Ferguson v. Marysville Housing Commission

District Court, E.D. Michigan·Decided October 3, 2025·No. 2:23-cv-11094·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

VICKIE FERGUSON,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:23-cv-11094

v. Honorable Susan K. DeClercq United States District Judge MARYSVILLE HOUSING COMMISSION,

Defendant. ___________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S OMNIBUS MOTION IN LIMINE (ECF No. 37), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS (ECF No. 40), AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S OMNIBUS MOTION IN LIMINE (ECF No. 41)

In this FLSA case, Plaintiff Vickie Ferguson is suing her former employer, Defendant Marysville Housing Commission. A bench trial is scheduled to begin on October 7, 2025. See ECF No. 36. Currently pending before this Court are the following motions: (1) Defendant’s omnibus motion in limine, ECF No. 37; (2) Plaintiff’s motion to strike witnesses and exhibits, ECF No. 40; and (3) Plaintiff’s omnibus motion in limine, ECF No. 41. A hearing on all three motions was held on September 29, 2025. See ECF No. 36. During the hearing, all eleven disputed issues were discussed at length, and the Court informed the Parties of its ruling on ten of those issues. This order summarizes the ten resolved disputes and addresses the sole outstanding evidentiary dispute regarding whether evidence of proposed and actual changes to the building monitor role is admissible at trial.

I. LEGAL STANDARD “A ‘motion in limine’ is any motion ‘to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered.’” Good v. BioLife Plasma Servs.,

L.P., 605 F. Supp. 3d 947, 955 (E.D. Mich. 2022), recon. denied, 647 F. Supp. 3d 555 (E.D. Mich. 2022) (quoting Louzon v. Ford Motor Co., 718 F.3d 556, 561 (6th Cir. 2013)). Motions in limine are designed “to narrow the issues remaining” and “minimize disruptions,” United States v. Brawner, 173 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir.

1999), to help ensure “evenhanded and expeditious management of trials,” United States v. Phillips, 146 F. Supp. 3d 837, 841 (E.D. Mich. 2015), aff’d in part, 677 F. App’x 294 (6th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). Indeed, “the Supreme Court has

allowed district courts to rule on motions in limine ‘pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of trials.’” Id. (citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n. 4 (1984)). “A district court should grant a motion to exclude evidence in limine ‘only

when [that] evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.’” Id. (quoting Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004)). “In cases where that high standard is not met, evidentiary rulings should be deferred

until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” Id. (citations modified) (quoting Ind. Ins. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d at 846); see also Good, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 955; Figgins v. Advance Am.

Cash Advance Ctrs. of Mich., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 2d 861, 865 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (“It may be desirable in many cases to defer ruling on objections until trial.”). Even when a court denies a motion in limine, that “does not necessarily mean

that the court will admit the evidence at trial.” Phillips, 146 F. Supp. 3d at 841. Rather, “[d]enial merely means that without the context of trial, the court is unable to determine whether the evidence in question should be excluded.” Ind. Ins. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d at 846.

II. ANALYSIS A. Defendant’s Omnibus Motion in Limine (ECF No. 37) Defendant’s omnibus motion in limine seeks to exclude three categories of

evidence: (1) evidence of proposed and actual changes to the building monitor role1; (2) letters of support from Plaintiff’s friends and co-residents; and (3) improper character evidence. ECF No. 37. 1. Evidence of proposed and actual changes to the building monitor role

Defendant argues that evidence of proposed and actual changes to the building

1 Defendant first frames this category as two separate categories, see ECF No. 37 at PageID.670, but then proceeds to analyze both categories together, see id. at PageID.678–80. This Court will follow Defendant’s lead and address the evidence of proposed and actual changes to the building monitor role together. monitor role are irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, thus such evidence should be excluded. Id. at PageID.679. Specifically, the parties dispute the admissibility of (1)

testimony and evidence relating to the proposed new building monitor agreement Defendant presented to Plaintiff in December 2022 and (2) testimony and evidence related to how Defendant handled the building monitor duties after Plaintiff left the

role in April 2023. Id. at PageID.678. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 402, only relevant evidence is admissible. Evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in

determining the action.” FED. R. EVID. 401. As the Sixth Circuit has recognized, Rule 401 sets a “low bar” for relevance. United States v. Lang, 717 F. App’x 523, 539 (6th Cir. 2017).

As to the proposed new building monitor agreement Defendant presented to Plaintiff in December 2022, it appears at this pretrial stage that such evidence would be relevant. Indeed, the fact that Defendant presented Plaintiff with a new building monitor agreement suggests that perhaps at some point Defendant did understand

the building monitor role to include duties beyond those listed in the proposed 2022 agreement. Or perhaps the evidence on this issue would suggest that the reason Defendant presented a new agreement to Plaintiff in December 2022 was to comply

with federal regulations regarding how heavily they could discount her rent as a building monitor. In this way, the evidence is relevant to the question of what Defendant understood the building monitor role to encompass and what duties it

expected Plaintiff to carry out. And it is not clear how such evidence would be prejudicial. Indeed, just because evidence is unfavorable to one party does not make it unfairly prejudicial. See id.

The relevance of evidence related to how Defendant handled the building monitor duties after Plaintiff left the role in April 2023 is a closer question. As this Court noted at the motion hearing, such evidence is not evidence of a subsequent remedial measure. So, Defendant argues that this evidence should be excluded as

irrelevant because it is “of no consequence” to determining what Plaintiff’s duties were between 2011 and 2023 nor how much time she spent performing those duties. Id. at PageID.679–80; see also ECF No. 28 at PageID.600 (noting the two primary

factual disputes for trial are “(1) Whether [Defendant] required [Plaintiff] to wait, or merely requested that she wait; and (2) What [Plaintiff]’s duties as building monitor actually included”). Plaintiff responds that the way Defendant divided up the building monitor duties among three people after Plaintiff left the role is relevant

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Ferguson v. Marysville Housing Commission, (E.D. Mich. 2025).

Ferguson v. Marysville Housing Commission (Ferguson v. Marysville Housing Commission) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Luce v. United States
469 U.S. 38 (Supreme Court, 1984)
United States v. Steven D. Brawner
173 F.3d 966 (Sixth Circuit, 1999)
Moien Louzon v. Ford Motor Company
718 F.3d 556 (Sixth Circuit, 2013)
Indiana Insurance v. General Electric Co.
326 F. Supp. 2d 844 (N.D. Ohio, 2004)
United States v. Sonny Phillips
677 F. App'x 294 (Sixth Circuit, 2017)
United States v. Phillips
146 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Michigan, 2015)