[1002]*1002
ORDER LIFTING STAY AND GRANTING WRIT OF PROHIBITION
This proceeding arises from the criminal conviction of Wilford Lawrence “Pete” Cherry in McCurtain County District Court, Case Number CRF-96-5. Cherry pled guilty on February 5, 1996 to Unlawful Delivery of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Cocaine), in violation of 63 O.S.1991, § 2-401(B)(2), and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the Oklahoma State Penitentiary for twelve (12) years with the last five (5) years suspended. Cherry was transported to the Lexington Assessment and Reception Center (LARC) and received by the Department of Corrections. Thirty-two (32) days later, Cherry was assigned to the Electronic Monitoring Program (EMP), released from LARC, and placed under the supervision of a Department of Corrections’ probation and parole officer.
On March 19, 1996, the Honorable Willard L. Driesel, District Judge, issued an Order to Comply in Cherry’s criminal case, ordering Petitioner Fields to either furnish the District Court with proof that Cherry was not assigned to EMP, to take Cherry into immediate custody and imprison him, or to personally appear on April 8, 1996 and show cause why Petitioner should not be held in contempt of court for failing or refusing to comply with the Judgment and Sentence imposed by the District Court on February 5, 1996.
Petitioner Fields, through counsels Vincent L. Knight and Ronald Anderson, General Counsel and Assistant General Counsel for the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, filed an Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction on Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Stay of District Court Order to Comply or Conduct Show Cause Hearing in the Supreme Court of this State on April 4, 1996. Therein, Petitioner sought to prohibit Respondent from enforcing the March 19, 1996, Order to Comply. Petitioner asserts (1) the District Court has no personal jurisdiction over him because he was not a party to the criminal proceeding in Case Number CRF-96-5; (2) the District Court’s Order to Comply directing Petitioner to remove a prisoner from a program which is authorized by law is an unconstitutional infringement by the judicial branch into the executive branch; and (3) the District Court’s Order to Comply to remove a prisoner from a program authorized by law will result in chaos to the orderly management of an already overburdened prison system.
On April 4, 1996, the Supreme Court granted an immediate stay of the April 8, 1996, show cause hearing and directed the stay to remain in effect until determination of this original action or until further order of the Court. The request for stay was denied as to the hearing set on the Petitioner’s Objection to Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss filed in the District Court. Respondent was directed to file a response. See Fields v. Driesel, No. 87,234 (Okl. April 4, 1996) (not for publication).
At the hearing on April 8, 1996, Respondent Judge denied Petitioner’s Motion for Dismissal in the District Court, finding that venue was proper and declining to address the issues of whether the District Court had personal jurisdiction over Petitioner and whether public officials were parties to a criminal prosecution.
On July 5, 1996, the Supreme Court declined to assume jurisdiction and transferred the ease to this Court. See Fields v. Driesel, No. 87,234 (Okl. July 5, 1996) (not for publication).1
[1003]*1003Petitioner argues that a writ of prohibition should be granted for the following reasons:
1. The Order of the District Court is void as the court order to remove a prisoner from the Program violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine;
2. Corrections officials are not parties to criminal prosecutions; thus, the District Court lacks any personal jurisdiction over Director Larry Fields;
3. A contempt action cannot be used to challenge the acts of public officials for acts carried out in their official capacity;
4. Venue is proper only in Oklahoma County to contest any acts of public officials in the management and operation of prisons including the assignment of inmates to the Electronic Monitoring Program; and
5. A- Writ of Prohibition is the only adequate remedy for Petitioner Fields.
For a writ of prohibition, Petitioner has the burden of establishing that “(1) a court, officer or person has or is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power; (2) the exercise of said power is unauthorized by law; and (3) the exercise of said power will result in injury for which there is no other adequate remedy.” Rule 10.6(A), 22 O.S.Supp.1996, Ch. 18, App., Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We are satisfied that Petitioner is entitled to an extraordinary writ prohibiting Respondent from doing an act which is unauthorized by law. Respondent cannot assert jurisdiction over the Director of the Department of Corrections in a criminal proceeding to which the Director was not a named party and Respondent’s effort to hold Petitioner in “indirect contempt” to challenge his official discretionary acts performed as Director of the Department of Corrections violates the Oklahoma constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
In this ease, Respondent has attempted to hold Petitioner in indirect contempt of court if Petitioner “fails” to perform certain acts. Indirect contempt of court is defined as “wilful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued or made by court; resistance wilfully offered by any person to the execution of a lawful order or process of a court.” 21 O.S.1991, § 565. The lawful order involved in this matter is the Judgment and Sentence entered in the criminal case of Mr. Cherry.
Respondent asserts there is no necessity that a person be a named party to an action to be in indirect contempt of a court order and asserts that the “normal rules associated with parties would not be applicable.” Therefore, Respondent claims the District Court had the authority to issue its Order to Comply directing Petitioner Fields to perform certain acts or to appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt.
We agree with Petitioner that the District Court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over him simply by virtue of its rendering of a Judgment and Sentence against a criminal defendant. The language in the Judgment and Sentence imposed in McCurtain County District Court, Case Number CRF-96-5, does not direct the Department of Corrections to perform any act to carry out the Judgment and Sentence. The Judgment and Sentence places the defendant in the “custody and control” of the Department of Corrections in compliance with the provisions of 57 O.S.Supp.1996, § 521. Because the sentence imposed was for incarceration in the Department of Corrections, the Sheriff of the county was directed to deliver the defendant to the LARC and to leave a copy of the Judgment and Sentence “to serve as warrant and authority” for imprisonment of the defendant.
Every exercise of the power to punish a violation of a judicial order is, however, subject to one important qualification, namely, it is absolutely essential that the court making the order should have acted directly within jurisdictional limits, otherwise the disobedience of such an order will be no contempt. In the absence of jurisdiction the judgment is a nullity ...
[1004]*1004Ex parte Driggs, 325 P.2d 72, 75-76 (Okl.1958). Generally, a trial court’s jurisdiction is based upon jurisdiction over the parties and jurisdiction of the general subject matter. See e.g., In re Anderson, 803 P.2d 1160, 1163 (Okl.Cr.1990); Scobie v. Page, 397 P.2d 520, 521 (Okl.Cr.1964).
Section 565 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes, which defines contempt of court, requires “the order or process disobeyed to be lawful. The lawfulness of the order is determined by whether the court had jurisdiction to so act.” Whillock v. Whillock, 550 P.2d 558, 559 (Okl.1976). Here, the District Court’s Order to Comply directing Petitioner to perform certain acts or to show cause why he should not be held in indirect contempt of court is not a valid order, because the District Court did not have jurisdiction over Petitioner simply by virtue of its issuance of a Judgment and Sentence in a criminal matter. As Petitioner argues, the language of a Judgment and Sentence does not make the Department of Corrections a party to the criminal proceeding. The Judgment and Sentence only requires the sheriff to deliver the defendant to LARC and leave him there for imprisonment as set out in 57 O.S.Supp.1996, § 530. Petitioner compares his case to People v. Lockhart, 699 P.2d 1332 (Colo.1985), where Department of Corrections officials refused to accept prisoners in accordance with mittimus orders which contained the following language:
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Sheriff of Jefferson County shall safely convey the Defendant to the Colorado State Department of Corrections Diagnostic Unit at Canon City, Colorado, to be received and kept as provided by law.
When the Jefferson County sheriff petitioned the District Court for twenty-three orders to show cause why the Department of Corrections should not be held in contempt, the Department of Corrections claimed the District Court had no jurisdiction to hold them in contempt because they were not officers of the court identified by state statute whose compliance could be enforced through a contempt proceeding. Id. at 1335.
The Colorado Supreme Court noted that “[generally, state officials who are not parties to a proceeding may not be held in contempt,” but determined that “corrections officials are officers of the court for the limited purpose of taking custody of prisoners as directed by the mittimus.” Id. at 1336. The mittimus orders in question required the prisoners to “be accepted into custody,” and to the extent that officials refused to accept prisoners when they had the ability to obey the order, they could be held in contempt. Id. at 1336-1337.
Relying upon Lockhart, Petitioner argues that any jurisdiction the District Court might have is limited to enforcement of the “mitti-mus” of the Judgment and Sentence. Petitioner maintains, however, that limited jurisdiction is not available in Oklahoma, because corrections officials are not the officers who are directed to act in the Judgment and Sentence.
Respondent argues that the Judgment and Sentence is “more than a mittimus” and Department of Corrections officials are “compelled to carry out the orders of the Court.”
Title 22 O.S.1991, § 982a does allow the District Court to modify a sentence within one hundred twenty (120) days after the sentence is imposed or after probation is revoked. While this statute allows the District Court to consider modification of the sentence imposed on the defendant for one hundred twenty (120) days after sentencing, that jurisdiction does not extend to corrections officials.
When a person in this state is convicted of an offense and sentenced to imprisonment that is not to be served in a county jail, the sheriff of the county where the person was convicted is required to transport the defendant to LARC. At LARC, the sheriff must provide the Department of Corrections officials with a copy of the judgment and sentence and “the Department shall give the sheriff a receipt for each prisoner received.” 57 O.S.1991, § 95; see also 22 O.S.1991, § 982; 57 O.S.Supp.1996, § 521.
The language of 57 O.S.1991, § 95 which requires the Department of Corrections to give the sheriff “a receipt” may be construed to require the Department of Corrections to actually receive prisoners. Unlike Colorado, [1005]*1005the Department of Corrections’ duty to receive the prisoners stems not from the Judgment and Sentence or mittimus, but rather from state statute. Once the Department of Corrections, through its officials at LARC, receive a prisoner in custody, the Department has fulfilled its charge under the Judgment and Sentence issued by the District Court.2
In this case, Petitioner did not refuse to receive Cherry as a new inmate at LARC. The pleadings demonstrate that Cherry was received and processed as a new inmate, as required by law. Therefore, we find that any jurisdiction the District Court might have had over Petitioner by virtue of the Judgment and Sentence issued in defendant Cherry’s ease was limited and ended when Petitioner completed his obligation under that order by receiving Cherry into custody at LARC.
Secondly, we find the District Court’s attempt to order Petitioner to perform a purely discretionary act is violative of the separation of powers doctrine embodied in the Oklahoma Constitution. Okla. Const, art. IV, § 1, which provides:
The powers of the government of the State of Oklahoma shall be divided into three separate departments: The Legislative, Executive, and Judicial; and except as provided in this Constitution, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments of government shall be separate and distinct, and neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others.
The legislative branch of government is vested with the power of enacting all laws. Okla. Const, art. V, § 1. That branch of government is intrusted with the determination of what laws shall be enacted and what laws shall not be enacted. Threadgill v. Cross, 26 Okl. 403, 109 P. 558, 562 (1910). We must assume that the members of the Legislature will not act in a manner which is violative of . the state Constitution or in degradation of its duty to the citizens of Oklahoma. ' Further, once the Legislature has acted and adopted a proposed measure as law, it will be presumed a valid enactment. Id.
The Oklahoma Legislature, at 57 O.S.1991, § 501 et seq. (the Oklahoma Corrections Act of 1967), granted to the Department of Corrections the sole and exclusive power to operate the state prisons. The Act provides for appointment of a Director and sets forth the powers and duties of that Director. See e.g. 57 O.S.1991, §§ 507 and 510; 57 O.S.Supp. 1996, §§ 510, 510.9 and 510.10. The Director’s duties specifically include the assignment of prisoners to and from EMP and the determination of which prisoners may be assigned to that program rests solely within the discretion of the Director of the Department of Corrections. See 57 O.S.Supp.1996, § 510.9.
This Court has recognized for a long time that custody and place of confinement is an administrative matter and not a judicial act. See e.g., Ex Parte Hampton, 87 Okl.Cr. 416, 198 P.2d 751, 754 (1948); Ex Parte Hunt, 93 Okl.Cr. 106, 225 P.2d 193 (1950).
Respondent claims that Petitioner’s exercise of his discretionary duty to assign inmates to the EMP violates the “province of the governor” and states that “early release of a prisoner is a matter solely for the governor, upon recommendation of the Pardon and Parole Board.” Respondent contends “the exercise of this unconstitutional power by the Director of the Department of Corrections justifies the District Court in asking him to justify his action through the citation for indirect contempt.”
Article VI, Section 10 of the Oklahoma Constitution sets forth the power of the Governor of this State to grant commutations, pardons and paroles upon recommendation of the Pardon and Parole Board. Discharge of an inmate from serving a lawful sentence rests solely with the Governor. Ex parte McClure, 6 Okl.Cr. 241, 118 P. 591, 592 (1911); see also Swart v. State, 720 P.2d 1265 (Okl.Cr.1986). Respondent cites Swart as authority that Petitioner’s power to assign [1006]*1006inmates to the EMP violates the separation of powers doctrine. In Swart, we held, in part, that the Intermediate Offender Act violated the doctrine of separation of powers because it placed within the hands of the Department of Corrections the power to establish the rules and conditions of probation. We said that it was within the authority of the “court imposing a suspended sentence to set forth the terms and conditions governing such suspension” and, “the Court cannot delegate its responsibility to state the terms and conditions of suspension.” Id. at 1271-1272; In re Collyar, 476 P.2d 354, 356, 357 (Okl.Cr. 1970). In short, we held that the power to state the terms of a suspended sentence rested solely within the judicial branch.
In this case, we do not have a situation where an inmate has been “discharged from a lawful sentence” or pardoned or paroled. Petitioner acted in his discretion, pursuant to authority vested in him by statute, in placing defendant Cherry in the EMP. The exercise of this discretionary power does not violate any power vested in the judicial branch. Conversely, we find that the District Court’s attempt to hold Petitioner in indirect contempt for performance of a statutorily authorized discretionary act is an intrusion by the judicial branch of government on the power of the executive branch.
In Barnett v. Moon, 852 P.2d 161, 163 (Okl.Cr.1993), we said that placement of an inmate in the Preparóle Conditional Supervision Program (PPCS) was not the equivalent of parole and noted that the inmate in PPCS remains in the custody of the Department of Corrections and only the “degree” of his confinement was affected by being placed in the PPCS. An inmate in PPCS, upon violation of the rules and conditions of probation, is subject to Department of Corrections disciplinary proceedings. Id. An inmate who “escapes” from PPCS is subject to criminal charges under 21 O.S.1991, § 443. 57 O.S.Supp.1996, § 365(F).
Similarly, placement of an inmate in the EMP is not the equivalent of parole or discharge from a lawful sentence. By statute, it is a program “for inmates in the custody of the Department of Corrections ...” 57 O.S.Supp.1996, § 510.9(A). Before an inmate can be assigned to the EMP, the inmate must be processed through LARC. “The Director of the Department of Corrections shall exercise his discretion in selecting eligible inmates for assignment to the Electronic Monitoring Program ...” 57 O.S.Supp.1996, § 510.9(B).
The legislative intent that persons assigned to this program are in “custody” of the Department of Corrections is evident. See e.g. 57 O.S.Supp.1996, §§ 510.9(C)-(F) and 510.10. “The electronic monitoring of an inmate pursuant to this section shall be in addition to active supervision required by law and shall be considered a level of security and confinement for the inmate within the assigned program.” 57 O.S.Supp.1996, § 510.10. Like inmates assigned to the Pre-paróle Conditional Supervision Program, any inmate “who escapes from the Electronic Monitoring Program shall be subject to the provisions of Section 443 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes.” 57 O.S.Supp.1996, § 510.9(E).
This Court has, more than once, recognized that the management and running of prisons is a function of the executive branch of government. See e.g. Mayfield v. Page, 402 P.2d 457 (Okl.Cr.1965); Best v. Page, 422 P.2d 210 (Okl.Cr.1966); Galcatcher v. Page, 437 P.2d 284 (Okl.Cr.1968); Bell v. State, 381 P.2d 167, 173 (Okl..Cr.1962) (“the incarceration of a convict is one of administration for an arm of the executive branch of the government.”)
In addressing similar, but not identical, situations, courts in other states have arrived at the same result. In White v. Adamek, 907 P.2d 735 (Colo.Ct.App.1995), where a District Court entered a contempt order against the Director of the Colorado Division of Youth Services for violating the trial court’s sentencing order regarding placement of a petitioner, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the order of contempt was void on two grounds. First, the trial court’s order that a defendant sentenced as an adult be placed in the Department of Institutions exceeded the trial court’s jurisdiction. Second, because Colorado’s sentencing provisions for adult felony offenders provided for imprisonment by confinement in “an appropriate facility as [1007]*1007determined by the executive director of the Department of Corrections,” the doctrine of separation of powers prohibited a court from exercising its inherent powers in a manner that would preempt an executive agency from “exercising powers properly within its own sphere.” Id. at 738. The Court of Appeals held the authority to determine the appropriate setting for adult felony offenders was vested by statute in the executive director of the Department of Corrections, rather than the judiciary. Therefore, the trial court’s placement order exceeded the scope of the court’s inherent powers. Id.
In Kort v. Hufnagel, 729 P.2d 370 (Colo.1986), the Supreme Court of Colorado held a District Court did not have the authority to issue an order prohibiting transfer of a defendant in the custody of Department of Institutions to any setting other than a maximum security setting within the Colorado State Hospital. “[S]uch an order violates constitutional separation of powers and was issued without subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 371.
In State v. Beauchamp, 262 N.J.Super. 532, 621 A.2d 516 (App.Div.1993), a defendant was convicted of burglary and contempt. As part of the sentencing order, the judge included conditions of parole. On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey held that the trial court had no authority to impose conditions of parole and said “once a trial court has pronounced sentence and entered a judgment of conviction, it relinquishes jurisdiction over the matter to the' executive branch.” Id. at 519.
In Davis v. State, 181 Ga.App. 498, 353 S.E.2d 7 (1987), a trial court imposed a sentence upon a defendant convicted of Driving Under the Influence which provided that he receive no good time credits until all fines were paid. The Court of Appeals held the trial court did not have the power to impose such a restriction, noting that the statutory provisions for good time are directly related to the duties of sentence administration, affirmatively delegated by the legislature to the custodians of the inmates. Id. 353 S.E.2d at 7-8; see also Johns v. State, 160 Ga.App. 535, 287 S.E.2d 617, 619 (1981) (“[a]ny attempt by a court to impose its will over the Executive Department as to what constitutes service of a period of confinement would be a nullity and constitute an exercise of power granted exclusively to the Executive.”)
In Care and Protection of Jeremy, 419 Mass. 616, 646 N.E.2d 1029 (1995), a district court judge required the Department of Social Services to place a child in its temporary custody into a specific type of placement. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said, “[Wjhere the means of carrying out a statutory duty is within the discretion of the public official, courts normally will not direct how the public official should exercise that statutory duty.” Id. at 1033 (brackets in original). The power to act in the best interests of a person properly within the jurisdiction of the court does not extend to deciding questions committed by law to the determination of a public official. Id; see also Charrier v. Charrier, 416 Mass. 105, 616 N.E.2d 1085 (1993).
It is clear that the Oklahoma Legislature intended to place the power to operate the prisons and to incarcerate its inmates in the hands of the Department of Corrections. The Legislature specifically placed upon the shoulders of the Department of Corrections the additional responsibility of administering alternative incarceration programs, including EMP. See 57 O.S.Supp.1996, § 510.4. We empathize and understand the frustration of trial judges of this State who enter Judgment and Sentences, arising from findings of guilt in accordance with the statutes of this State, and who assume due deference will be given to those sentences. This is especially true in this case where the Respondent not only considered but also included a probation component in the sentence imposed.
When the concept of accountability is thwarted by an act or acts of a public official, it dilutes the confidence of the people of this State in our system of justice. One naturally wants to take action to correct those deficiencies in lack of stewardship by an entity or individual in the execution and.fulfillment of the assigned governmental role. Such action, however, must be taken in accordance with the law, the statutes, and the Constitution of this State. The issue of truth in [1008]*1008sentencing to ensure a person sentenced must actually serve the sentence imposed must be addressed and determined by the legislative branch. It is incumbent upon the executive and legislative branches to work together to provide the citizens of Oklahoma with a corrections system which is truthful and accountable to the public.
Article II, Section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides that “All political power is inherent in the people; and government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and to promote their general welfare; ...” While cost is a factor which must be considered in formulating policy which seeks to fulfill this role of government, it cannot be the only consideration. To restore their faith in the corrections system, the citizens have an inherent right to require the legislative and executive branches of government to forge a corrections policy which will provide accountability for individuals convicted of crimes, and which will ensure appropriate punishments which have certainty in service, once imposed by the courts. The judicial branch is tasked with the responsibility of interpreting the policy as enacted into our statutory structure and ensuring those statutes conform to state and federal constitutional requirements. The judiciary cannot subvert otherwise constitutional statutory provisions merely because a judge or judges disagree with the policy which has been properly formulated.
Therefore, we find that the Application for Writ of Prohibition should be granted. The District Court, while having limited jurisdiction over Petitioner to the extent that Petitioner is required to receive an inmate into custody, does not have jurisdiction to hold Petitioner in indirect contempt in this criminal proceeding. Further, the District Court’s attempt, through a citation for indirect contempt, to challenge Petitioner’s performance of a discretionary act is a violation by the judicial branch of government of powers vested solely in the executive branch.
THEREFORE IT IS THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that the stay of proceedings is hereby LIFTED and the Petitioner’s Application for Writ of Prohibition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby prohibited from further proceeding against Petitioner in McCurtain County District Court, Case Number CRF-96-5.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Gary L. Lumpkin GARY L. LUMPKIN, Judge
James F. Lane JAMES F. LANE, Judge
Charles A. Johnson CHARLES A. JOHNSON, Judge
CHAPEL, P.J., and STRUBHAR, V.P.J., dissent.