Festor v. Wolf

647 F. Supp. 2d 750, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70939, 2009 WL 2498288
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 11, 2009
Docket2:09-mj-00054
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 647 F. Supp. 2d 750 (Festor v. Wolf) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Festor v. Wolf, 647 F. Supp. 2d 750, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70939, 2009 WL 2498288 (W.D. Tex. 2009).

Opinion

Order

XAVIER RODRIGUEZ, District Judge.

On this date, the Court considered Defendant Mary Wolfs Motion to Dismiss for *752 Forum Non Conveniens (Docket Entry No. 5) and Plaintiffs’ Response (Docket Entry No. 11) thereto. After careful consideration, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens.

I. Background

The Defendant, Mary Wolf, owned a fractional interest in an unfinished property development, Misión La Serena, in Puerto Los Cabos, San Jose del Cabo, Baja California Sur, Mexico (the “Property”). The interest was for twelve consecutive periods starting in week fifty-one of 2008. 1 According to Wolf, a Misión La Serena agent named Dan West contacted her and informed her that the Plaintiffs, Roger Festor, Steve McKim, and Leticia Cisneros (the “Plaintiffs”), wished to purchase her interest in the Property. 2 West forwarded a letter via facsimile to Wolf that included an Interim Agreement that both Wolf and the Plaintiffs subsequently signed. Wolf then sent the Interim Agreement back to Misión La Serena employees. 3

On January 7, 2008, the parties signed a Letter of Intent prepared by Misión La Serena employees that set forth the terms for the assignment of Wolfs entire fractional ownership interest to the Plaintiffs. 4 After Wolf executed the Letter of Intent, she returned it to Misión La Serena without contacting the Plaintiffs. 5 The Plaintiffs claim that West, then acting as Wolfs agent, sent them the Letter of Intent. 6 Pursuant to the Letter of Intent, the Plaintiffs then wired the $722,384.00 purchase price to Defendant’s account. 7

Over the next several months Wolf and Plaintiff Festor exchanged several phone calls and documents regarding the transaction. 8 In those phone calls Wolf assured Festor that a deed would be forthcoming, and at Festor’s request, Wolf mailed to Festor paperwork issued by Misión La Serena regarding the development. 9 The Plaintiffs also contacted the developer, who requested that the Plaintiffs provide them with an “executed agreement.” 10 In November 2008, Festor then sent a letter to Wolf that included a Transaction Agreement. 11 Signed by Wolf and the Plaintiffs, the Transaction Agreement is distinguishable from the Letter of Intent only in that the former confirmed that Plaintiffs had wired the money to Defendant’s account and stated that both parties intended to honor their remaining obligations under the Letter of Intent. 12 After signing the Transaction Agreement, Wolf returned it to Festor by using the self-addressed envelope that Festor sent with the letter and agreement. 13

After the parties signed the Transaction Agreement, Wolf neither conveyed the deed to the fractional interest, nor returned the Plaintiffs’ money. Plaintiffs also allege that around this time the Mi *753 sion La Serena developer informed Wolf of the resort’s precarious financial situation. 14 At present, the fractional interest in the Property is allegedly unusable because “the developer closed the Property and ceased operations.” 15

The Plaintiffs have filed this suit alleging breach of contract, common law fraud, statutory fraud/fraud in a real estate transaction, restitution, unjust enrichment, and violations under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 16 Defendant Wolf moves to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens.

II. Analysis

A. The Legal Standard for Forum Non Conveniens in an International Context

A federal court sitting in diversity applies the federal law of forum non conveniens in deciding a motion to dismiss. DTEX LLC v. BBVA Bancomer, S.A., 508 F.3d 785, 793 (5th Cir.2007). The “doctrine of forum non conveniens proceed[s] from [the] premise [that] ... [i]n rare circumstances, federal courts can relinquish their jurisdiction in favor of another forum.” Id. (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 722, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996)).

A forum non conveniens analysis in an international context has two steps. First, “the court must determine whether there exists an alternative forum.” DTEX, 508 F.3d at 794. A foreign forum is available if “the entire case and all parties can come within the jurisdiction of that forum.” Id. at 796. (quoting Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824, 835 (1993)). The alternative forum “is adequate when the parties will not be deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly, even though they may not enjoy the [sic] all the benefits of an American court.” DTEX, 508 F.3d at 796. “The substantive law of the foreign forum is presumed to be adequate unless the plaintiff makes some showing to the contrary, or unless conditions in the foreign forum made known to the court, plainly demonstrate that the plaintiff is highly unlikely to obtain basic justice there.” Id. (quoting Tjontveit v. Den Norske Bank ASA, 997 F.Supp. 799, 805 (S.D.Tex.1998)).

Second, if an alternative forum is both available and adequate, a court must determine which forum is best suited to the litigation. DTEX, 508 F.3d at 794. In performing this second step, a court must consider whether “certain private and public interest factors weigh in favor of dismissal.” Id. Private interest factors include:

(i) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (ii) availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; (iii) possibility of view of [the] premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; (iv) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive ... enforceability of judgment^ and whether] the plaintiff [has sought to] “vex,” “harass,” or “oppress” the defendant.

Id. (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 S.Ct.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
647 F. Supp. 2d 750, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70939, 2009 WL 2498288, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/festor-v-wolf-txwd-2009.