En Banc
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 In this original proceeding under C.A.R. 21, we address whether an employer’s admission of vicarious liability for an employee’s negligence in response to a plaintiffs complaint forecloses a plaintiffs additional, direct negligence claims against the employer.
¶2 Plaintiff Jessica Ferrer and her companion, Kathryn Winslow, were injured when a taxicab driven by Tesfamariam Okbamicael struck them as they crossed a street in Denver, Colorado. Okbamicael worked for Colorado Cab Company (“Yellow Cab”), which owned the taxicab. Ferrer1 brought this suit against Okbamicael and Yellow Cab (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that Okbami-eael was negligent and that Yellow Cab was vicariously liable for his negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Ferrer also alleged that Yellow Cab was liable for her injuries suffered in the collision under theories of direct negligence, namely, negligence as a common carrier and negligent entrustment, hiring, supervision, and training.
¶3 In an amended answer to the complaint, Yellow Cab admitted that Okbamicael was an employee acting within the course and scope of his employment with Yellow Cab at the time of the accident. Defendants then moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, seeking to dismiss Ferrer’s direct negligence claims against Yellow Cab. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion, applying the rule articulated in McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1995), that an employer’s admission of vicarious liability for an employee’s negligence bars a plaintiffs direct negligence claims against the employer.
[840]*840¶4 Ferrer later moved to amend the complaint to add exemplary damages against both Okbamicael and Yellow Cab. The trial court denied Ferrer’s motion because Ferrer failed to allege evidence of willful and wanton conduct by Okbamicael or by Yellow Cab sufficient to establish prima facie proof of a triable issue of exemplary damages, as required by section 13-21-102(1.5), C.R.S. (2016).
¶5 Ferrer petitioned for relief under C.A.R. 21, asking this court to vacate the trial court’s orders dismissing her direct negligence claims against Yellow Cab and denying her motion to amend the complaint to add exemplary damages against Okbamicael and Yellow Cab. Ferrer likewise sought relief from the trial court’s orders denying her motions for reconsideration.
¶6 We issued a rule to show cause to review the trial court’s orders.2 We now discharge the rule.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶7 At approximately 10:40 p.m. on July 15, 2011, Okbamicael struck Ferrer and Winslow with his taxicab as they crossed an intersection in lower downtown Denver. Ferrer sustained significant injuries as a result of the collision.
¶8 In July 2014, Ferrer filed suit against Okbamicael and Yellow Cab, seeking damages for the injuries she suffered in the collision. Ferrer asserted claims against Ok-bamicael for negligence and negligence per se. She also alleged that Yellow Cab was liable for Okbamicael’s negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Finally, she asserted direct negligence claims against Yellow Cab, specifically, negligence as a common carrier, negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, negligent retention/ supervision, and negligent training.
¶9 Yellow Cab initially denied allegations in Ferrer’s complaint that Okbamicael was an employee and instead asserted that he operated the taxicab as an independent contractor. Defendants later filed an amended answer, however, to admit that Okbamicael was an employee and that he was operating the taxicab within the course and scope of his employment with Yellow Cab at the time of the accident.
¶10 After filing their amended answer, Defendants moved in December 2014 for partial judgment on the pleadings, seeking dismissal of the direct negligence claims against Yellow Cab (negligence as a common carrier, negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, negligent retention/supervision, and negligent training). Defendants ai’gued that under the McHaffie rule followed in other jurisdictions, direct negligence claims against an employer are barred where the employer has acknowledged the employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the alleged tort.
¶11 On March 6, 2015, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Ferrer’s direct negligence claims against Yellow Cab. It simultaneously entered a protective order to preclude discovery regarding Okba-micael’s hiring, supervision, retention, and training. The trial court noted that although no Colorado appellate court had addressed this issue, it was persuaded by several rulings by state and federal trial courts applying the McHaffie rale.
¶12 Ferrer moved for reconsideration, arguing that the McHaffie rule is inapplicable in a comparative fault jurisdiction such as Colorado. The trial court denied Ferrer’s motion, reasoning that Ferrer “failed to demonstrate how the [trial court’s] ruling is inconsistent with Colorado’s adoption of comparative negligence.”
¶13 Five months later, in August 2015, Ferrer moved to amend the complaint to add exemplary damages against both Okbamicael and Yellow Cab under section 13-21-102. As evidence of Defendants’ willful and wanton conduct, Ferrer alleged that at the time of the collision, Okbamicael was driving in excess of the speed limit, was talking on his cell phone in violation of company policy, and had been driving more than ten hours in [841]*841violation of Public Utilities Commission (“PUC”) regulations. In addition, Ferrer alleged that Yellow Cab knew before the incident that Okbamicael was a “habitual hours of service violator”; that Yellow Cab intentionally destroyed its drivers’ trip sheets; and that Yellow Cab “forced” its drivers to use cell phones by not using a dispatch system at the airport. Ferrer indicated that she would request a spoliation instruction regarding Yellow Cab’s destruction of the trip sheets.
1Í14 Defendants opposed Ferrer’s motion to amend as untimely,3 and argued that Ferrer’s late amendment to the complaint would significantly prejudice Defendants by requiring additional discovery and further delaying trial. Defendants also objected on grounds that Ferrer failed to set forth prima facie proof of a triable issue of exemplary damages, as required by section 13-21-102(1.5)(a).
¶15 Following a hearing, the trial court denied Ferrer’s motion to amend the complaint to add exemplary damages. The trial court reasoned that Ferrer’s allegations that Okbamicael was speeding and talking on his cell phone did not constitute willful and wanton conduct justifying punitive damages. The court further concluded that Ferrer’s allegations that Yellow Cab destroyed Okbamiea-el’s time sheets and that Okbamicael exceeded a ten-hour-maximum-driving-time rule on the day of the accident failed to establish prima facie evidence of willful and wanton conduct by Yellow Cab. Because PUC regulations require trip sheets to show the hours a driver was on duty, not his actual driving time, the missing trip sheets would not have shed light on Ferrer’s contention that Okba-micael drove more than ten hours on the day of the accident. The tidal court observed that Ferrer’s allegations against Yellow Cab required “a lot of leaps of faith and a lot of connecting of inferences” and concluded that Ferrer had failed to establish prima facie proof of a triable issue of exemplary damages. The court therefore denied Ferrer’s motion for leave to amend the complaint, and later denied Ferrer’s motion for reconsideration.
¶16 Ferrer petitioned for relief under C.A.R. 21, asking this court to vacate the trial court’s orders granting Defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and dismissing Ferrer’s direct negligence claims against Yellow Cab, denying Ferrer’s motion for leave to amend the complaint to add exemplary damages claims, and denying reconsideration of those rulings. We issued an order to show cause and now discharge the rule.
II. Original Jurisdiction
¶17 Original relief under C.A.R. 21 is an extraordinary remedy limited in purpose and availability. People v. Darlington, 105 P.3d 230, 232 (Colo. 2005). Our exercise of this extraordinary jurisdiction is discretionary. Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1271 (Colo. 2005). We have exercised original jurisdiction to review pretrial orders issued by trial courts that “will place a party at a significant disadvantage in litigating the merits of the controversy.” People v. Dist. Court, 664 P.2d 247, 251 (Colo. 1983) (quoting Sanchez v. Dist. Court, 624 P.2d 1314, 1316 (Colo. 1981)). We also generally exercise original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 in cases that raise issues of first impression and are of significant public importance. Stamp v. Vail Corp., 172 P.3d 437, 440 (Colo. 2007).
¶18 This court has not addressed whether an employer’s admission of vicarious liability for an employee’s negligence in response to a plaintiffs complaint forecloses a plaintiffs additional, direct negligence claims against the employer. Because this case presents an important issue of first impression, we conclude that exercise of our original jurisdiction pursuant to C.A.R. 21 is appropriate.
III. Analysis
¶19 We adopt the rule articulated in McHaffie v. Bunch and hold that where an employer acknowledges vicarious liability for [842]*842its employee’s negligence, a plaintiffs direct negligence claims against the employer are barred.
A. The McHaffie Rule
1. The Development of the McHaffie Rule
¶20 To provide context for our holding, we begin by discussing the development of the rule that a plaintiff cannot maintain direct negligence claims against an employer once the employer acknowledges respondeat superior liability4 for its employee’s alleged negligence.
¶21 Maryland first articulated this rule in Houlihan v. McCall, 197 Md. 130, 78 A.2d 661 (1951). In that case, plaintiffs who were injured in a traffic accident sued both the truck driver involved and the driver’s employer for negligent hiring or retention. Id. at 664. Before trial, the employer acknowledged an agency relationship with the track driver. Id. The trial court admitted evidence of the driv-ei’’s driving record at trial, and the jury ultimately found for the plaintiffs. Id. Maryland’s highest court reversed. Id. at 666. The court reasoned that because the employer admitted the driver was its agent, “it was quite unnecessary to pursue the alternative theory [of negligence] in order to hold the corporate defendant [liable].” Id. at 665. The court therefore concluded the trial court erred by admitting the driver’s record because where agency is admitted, an employee’s driving record “can serve no purpose except to inflame the jury.” Id. at 666.
¶22 Three years after Houlihan, California applied the same rationale to a negligent entrastment claim in Armenta v. Churchill, 42 Cal.2d 448, 267 P.2d 303, 308-09 (1954). There, a roadside worker was killed when a dump track backed over him. Id. at 305. The decedent’s family sued the track driver for negligence and his employer for negligent entrastment. Id. at 308. The employer admitted that the driver was acting in the course of his employment and acknowledged vicarious liability for all damages sustained by the plaintiffs in the event the driver was found negligent. Id. Relevant here, the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of evidence of the driver’s driving history. Id. at 309. The court reasoned that the allegations of direct negligence against the employer (for negligent entrastment) represented merely an alternative theory under which plaintiffs sought to impose upon the employer the same liability as might be imposed upon the employee-driver. Id. Because the employer’s admission of vicarious liability removed any issue of her liability for the alleged tort, there remained no material issue to which the evidence of the employee’s driving history could be legitimately directed. Thus, the California Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly excluded this evidence. Id.
¶23 The most frequently cited case articulating this rule is McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1995). McHaffie was a passenger in a vehicle that crossed a highway median and collided with a tractor-trailer. Id. at 824. McHaffie’s guardian (the plaintiff) brought negligence claims against the driver of the vehicle and the driver of the tractor-trailer; the plaintiff also brought vicarious liability claims against the owner-lessor and the operator-lessee of the tractor-trailer for its driver’s alleged negligence. Id. The operator-lessee of the tractor-trailer admitted vicarious liability for the tractor-trailer driver’s alleged negligence, conceding the driver was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the collision.5 Id. The [843]*843plaintiff also claimed that the operator-lessee of the tractor-trailer negligently hired and supervised the tractor-trailer driver and presented evidence that the operator-lessee did not require the driver to have adequate experience, testing, training, and medical evaluations before driving its trucks. Id. The jury assessed fault to the various parties, including ten percent collectively to the driver, the owner-lessor, and the operator-lessee of the tractor-trailer based on the driver’s negligence and the owner-lessor’s and operator-lessee’s vicarious liability, as well as ten percent to the operator-lessee based on negligent hiring.6 Id. at 825. On appeal, defendants argued that it was improper to permit claims against the operator-lessee based on both respondeat superior liability and negligent hiring. Id.
¶24 The McHaffie court agreed. It adopted the “majority view” that once an employer admits respondeat superior liability for a driver’s negligence, it is improper to allow a plaintiff to proceed against the employer on other theories of imputed liability. Id. at 826. The court observed that direct negligence claims such as negligent entrustment and negligent hiring are forms of imputed liability, just as respondeat superior is a form of imputed liability, because the employer’s duty is dependent on and derivative of the employee’s conduct. Id. The court reasoned that to allow multiple theories for attaching liability to a single party for the negligence of another “serves no real purpose,” unnecessarily expends the “energy and time of courts and litigants,” and risks the introduction of potentially inflammatory, irrelevant evidence into the record. Id. The court also explained that once an employer concedes it is vicariously liable for any negligence of its employee, the employer becomes strictly liable to the plaintiff for damages attributable to the employee’s conduct, regardless of the percentage of fault as between the employer and the employee. Id.
¶25 Several state supreme courts have adopted the rule articulated in McHaffie,7 and numerous intermediate appellate courts8 and federal district courts9 in other jurisdic[844]*844tions have applied the McHaffie rule as well. But see, e.g., James v. Kelly Trucking Co., 377 S.C. 628, 661 S.E.2d 329, 332 (2008) (holding that a plaintiffs direct negligence claims against an employer are not precluded by the employer’s admission of respondeat superior liability). Although this case presents an issue of first impression for this court, we note that at least one federal district court order and three state trial court orders in Colorado have applied the McHaf-fie rule.10
2. Rationales for the McHaffie Rule
¶26 We adopt the McHaffie rule because we agree with those courts that hold that where an employer has conceded it is subject to respondeat superior liability for its employee’s negligence, direct negligence claims against the employer that are nonetheless still tethered to the employee’s negligence become redundant and wasteful.
¶27 Direct negligence claims provide an alternate means of recovery when vicarious liability is unavailable against an employer because the tortfeasor-employee was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of his alleged negligence. See Richard A. Mincer, The Viability of Direct Negligence Claims Against Motor Carriers in the Face of an Admission of Respondeat Superi- or, 10 Wyo. L. Rev. 229, 232-33 & n.9 (2010) (citing Plains Res., Inc, v. Gable, 236 Kan. 580, 682 P.2d 663, 662 (1984) (“The application of the theory of independent negligence in hiring or retaining an employee becomes important in cases where the act of the employee either was not, or may not have been, within the scope of his employment.”)).
¶28 But where the employer has already conceded it is subject to respondeat superior liability for any negligence of its employee, direct negligence claims become superfluous. Importantly, to prevail on direct negligence claims against the employer, a plaintiff still must prove that the employee engaged in tortious conduct. That is, tortious conduct by an employee is a predicate in direct negligence claims against the employer. See, e.g., Raleigh v. Performance Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 130 P.3d 1011, 1016 (Colo. 2006) (in negligent hiring cases, the employee’s “intentional or non-intentional tort is the predicate for the plaintiffs action against the employer, so proof in the case involves both the employer’s and the employee’s tortious conduct”); McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826 (elements of negligent entrustment include proof that “the negligence of the entrustor concurred with the negligence of the entrustee to harm the plaintiff’); Rodgers v. McFarland, 402 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. App. 1966) (in a negligent entrustment action, “[t]he driver’s wrong ... first must be established, then by negligent entrustment liability for such wrong is passed on to the owner”). Direct negligence claims effectively impute the employee’s liability for his negligent conduct to the employer, similar to vicarious liability.
¶29 An employer’s negligent act in hiring, supervision and retention, or en-trustment is not a wholly independent cause of the plaintiffs injuries, unconnected to the employee’s negligence. A plaintiff has no cause of action against the employer for negligent hiring, for example, unless and until the employee’s own negligence causes ah accident.
[845]*845¶30 Stated differently, both vicarious liability and direct negligence claims are tethered to the employee’s tortious acts. “Derivative or dependent liability means that one element of imposing liability on the employer is a finding of some level of culpability by the employee in causing injury to a third party.” McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 825. As one court explained:
Under either theory, the liability of the principal is dependent on the negligence of the agent. If it is not disputed that the employee’s negligence is to be imputed to the employer, there is no need to prove that the employer is liable. Once the principal has admitted its liability under a re-spondeat superior theory ... the cause of action for negligent entrustment is duplica-tive and unnecessary. To allow both causes of action to stand would allow a jury to assess or apportion a principal’s liability twice.
Gant v. L.U. Transp., Inc., 331 Ill.App.3d 924, 264 Ill.Dec. 459, 770 N.E.2d 1155, 1160 (2002).
¶31 The pursuit of both vicarious liability and direct negligence claims against an employer after it has conceded respondeat superior liability for any of its employee’s negligence is also superfluous to the plaintiffs recovery; the direct negligence claims will not increase the plaintiffs damages. Where an employer acknowledges responde-at superior liability, the employer becomes strictly liable for one hundred percent of the damages attributable to the employee’s negligence. McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826. The fact that a plaintiff is the “master of her complaint” and may assert multiple theories of attaching liability to an employer for the employee’s conduct does not mean, that a plaintiff should be permitted to introduce evidence supporting those multiple theories where such evidence would serve only to establish that which is already undisputed: that the employer is liable for the plaintiffs damages caused by the employee’s negligent acts.11
¶32 We are also persuaded to adopt the McHaffie rule for two additional reasons. First, evidence necessary to prove direct negligence claims is likely to be unfairly prejudicial to the employee. Houlihan, 78 A.2d at 664-65 (“[W]here agency is admitted, [evidence of a driver’s record] can serve no purpose except to inflame the jury.”); Clooney v. Geeting, 352 So.2d 1216, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (“Since the [direct negligence] counts impose no additional liability but merely allege a concurrent theory of recovery, the desirability of allowing these theories is outweighed by the prejudice to the defendants.”); Hackett v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 736 F.Supp. 8, 10 (D.D.C. 1990) (dismissing claims for negligent supervision, hiring, and retention as prejudicial and unnecessary). For instance, evidence of an employee’s prior convictions for traffic offenses, relevant to the issue of the employer’s negligent hiring, may lead a jury to “draw the inadmissible inference that because the [driver] had been negligent on other occasions he was negligent at the time of the accident.” Houlihan, 78 A.2d at 665.
¶33 In addition, there is a danger that a jury will assess the employer’s liability twice and award duplicative damages to the plaintiff if it hears evidence of both a negligence claim against an employee and direct negligence claims against the employer. Mincer, supra, at 238; see also Thompson v. Ne. Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp., 367 Ill.App.3d 373, 305 Ill.Dec. 152, 854 N.E.2d 744, 747 (2006) (“To allow both causes of action to stand would allow the jury to assess or apportion the principal’s liability twice.”). This is incompatible with the theory of respondeat superior liability, in which the liability of the employer (upon acknowledgement of a re-spondeat superior relationship) is fixed by the amount of liability of the employee, see Gant, 331 Ill.App.3d 924, 264 Ill.Dec. 459, 770 N.E.2d at 1160; McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826, and the plaintiffs comparative fault does not differ based on the number of defendants. The McHaffie rule prevents the fault of one party from being assessed twice and thereby avoids a “plainly illogical” result. McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 827.
¶34 We note the McHaffie rule does not apply where the plaintiffs injuries are not in fact caused by the employee’s negligence. For example, if an employer is aware its- vehicle has defective brakes yet allows an [846]*846employee to use it and the defective brakes cause an accident, the rule would not apply. The unknowing employee was not negligent, and the employer could not be vicariously liable. “[T]he means of imposing liability on the owner would be through his own negligence of lending the car with bad brakes, i.e., negligent entrustment.” Clooney, 352 So.2d at 1220; see also Willis v. Hill, 116 Ga.App. 848, 159 S.E.2d 145, 159 n.6 (1967), rev’d on other grounds, 224 Ga. 263, 161 S.E.2d 281 (1968). In that situation, the employer’s own negligence is both the independent and direct cause of the plaintiffs injuries, unconnected to any negligent act of the employee.
3. The McHaffie Rule in a Comparative Negligence Jurisdiction
¶35 Colorado is a comparative negligence jurisdiction. See § 13-21-111, C.R.S. (2016). Pursuant to section 13-21-111, a plaintiff equally or more responsible for her own injuries may not recover damages for negligence from other persons or entities. § 13-21-111(1). However, if the plaintiff is less than fifty percent responsible for her own injuries, she can recover damages for negligence, diminished in proportion to the amount her own negligence contributed to her injuries. Id. The General Assembly’s intent behind adopting a comparative negligence regime was to ameliorate the harshness of the common law rule of contributory negligence, which barred recovery by negligent plaintiffs. Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883, 888 (Colo. 1983). The focus of the change to comparative negligence was on the conduct of the plaintiff, not the number of defendants who also contributed to the injuries. Id.
¶36 Ferrer contends that the McHaffie rule is inconsistent with Colorado’s comparative negligence regime. Ferrer argues that in comparative fault jurisdictions, the acts of all parties must be considered by the jury, and that the McHaffie rule prevents the employer’s fault from being considered by the jury. See Lorio v. Cartwright, 768 F.Supp. 658, 660-61 (N.D. Ill. 1991). A small number of courts and some commentators are similarly persuaded the McHaffie rule is incompatible with comparative negligence. See, e.g., id. at 661 (“It would not be possible for a finder of fact to make the necessary determination of degrees of fault without having before it the evidence of the entrustor-prineipal’s negligence in entrusting the vehicle to the entrus-tee-agent. This court is accordingly of the view that [the McHaffie rule] is no longer viable because of the adoption of comparative negligence.”);12 J.J. Burns, Note, Responde at Superior as an Affirmative Defense: How Employers Immunize Themselves from Direct Negligence Claims, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 657, 664 (2011). Like Ferrer, they assert the rule fails to account for the fault a juiy might apportion to multiple defendants. See Lorio, 768 F.Supp. at 661.
¶37 We are unpersuaded by this minority position. We conclude, as have other courts in comparative negligence jurisdictions, that the McHaffie rule is compatible with Colorado’s comparative negligence regime. Where the employer has accepted re-spondeat superior liability for any negligence of its employee, the employer is strictly liable for the employee’s negligence “regardless of the ‘percentage of fault’ as between the party whose negligence directly caused the injury and the one whose liability for negligence is derivative.” McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826. The employer is “responsible for all the fault attributed to the negligent employee, but only the fault attributed to the negligent employee as compared to the other parties to the accident.” Gant, 331 Ill.App.3d 924, 264 Ill.Dec. 459, 770 N.E.2d at 1159.
¶38 Importantly, a plaintiffs comparative fault should not be reduced based on the number of defendants liable for damages. For example, “[i]n a motor vehicle accident, comparative fault as it applies to the plaintiff should end with the parties to the accident. A plaintiffs comparative negligence remains the same, regardless of whether the remaining fault can be allocated in part to the employer based on negligent entrustment.” Id. Thus, if a plaintiff is fifty percent at fault [847]*847in an accident, her comparative negligence should not be diminished simply because the portion of fault for which she is not responsible may be attributed to two defendants instead of one.
¶39 Indeed, to allow direct negligence claims to proceed after an employer acknowledges respondeat superior liability for its employee’s conduct raises a concern that a plaintiff may allege additional direct negligence claims against the employer to convince the jury that he is less at fault than he actually is, thereby recovering damages where the plaintiff might otherwise be disqualified from doing so by section 13-21-111’s fifty percent bar. See Mincer, supra, at 258-59.
¶40 For these reasons, we join other courts in concluding that the McHaffie rule accords with a comparative negligence regime. See, e.g., Diaz v. Carcamo, 51 Cal.4th 1148, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 443, 253 P.3d 535, 544 (2011) (reaffirming Armenta, 42 Cal.2d 448, 267 P.2d 303, after the adoption of comparative negligence) (“[T]he objective of comparative fault is to achieve an equitable allocation of loss. That objective is not served by subjecting the employer to a second share of fault in addition to that assigned to the employee and for which the employer has accepted liability.”); Loom Craft Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Gorrell, 823 S.W.2d 431, 432 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (retaining the McHaffie rule after the adoption of comparative negligence) (“We believe the better rule is to apportion fault only among those directly involved in the accident, and to hold the entrustor liable for the percentage of fault apportioned to the driver.”); McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826 (holding that the rule applies regardless of the comparative fault of the employer versus the employee); Gant, 331 Ill.App.3d 924, 264 Ill.Dec. 459, 770 N.E.2d at 1159 (“Notwithstanding the fact that Illinois is a comparative negligence jurisdiction, a plaintiff ... cannot maintain a claim for negligent hiring, negligent retention or negligent entrustment against an employer where the employer admits responsibility for the conduct of the employee under a respondeat superior theory.”).
B. No Exception for Exemplary Damages
¶41 Tort law allows plaintiffs two types of monetary remedies: compensatory damages and exemplary damages. Stamp, 172 P.3d at 448. Compensatory damages are designed to make the plaintiff whole. Kirk v. Denver Publ’g Co., 818 P.2d 262, 265 (Colo. 1991). Exemplary damages, also known as punitive damages, are intended “to punish and penalize [the defendant] for certain wrongful and aggravated conduct and to serve as a warning to other possible offenders.” Beebe v. Pierce, 185 Colo. 34, 521 P.2d 1263, 1264 (1974).
¶42 Exemplary damages are available in Colorado only pursuant to statute. Kaitz v. Dist. Court, 650 P.2d 553, 556 (Colo. 1982). Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages “[i]n all civil actions in which damages are assessed by a jury for a wrong done to the person or to personal or real property, and the injury complained of is attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct.” § 13-21-102(l)(a) (emphasis added). Willful and wanton conduct is statutorily defined as “conduct purposefully committed which the actor must have realized as dangerous, done heedlessly and recklessly, without regards to consequences, or of the rights and safety of others, particularly the plaintiff.” § 13-21-102(l)(b). To assert exemplary damages, the plaintiff must “[establish] prima facie proof of a triable issue.” § 13-21-102(1.5)(a).
¶43 A few courts applying the McHaffie rule have recognized an exception for direct negligence claims where the plaintiff seeks exemplary damages. E.g., Plummer v. Henry, 7 N.C.App. 84, 171 S.E.2d 330 (1969). Other courts have suggested in dicta that a theoretical exception to the rule may exist where the plaintiffs allegations suffice to allow a claim for exemplary damages against the employer. E.g., Clooney, 352 So.2d at 1220; Arrington’s Estate v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d 173, 178-79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), writ refused NRE (July 5, 1979); Barija v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 218 Ga.App. 815, 463 S.E.2d 358, 361 (1995); Wise v. Fiberglass Sys., Inc., 110 Idaho 740, 718 P.2d 1178, 1181 (1986). However, jurisdictions recogniz[848]*848ing a potential exemplary damages exception have done so with little to no analysis, simply citing McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826, for the proposition that “it is ... possible that an employer or an entrustor may be liable for punitive damages which would not be assessed against the employee/entrustee.” See, e.g., Hill v. W. Door, No. 04-CV-0332-REB-CBS, 2006 WL 1586698, at *1-2 (D. Colo. June 6, 2006) (citing McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826).
¶44 We reject any exception to the rule where the plaintiff asserts exemplary damages against the employer. Such an exception is not logically consistent with the rule. Exemplary damages do not present a separate, distinct cause of action, but rather, depend on an underlying claim for actual damages. See Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 213-14 (Colo. 1984) (“[I]t is not a separate and distinct cause of action. Rather, it is auxiliary to an underlying claim for actual damages.”). Section 13-21-102 “by its own terms ... has no application in the absence of a successful underlying claim for actual damages.” Harding Glass Co., Inc. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Colo. 1982); see also Armijo v. Ward Transp., Inc., 134 Colo. 275, 302 P.2d 517 (1956); Ress v. Rediess, 130 Colo. 572, 278 P.2d 183 (1954). In short, section 13-21-102 “does not create an independent cause of action, but merely authorizes increased damages ancillary to an independent claim for actual damages,” Palmer, 684 P.2d at 214.
¶45 As we explain above, where an employer acknowledges respondeat superior liability for any negligence of its employee, the McHaffie rule bars direct negligence claims against the employer. Because any direct negligence claims against the employer are barred, there can be no freestanding claim against the employer on which to base exemplary damages. A plaintiff cannot simply resurrect direct negligence claims against the employer by asserting a claim for exemplary damages against the employer. We therefore decline to recognize any exception to the McHaffie rule for when a plaintiff claims exemplary damages against the employer.
¶46 Moreover, to allow such an exception would present a case management conundrum, Under section 13-21-102, a claim for exemplary damages may not be included in any initial claim for relief. § 13-21-102(1.5)(a). Rather, it “may be allowed by amendment to the pleadings only after the exchange of initial disclosures pursuant to [C.R.C.P. 26] and the plaintiff establishes prima facie proof of a triable issue.” Id. A defendant-employer who admits respondeat superior liability in response to the plaintiffs complaint can move for judgment on the pleadings before initial disclosures are exchanged and therefore before the plaintiff can seek to amend his complaint to add exemplary damages claims. If a trial court grants the employer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismisses the plaintiffs direct negligence claims under the rule we adopt today, it makes no sense to require a trial court nonetheless to permit discovery on those direct negligence claims because the plaintiff may later seek to assert exemplary damages. Colorado’s case management time-line functionally pi’ecludes an exception to the rule for exemplary damages against an employer.
¶47 For these reasons, we decline to recognize an exception to the rule for exemplary damages against an employer. We note, however, that this holding does not curtail a plaintiffs ability to seek exemplary damages against the employee for willful and wanton conduct.
C. Application
¶48 We affirm all the trial court orders challenged in this petition and therefore discharge the rule.
1. Ferrer’s Direct Negligence Claims Against Yellow Cab
¶49 Ferrer argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her direct negligence claims against Yellow Cab and urges this court to hold that an employer cannot raise respondeat superior as a defense to direct negligence claims.
¶50 The trial court did not err in granting Defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and in dismissing Ferrer’s direct negligence claims against Yellow Cab. [849]*849Yellow Cab admitted that Okbamieael was acting in the course and scope of his employment, thereby conceding respondeat superior liability for any of Okbamicael’s alleged negligence. Yellow Cab will be strictly liable for one hundred percent of Ferrer’s damages attributable to Okbamicael’s negligent conduct. Given Yellow Cab’s admission of vicarious liability for Ferrer’s damages, her direct negligence claims—likewise seeking to attach liability to Yellow Cab for those damages— became duplicative and unnecessary.
¶51 The trial court applied the McHaffie rule to dismiss Ferrer’s direct negligence claims against Yellow Cab though this court had not yet adopted that rule. We adopt the McHaffíe rule today and therefore affirm the trial court’s order granting Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on Ferrer’s direct negligence claims.
2. Ferrer’s Exemplary Damages Claims Against Yellow Cab
¶52 Ferrer asserts the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for leave to amend her complaint to add exemplary damages against Yellow Cab. She contends that she demonstrated prima facie proof of a triable issue of willful and wanton conduct by Yellow Cab.
¶53 A determination of whether the plaintiff has established prima facie proof to add a claim for exemplary damages lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Stamp, 172 P.3d at 449, Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court’s treatment of a motion to amend will not be disturbed. Id. We will And an abuse of discretion only where the lower court’s decision was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1094 (Colo. 2007).
¶54 The tidal court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ferrer’s motion for leave to amend the complaint to add exemplary damages claims against Yellow Cab. Because the trial court properly dismissed Ferrer’s direct negligence claims against Yellow Cab, there existed no freestanding claims against Yellow Cab on which Ferrer could base exemplary damages. A plaintiff like Ferrer cannot resurrect independent, direct negligence claims against the employer by asserting exemplary damages. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Ferrer’s motion to amend the complaint.
¶55 In any event, the court explained that Ferrer’s reliance on an adverse inference from missing driver time sheets (to allege hours of service violations by Yellow Cab) did not suggest willful and wanton conduct by Yellow Cab. The trial court further explained that Ferrer’s other allegations about Yellow Cab’s direct negligence—for example, that Okbamieael was a repeat violator, that irregularities existed in Yellow Cab’s inspection reports, and that Yellow Cab did not use a dispatch system13—required “a lot of leaps of faith and a lot of connecting of inferences” and did not amount to sufficient evidence of willful and wanton conduct by Yellow Cab. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that these allegations failed to establish prima facie proof of a triable issue of exemplary damages.
3. Ferrer’s Exemplary Damages Claims Against Okbamieael
¶56 Ferrer also argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for leave to amend her complaint to add exemplary damages against Okbamieael. Ferrer cites courts in other jurisdictions that determined excessive speeding or distracted driving to be wanton conduct. She urges this court to hold that the trial court abused its discretion in holding that Ferrer’s allegations about Okbamicael’s speeding and cell phone use at the time of the collision did not amount to prima facie proof of willful and wanton conduct.
¶57 We cannot conclude that the trial court’s denial of Ferrer’s motion to add a claim for exemplary damages against Okba-micael was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. After properly explaining the statutory standard for exemplary damages claims, the trial court concluded that Ferr[850]*850er’s allegations about Okbamicael’s speeding failed to establish willful and wanton conduct sufficient to justify exemplary damages. The court further observed that talking on a cell phone while driving is legal in Colorado. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ferrer’s motion to amend the complaint to add exemplary damages against Okbamicael.
IV. Conclusion
¶58 We adopt the McHaffie rule followed in other jurisdictions and hold that where an employer acknowledges vicarious liability for its employee’s negligence, a plaintiffs direct negligence claims against the employer are barred. We affirm the trial court orders challenged by Ferrer and discharge the rule.
JUSTICE GABRIEL dissents, and CHIEF JUSTICE RICE and JUSTICE HOOD join in the dissent.