FBS AG CREDIT, INC. v. Estate of Walker

906 F. Supp. 1427, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 389, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17581, 1995 WL 695979
CourtDistrict Court, D. Colorado
DecidedNovember 21, 1995
DocketCiv. A. 94-B-2587
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 906 F. Supp. 1427 (FBS AG CREDIT, INC. v. Estate of Walker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
FBS AG CREDIT, INC. v. Estate of Walker, 906 F. Supp. 1427, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 389, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17581, 1995 WL 695979 (D. Colo. 1995).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BABCOCK, District Judge.

In this diversity jurisdiction action, plaintiff, FBS AG Credit, Inc. (FBS), moves for summary judgment on its claim against defendants, Estate of Howard Walker (Walker), R. Kent Kunz (Kunz), and Weldon Gainer (Gainer). The motion is adequately briefed and oral argument will not materially aid its resolution. After consideration of the motion and briefs, I conclude that summary judgment should be granted in favor of FBS.

I.

FBS seeks recovery under the terms of written guaranties executed by Walker, Kunz, and Gainer in connection with a financial transaction. In January, 1993, FBS made loans to a group of affiliated companies, Heartland, Inc. (Heartland), Western Valley Pallets, Inc., Heartland Industries, Inc., Heartland Distributors Group, Inc., Western Valley Processing, Inc., Sand Hills Beef Corporation, and The Sigman Meat Company (Sigman), Inc. (collectively “Borrower”). The loan and security agreement (Pltf.Exh. 1) provided for loans in principal sums from FBS up to $23,500,000.00. As contemplated by the loan and security agreement, Borrower executed and delivered to plaintiff a term note (Plt.Exh. 2) in the amount of $3,500,000.00. Walker, Kunz, and Gainer each executed a written guaranty (Appendix A) in which each unconditionally guaranteed full and prompt payment of the $3,500,000 term note. The $20,000,000 line of credit note was not guaranteed by defendants.

Borrowers defaulted on the term note and then filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. FBS then filed this action against the guarantors, Walker, Kunz, and Gainer. On September 11, 1995, Walker died. On September 22,1995,1 ordered that the Estate of Howard Walker be substituted for Howard Walker> individually.

II.

Choice of law

As an initial matter, I address the choice of law issue raised by defendants who assert that despite the choice of law provision selecting Colorado in each guaranty, California law should apply. I disagree.

Each guaranty provides in bold caps that “this guaranty shall be interpreted, and the rights and liabilities of the parties hereto determined, in accordance with the laws and decisions of the state of Colorado_” (Appendix A p. 4)

Colorado requires resolution of conflicts under the principles set forth in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, §§ 187 and 188 (1971). Wood Bros. Homes, Inc. v. Walker Adjustment Bureau, 198 Colo. 444, 601 P.2d 1369 (1979). However, those principles apply only “in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.” Id.; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, §§ 187 and 188. The parties’ choice of law is effective “unless there is no reasonable basis for their choice or unless applying the law of the state so chosen would be contrary to the fundamental policy of a state whose law would otherwise govern.” Hansen v. GAB Business Services, Inc., 876 P.2d 112 (Colo. App.1994); See Wood Bros., 601 P.2d 1369 n. 4. “Merely not recognizing a claim or theory of recovery is not a substantial conflict which warrants a court’s rejection of a contractually designated choice of law.” Hansen, 876 P.2d 112. Defendants fail to show any lack of reasonable basis for their choice of Colorado law or that Colorado’s law is contrary to a fundamental policy of California. Accordingly, I will apply Colorado law.

III.

Summary Judgment Standard

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 provides that summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, ad *1430 missions, or affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The non-moving party has the burden of showing that there are issues of material fact to be determined. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of genuine issues for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; Mares v. ConAgra Poultry Co., Inc., 971 F.2d 492, 494 (10th Cir.1992). Once a properly supported summary judgment motion is made, the opposing party may not rest on the allegations contained in his pleadings, but must respond with specific facts showing the existence of a genuine factual issue to be tried. Otteson v. U.S., 622 F.2d 516, 519 (10th Cir.1980); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). These specific facts may be shown “by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the pleadings themselves.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.

Summary judgment is also appropriate when the court concludes that no reasonable juror could find for the non-moving party based on the evidence present in the motion and response. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The operative inquiry is whether, based on all documents submitted, reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, summary judgment should not enter if, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for that party. Anderson Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512; Mares, 971 F.2d at 494.

IV.

FBS seeks summary judgment on the grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact that defendants are legally obligated to repay FBS pursuant to the guaranties.

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906 F. Supp. 1427, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 389, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17581, 1995 WL 695979, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fbs-ag-credit-inc-v-estate-of-walker-cod-1995.