Federal Trade Commission v. Arch Coal, Inc.

329 F. Supp. 2d 109
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedAugust 16, 2004
DocketCIV.A.04-0534 JDB, CIV.A.9409535 JDB
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (Federal Trade Commission v. Arch Coal, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Federal Trade Commission v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BATES, District Judge.

Coal is the primary fuel that produces electric power for residential and business consumers across the United States. It is mined in various regions across the country, in either surface or underground mining operations, after which the coal is transported by rail, truck or barge to electrical generating plants. One-third of the coal produced annually in the United States — over 360 million tons — is produced from large-scale surface mining operations in the Southern Powder River Basin (“SPRB”) region of Wyoming. Seven companies operate fourteen mines in the SPRB at this time.

In May of 2003, Arch Coal, Inc. (“Arch”), the owner and operator of two SPRB mines (Black Thunder and Coal Creek) as well as other mining operations across the United States, and New Vulcan Coal Holdings, LLC (“New Vulcan”), the owner of two SPRB mines (North Rochelle and Buckskin), which it operates through its subsidiary Triton Coal Company, LLC (“Triton”), entered into a merger and purchase agreement under which Arch would acquire Triton and its two SPRB mines. HarWScotWRodino pre-merger notification was provided to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), which in August 2003 requested additional information from Arch and New Vulcan. Arch subsequently informed the FTC that it intended to divest one of the acquired mines (Buckskin) to Peter Kiewit Sons, Inc. (“Kiewit”), a large company with some mining interests outside the SPRB, and in January 2004 a firm asset purchase agreement was entered by Arch and Kiewit.

After a nine-month review, the FTC voted on March 30, 2004, to commence this action seeking to enjoin the proposed acquisition under Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), as violative of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18. The FTC seeks to preliminarily enjoin Arch’s proposed acquisition of Triton until an administrative FTC proceeding challenging the transaction under Section 7 can be completed. A parallel suit was also filed on April 1, 2004, by the States of Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, Illinois, Iowa, and Texas (the “States”) seeking both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The two actions were consolidated by this Court on April 21, 2004. 1

The Court held a two-week trial commencing on June 28, 2004, during which it heard from more than twenty witnesses and received hundreds of exhibits, many of them lengthy, including deposition and affidavit testimony of several additional witnesses. The parties have submitted well over 700 pages of post-hearing proposed findings of fact and briefs. The Court has reviewed that substantial body of evidence and argument in assessing the FTC’s challenge to the proposed acquisition of the *115 North Rochelle and Buckskin mines by Arch, and the simultaneous transfer of Buckskin to Kiewit, and the probable effect of those transactions on competition in the SPRB. 2 The case is complex, and represents an attempt by the FTC to enjoin transactions that do not reduce the number of competitors and only modestly increase the concentration in what has been a very competitive market. Moreover, the case rests on a novel FTC theory of likely future “tacit coordination” among competu tors to restrict production, as opposed to direct coordination of prices. In the end, the Court concludes that the FTC and the States have not met their burden under Section 7 of the Clayton Act and (for the FTC) Section 13(b) of the FTC Act to show a likelihood that the challenged transactions will substantially lessen competition in the SPRB. The requested preliminary injunctive relief will therefore be denied. 3

1. APPLICABLE LAW

Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, prohibits a merger between two companies “where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition ... may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.” The Supreme Court has observed that Section 7 “deals in probabilities, not certainties.” United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 505, 94 S.Ct. 1186, 39 L.Ed.2d 530 (1974); see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 658, 84 S.Ct. 1044, 12 L.Ed.2d 12 (1964). As defendants also correctly stress, however, “Section 7 deals in probabilities not ephemeral possibilities.” FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1051 (8th Cir.1999). To warrant injunctive relief under the Clayton Act, the challenged acquisition must be likely substantially to lessen competition. Although certainty is not required, Section 7 does demand that a plaintiff demonstrate that the substantial lessening of competition will be “sufficiently probable and imminent” to warrant relief. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 618, 94 S.Ct. 2856, 41 L.Ed.2d 978 (1974); see United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C.Cir.1990) (“Section 7 involves probabilities, not certainties or possibilities.”).

Congress has empowered the Federal Trade Commission to seek preliminary injunctive relief preventing parties from consummating a merger until the F.TC has had an opportunity to adjudicate the merger’s legality. Section 13(b) of the FTC Act “provides for the grant of a preliminary injunction where such action would be in the public interest — as determined by a weighing of the equities and a consideration of the Commission’s likelihood of success on the merits.” FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 714 (D.C.Cir.2001); see 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). The FTC “is not required to prove, nor is the court *116 required to find, that the proposed merger would in fact violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act.” FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F.Supp. 1066, 1070 (D.D.C.1997) (citations omitted); see FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1218 (11th Cir.1991) (court’s task is to make preliminary assessment of impact on competition). Rather, the FTC “need only show that there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that the Acquisition may substantially lessen competition.” Staples, 970 F.Supp. at 1072.

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Bluebook (online)
329 F. Supp. 2d 109, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/federal-trade-commission-v-arch-coal-inc-dcd-2004.