Feliciano-Munoz v. Rebarber-Ocasio

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: April 23, 2025
• Docket: 24-1122
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 24-1122

LUIS FELICIANO-MUÑOZ; AIR AMERICA, INC.,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

FRED J. REBARBER-OCASIO,

Defendant, Appellee.

Plaintiff, Appellee,

LUIS FELICIANO-MUÑOZ; CHRISTEL BENGOA; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FELICIANO-BENGOA,

Defendants, Appellants,

ABC INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr.,* U.S. District Judge]

* Of the District of Maine, sitting by designation. Before

Barron, Chief Judge, Lipez and Thompson, Circuit Judges.

José R. Olmo-Rodríguez, for appellants.

Carlos A. Mercado-Rivera, with whom Mercado Rivera Law Offices was on brief, for appellee.

April 23, 2025 BARRON, Chief Judge. Luis Feliciano-Muñoz

("Feliciano"), Air America Inc., Christel Bengoa, and the

Feliciano-Bengoa conjugal partnership appeal from a jury verdict

in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto

Rico. They ask us to grant a new trial, or, in the alternative,

to order remittitur. We affirm the judgment below, substantially

for the reasons set forth in the District Court's ruling on

appellants' motion for a new trial. See Local Rule 27.0(c) (this

court may summarily dispose of an appeal that does not raise a

"substantial question").

I.

In 2016, Feliciano and Air America Inc., a regional

airline in Puerto Rico, brought Puerto Rico law claims against

Fred Rebarber-Ocasio ("Rebarber") in connection with Rebarber's

sale of the majority share of Air America to Feliciano. The suit

alleged that Rebarber breached the agreement effectuating the

airline's sale by misrepresenting the condition of airline

equipment and by failing to pay for repairs for which he was

responsible under the agreement's terms. In April 2018, while

those claims were pending, Rebarber countersued Feliciano, his

wife, Christel Bengoa, and the conjugal partnership, alleging that

Feliciano had been grossly negligent in his management of Air

America.

- 3 - On July 1, 2022, at the end of a nine-day jury trial,

the jury returned verdicts in Rebarber's favor on all the claims.

The jury awarded $534,836 in damages to Rebarber for Feliciano's

gross negligence. Bengoa and the conjugal partnership were held

jointly liable for $141,400 of that amount.

Feliciano, Air America, Bengoa, and the conjugal

partnership filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 59. In their Rule 59 motion, they

contended that the jury's verdicts were against the weight of the

evidence, that the damages were excessive, and that the District

Court had made various errors during trial. They asked the

District Court to vacate the judgment in favor of Rebarber and to

enter judgment in their favor, to hold a new trial, or, in the

alternative, to order remittitur. The District Court denied the

motion in a thorough opinion.

partnership appeal from the jury verdicts and the District Court's

denial of their motion for a new trial. On appeal, they reprise

many of the arguments they made in their Rule 59 motion and also

argue that the District Court exhibited bias against Feliciano

during the trial and in resolving their Rule 59 motion.

II.

A district court's denial of a motion for a new trial is

reviewed for abuse of discretion. Blomquist v. Horned Dorset

- 4 - Primavera, Inc., 925 F.3d 541, 551 (1st Cir. 2019). "On appeal,

we owe much deference to the trial court's determination," Correia

v. Feeney, 620 F.3d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 2010), and we review it "bearing

in mind that [a court] 'may set aside a jury's verdict and order

a new trial only if the verdict is so clearly against the weight

of the evidence as to amount to a manifest miscarriage of

justice,'" Sailor Inc. F/V v. City of Rockland, 428 F.3d 348, 351

(1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Rivera Castillo v. Autokirey, Inc., 379

F.3d 4, 13 (1st Cir. 2004)). Where an appellant's motion for a

new trial challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this inquiry

"merge[s]" with the standard of review for a court's denial of a

motion for judgment as a matter of law. Blomquist, 925 F.3d at

551 n.15 (quoting Dimanche v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 893 F.3d 1,

8 n.9 (1st Cir. 2018)).

We review the District Court's various trial management

decisions for abuse of discretion, as the appellants urge us to

do.

Lastly, a jury's damages award will be set aside on

appeal only when "it is so excessive that the district court's

refusal to order a new trial constitutes a manifest abuse of

discretion." Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 215 (1st Cir. 1987)

(quoting Joia v. Jo-Ja Serv. Corp., 817 F.2d 908, 918 (1st Cir.

1987)) (cleaned up). A court must "[v]iew[] the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict" and may not disturb the jury's

- 5 - assessment of the damages "unless it is 'grossly excessive,

inordinate, shocking to the conscience of the court, or so high

that it would be a denial of justice to permit it to stand.'"

Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19, 30 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting

Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 215). This places a "heavy burden" on the

party seeking to upset the award. Currier v. United Techs. Corp.,

393 F.3d 246, 256 (1st Cir. 2004).

III.

A.

We begin with the appellants' contention that the jury's

verdicts on the breach-of-contract claim and the gross-negligence

claim are against the weight of the evidence. We are not

persuaded.

As to the jury's verdict on the breach-of-contract

claim, the District Court rejected the appellants' assertion that

"unchallenged evidence" demonstrated that the airline equipment

repaired post-sale was the same equipment identified for repair

pre-sale and that the jury verdict on the breach-of-contract claim

was therefore against the weight of the evidence. The District

Court supportably concluded that this "evidence was challenged" by

Rebarber and thus that it "readily falls under the categories of

'conflicting testimony' and 'questions as to the credibility of a

witness'" that are not grounds for granting a new trial. See

Blomquist, 925 F.3d at 551. In so concluding, the District Court

- 6 - explained that a "reasonable jury could have accepted [the]

testimony" of Feliciano's witness but that, in the face of evidence

offered to the contrary, "they were not required to do so." The

appellants do not convincingly explain why the District Court was

wrong to conclude that their evidence was not "unchallenged." As

a result, we see no abuse of discretion in the District Court's

determination that it would not override the jury's choice.

In addition, as to the breach-of-contract claim, the

District Court supportably rejected the appellants' assertion that

the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence because

the evidence adduced at trial established that Rebarber had failed

to disclose to Feliciano necessary information about the

conditions of the aircraft prior to the airline's sale. After

canvassing the trial evidence in detail, the District Court

concluded that "a reasonable jury, based on trustworthy testimony

presented at trial, could readily have found that Mr. Rebarber

disclosed all necessary information to Mr. Feliciano, that Mr.

Feliciano was aware of the conditions of the aircraft . . . and

that the aircraft flew well at the time of the purchase and after

the Agreement." Given what the record shows, the District Court

did not abuse its discretion in so concluding.

As to the jury's verdict on Rebarber's gross-negligence

claim, the District Court supportably determined that a reasonable

jury, presented with Rebarber's evidence that Feliciano "never

- 7 - held shareholder meetings, did not contact Rebarber to consult

him, took a loan from a company other than a recognized financial

institution, [and] paid for personal items with Air America's

money," as well as evidence "that there were falsified records

during Mr. Feliciano's leadership," could have concluded that

Feliciano was grossly negligent in his management of Air America

and that his gross negligence was "relevant to, if not the outright

cause of [its] downfall" (internal quotation marks omitted). We

thus discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court's

determination rejecting the appellants' contention that the

verdict on this claim was against the weight of the evidence.

B.

The appellants next raise various challenges related to

the District Court's asserted errors in managing the trial. They

assert that these errors so confused the jury that we must conclude

that the jury returned unreasonable verdicts on both claims. In

particular, the appellants contend that the District Court abused

its discretion by (1) allowing Rebarber to conduct an improperly

broad re-cross-examination of Feliciano; (2) permitting Feliciano

to be improperly impeached about a clerical error; (3) allowing

the jury to be confused as to the correct legal standard for gross

negligence; and (4) permitting highly prejudicial testimony about

Feliciano's alleged falsification of records.

- 8 - As to the first two contentions, based on our review of

the record and the District Court's reasoning in rejecting those

challenges, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its

discretion in its management of Feliciano's cross-examination. As

to the third contention, we deem this claim waived, as the

appellants advert to it only in a perfunctory manner. See United

States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). Lastly, the

appellants did not raise in their Rule 59 motion any objection to

the assertedly prejudicial testimony regarding Feliciano's

falsification of records that they now object to on appeal.

"[L]egal theories not raised squarely in the lower court cannot be

broached for the first time on appeal." Pomerleau v. W.

Springfield Pub. Sch., 362 F.3d 143, 146 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting

Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Loc. No. 59

v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992); see

also Neufville v. Coyne-Fague, No. 21-1158, 2021 WL 3730224, at *1

(1st Cir. June 2, 2021) (explaining that a Rule 59 motion affords

a party an opportunity to preserve claims for appeal). We

therefore deem this challenge waived as well.

C.

The appellants also challenge the jury's damages award.

They first contend that it amounts to "double compensation" because

the damages awarded include both the stock value of Rebarber's Air

America shares as well as an additional sum for the company's

- 9 - "goodwill value." The appellants argue in the alternative, but

for related reasons, that remittitur is warranted because the award

"exceeds any rational assessment or estimation of damages

supported by the evidence presented." This is so, they contend,

because Rebarber could not have been awarded more than the "market

value of [his Air America] stock" and because the evidence

presented at trial demonstrated that the company's assets were

overvalued.

The District Court rejected the appellants' objections

to the jury's award, emphasizing that "[t]he standard of review of

damages awards places an enormous burden on the party challenging

the award," and concluding, based on its review of the evidence

presented at trial, that the jury's award had "a 'substantial basis

in the evidence'" (first quoting Velazquez v. Figueroa-Gomez, 996

F.2d 425, 428 (1st Cir. 1993); and then quoting Tejada-Bautista v.

Fuentes Agostini, 258 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.P.R. 2003)). It also

noted that Feliciano had "point[ed] the Court to no precedent"

supporting its position that the damages could not exceed the

market value of the stock.

On appeal, the appellants likewise point to no caselaw

to support their contention that the damages awarded cannot exceed

the value of the stock or, relatedly, that awarding damages for

"both the stock value and an additional sum for goodwill

constitutes double compensation, amounting to unjust enrichment."

- 10 - The appellants also do not refer to any part of the record to

support their claim that the value of the stock at issue could not

have exceeded $325,000. Yet, "[i]t is well settled in this circuit

that 'issues adverted to on appeal in a perfunctory manner,

unaccompanied by some developed argumentation, are deemed to have

been abandoned.' We will not attempt to supply an argument the

appellant has not articulated." Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden

Am., Inc., 591 F.3d 1, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Vallejo

Piedrahita v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 142, 144 (1st Cir. 2008)). The

appellants therefore have not met their "heavy burden" to show

that the relief they request is warranted. Currier, 393 F.3d at

256 (quoting Koster v. TWA, 181 F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir. 1999)).

D.

There remains to address the appellants' argument that

the District Court demonstrated bias against Feliciano during

trial and in its resolution of the appellants' Rule 59 motion. As

evidence of bias, they point to (1) what they contend are unfounded

statements by the District Court in front of the jury that

Feliciano changed his testimony and provided prior inconsistent

statements; (2) the District Court's discussion of Feliciano's and

Rebarber's "biographical data" in its resolution of the Rule 59

motion; and (3) references in the District Court's opinion to

Feliciano's "obstinacy, blame-shifting, and obfuscation." The

appellants assert that these statements either prejudiced the jury

- 11 - or otherwise demonstrate the District Court's partiality and

"inclination to favor" Rebarber over Feliciano, "infect[ing] the

entire trial process, so as to require reversal."

We need not linger on this claim because we disagree

with the appellants' characterization of the District Court's

statements, none of which leave us with an "abiding impression" of

bias, United States v. Espinal-Almeida, 699 F.3d 588, 607 (1st

Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. de la Cruz-Paulino, 61 F.3d

986, 997 (1st Cir. 1995)), or otherwise provide any factual basis

to doubt the District Court's impartiality, see Blizard v.

Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217, 1220 (1st Cir. 1979). The statements

made during trial were not unfounded and, moreover, were germane

to the District Court's resolution of an evidentiary objection.

The District Court's discussion of the parties' "biographical

data" in its denial of the Rule 59 motion also showed no partiality

to either party and was grounded in the trial evidence. As the

District Court also explained, background context concerning the

parties' relevant business experience and work in the aviation

industry could have been relevant to the jury's analysis of the

parties' claims. For similar reasons, we also see no evidence of

bias in the District Court's characterization of Feliciano's trial

testimony, which the District Court determined could have been

relevant to the jury's assessment of Feliciano's credibility. We

- 12 - thus decline to hold that the appellants are entitled to a new

trial on the basis of their assertions of bias.

IV.

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

- 13 -