter. See Goodwin v. Bright, 202 N. C., 481, 163 S. E., 576.

The question, then, on the present record is whether plaintiff’s intestate’s death may reasonably be attributed to the increased temperature occasioned by the manner and method employed in doing the work, or should it be ascribed to natural causes. Either inference seems permissible. Hence, the determination of the Industrial Commission that the additional hazard created by the artificial heat was the direct and super-inducing cause of plaintiff’s intestate’s death is conclusive On appeal. Brown v. Aluminum Co., ante, 766; Hegler v. Cannon Mills, ante, 669.

Where the record supports the fact-finding body, its determinations are not subject to review by the Superior Court or this Court. Kearns v. Furniture Co., 222 N. C., 438, 23 S. E. (2d), 310.

The following from the opinion of the Commission makes clear its position in the matter: “It is the opinion of the Full Commission that a one degree increase in temperature by artificial heat at a time and ' place where the temperature is 104 degrees would be more likely to cause a heat stroke than an increase of 30 degrees from the natural temperature by artificial heat for instance in a boiler room when or at a place where the natural temperature is 60 degrees Fahrenheit.” In other words, it is the last straw that breaks the camel’s back.

While the evidence may be slight, it seems sufficient to sustain the • award.

Affirmed.