[37]*37Opinion
CLARK, J.
The Fair Political Practices Commission petitions for writ of mandate to compel respondent court to vacate a judgment enjoining enforcement of the Political Reform Act of 1974 (Gov. Code, § 81000 et seq.), an initiative measure.
We have stayed enforcement of the judgment except for paragraph 5, “That intervenor Fair Political Practices Commission . . . [is] permanently enjoined from commencing proceedings as civil prosecutor against any lobbyist based on the single act of advising or making a recommendation to the employer of the lobbyist with regard to the making of a political contribution where the advice or recommendation results in a contribution from the employer.” This provision made permanent a preliminary injunction issued in 1975 by Judge Hupp of the superior court, and affirmed in Institute of Governmental Advocates v. Younger (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 878 [139 Cal.Rptr. 233].
Respondent court declared the entire initiative invalid, holding it violates the one subject rule applicable to initiatives (Cal.Const., art. II, § 8, subd. (d), formerly art. IV, § 22); section 86202 of chapter 6 (prohibiting lobbyist contributions to political campaigns) violates First Amendment and equal protection guarantees; and, with minor exceptions, the remainder of chapter 6 violates equal protection guarantees. Sections of chapter 6 declared invalid include limitations on lobbyist gifts to certain public officials, and disclosure requirements for certain persons and organizations involved with lobbying.
The Single Subject Rule
The initiative concerns elections and different methods for preventing corruption and undue influence in political campaigns and governmental activities. Chapters 1 and 2 contain general provisions and definitions, including a severability provision. Chapter 3 establishes the commission. Chapter 4 establishes disclosure requirements for candidates’ significant financial supporters. Chapter 5 places limitations on campaign spending. Chapter 6 regulates lobbyist activities. Chapter 7 establishes rules relating to conflict of interest. Chapter 8 establishes rules relating to voter pamphlet summaries of arguments on proposed ballot measures. Chapter 9 regulates ballot position of candidates. Chapter 10 establishes auditing procedures to aid enforcement of the law, and chapter 11 imposes penalties for violations of the act.
[38]*38Several sections of the initiative have been held invalid in prior decisions. Under the compulsion of Buckley v. Valeo (1976) 424 U.S. 1 [46 L. Ed.2d 659, 96 S.Ct. 612], we held sections 85300-85305 limiting expenditures on statewide ballot propositions violated the freedom of speech guarantee of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Citizens for Jobs & Energy v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 671 [129 Cal.Rptr. 106, 547 P.2d 1386].) In Hardie v. Eu (1976) 18 Cal.3d 371 [134 Cal.Rptr. 201, 556 P.2d 301], we concluded Government Code sections 85200-85202 limiting the amount to be expended for circulation of initiative petitions was in conflict with First Amendment guarantees, again relying on Buckley. In Institute of Governmental Advocates v. Younger, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 878, the Court of Appeal held that a commission ruling precluding lobbyists from advising their employers to make political contributions violated First Amendment guarantees.
The California Constitution, article II, section 8, subdivision (d), states: “An initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect.”
The single subject requirement for initiative measures was adopted in 1948 as article IV, section lc. The next year this court in Perry v. Jordan (1949) 34 Cal.2d 87, 92-93 [207 P.2d 47], construed the provision as follows: “The problem of whether more than one subject is embraced within one legislative act is not new in this state. Although section lc has been newly added extending the requirement to initiative constitutional amendments, the Constitution for many years has required that ‘Every act shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be expressed in its title.’ (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 24.) The proper scope and application of that provision as to singleness of subject was elucidated, as the latest word on the subject, by this court in Evans v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 58, 62 [8 P.2d 467], upholding the adoption of the Probate Code in a single enactment: ‘... we are of the view that the provision is not to receive a narrow or technical construction in all cases, but is to be construed liberally to uphold proper legislation, all parts of which are reasonably germane. (Heron v. Riley, 209 Cal. 507, 510 [289 P. 160].) The provision was not enacted to provide means for the overthrow of legitimate legislation. (McClure v. Riley, 198 Cal. 23, 26 [243 P. 429].) ... [If] Numerous provisions, having one general object, if fairly indicated in the title, may be united in one act. Provisions governing projects so related and interdependent as to constitute a single scheme may be properly included within a single act. (Barber v. Galloway, 195 Cal. 1, 3 [231 P. [39]*3934].) The legislature may insert in a single act all legislation germane to the general subject as expressed in its title and within the field of legislation suggested thereby. (Treat v. Los Angeles Gas Corp., 82 Cal.App. 610 [256 P. 447].) Provisions which are logically germane to the title of the act, and are included within its scope, may be united. The general purpose of a statute being declared, the details provided for its accomplishment will be regarded as necessary incidents. (Estate of Wellings, 192 Cal. 506, 519 [221 P. 628]; Buelke v. Levenstadt, 190 Cal. 684, 687 [214 P. 42]; and cases cited.) The language of this court in Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 51 [121 Am.St.Rep. 90, 12 Ann.Cas. 829, 90 P. 129], is especially applicable to this case at this point. A provision which conduces to the act, or which is auxiliary to and promotive of its main purpose, or has a necessary and natural connection with such purpose is germane within the rule. . . . Our conclusion, therefore, is that the newly enacted Probate Code does not embrace more than one subject. Its numerous provisions have one general object. The classification of these provisions, made by the code commission, and carried into the title of the act, is a “reasonably intelligent reference to the subject to which the legislation of the act is to be addressed,” which is all that is requisite.’ (See, also, cases collected in 23 Cal.Jur. 646-650; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, §§ 196-199.) When the scope and meaning of words or phrases in a statute have been repeatedly interpreted by the courts, there is some indication that the use of them in a subsequent statute in a similar setting carries with it a like construction. (City of Long Beach v. Payne, 3 Cal.2d 184 [44 P.2d 305].) There is nothing in the argument to the voters when section lc of article IV was adopted contrary to such construction or the purposes underlying the ‘one subject’ limitation.”
Relying upon Perry v. Jordan, this court applied the reasonably germane test and upheld the California Water Resources Development Bond Act in Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Marquardt (1963) 59 Cal.2d 159, 172-173 [28 Cal.Rptr. 724, 379 P.2d 28]. The act provided for issuance of nearly $2 billion in bonds, the proceeds to be used for dams, levees, channel improvements, a water distribution system, drainage facilities, electrical energy generation and transmission systems, and local water development facilities.
Recently, we rejected a claim that the one subject requirement was violated by an initiative limiting real property tax rates, limiting real property assessments, restricting state taxes, and restricting local taxes. (Cal. Const., art. XIII A; the Jarvis-Gann Initiative.) We held that all provisions were functionally related and reasonably germane to the [40]*40subject of property tax relief. (Amador Valley Joint Union High Schl. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 231 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].)1
Real party in interest Institute of Governmental Advocates (Advocates) argues that a more restrictive test should be applied in determining compliance with the one subject requirement applicable to initiatives than to the same requirement applicable to legislation. Two reasons are offered for a more restrictive test: the lengthy ballot propositions, having numerous provisions, will mislead and confuse the voter, and danger exists that voters wanting one or more of the provisions offered might vote for the proposition even though they reject other provisions—a danger of so-called “log rolling.” (See Schmitz v. Younger (1978) 21 Cal.3d 90, 93, 97 et seq. (dis. opn.) [145 Cal.Rptr. 517, 577 P.2d 652].)
Advocates does not articulate a particular test to replace the reasonably germane test. Rather, Advocates takes the position that the reasons for a more restrictive test necessarily provide the measure of such test. Advocates claims both reasons apply to the Political Reform Act of 1974, asserting the initiative is lengthy and confusing—containing more than 20,000 words and numerous interrelated provisions—and that it involves four wholly separate substantive subjects: (1) regulation of election to public office, (2) regulation of ballot measure petitions and elections, (3) regulation of public official conflicts of interest, and (4) regulation of lobbyists.2
[41]*41Consistent with our duty to uphold the people’s right to initiative process, we adhere to the reasonably germane test and, in doing so, find that the measure before us complies with the one subject requirement.
“The amendment of the California Constitution in 1911 to provide for the initiative and referendum signifies one of the outstanding achievements of the progressive movement of the early 1900’s. Drafted in light of the theory that all power of government ultimately resides in the people, the amendment speaks of the initiative and referendum, not as a right granted the people, but as a power reserved by them. Declaring it ‘the duty of the courts to jealously guard this right of the people’ (Martin v. Smith (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 115, 117 [1 Cal.Rptr. 307]), the courts have described the initiative and referendum as articulating ‘one of the most precious rights of our democratic process’ (Mervynne v. Acker, ... 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 563 [11 Cal.Rptr. 340]). ‘[I]t has long been our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this power wherever it is challenged in order that the right be not improperly annulled. If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power, courts will preserve it.’ (Mervynne v. Acker, supra, 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 563-564; Gayle v. Hamm, ... 25 Cal.App.3d 250, 258 [101 Cal.Rptr. 628].)” (Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591 [135 Cal.Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473, 92 A.L.R.3d 1038] (fns. omitted); Farley v. Healey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 325, 328 [62 Cal.Rptr. 26, 431 P.2d 650].)
In keeping with the policy favoring the initiative, the voters may not be limited to brief general statements but may deal comprehensively and in detail with an area of law.
[42]*42Although the initiative measure before us is wordy and complex, there is little reason to expect that claimed voter confusion could be eliminated or substantially reduced by dividing the measure into four or ten separate propositions. Our society being complex, the rules governing it whether adopted by legislation or initiative will necessarily be complex. Unless we are to repudiate or cripple use of the initiative, risk of confusion must be borne.
Nor does the possibility that some voters might vote for the measure —while objecting to some parts—warrant rejection of the reasonably germane test. Such risk is inherent in any initiative containing more than one sentence or even an “and” in a single sentence unless the provisions are redundant. For example, the Jarvis-Gann initiative (Cal. Const., art. XIII A) provided limitations on property taxes and restrictions on state and other local taxes. (See Amador Valley Joint Union High Schl. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 22 Cal.3d 208.) Some property owners may have voted for the measure primarily because of the property tax relief, while having questions about the state and other local tax restrictions. Similarly, some nonproperty owners may have voted for the initiative primarily because of the restrictions on other state and local taxes, while having reservations as to the property tax limitations.
The enactment of laws whether by the Legislature or by the voters in the last analysis always presents the issue whether on balance the proposed act’s benefits exceed its shortcomings. If so, the remedy for shortcomings is repeal, which will be difficult whether the law is adopted by the Legislature or the people. The difficulty of repeal is merely one factor to be considered by legislators and voters when casting their votes.
Given the widespread public debate of initiatives, the explanations in the ballot pamphlets and in the media, and the huge volume of legislative business—over 1,000 bills enacted each year—it is unreasonable to assume that initiative measures receive less scrutiny than proposed legislation.
The people having reserved the legislative power to themselves as well as having granted it to the Legislature, there is no reason to hold that the people’s power is more limited than that of the Legislature, and the single subject requirements applicable to both powers (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8, subd. (d); art. IV, § 9) should not be used to establish inequality. (Cf. Associated Home Builders etc. Inc. v. City of Livermore, supra, 18 Cal.3d 582, 591-592.) Accordingly, we adhere to the reasonably germane test for both.
[43]*43The provisions of the initiative are reasonably germane to the' subject of political practices, and there is no violation of the one subject requirement.
Lobbyist Regulation
A. Contributions
Section 86202 provides: “It shall be unlawful for a lobbyist to make a contribution, or to act as an agent or intermediary in the making of any contribution, or to arrange for the making of any contribution by himself or by any other person.” “Contribution” means a “contribution made to a state candidate, a committee supporting a state candidate, or an elected state officer.” (§ 8620Ó.) “ ‘Lobbyist’ means any person who is employed or contracts for economic consideration, other than reimbursement for reasonable travel expenses, to communicate directly or through his agents with any elective state official, agency official or legislative official for the purpose of influencing legislative or administrative action, if a substantial or regular portion of the activities for which he receives consideration is for the purpose of influencing legislative or administrative action. No person is a lobbyist by reason of activities described in Section 86300.”3 (§ 82039.) There is no prohibition against contributions by employers of lobbyists.
In Institute of Governmental Advocates v. Younger, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 878, as pointed out earlier, the Court of Appeal on First Amendment grounds invalidated a commission ruling based on section 86202, precluding lobbyists from advising their employers to make political contributions.
In Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. 1, 23-38 [46 L.Ed.2d 659, 690-699], the United States Supreme Court' considered the validity of provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as amended limiting the amount of political contribution by individuals to $1,000 for any candidate and $25,000 total. The court held that contribution limitations restrict the contributor’s freedom of association, “a ‘basic constitutional freedom,’ Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. at 57, that is ‘closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the [44]*44foundation of a free society.’ Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960). See, e.g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-523 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 460-461; NAACP v. Button, supra, [371 U.S.] at 452 (Harlan, J., dissenting).” (424 U.S. at p. 25 [46 L.Ed.2d at p. 691].)
The court pointed out that under our system of private financing of elections, effective candidacy requires large sums of money for the communication media and mass mailing to allow effective discussion of candidacies and campaign issues. (424 U.S. at pp. 26-29 [46 L.Ed.2d at pp. 691-694].) It is apparent that unless an individual is permitted to participate in the election by contributing to candidates, his political voice may be quieted.
The right to associate being fundamental, any governmental action in curtailment of it “ ‘is subject to the closest scrutiny.’ ” Recognizing that the right is not absolute, the court said that significant interference may be sustained if the “State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.” (424 U.S. at p. 25 [46 L.Ed.2d at p. 691].)
The court concluded that the government’s interest in limiting actual or apparent corruption resulting from large individual political contributions is sufficient justification for restricting associational freedoms and the limitation “focuses precisely on the problem of large campaign contributions—the narrow aspect of political association where the actuality and potential for corruption have been identified.” (424 U.S. at pp. 24-29 [46 L.Ed.2d at pp. 690-694].) However, the court also concluded the governmental interest in preventing corruption and its appearance is insufficient justification for limitations on political expenditures. (424 U.S. at pp. 45-47 [46 L.Ed.2d at pp. 702-704]; Hardie v. Eu, supra, 18 Cal.3d 371, 377; Citizens for Jobs & Energy v. Fair Political Practices Com., supra, 16 Cal.3d 671, 674-675.)
A sufficiently compelling governmental interest justifying substantial interference with political rights was also found in CSC v. Letter Carriers (1973) 413 U.S. 548 [37 L.Ed.2d 796, 93 S.Ct. 2880]. Upholding the Hatch Act limiting political activity of governmental employees, the court identified three governmental interests that could be harmed if governmental employees could participate publicly in political activities: (1) governmental employment and promotion might depend upon the extent of participation rather than governmental efficiency, (2) the large number [45]*45of governmental employees might become a huge political machine defeating our democratic processes, and (3) partisan political activity might impair the . employee’s ability to act fairly without bias or favoritism. (413 U.S. at pp. 564-567 [37 L.Ed.2d at pp. 808-810].)
Obviously, the prohibition against lobbyist contributions in section 86200 is a substantial restriction on the lobbyists’ freedom of association, and the restriction may be upheld only if the “State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.” (Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. 1, 25 [46 L.Ed.2d 659, 691].) The statute fails to meet the test.
The claimed state interest is to rid the political system of both apparent and actual corruption and improper influence. Under Buckley such a purpose justifies closely drawn restrictions. However, it does not appear that total prohibition of all contributions by any lobbyist is a closely drawn restriction.
First, the prohibition applies to contributions to any and all candidates even though the lobbyist may never have occasion to lobby the candidate. Secondly, the definition of lobbyist is extremely broad, to include persons who appear regularly before administrative agencies seeking to influence administrative determinations in favor of their clients. Thirdly, the statute does not discriminate between small and large but prohibits all contributions. Thus, it is not narrowly directed to the aspects" of political association where potential corruption might be identified.
While either apparent or actual political corruption might warrant some restriction of lobbyist associational freedom, it does not warrant total prohibition of all contributions by all lobbyists to all candidates.
The governmental interests held to warrant substantial restrictions on political rights in CSC v. Letter Carriers, supra, 413 U.S. 548, have no greater application to lobbyists than to other private campaign contributors.
Section 86202 is invalid because it is not “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.” (Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. 1, 25 [46 L.Ed.2d 659, 691].) This makes it unnecessary to discuss whether the section results in a denial of equal protection.
[46]*46B. Gifts and Other Lobbyist and Employer Regulations
Lobbyists are prohibited from making gifts of more than $10 in any month to any state candidate, a legislative agency or elective state official or from participating in gifts by any other person. (§§ 86201, 86203.) Lobbyists are also required to register and to report all payments for lobbying activities, the names of those supplying the funds and the amounts they furnished, disbursements from the funds received, and any transactions with candidates or legislative agency, or state elective officials or their families. (§§ 86100-86107.) Lobbyists’ reports must include any transaction totalling $500 or more in a single year with business entities in which the lobbyist knows or has reason to know that any state candidate, or legislative, agency, or elective official is a proprietor, partner, director, officer or manager or has more than a 50 percent interest. (See, § 86107, subd. (e).) Lobbyists must also report a “specific description of legislative or administrative action which the lobbyist has influenced or attempted to influence, and the agencies involved, if any.” (§ 86107, subd. (f).)
Persons who employ a lobbyist or pay $250 in any month to influence legislative or administrative action must also file reports. Among other matters, the reports must disclose businesses engaged in, the total amount of payments to influence legislative or administrative action, any contributions made, the names of persons who received $25 or more, and a specific description of legislative or administrative action sought to be influenced. (§ 86109.) The transaction reporting requirement differs from that applicable to lobbyists, applying only to transactions totalling more than $1,000 per year. (Id., subds. (d), (e).)
Among the fundamental rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution is the right to “petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” The lobbyist’s function obviously is to exercise such right on behalf of his employer. The challenged statutes do not directly limit or restrict the right to petition. Rather, the registration and reporting requirements impose burdens on the right to petition, and the gift limitation affects the form of the petition. All may petition provided they bear the burden of registration and reporting and do not offer excessive gifts.
Advocates claims that because speech and petition rights are affected, the strict scrutiny rule is applicable.
[47]*47Although a fundamental interest may be involved, both the United States Supreme Court and this court have recognized that not every limitation or incidental burden on a fundamental right is subject to the strict scrutiny standard. When the regulation merely has an incidental effect on exercise of protected rights, strict scrutiny is not applied. (E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail (1978) 434 U.S. 374 [54 L.Ed.2d 618, 98 S.Ct. 673, 681-683] [regulations affecting the right to marry]; Califano v. Jobst (1977) 434 U.S. 47 [54 L.Ed.2d 228, 98 S.Ct. 95, 99] [same]; Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 303-305 [138 Cal.Rptr. 53, 562 P.2d 1302] [reasonable limitations on placement of newspaper racks]; Gould v. Grubb (1975) 14 Cal.3d 661, 670 [122 Cal.Rptr. 377, 536 P.2d 1337] [rational basis standard applicable to numerous statutes detailing the mechanisms of the right to vote].) It is only when there exists a real and appreciable impact on, or a significant interference with the exercise of the fundamental right that the strict scrutiny doctrine will be applied. (Zablocki v. Redhail, supra, 434 U.S. 374 [54 L.Ed.2d 618, 98 S.Ct. 673, 681]; Gould v. Grubb, supra, 14 Cal.3d 661, 670.)
In United States v. Harriss (1954) 347 U.S. 612, 625-626 [98 LEd. 989, 1000-1001, 74 S.Ct. 808], the court upheld the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act which required lobbyists to report lobbying receipts and expenditures against challenges that it violated the guarantees of freedom to speak, publish, and petition. Pointing out that Congress had not sought to prohibit lobbying, the court concluded that Congress has a valid interest in determining the source of voices seeking to influence legislation and could reasonably require the professional lobbyist to identify himself and disclose his lobbying activities. This court has also upheld reasonable statutes requiring disclosure of financial activities of persons engaged in political processes. (Brown v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 509, 519-523 [96 Cal.Rptr. 584, 487 P.2d 1224]; cf. County of Nevada v. MacMillen (1974) 11 Cal.3d 662, 670-672 [114 Cal.Rptr. 345, 522 P.2d 1354].)
As pointed out above, the registration, reporting, and gift provisions are not direct limitations on the right to petition for redress of grievances. Application of the burdens of registration and disclosure of receipts and expenditures to lobbyists does not substantially interfere with the ability of the lobbyist to raise his voice. While the burden of disclosure might be substantial for those engaging in extensive lobbying activities, the burden is not great when viewed in the context of the total activities engaged in. Requiring a person engaged in a business to describe it and to report its receipts and expenses may not be viewed in [48]*48our commercial society as a substantial impediment to engaging in that business.
Similarly, the burden placed on employers of lobbyists to disclose their expenditures for lobbying purposes, and the action thereby sought to be influenced, does not constitute a substantial interference with the exercise of petition and speech rights.
On the basis of Harriss and Brown, we sustain the validity of the provisions requiring the registration of lobbyists and their employers and the reporting of lobbying receipts, expenditures, and activities and employers’ businesses.
The limitation on lobbyist gifts, affecting only the form of the petition, also does not have a real and appreciable impact on the legitimate exercise of the rights of petition and speech, and the strict scrutiny test is inapplicable.
On the other hand, the transaction reporting requirements will often be so onerous as to constitute a significant interference with the fundamental right to petition. The extent of reporting required is not. directly related to the extent of lobbying activities but is determined mainly by lobbyist and employer transactions with others, which may be entirely unrelated to lobbyist activities. For example, the reporting requirement as to business transactions applies to transactions with a business entity where any state candidate, or legislative, agency, or elective state official is a director. (§ 86109, subd. (e).) Accordingly, if a director of the Bank of America is also an agency official—perhaps a Regent of the University of California—a lobbyist and any person who employs a lobbyist or spends more than $250 in a single month to influence legislative or administrative action must disclose transactions above the statutory amount with the Bank of America. The requirement applies even though the lobbying activities have nothing to do with the university or banks. Because directors of many major corporations serve on boards and other administrative agencies, the transaction reporting requirement may be extremely burdensome, and persons and business, union or other organizations who only seek to influence governmental action on an isolated basis will be deterred from doing so by the burdensome reporting requirements.
Because the transaction reporting requirements will often constitute a significant interference with the fundamental right to petition, the strict [49]*49scrutiny doctrine is applicable. The requirements may be upheld only if the state demonstrates sufficiently important interests and the statute “is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.” (Zablocki v. Redhail, supra, 434 U.S. 374, 388 [54 L.Ed.2d 618, 631, 98 S.Ct. 673, 682]; Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. 1, 25.) Even if the compelling state interest is present, the restriction on First Amendment activities must be drawn with narrow specificity to avoid arbitrary and unnecessary curtailment of the protected freedom. (Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 19 Cal.3d 294, 303; Fort v. Civil Service Com. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 331, 337-338 [38 Cal.Rptr. 625, 392 P.2d 385].)
We have considered the validity of disclosure requirements of financial activities of public officials and employees and held invalid a statute which “would intrude alike into the relevant and the irrelevant private financial affairs . . . and is not limited to only such holdings as might be affected by the duties or functions of a particular public office.” (City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young (1970) 2 Cal.3d 259, 272 [85 Cal.Rptr. 1, 466 P.2d 225, 37 A.L.R.3d 1313]; County of Nevada v. MacMillen, supra, 11 Cal.3d 662, 671.) We are satisfied that the right to petition for redress of grievances similarly may not be conditioned upon disclosure of irrelevant private financial matters unrelated to the petition activity. Because the transaction reporting requirements apply to transactions having no relation to the lobbying activities, they are not “closely tailored” to any legitimate state interest in the regulation of lobbying but constitute an unnecessary curtailment of the right to petition.
Conclusion
In sum, we conclude: The prohibition against lobbyist contributions set forth in section 86202 is a substantial limitation on associational freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment, and is invalid. The right to petition for grievances guaranteed by the First Amendment may not be conditioned on disclosure of private financial matters irrelevant to the petition activity and section 86107, subdivisions (d) and (e) and section 86109, subdivisions (d) and (e) are therefore invalid. However, the other reporting requirements,-the registration requirements, and the limitation on gifts do not constitute substantial limitations on petition and speech rights, and the challenge to those provisions is rejected, Finally, the Political Reform Act of 1974 does not involve multiple subjects in violation of California Constitution, article II, section 8, subdivision (d).
[50]*50Let a writ of mandate issue directing respondent court to vacate its judgment and to enter judgment in accordance with the views expressed herein.
Mosk, J., and Richardson, J., concurred.