Federal Election Commission v. Political Contributions Data, Inc.

943 F.2d 190, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19767, 1991 WL 159770
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedAugust 21, 1991
Docket1779, Docket 91-6084
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 943 F.2d 190 (Federal Election Commission v. Political Contributions Data, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Federal Election Commission v. Political Contributions Data, Inc., 943 F.2d 190, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19767, 1991 WL 159770 (2d Cir. 1991).

Opinion

GEORGE C. PRATT, Circuit Judge:

It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that congress is presumed to have passed statutes which are constitutional. Thus, we are obliged to construe statutes to avoid constitutional problems whenever possible. See, e.g., DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const., 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 1397, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988); Lowe v. Securities and Exchange Comm’n, 472 U.S. 181, 207, 105 S.Ct. 2557, 2571, 86 L.Ed.2d 130 (1985) (“the apparent intent of Congress [was] to keep the Act free of constitutional infirmities”); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657, 15 S.Ct. 207, 211, 39 L.Ed. 297 (1895) (“every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality”). Moreover, when congress indicates that its goal in passing a statute is to avoid constitutional problems, our task is made easier. This is such a case.

Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”, or “the act”) in order to, inter alia, require disclosure of campaign contributions and contributors. Congress determined that this disclosure was necessary in order to inform the electorate where campaign money comes from, to deter corruption, and to effectively enforce the act’s contribution limitation requirements. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68, 96 S.Ct. 612, 657-58, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1974).

The FECA’s broad disclosure requirements, as well as the legislative history of the act, indicate that the FECA holds, as its overarching philosophy, the principle that “[publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best disinfectant; electric light the most efficient policeman.” Brandéis, What Publicity Can Do, Harper’s Weekly, Dec. 20, 1913, at 10 (quoted in Senate Comm, on Commerce, Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, S.Rep. 96, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (additional views of Sen. Griffin), reprinted in 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1773, 1816).

Today, we are faced with the FEC’s attempt to limit the FECA’s broad disclosure requirements through the “commercial purposes” restriction contained in 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4). Specifically, we must decide whether the defendant, a corporation which produces campaign contribution reports to *192 sell to the public, “sold or used” information culled from the FEC in violation of § 438(a)(4). Since we answer that question in the negative by reading the statute in a manner that avoids the first amendment problems that the FEC’s interpretation would engender, we not only further the intent of congress, but also need not reach the “important and troubling First Amendment implications raised by any construction of the statute that bars the use of the information at issue in this case by organizations such as” the defendant. National Republican Cong. Comm. v. Legi-Tech Corp., 795 F.2d 190, 194 (D.C.Cir.1986) (Wright, J., concurring) (hereinafter “NRCC’).

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF § 438(a)(4)

The § 438(a)(4) “commercial purposes” exception was proposed as an amendment to that section by Senator Bellmon of Oklahoma:

Mr. President, the purpose of this amendment is to protect the privacy of the generally very public-spirited citizens who may make a contribution to a political campaign or a political party. We all know how much of a business the matter of selling lists and list brokering has become. These names would certainly be prime prospects for all kinds of solicitations, and I am of the opinion that unless this amendment is adopted, we will open up the citizens who are generous and public spirited enough to support our political activities to all kinds of harassment, and in that way tend to discourage them from helping out as we need to have them do.

117 Cong.Rec, 30,057 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1971) (statement of Sen. Bellmon). Senator Bellmon’s amendment was grudgingly accepted by the bill’s sponsor, Senator Cannon, who replied:

Mr. President, this is certainly a laudable objective. I do not know how we are going to prevent it from being done. I think as long as we are going to make the lists available, some people are going to use them to make solicitations. But as far as it can be made effective, I am willing to accept the amendment, and I yield back the remainder of my time.

Id. (statement of Sen. Cannon). Senator Bellmon went on to give an example of the evils he was attempting to combat with his amendment:

Mr. Bellmon. * * *.
In the State of Oklahoma, our own tax division sells the names of new car buyers to list brokers, for example, and I am sure similar practices are widespread elsewhere. This amendment is intended to protect, at least to some degree, the men and women who make contributions to candidates or political parties from being victimized by that practice.
Mr. Nelson. Do I understand that the only purpose is to prohibit the lists from being used for commercial purposes?
Mr. Bellmon. That is correct.
Mr. Nelson. The list is a public document, however.
Mr. Bellmon. That is correct.
Mr. Nelson. And newspapers may, if they wish, run lists of contributors and amounts.
Mr. Bellmon. That is right; but the list brokers, under this amendment, would be prohibited from selling the list or using it for commercial solicitation.

Id. at 30,058.

FACTS AND BACKGROUND

The Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or the “commission”) is the independent agency of the United States government charged with the administration, interpretation, and civil enforcement of the FECA. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c(b)(l), 437d(a) & (e), 437f, 437g. FEC is specifically authorized to formulate policy under the act. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(l). One of FEC’s responsibilities is to serve as a clearinghouse for all campaign finance reports and statements filed under the requirements of the FECA. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432(g), 438(a)(10).

FEC maintains a computerized database which contains much of the financial information reported to the commission. This database can be searched by,

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Bluebook (online)
943 F.2d 190, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19767, 1991 WL 159770, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/federal-election-commission-v-political-contributions-data-inc-ca2-1991.