Exxon Mobil Corporation and Affiliated Companies, f.k.a. Exxon Corporation and Affiliated Companies v. Commissioner

114 T.C. No. 20
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedMay 3, 2000
Docket18618-89, 18432-90
StatusUnknown

This text of 114 T.C. No. 20 (Exxon Mobil Corporation and Affiliated Companies, f.k.a. Exxon Corporation and Affiliated Companies v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Exxon Mobil Corporation and Affiliated Companies, f.k.a. Exxon Corporation and Affiliated Companies v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. No. 20 (tax 2000).

Opinion

114 T.C. No. 20

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION AND AFFILIATED COMPANIES, f.k.a. EXXON CORPORATION AND AFFILIATED COMPANIES, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket Nos. 18618-89, 18432-90. Filed May 3, 2000.

Held: For the years before the Court, $204 million (reflecting petitioners’ 22-percent share of a total $928 million) in estimated dismantlement, removal, and restoration (DRR) costs relating to fieldwide oil production equipment and facilities located in the Prudhoe Bay oil field on the North Slope of Alaska is not sufficiently fixed and definite to be accruable under the all-events test of sec. 1.461- 1(a)(2), Income Tax Regs.

Held, further, for the years before the Court, $24 million (reflecting petitioners’ 22-percent share of a total $111 million) in estimated DRR costs relating specifically to oil wells and to well drilling sites located in the Prudhoe Bay oil field: (1) Is sufficiently fixed, definite, and reasonably determinable to satisfy the all-events accrual test of the accrual method of accounting; (2) is not accruable as a capital cost because such accrual would constitute - 2 -

a change in petitioners’ method of accounting for such costs for which change respondent has not granted permission; and (3) is not accruable as a current ordinary and necessary business expense because such accrual would cause a distortion in petitioners’ reporting of income.

Robert L. Moore II, Jay L. Carlson, Thomas D. Johnston,

Kevin L. Kenworthy, Emmett B. Lewis III, James P. Tuite, David B.

Blair, Laura G. Ferguson, Troy J. Babin, Jeffrey S. Lynn, Paul F.

Kirgis, and Matthew J. Borger, for petitioners.

Richard L. Hunn, Robert M. Morrison, William G. Bissell,

Carl D. Inskeep, Sandra K. Reid, Richard T. Cummings, and

Richard D. Fultz, for respondent.

SWIFT, Judge: In these consolidated cases, respondent

determined deficiencies in petitioners’ Federal income taxes for

the years 1979 through 1982 as follows:

Year Deficiency 1979 $ 268,721,294 1980 2,898,174,073 1981 2,037,809,876 1982 1,599,495,218

After settlement of many issues and court decisions on three

issues,1 the primary issue remaining for decision is whether

1 See Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 338 (1999) (involving the creditability of the United Kingdom petroleum revenue tax); Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 721 (1994) (involving percentage depletion); Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner, (continued...) - 3 -

petitioners’ attempted accrual, for 1979 through 1982, of its

$204 million share of $928 million in total estimated

dismantlement, removal, and restoration (DRR) costs relating to

oil wells and to oil production equipment and facilities in the

Prudhoe Bay oil field on the North Slope of Alaska (North Slope)

would satisfy the all-events test of the accrual method of

accounting. If, for the years in issue, the accrual of any of

the estimated DRR costs would satisfy the all-events test of the

accrual method of accounting, further issues are to be addressed

relating to the amount and method of petitioners’ claimed accrual

thereof.2

Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to

the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and

all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and

Procedure.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The parties have stipulated numerous facts and the

authenticity and admissibility of numerous exhibits. The

stipulated facts are so found.

1 (...continued) T.C. Memo. 1999-247 (involving the accrual of deficiency interest). 2 The issues in these consolidated cases have also been raised by petitioners in timely filed claims for refund for 1977 and 1978, which claims we understand to be still pending. - 4 -

During the years in issue, petitioners constituted an

affiliated group of more than 175 U.S. and 500 foreign subsidiary

corporations. At the time the petitions were filed, petitioner

Exxon Corp. was the common parent of the affiliated group,

incorporated in New Jersey, with its principal places of business

located in New York, New York, or Houston, Texas. Hereinafter,

petitioners will be referred to simply as Exxon.3

The businesses in which Exxon was engaged primarily involved

exploration for and production, refining, transportation, and

sale of crude oil, natural gas, and other petroleum products.

During the years in issue, Exxon owned a 22-percent interest in

the Prudhoe Bay Unit, a partnership of international oil and gas

companies that owned and operated oil and gas leases in the

Prudhoe Bay oil field on the North Slope of Alaska.

Location of Prudhoe Bay Oil Field

The Prudhoe Bay oil field is located in an extremely remote

area 250 miles above the Arctic Circle on the North Slope of

Alaska. It is bounded by the Beaufort Sea on the north, the

Arctic National Wildlife Refuge on the east, the Brooks Mountain

Range on the south, and the Bering Sea on the west.

3 The parties appear to disagree as to Exxon’s principal place of business during the years in issue. If this question cannot be resolved by the parties by way of a post-opinion stipulation, it will be resolved in a Rule 155 hearing. - 5 -

The surface of the Prudhoe Bay oil field consists of a flat,

treeless, desert plain of approximately 69,000 square miles

covered by a thin mat of vegetation and organic material called

tundra. Beneath the tundra is a layer of permafrost that extends

to a depth of 1,800 to 2,000 feet.

From mid-May through mid-September, the sun does not set on

the North Slope. Summer temperatures may reach 80 degrees

Fahrenheit. From June through September, when the tundra thaws

to a depth of 12 to 18 inches, vehicular traffic on the tundra is

prohibited unless authorized by permit and may be conducted only

in specially designed vehicles called Rolligons.

During summer, the permafrost traps water on the tundra

surface, and the North Slope becomes a wetlands with thousands of

shallow lakes and abundant wildlife, including numerous migratory

birds and animals.

In winter, North Slope temperatures fall to -70 degrees

Fahrenheit, the tundra freezes, blizzards and whiteouts are

common, and darkness prevails for much of the day. In late

November, the sun dips below the horizon and does not reappear

until mid-January.

In spite of harsh winter conditions, some work on the North

Slope is better performed during winter because frozen tundra

provides a better foundation for vehicular traffic than tundra

that, during the summer, may not be passable. - 6 -

In 1979, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers designated the

entire North Slope of Alaska as a protected wetlands. Ninety-

nine percent of the tundra on the North Slope is treated as

wetlands for regulatory purposes.

Even with the extensive oil wells and oil recovery equipment

and facilities that were constructed in the Prudhoe Bay oil field

and that will be described further below, the North Slope of

Alaska accurately may be described and regarded as essentially

undeveloped, as a habitat for fish, wildlife, and birds, with

occasional subsistence use of the land by isolated Eskimo

communities.

Physical access to the North Slope is limited. The Dalton

Highway, a two-lane gravel road that traverses the Brooks

Mountain Range, provides the only land access. The only all-

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