Fidler v. Touchette, No. 537-10-19 Wncv (Tomasi, J., Feb. 28, 2020).
[The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.]
STATE OF VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION Washington Unit Docket No. 537-10-19 Wncv
Matthew Fidler, Plaintiff
v.
Michael P Touchette, Joshua Rutherford, Defendants
Opinion and Order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff brings this claim against two corrections officials in their individual
and official capacities. He asserts claims under the federal Constitution and
Vermont tort law arising out of an alleged slip and fall that occurred at a
correctional facility and the allegedly inadequate medical care that he received. He
seeks monetary damages for his alleged injuries. Defendants have moved to
dismiss on various grounds. Plaintiff has opposed the motion. The Court makes
the following determinations.
I. The Standard
The Vermont Supreme Court disfavors Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.
“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only when it is beyond doubt that there
exist no facts or circumstances consistent with the complaint that would entitle
Plaintiff to relief.” Bock v. Gold, 2008 VT 81, ¶ 4, 184 Vt. 575, 576 (mem.) (quoting
Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Joerg, 2003 VT 27, ¶ 4, 175 Vt. 196, 198)). In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court “assume[s] that all factual allegations
pleaded in the complaint are true, accept[s] as true all reasonable inferences that
may be derived from plaintiff's pleadings, and assume[s] that all contravening
assertions in defendant's pleadings are false.” Mahoney v. Tara, LLC, 2011 VT 3,
¶ 7, 189 Vt. 557, 559 (mem.) (internal quotation, brackets, and ellipses omitted).
II. The Federal Constitutional Claims
A. Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff has asserted what amount to claims for deprivations of his
constitutional rights under the United States Constitution. Such claims must be
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As Defendants correctly argue, however, a
constitutional claim for retrospective money damages against a state official in his
official capacity cannot be maintained under Section 1983. The United States
Supreme Court has made clear that a state official in his “official capacity” is not “a
person” subject to suit under Section 1983. Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-65 (1974); accord J. Endres v. Ne. Ohio Med.
Univ., No. 18-3825, 2019 WL 4125263, at *10 (6th Cir. Aug. 30, 2019) (“state
defendants acting in their official capacities are not ‘persons’ under § 1983 with
respect to claims for monetary damages”).1
The federal claims against Defendants in their official capacities are
dismissed.
1 A plaintiff may sue a state official under Section 1983 to obtain forward-looking injunctive relief. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). Plaintiff has not sought such a remedy in this case. 2 B. Individual Capacity Claims
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their individual capacities fare
better, at least at this early stage. As an initial matter, claims against an
individual state official for violations of federal constitutional rights are cognizable
under Section 1983. Defendants’ motion challenges the Complaint by asserting that
it does not allege that the Defendant had sufficient “personal involvement” with the
alleged constitutional violations to state a claim. Indeed, the law is well settled that
supervisors cannot be held liable under Section 1983 simply because of their status
as supervisors. Instead, they must have played a meaningful role in the
constitutional violation. See, e.g., Bass v. Jackson, F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986).
Relying on federal precedent, the Defendants argue that Plaintiff must set out
sufficient facts in the Complaint to support his claim for supervisory liability. The
Court disagrees.
Whatever is required procedurally in federal court, under existing Vermont
precedent, a complaint need not provide such detail. Instead, it need only provide a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Vt. R. Civ. P. 8. The rule that a complaint need only “’provide[ ] the
defendant with notice of the claims against it’ is an attempt to strike a balance
between ‘encouraging valid, but as yet underdeveloped, causes of action and
discouraging baseless or legally insufficient ones,’ mindful that the complaint's
‘purpose is to initiate the cause of action, not prove the merits of the plaintiff's case.’
3 Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 2008 VT 20, ¶ 13, 184 Vt. 1, 955 A.2d 1082.” Sutton v.
Vermont Reg’l Ctr., 2019 VT 71, ¶ 20 (Vt. Oct. 4, 2019).
In this instance, the Complaint is sufficient to put Defendants on notice of
the alleged supervisory claim. It need not go into detail as to the precise level of
personal involvement because the Court can only dismiss if there are no set of facts
consistent with the Complaint that could warrant relief. Bock, 2008 VT 81, ¶ 4, 184
Vt. at 576. It cannot make that determination here.
A similar result ensues with regard to Defendants’ assertion that the
Complaint fails to allege that Defendants were “deliberately indifferent” to his
medical care. No doubt, that is the correct standard that Plaintiff will need to meet
to establish his claim. The Complaint is not fatally defective, however, for failing to
employ that precise language.
The motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claims against Defendants in their
individual capacities is denied.
III. The State Tort Claims
Claims against state officials for torts committed in the course of their duties
are governed by the Vermont Tort Claims Act (VTCA). 12 V.S.A. §§ 5601-08. The
VTCA requires that negligence claims be brought against the “State of Vermont.”
This Court has already ruled that, in this context, a claim against a state official in
his official capacity is not cognizable under the VTCA. See Blatt v. Touchette,
Docket No. 286-5-19 Wncv (Sept. 9, 2019). The Court adheres to that
determination.
4 Accordingly, the tort claims against both Defendants in their official
capacities are dismissed.2
A. Defendant Touchette – Individual Capacity
Defendant Touchette was the Commissioner of Corrections. State law
provides that such officials are absolutely immune from suit. See Curran v.
Marcille, 152 Vt. 247, 248-49 (1989).
That VTCA claims against Defendant Touchette in his individual capacity
are dismissed.
B. Defendant Rutherford -- Individual Capacity
Defendant Rutherford argues that the Complaint should be dismissed
against him in his personal capacity because Plaintiff’s cause of action for
negligence is rightly brought solely against the State. 12 V.S.A. § 5602. He is
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Fidler v. Touchette, No. 537-10-19 Wncv (Tomasi, J., Feb. 28, 2020).
[The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.]
STATE OF VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION Washington Unit Docket No. 537-10-19 Wncv
Matthew Fidler, Plaintiff
v.
Michael P Touchette, Joshua Rutherford, Defendants
Opinion and Order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff brings this claim against two corrections officials in their individual
and official capacities. He asserts claims under the federal Constitution and
Vermont tort law arising out of an alleged slip and fall that occurred at a
correctional facility and the allegedly inadequate medical care that he received. He
seeks monetary damages for his alleged injuries. Defendants have moved to
dismiss on various grounds. Plaintiff has opposed the motion. The Court makes
the following determinations.
I. The Standard
The Vermont Supreme Court disfavors Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.
“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only when it is beyond doubt that there
exist no facts or circumstances consistent with the complaint that would entitle
Plaintiff to relief.” Bock v. Gold, 2008 VT 81, ¶ 4, 184 Vt. 575, 576 (mem.) (quoting
Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Joerg, 2003 VT 27, ¶ 4, 175 Vt. 196, 198)). In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court “assume[s] that all factual allegations
pleaded in the complaint are true, accept[s] as true all reasonable inferences that
may be derived from plaintiff's pleadings, and assume[s] that all contravening
assertions in defendant's pleadings are false.” Mahoney v. Tara, LLC, 2011 VT 3,
¶ 7, 189 Vt. 557, 559 (mem.) (internal quotation, brackets, and ellipses omitted).
II. The Federal Constitutional Claims
A. Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff has asserted what amount to claims for deprivations of his
constitutional rights under the United States Constitution. Such claims must be
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As Defendants correctly argue, however, a
constitutional claim for retrospective money damages against a state official in his
official capacity cannot be maintained under Section 1983. The United States
Supreme Court has made clear that a state official in his “official capacity” is not “a
person” subject to suit under Section 1983. Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-65 (1974); accord J. Endres v. Ne. Ohio Med.
Univ., No. 18-3825, 2019 WL 4125263, at *10 (6th Cir. Aug. 30, 2019) (“state
defendants acting in their official capacities are not ‘persons’ under § 1983 with
respect to claims for monetary damages”).1
The federal claims against Defendants in their official capacities are
dismissed.
1 A plaintiff may sue a state official under Section 1983 to obtain forward-looking injunctive relief. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). Plaintiff has not sought such a remedy in this case. 2 B. Individual Capacity Claims
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their individual capacities fare
better, at least at this early stage. As an initial matter, claims against an
individual state official for violations of federal constitutional rights are cognizable
under Section 1983. Defendants’ motion challenges the Complaint by asserting that
it does not allege that the Defendant had sufficient “personal involvement” with the
alleged constitutional violations to state a claim. Indeed, the law is well settled that
supervisors cannot be held liable under Section 1983 simply because of their status
as supervisors. Instead, they must have played a meaningful role in the
constitutional violation. See, e.g., Bass v. Jackson, F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986).
Relying on federal precedent, the Defendants argue that Plaintiff must set out
sufficient facts in the Complaint to support his claim for supervisory liability. The
Court disagrees.
Whatever is required procedurally in federal court, under existing Vermont
precedent, a complaint need not provide such detail. Instead, it need only provide a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Vt. R. Civ. P. 8. The rule that a complaint need only “’provide[ ] the
defendant with notice of the claims against it’ is an attempt to strike a balance
between ‘encouraging valid, but as yet underdeveloped, causes of action and
discouraging baseless or legally insufficient ones,’ mindful that the complaint's
‘purpose is to initiate the cause of action, not prove the merits of the plaintiff's case.’
3 Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 2008 VT 20, ¶ 13, 184 Vt. 1, 955 A.2d 1082.” Sutton v.
Vermont Reg’l Ctr., 2019 VT 71, ¶ 20 (Vt. Oct. 4, 2019).
In this instance, the Complaint is sufficient to put Defendants on notice of
the alleged supervisory claim. It need not go into detail as to the precise level of
personal involvement because the Court can only dismiss if there are no set of facts
consistent with the Complaint that could warrant relief. Bock, 2008 VT 81, ¶ 4, 184
Vt. at 576. It cannot make that determination here.
A similar result ensues with regard to Defendants’ assertion that the
Complaint fails to allege that Defendants were “deliberately indifferent” to his
medical care. No doubt, that is the correct standard that Plaintiff will need to meet
to establish his claim. The Complaint is not fatally defective, however, for failing to
employ that precise language.
The motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claims against Defendants in their
individual capacities is denied.
III. The State Tort Claims
Claims against state officials for torts committed in the course of their duties
are governed by the Vermont Tort Claims Act (VTCA). 12 V.S.A. §§ 5601-08. The
VTCA requires that negligence claims be brought against the “State of Vermont.”
This Court has already ruled that, in this context, a claim against a state official in
his official capacity is not cognizable under the VTCA. See Blatt v. Touchette,
Docket No. 286-5-19 Wncv (Sept. 9, 2019). The Court adheres to that
determination.
4 Accordingly, the tort claims against both Defendants in their official
capacities are dismissed.2
A. Defendant Touchette – Individual Capacity
Defendant Touchette was the Commissioner of Corrections. State law
provides that such officials are absolutely immune from suit. See Curran v.
Marcille, 152 Vt. 247, 248-49 (1989).
That VTCA claims against Defendant Touchette in his individual capacity
are dismissed.
B. Defendant Rutherford -- Individual Capacity
Defendant Rutherford argues that the Complaint should be dismissed
against him in his personal capacity because Plaintiff’s cause of action for
negligence is rightly brought solely against the State. 12 V.S.A. § 5602. He is
correct as regards any negligence claim.
Defendant overreaches, however, in saying that all tort claims should be
dismissed against him. The VTCA allows claims for gross negligence to be lodged
against an individual state employee. Id. At this early stage, and in light of the
Bock standard, the Court cannot conclude that the Complaint does not plead a
claim for gross negligence.
Accordingly, the negligence claim against Defendant Rutherford is dismissed;
a claim for gross negligence remains.
2 That ruling does not preclude the Plaintiff from seeking to amend his claim to name the State of Vermont in connection with his negligence claims. 5 C. Medical Malpractice
To the extent the Complaint can be read to assert a claim for medical
malpractice, it is also subject to dismissal. The Court agrees with Defendants that
Plaintiff has not complied with the procedural requirements that must be followed
to initiate such a suit. 12 V.S.A. §§ 1042 (a) & (e).
Accordingly, the medical malpractice claim under state law is dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is granted, in part, and denied,
in part.
Electronically signed on February 27, 2020 at 5:06 AM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 7(d).
________________________ Timothy B. Tomasi Superior Court Judge