Opinion issued November 13, 2025.
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00790-CV ——————————— FERNANDO YATES, Appellant V. HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1216651
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Fernando Yates is appealing the trial court’s orders granting
Appellee Houston Independent School District’s application for writ of certiorari,
plea to the jurisdiction, and motion for attorneys’ fees. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment. Background
Appellant Fernando Yates was hired by Appellee Houston Independent
School District as a high school math teacher during the 2019-2020 school year. In
December 2019, Yates filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) claiming the District had discriminated against
him on the basis of his national origin, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, and retaliated against him because he opposed these unlawful acts. After
successfully mediating the matter before the EEOC, Yates and the District signed a
settlement agreement pursuant to which the District agreed to pay Yates “a lump
sum equal to four months’ salary (the remainder of his salary for the 2019-2020
school year, plus two additional months of salary) at his current rate of pay, less any
appropriate deductions.” In exchange, Yates agreed to resign from his employment
with the District effective April 10, 2020, and to release the District from all claims.
Yates signed the settlement agreement on March 27, 2020.
After the District’s Board of Trustees voted to approve the settlement
agreement on April 9, 2020 and the District’s representatives signed the settlement
agreement, Yates emailed the District’s General Counsel, Catosha Woods, inquiring
about the timing of his settlement payment and arguing that the payment had to be
calculated based on the annual salary for teachers with thirty-seven years of
experience because he had submitted service records to the District from prior
2 teaching jobs establishing that he had thirty-seven years of teaching experience.1
Woods informed Yates that any service records he had submitted to the District prior
to April 9, 2020 would be honored and that the settlement payment would be
calculated commensurate with the records the District received prior to that date.
On April 29, 2020, Yates received the settlement check from the District and
deposited the $28,360.44.00 check into his bank account. The next day, Yates
emailed Woods informing her that the check was “short,” because the payment was
based on the $72,109 annual salary for teachers with thirty years of experience and
he had thirty-seven years of teaching experience, meaning his annual salary should
be $80,309.
Application for Writ of Certiorari
On July 8, 2021, Yates filed a handwritten small claims petition against the
District in the Harris County Justice Court, Precinct 1, Place 1. Under the “Cause
of Action” section of his petition, Yates wrote, “Please see Attachment!” The
attachment states in its entirety:
1 The District attached to its plea to the jurisdiction an affidavit from Lisa McManus, the District’s Compensation Coordinator 2, in which McManus states that during the 2019-2020 school year, the District “determined a teacher’s salary based on the teacher’s ‘creditable’ years of prior teaching service, which were determined by, among other things, the teacher’s official service records from the educational institutions where the teacher previously worked.” According to McManus, teachers could submit a “Report of Teaching Experience” form or submit original copies of service records from previous institutions that include the required information.
3 My name is Fernando Yates. I am a former employee of the HISD. I was a math teacher from the 2019-2020 school year. I filed a discrimination EEOC lawsuit against HISD. They agreed to mediate before the EEOC and avoid further litigation. I have thirty seven years of experience. The HISD paid me for only twenty nine years of experience. I have been asking them to pay me according to my years of experience, but they refused to pay me several times.
Yates requested $10,000 in damages. On August 24, 2023, the Justice Court issued
a post-answer default judgment against the District after the District failed to appear
for trial.
On November 21, 2023, the District filed an application for writ of certiorari
with the Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 2 arguing (1) the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because Yates had not identified any specific claims for which
the District’s immunity had been waived, and (2) the District’s failure to appear for
trial was not due to inexcusable neglect. On this last point, the District argued the
trial notice had been mailed to a District attorney who no longer worked for the
District, and no one in the District’s legal services department received the trial
setting notice or was aware of the trial setting. According to the District, it did not
learn of the trial setting until October 23, 2023, when the District first received a
letter from Harris County, Precinct 1, stating that a writ of execution had been issued
against the District in connection with the Yates’ lawsuit. The District attached an
affidavit from Woods attesting to these facts in support of its application.
4 Yates filed a response in which he argued that Woods’ statement that “no one
in HISD’s Legal Services office received the trial setting notice” was false because
the notice was addressed to the District. He further argued that Woods’ statement
that the District had first learned of the Justice Court’s default judgment on October
23, 2023 was also false because Yates had emailed the District’s superintendent on
August 30, 2023 referencing the default judgment and demanding payment of
$10,000. The County Court granted the District’s application.
Plea to the Jurisdiction
Subsequently, the District filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which it argued
that Yates had not identified any law or statute allegedly violated by the District that
would waive its governmental immunity. In the alternative, it argued Yates had not
plead jurisdictional facts showing he could meet any element of relief under any
applicable law or statute.2 The County Court granted the District’s plea to the
jurisdiction and dismissed Yates’ claims against the District. This appeal ensued.
After Yates filed his notice of appeal, the District moved for attorneys’ fees
in County Court pursuant to Section 11.161 of the Texas Education Code and
2 Governmental units, including school districts, are immune from suit unless the state consents. See Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018). Immunity from suit may be asserted through a plea to the jurisdiction or other procedural vehicle such as a motion for summary judgment, and the plea may challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both. See id.
5 Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.3 The trial court granted
the motion and awarded the District $20,869.35 in attorneys’ fees.4
Discussion
Citing to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1, the District argues that
Yates’ appellate issues are waived due to inadequate briefing. The District argues
that Yates’ brief fails to cite to any relevant legal authorities or the appellate record
and he “relies on his Table of Contents to provide the Court with his entire legal
analysis.” In his reply brief, Yates argues that he “perfected his appeal under the
Texas Rules of Appellant Procedure,” his “appeal supports his contentions,” and the
District “continue[s] reciting cases not related to the truth of this case.”
A. Standard of Review
The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant’s brief to
contain, among other things, “a clear and concise argument for the contentions made,
with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
When an appellate issue is unsupported by argument or lacks citation to the record
3 See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.161(a) (authorizing recovery of attorneys’ fees in civil suit brought under state law against independent school district if court finds suit “frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation” and the suit is “dismissed or judgment is for the defendant”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 10.001, 10.003(c), and 10.004(a), (c)(3) (authorizing award of attorneys’ fees as sanctions against party for filing frivolous pleadings and motions). 4 The trial court granted the District’s motion for attorneys’ fees on July 31, 2024, and Yates filed his opening appellate brief on August 5, 2024.
6 or legal authority, nothing is presented for review. See Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal
Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 500 (Tex. 2015) (“Failure to provide citations or argument
and analysis as to an appellate issue may waive it.”); Walker v. Eubanks, 667 S.W.3d
402, 408 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (holding issue waived for
review because appellant’s brief lacked “substantive argument, record references, or
relevant citation to legal authority” with respect to that issue). Appellate courts are
not responsible “for identifying possible trial court error, searching the record for
facts favorable to [the appellant’s] position, or conducting legal research to support
[the appellant’s] contentions.” Walker, 667 S.W.3d at 407. Were they to do so,
courts would be abandoning their role as neutral adjudicators and taking on the role
of advocate for the appellant. Id. at 408 (citing Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843,
845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.)); see also Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. of
Medicine, 271 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)
(“It would be inappropriate for this court to speculate as to what appellant may have
intended to raise as an error by the trial court on appeal. To do so would force this
court to stray from our role as a neutral adjudicator and become an advocate for
appellant.”).
Appellate courts liberally construe a pro se litigant’s brief to reach his
appellate issues on the merits when possible. See Harrison v. Reiner, 607 S.W.3d
450, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). Nevertheless, pro se
7 litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with
applicable rules of procedure. Id.; Morris v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 360
S.W.3d 32, 36 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (“To apply a different
set of rules to pro se litigants would be to give them an unfair advantage over litigants
represented by counsel.”).
Appellate courts, however, “should hesitate to resolve cases based on
procedural defects and instead endeavor to resolve cases on the merits.” Bertucci v.
Watkins, 709 S.W.3d 534, 541–42 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Lion Copolymer Holdings,
LLC v. Lion Polymers, LLC, 614 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. 2020); Dudley Constr., Ltd.
v. Act Pipe & Supply, Inc., 545 S.W.3d 532, 538 (Tex. 2018) (“Whenever possible,
we reject form-over-substance requirements that favor procedural machinations over
reaching the merits of a case.”).
B. Yates’ Appellate Briefing
The “Argument” section of Yates’ opening brief contains one sentence
referring to the “Argument” section of the table of contents:
The Table of Contents states in its entirety:
8 a. The trial Court relied on “perjured sworn testimony” in granting the writ of Certiorari, and improperly evaluated evidence under the traditional writ of Certiorari standard.
b. The trial Court erred by ignoring relevant evidence of the Plaintiff, this error changed the ultimate outcome of the case, and the case require that the case be reversed or remanded.
c. The trial Court improperly granted the writ of Certiorari, the evidence clearly shows that the Court relied on perjured sworn evidence.
And in the “Opening Statement” portion of his opening brief, Yates states:
An attorney cannot win a case based on perjured sworn evidence. On Page 3, lines 19, 20, 21 and page 4 lines 1, 2. Defendant’s attorney stated: Ms. Sloan had resigned from HISD when the Justice Court issued the notice and no one in HISD’s Legal Services received the trial notice. As a result, no one in HISD’s Legal Services office was aware of the August 24. 2023 trial setting and no one from HISD’s Legal Services office attended the trial. (EXHIBIT 1)
PLAINTIFF STATEMENT: Nothing could be further from the truth. The Notice of Trial Setting was sent to the Houston Independent School District 4400 West 18th St. Houston TX 77092 also. The Notice of Trial Setting from the Justice Court Harris County, Precinct 1, Place 1 clearly prove it. (Exhibit A) Exhibit 1, 2
The “Statement of Facts” and “Statement of the Case” portions of Yates’ brief state
that Yates began working for the District as a math teacher in 2019 and he “provided
the proper documentation of his previous experience since the beginning of the
school year 2019-2020.” According to Yates, he “submitted [proof] of at least thirty-
seven years of experience, and [the District] only paid him for twenty each years of
experience, in retaliation for [Yates] filing an EEOC complaint against [the
District],” and he filed a small claims lawsuit against the District in the justice court 9 that resulted in a post-answer default judgment against the District. In his conclusion
and prayer, Yates “prays for this Court to reverse the trial Court granting [the
District’s] petition for writ of Certiorari and let the post answer default judgement
by the Justice Court stand.”
The brief does not contain any relevant legal authority or citations to the
appellate record. Although the table of authorities lists four state court opinions
from California, none of these opinions involve pleas to the jurisdiction or
applications for writs of certiorari and they are not cited to elsewhere in the brief.5
Instead of citing to the appellate record, Yates cites to the three “exhibits” attached
to his brief: (1) a copy of the District’s application for writ of certiorari that includes
handwritten notes identifying the portions of the application Yates argues are false,
(2) a notice of trial setting addressed to the District with handwritten notes stating,
“This is proof HISD received the notice of trial setting,” and (3) the notice of default
judgment sent to the District.
5 See Gallin v. Poulou, 140 Cal. App. 2d 638, 639–40, 295 P.2d 958, 958–59 (1956) (suit by tenant against landlord for trespass); Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co. 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1986) (appeal from grant of summary judgment on claims of trespass, invasion of privacy, and infliction of emotional distress); Williams v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 159 Cal. App. 2d 527, 528, 323 P.2d 1046, 1047 (1958) (appeal from judgment rendered after jury trial in action for trespass); Williams v. Wraxall, 33 Cal. App. 4th 120, 129, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658 (1995) (appeal from summary adjudication of claims for fraud and deceit, suppression of information, malpractice, and conspiracy).
10 In his reply brief, Yates clarifies that the “perjured” statement he referred to
in his opening brief is Woods’ statement in her affidavit that no one in the District’s
legal services department received the Justice Court’s trial setting notice or was
aware of the August 24, 2023 trial setting and the evidence the trial court failed to
consider is the notice of trial setting sent to the District that he attached to his
appellate brief as Exhibit 2.6 He also responds to the District’s appellate arguments
regarding the plea to the jurisdiction and argues for the first time that the trial court
erred by awarding the District its attorneys’ fees. Yates attached two new exhibits
to his reply brief for which he did not provide record cites. He provides a record cite
for the District’s plea to the jurisdiction, which the District had attached to its motion
for attorneys’ fees. (“Supplemental Court Record, Exhibit 1”). There are multiple
citations to the appellate briefing and other “exhibits” (e.g., “Brief of Appellant
Exhibit 4”).
Despite the significant deficiencies in Yates’ appellate briefs, to the extent
possible and without abandoning our role as a neutral adjudicator and becoming
Yates’ legal advocate, we address the merits of Yates’ challenge to the trial court’s
orders granting the District’s application for writ of certiorari and plea to the
jurisdiction and awarding attorneys’ fees. See Salazar v. Sanders, 440 S.W.3d 863,
6 Exhibit 2 was not attached to Yates’ response to the District’s plea to the jurisdiction.
11 872 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, pet. denied) (“Appellate courts are required to
construe briefs reasonably, yet liberally, so that the right to appellate review is not
lost by waiver, and in so doing, we should reach the merits of an appeal whenever
reasonably possible. At the same time, an appellate court should not make the
appellant’s argument for him because the court would be abandoning its role as a
neutral adjudicator and would become an advocate for the appellant.”) (internal
citation omitted).
Liberally construing Yates’ briefing, we understand Yates to argue that the
trial court erred by granting the District’s application for writ of certiorari based on
the evidence submitted by the District because Woods committed “perjury” when
she claimed in her affidavit that no one in the District’s legal services department
received notice of the trial setting. Yates also argues the trial court erred by
“ignoring” the notice of trial setting addressed to the District, which according to
Yates, “clearly shows that [the District] was notified by the Justice Court for the
August 24, 2023, Notice of Trial Setting.”
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 506.4 authorizes a party to “apply to the county
court for a writ of certiorari” after the entry of a final judgment in a case tried in
justice court when “the justice court [lacked] jurisdiction” or “the final determination
of the suit worked an injustice to the applicant that was not caused by the applicant’s
12 own inexcusable neglect.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.4(a), (b). When reviewing an order
disposing of an application for a writ of certiorari, “we take the facts alleged in the
application as true and, on this basis, make a de novo determination of the adequacy
of the stated grounds.” See Centro Jurici de Instituto Tecnologico y Estudios
Superiores de Monterrey v. Intertravel, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 446, 450 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1999, no pet.) (citing Am. Bankers’ Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 64 S.W.2d 806, 807
(Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1933, no writ).
The District argued that it was entitled to a writ of certiorari because (1) the
justice court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in that Yates failed to identify any
specific claims for which the District’s immunity had been waived and (2) the
District’s failure to appear for trial was not due to inexcusable neglect because no
one in the District’s legal department received notice or was aware of the August 14,
2023 trial setting. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.4(a), (b). The District’s general counsel,
Catosha Woods, stated in her affidavit submitted in support of the application that
the attorney who filed the District’s answer in the Justice Court “had resigned from
[the District] when the Justice Court issued the notice and no one in [the District’s]
Legal Services office received the trial setting notice. As a result, no one in [the
District’s] Legal Services office was aware of the August 24, 2023, trial setting, and
no one from [the District’s] Legal Services office attended the trial.” Taking Woods’
sworn statements as true, as we must, we conclude the District submitted sufficient
13 evidence establishing that entry of the challenged default judgment “worked an
injustice to [the District] that was not caused by the [District’s] own inexcusable
neglect.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.4(b)(2); Flowers, 64 S.W.2d at 807 (“The allegation
in the application of plaintiff in error for the writ of certiorari to the effect that it was
never cited and never appeared in the case in the justice court, taken alone, was a
showing of sufficient cause for the writ, since no court has jurisdiction to enter
judgment against a party not before it.”).
Although Yates argues that the County Court erred because the August 24,
2023 trial notice addressed to the District contradicts Woods’ statement that no one
in the District’s legal department had notice of the trial setting, the notice was not
attached to Yates’ response to the application for writ of certiorari. And there is no
indication that the notice was before the County Court when the court granted the
District’s application.
We thus overrule Yates’ challenge to the trial court’s order granting the
District’s application for writ of certiorari.
In his reply brief, Yates argues for the first time that the trial court erred in
granting the District’s plea to the jurisdiction. “An issue raised for the first time in
a reply brief is ordinarily waived and need not be considered by this Court.”
McAlester Fuel Co. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 257 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. App.—Houston
14 [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Bich Ngoc Nguyen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 404 S.W.3d
770, 781 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (“[A]n appellant may not include in
a reply brief a new issue in response to some matter pointed out in the appellee’s
brief but not raised in the appellant’s opening brief.”) (citations omitted).
Even if Yates had raised the issue in this opening brief and even if we could
get past the significant briefing deficiencies in his appellate brief, he would not
prevail. Governmental units, including school districts, are immune from suit unless
the state consents. See Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755,
770 (Tex. 2018). Immunity from suit may be asserted through a plea to the
jurisdiction and “may challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts,
or both.” See id. When the jurisdictional plea challenges the pleadings, we must
determine if the pleader has alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating subject-matter
jurisdiction. Id.; Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226
(Tex. 2004). In doing so, we construe the pleadings liberally, taking them as true,
and we consider the plaintiff’s intent. Id. Only if the pleadings affirmatively negate
jurisdiction should the plea to the jurisdiction be granted without affording the
plaintiff an opportunity to replead. Id. at 226–27. We review rulings on
jurisdictional pleas de novo. Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 805; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at
228.
15 The District argues the trial court did not err in granting its plea to the
jurisdiction because Yates failed to identify any waiver of the District’s
governmental immunity or plead jurisdictional facts establishing he could meet any
element of relief under any applicable law or statute. In neither his response to the
District’s plea to the jurisdiction nor his appellate briefing does Yates identify any
authority or legal grounds he contends waive the District’s immunity from suit,
much less argue that he pled facts sufficient to establish the District waived its
immunity. Yates, who does not meaningfully address the District’s immunity from
suit in his appellate briefing, does not appear to dispute that he did not plead a basis
demonstrating a waiver of immunity.7
We thus overrule Yates’ challenge to the court’s order granting the District’s
plea to the jurisdiction.
Attorneys’ Fees
In his reply brief, Yates argues for the first time that the trial court erred in
awarding the District its attorneys’ fees. According to Yates, “It would be an
injustice to ask Yates to pay attorney fees, when the attorney used perjured evidence
7 Yates did not ask the trial court to allow him an opportunity to amend his pleadings to cure any defects, nor does he argue on appeal that the trial court erred by not allowing him an opportunity to amend his pleadings. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Gray v. City of Galveston, No. 14–03–00298–CV, 2003 WL 22908145, at *2 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 11, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A]ppellant did not request an opportunity to amend in the trial court, so she has waived any complaint that she has been denied this opportunity.”).
16 and the trial Court erred by ignoring relevant evidence. That order will prejudice
Yates, and his family.”
An issue raised for the first time in a reply brief is ordinarily waived. See
McAlester Fuel Co., 257 S.W.3d at 737. In addition, Yates does not identify the
legal basis on which his challenge for the award of attorneys’ fees is based.8 While
he argues there was “perjured” and “ignored” evidence, those references concern the
affidavit from Woods and the notice of trial setting relevant to the trial court’s ruling
on the District’s application for writ of certiorari. Yates does not identify any
evidence offered in support of the District’s motion for attorneys’ fees which he
challenges on appeal. He also fails to cite to any legal authority or provide a
substantive analysis of the legal issues raised by his challenge to the award of fees.
See Walker, 667 S.W.3d at 408 (holding issue waived for review because appellant’s
brief lacked “substantive argument, record references, or relevant citation to legal
authority” with respect to that issue); see also Velasquez v. Waste Connections, Inc.,
169 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (“Because Velasquez’s
8 It appears from the record that the District moved for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Section 11.161 of the Texas Education Code and Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.161(a) (authorizing recovery of attorneys’ fees in “civil suit . . . brought under state law . . . against an independent school district . . . if: (1) the court . . . finds that the suit . . . is frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation; and (2) the suit . . . is dismissed or judgment is for the defendant”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 10.001(2),10.002(a) (authorizing award of attorneys’ fees as sanctions against party for filing frivolous pleadings and motions).
17 argument does not contain a single reference to a relevant case or legal principle, the
issues are not adequately briefed and are considered waived.”) (citing TEX. R. APP.
P. 38.1(i)). Given these substantial briefing deficiencies, it is not possible for the
court to address the merits of Yates’ argument without making argument on his
behalf and abandoning our role as a neutral adjudicator. Indeed, the grounds upon
which the District moved for its attorneys’ fees and the bases on which Yates appeals
are impossible to discern from Yates’ reply brief alone.9 Compare Oramas v. Univ.
of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, No. 01-24-00399-CV, 2025 WL 2446013, at *2
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 26, 2025, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (declining to
find briefing waiver when pro se appellant “laid out her position clearly, and she has
done so in a way that allows us to reach the legal arguments with no serious
difficulty”).
We conclude that Yates waived this issue due to inadequate briefing. See
Walker, 667 S.W.3d at 408; Velasquez, 169 S.W.3d at 436.
We overrule Yates’ challenge to the award of attorneys’ fees.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Veronica Rivas-Molloy Justice
18 Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Gunn, and Caughey.