Barcelon v. Landforce Corporation

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided April 14, 2020·No. 2:18-cv-01493·Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 ROBERT BARCELON, Case No. 2:18-cv-01493-GMN-DJA

7 Plaintiff, ORDER 8 v.

9 LANDFORCE CORP., et al.,

10 Defendants.

11 12 This matter is before the Court on Defendants Albert Leon Harris and Landforce 13 Corporation’s Motion to Compel (ECF No. 46) or in the alternative, Motion to Strike (ECF No. 14 47), filed on December 23, 2019. Plaintiff timely filed Responses (ECF Nos. 55-56) on January 15 21, 2020. Defendants filed their Replies (ECF Nos. 58-59) on January 24, 2020. The Court finds 16 this matter properly resolved without a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Defendants seek to compel supplemental responses to its Requests for Production Nos. 3- 19 5, which seek information regarding Plaintiff’s earnings, which were served on July 2, 2019. 20 (ECF No. 46). They claim responses were timely received on September 27, 2019, which 21 indicated Plaintiff had no responsive documents in his possession and indicated relevant 22 authorizations would be forthcoming. Further, Defendants assert that Plaintiff left his 23 computation of damages for lost earnings incomplete by stating to be determined. Then, Plaintiff 24 disclosed a vocational expert, Chris Reyes, on the expert disclosure deadline, November 27, 2019 25 who opined that Plaintiff has a lost earning capacity between $284,573 to $498,674. Defendants 26 assert they received the expert disclosure on December 4, 2019 and held a meet and confer 27 regarding Plaintiff’s supplemental documents on December 13, 2019. The parties agreed that 1 date, which impeded Defendants’ rebuttal experts from producing a report by the December 30, 2 2019 rebuttal expert disclosure deadline. Accordingly, Defendants request compelling 3 supplemental responses and an award of fees in having to bring the motion or alternatively, 4 striking Plaintiff’s expert. (ECF No. 47). 5 Plaintiff responds that he has been unable to work since the collision at issue in this case 6 and his claims regarding loss of earning capacity are well known to Defendants. (ECF No. 55). 7 In fact, he indicates that he responded to Interrogatories Nos. 19-20 and Requests for Production 8 Nos. 3-5 well in advance of the expert disclosure deadline. After Plaintiff disclosed a vocational 9 and economic expert on the issues of loss of earning capacity, he engaged in a meet and confer 10 regarding Defendants’ request to supplement his responses to the RFP Nos. 3-5. Plaintiff 11 prepared his 2009-2018 tax returns to disclose to Defendants on December 20, 2019, but they did 12 not get served due to the early holiday closure of Plaintiff’s counsel’s office. After the instant 13 Motions were filed on December 23, 2019, Plaintiff served the responsive documents. As a 14 result, Plaintiff indicates that there are no further documents to compel and the sanction of 15 striking his expert is not warranted. (ECF No. 56). 16 Defendants reply that they met and conferred with Plaintiff on December 16, 2019 and 17 agreed to give Plaintiff until December 20, 2019 to produce documents regarding his loss of 18 earning capacity. (ECF No. 58). They indicate that the documents were received after the instant 19 motions were filed, but that Plaintiff’s computation of damages on the topic of lost wages 20 references an amount to be determined. As such, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff’s late and 21 incomplete response is not justified or harmless as it was not produced prior to the expert 22 disclosure deadline. To the extent that the Court will not strike Plaintiff’s expert, Defendants 23 request supplementation of Plaintiff’s employment records or authorization to obtain them. 24 Defendants highlight deposition testimony from Plaintiff that indicates it is unclear if he returned 25 to work in 2016-2017. (ECF No. 59). 26 27 / / / 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 a. Motion to Compel 3 Rule 34 requires a party upon whom document requests are served to respond in writing 4 within 30 days after being served with the requests. The “failure to object to discovery requests 5 within the time required constitutes a waiver of any objection.” Richmark Corp. v. Timber 6 Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Haddad v. Interstate 7 Management Co., LLC, 2012 WL 398764, * 1 (D. Nev. 2012) (same). 8 As for the timing of Plaintiff’s production of his supplemental documents, including his 9 2009-2018 tax returns, it is apparent from the briefing that counsel for both parties were actively 10 engaged in meet and confer efforts regarding Plaintiff’s responses to Defendants’ RFP Nos. 3-5. 11 The parties agreed on a deadline of December 20, 2019 for Plaintiff to serve his supplemental 12 responses, which Plaintiff missed. Significantly, Plaintiff provided an explanation of missing that 13 deadline due to the early holiday closure of his office and did indeed serve his supplemental 14 responses a mere three days later, on December 23, 2019. Notably, the responses were served 15 after the instant motions were filed, which does not excuse Plaintiff’s late responses. Further, 16 Plaintiff’s counsel had an obligation to meet that deadline after the parties’ substantial meet and 17 confer efforts and should have ensured the disclosure was served prior to the early holiday closure 18 of his office. As such, the Court does not find it was substantially justified. 19 However, the three delay was harmless. The parties had already agreed on December 20, 20 2019 as the deadline and presumably, Defendants would not have moved to compel if Plaintiff 21 had met that deadline. So, Defendants’ argument that the delay of three days was not harmless 22 because there was insufficient time to prepare a rebuttal expert report is disingenuous. In fact, the 23 Court notes that the parties have not refrained from stipulating to extensions of the discovery 24 deadlines in this case – including the rebuttal expert deadline. Notably, the Court granted a fifth 25 extension of the discovery deadlines in its Order ECF No. 49 entered on January 6, 2020, which 26 reset the rebuttal expert deadline to February 13, 2020. Defendants fail to set forth any reason 27 why that extension of the December 30, 2019 rebuttal expert deadline until February 13, 2020 1 was insufficient. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s untimely disclosure of supplemental 2 responses to RFP Nos. 3-5 is harmless. 3 As to whether the responses were adequate, Defendants’ argument is rather weak. They 4 assert that they need additional information to determine whether Plaintiff actually returned to 5 work in 2016 or 2017 after the accident at issue based on his deposition testimony. However, 6 Plaintiff represents that he disclosed his 2009-2018 tax returns to Defendants on December 23, 7 2019 and he has no other responsive documents in his possession. Nevertheless, Defendants’ 8 reply briefing does not reference whether there was an income disclosed in 2016-2017 on the tax 9 returns that would resolve their question. Given that Plaintiff also agreed to provide an 10 authorization responsive to Defendants’ lost earnings requests, the Court will order Plaintiff to 11 either (1) produce documentation of wages from his employer for the time period of 2016-2017 or 12 (2) produce a signed authorization for Defendants to obtain earnings documentation from his 13 employer for the time period of 2016-2017 via a Rule 45 subpoena. In that respect only, the 14 Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Compel. 15 b. Motion to Strike 16 Defendants alternatively moved for a Rule 37 exclusionary sanction to preclude Plaintiff 17 from utilizing his vocational/economic expert, Chris Reyes, at trial.

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Barcelon v. Landforce Corporation, (D. Nev. 2020).

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Related

Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants
959 F.2d 1468 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)