Felipe Rodriguez Gutierrez v. Christopher Larose, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: December 12, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-03310
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 FELIPE RODRIGUEZ GUTIERREZ, Case No. 25-cv-03310-BAS-AHG

14 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 15 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (ECF No. 1) 16 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, et al., 17 Respondents. 18 19 20 Petitioner Felipe Rodriguez Gutierrez filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 21 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming he was improperly detained without bond pending 22 adjudication of his immigration matter. (ECF No. 1.) He requests that he be given a bond 23 hearing. (Id.) The Government has responded arguing: (1) 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and 24 1252(b)(9) strip this Court of jurisdiction; and (2) Petitioner is ineligible for bond and 25 subject to mandatory detention as an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. 26 § 1225(b)(2). (ECF No. 5.) Petitioner filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 7.) For the reasons 27 stated below, the Court GRANTS the Petition and orders Petitioner be granted a bond 28 hearing before an Immigration Judge. 1 I. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 3 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). “The traditional function of the 4 writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 5 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he or 6 she is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 7 The writ is available to non-citizens detained within the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis, 8 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 9 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 10 Petitioner entered the United States from Mexico in 1985. (Petition (“Pet.”) ¶ 3, 11 ECF No. 1.) He has lived in the United States for most of his adult life and is the father of 12 one U.S. citizen child. (Pet. ¶ 4.) He has no criminal convictions. (Pet. ¶ 13.) 13 On July 23, 2025, Petitioner was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement 14 (“ICE”) and has applied for Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status. (Pet. ¶¶ 15 1–2.) He is currently being held at the Otay Mesa Detention Center without a bond hearing 16 being set. (Pet. ¶ 80.) He claims he is being unlawfully detained and subjected to expedited 17 removal. (Pet. ¶¶ 43–47.) 18 III. ANALYSIS 19 Petitioner requests release from custody or that the Court order a bond hearing within 20 14 days. (Pet. Prayer ¶¶ 5, 7.) In their Return, Respondents argue that this Court lacks 21 jurisdiction to hear the Petition and that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention. This 22 Court disagrees on both grounds. 23 A. Jurisdiction 24 Respondents argue that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and 1252(b)(9) strip this Court of 25 jurisdiction to proceed. Section 1252(g) states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear 26 any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the 27 Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders 28 against any alien under this chapter.” 1 The general rule is to “‘resolve any ambiguities in a jurisdiction-stripping statute 2 [such as Section 1252(g)] in favor of the narrower interpretation,’ and by the ‘strong 3 presumption in favor of judicial review.’” Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989, 4 995 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2018)). 5 Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled Section 1252(g) applies only to three discrete actions: 6 commencing proceedings, adjudicating cases, or executing removal orders. Reno v. Am.- 7 Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). “Instead of ‘sweep[ing] in 8 any claim that can technically be said to arise from the three listed actions,’ the provision 9 ‘refers to just those three specific actions themselves.’” Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 995 10 (alteration in original) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018)). “There 11 are of course many other decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation 12 process . . .” that are not one of these three. See Reno, 525 U.S. at 482 (listing possibilities). 13 Section 1252(g) “does not prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they 14 are in some fashion connected to removal orders.” Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 997. 15 To the extent Petitioner argues that he is being unlawfully subjected to expedited 16 removal, the Court agrees it has no jurisdiction to address this issue. However, Petitioner 17 is requesting that the Court release him from custody or order a bond hearing before an 18 Immigration Judge. This request is not contesting the commencement or adjudication of 19 removal proceedings against him, nor is it raising an issue with respect to the execution of 20 removal. Petitioner’s detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) may be during, but is 21 nonetheless independent of, the removal proceedings. Thus, this Court is not stripped of 22 jurisdiction by Section 1252(g). 23 Section 1252(b)(9) states, “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact, 24 including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising 25 from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United 26 States . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” 27 “[C]laims that are independent of or collateral to the removal process do not fall 28 within the scope of § 1252(b)(9).” J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016). 1 Thus, in Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019), the Supreme Court held Section 1252(b)(9) 2 inapplicable when the petitioners were not asking for review of an order of removal, were 3 not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek removal, and were 4 not challenging any part of the process by which removability would be determined. Id. at 5 402 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294). 6 Again, to the extent Petitioner is seeking release on bond, he is not challenging the 7 Government’s authority to remove him from the United States. Instead, he challenges his 8 classification under Section 1225(b)(2) instead of Section 1226(a) and the BIA’s decision 9 that immigration judges lack authority to provide a bond under Section 1225(b)(2). Thus, 10 Section 1252(b)(9) does not provide a jurisdictional bar. 11 B. Applicability of Section 1225(b)(2) Versus Section 1226(a) 12 The primary disagreement between the parties is whether Petitioner is now, after 13 living in the United States for forty years, subject to discretionary release pursuant to 14 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or, as the BIA has ruled in Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, subject 15 to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). This Court agrees with the 16 multitude of cases that have concluded that applying Section 1225 in this situation “(1) 17 disregards the plain meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship 18 between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) would render a recent amendment to section 1226(c) 19 superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory interpretation and 20 practice.” Lepe v. Andrews, __F. Supp. 3d__, 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 21 23, 2025) (citing cases). 22 “We begin, as always, with the text.” Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U.S. 385, 23 391 (2017). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to an applicant “seeking admission” to the 24 United States, whereas Section 1226(a) applies to individuals who have been arrested “on 25 a warrant issued by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2)(A), 1226(a). 26 “Seeking,” as noted by other courts, “means ‘asking for’ or ‘trying to acquire or gain.’” 27 Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *5 (citing Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 28 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/seeking). “And the use of a present 1 participle, ‘seeking,’ necessarily implies some sort of present-tense action.” Id. (citation 2 modified). As noted by the Southern District of New York: 3 [S]omeone who enters a movie theater without purchasing a ticket and then proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily 4 then be described as “seeking admission” to the theater . . . . Even if that 5 person, after being detected, offered to pay for a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as “seeking admission.” 6 7 Lopez Benitez v. Francis, __F. Supp. 3d__, 2025 WL 2371588, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 8 2025). Respondents point to Section 1225(a)(1), which states, “[a noncitizen] present in 9 the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . shall 10 be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” However, if Section 11 1225 was intended to apply to all applicants for admission, “there would be no need to 12 include the phrase ‘seeking admission’ in the statute.” Lopez Benitez, 2025 WL 2371588, 13 at *6; see also Vasquez-Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, 14 at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025) (“Only those who take affirmative acts, like submitting an 15 application for admission, are those who can be said to be ‘seeking admission’ within 16 § 1225(b)(2)(A).”). 17 Furthermore, Respondents’ interpretation ignores the statutory scheme. “It is a 18 fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their 19 context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Lepe, 2025 WL 20 2716910, at *6 (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). 21 “Section 1225 ‘authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into 22 the country,’ whereas section 1226 ‘authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens 23 already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.’” Id. (quoting 24 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287). This is reinforced by the title of Section 1225: “Inspection by 25 immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for 26 hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225. “‘Inspection’ is a process that occurs at the border or other 27 ports of entry.” Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *6 (citing Posos-Sanchez v. Garland, 3 F.4th 28 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 2021)). 1 Petitioner, under the plain meaning of the statute, is not seeking admission to the 2 United States. He was already in the country and had been living in the United States for 3 forty years at the time of his arrest and is thus subject to Section 1226(a). 4 To the extent the addition of Section 1225(a) renders the two statutes ambiguous or 5 unclear as to which section applies, the Court turns to principles of statutory construction. 6 See Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1256 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“[E]ven when 7 a statute is ambiguous or internally contradictory, courts must ‘use every tool at their 8 disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.’” (quoting Loper Bright Enters. v. 9 Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024))). “[A] statute should be construed so that effect is 10 given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or 11 insignificant.” Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1258 (quoting Corley v. United States, 556 12 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)). 13 Section 1226 carves out a statutory category of non-citizens who, despite being 14 arrested while already in the country, may not be released because of their criminal or 15 terrorist activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). If, as Respondents argue, all non-citizens arrested 16 while already in this country are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, there would 17 be no need to carve out an exception for those who had committed criminal or terrorist 18 activities. See Rosado v. Figueroa, No. CV 25-2157-DHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 19 2337099, at *9 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025) (reasoning that if Section 1225’s “mandatory 20 detention provisions apply to all noncitizens present in the United States who have not been 21 admitted, it would render superfluous provisions of § 1226 that apply to certain categories 22 of inadmissible noncitizens”); Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1258 (noting that if the court 23 were to adopt a reading of Section 1225 advanced by the BIA, it would render significant 24 portions of Section 1226(c) meaningless). To avoid rendering Section 1226(c) completely 25 meaningless, the Court finds non-citizens arrested on a warrant in the interior of the United 26 States are subject to discretionary release on bond under Section 1226(a), not mandatory 27 detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). 28 1 In addition, “the longstanding practice of the government—like any other 2 interpretive aid—can inform a court’s determination of what the law is.” Rosado, 2025 3 WL 2337099, at *10 (citation modified) (quoting Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 386). “Until 4 this year, DHS has applied section 1226(a) and its regime of discretionary release and 5 review of detention to the vast majority of noncitizens allegedly in this country without 6 valid documentation—a practice codified by regulation.” Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, __F. 7 Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 2741654, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (citation modified); see 8 also Inspection & Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 9 1997). 10 Against this backdrop, Congress adopted the Laken Riley Act, adding Section 11 1226(c)(1)(E), which mandates detention for additional categories of criminal aliens. 12 “When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real 13 and substantial effect.” Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1259 (quoting Stone v. I.N.S., 514 14 U.S. 386, 397 (1995), abrogated on other grounds by Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 261 15 (2025)). “When Congress adopts a new law against the backdrop of a ‘longstanding 16 administrative construction,’ courts ‘generally presume the new provision should be 17 understood to work in harmony with what has come before.’” Id. (quoting Monsalvo 18 Velazquez v. Bondi, 604 U.S. 712, 725 (2025)). 19 The longstanding practice of DHS applying Section 1226 to those arrested in the 20 interior of the United States supports the finding that this practice was the best reading of 21 the statute. This conclusion is particularly true because adopting Respondents’ 22 interpretation would result in the recently enacted Laken Riley Act being completely 23 meaningless and unnecessary. 24 Statutory interpretation supports that Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), 25 applies to Petitioner’s immigration detention. Because the BIA’s decision binding 26 Immigration Judges incorrectly provides that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention 27 with no individualized bond determination, Petitioner is being held in violation of federal 28 law. Hence, his Petition is GRANTED. 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons stated above, Petitioner Felipe Rodriguez Gutierrez’s Petition for 3 || Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. The Court issues the following writ: ‘ The Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Felipe Rodriguez Gutierrez 5 (A221-421-545) an individualized bond determination hearing before an 6 Immigration Judge within 14 days of today’s date. 7 || The Clerk of the Court shall close the case. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 || DATED: December 12, 2025 (yatta Bahar 11 H¢n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

~ QR _