Exxon Mobil Corp. v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

501 F.3d 204, 378 U.S. App. D.C. 205, 174 Oil & Gas Rep. 766, 37 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20195, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 17913
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedJuly 27, 2007
Docket05-1299, 05-1300, 05-1301
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 501 F.3d 204 (Exxon Mobil Corp. v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, 501 F.3d 204, 378 U.S. App. D.C. 205, 174 Oil & Gas Rep. 766, 37 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20195, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 17913 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

Opinion

Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge:

The petitioners, which are developing a proposal to build a natural gas pipeline from the North Slope of Alaska to the contiguous United States, seek pre-en-forcement review of two regulations promulgated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 18 C.F.R. §§ 157.36, 157.37. According to the petitioners, the Commission has “asserted authority to condition a certificate of public convenience and necessity on the project sponsor’s willingness to allow the Commission to increase the capacity or expandability of the project,” and that assertion is invalid on its face because it contravenes the Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline Act (ANGPA), Pub.L. No. 108-324, § 105, 118 Stat. 1258, 1258-59,15 U.S.C. § 720c, and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), Ch. 556, § 7(a), 52 Stat. 821, 824, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(a). According to the Commission, it has broad authority to condition a certificate of public convenience and necessity upon the sponsor of a proposed pipeline making a “design change,” a term heretofore applied not to a change in capacity but to such matters as “routing, cost allocations, and the design of initial service rates.”

Preliminarily, we agree with the parties that this controversy is ripe for review because the issues are purely legal and delaying a decision would inhibit investment in a project the construction of which the Congress has made a priority. As to the merits, we note the Commission has not interpreted § 157.37, which provides that “[i]n reviewing any application for an Alaska natural gas pipeline project, the Commission ... may require changes in project design necessfary] to promote competition and offer a reasonable opportunity for access to the project,” as authority to condition a Certificate upon increasing the capacity of the proposed pipeline, and it may never do so. Nor do we agree with the petitioners that 18 C.F.R. § 157.36, which provides that “[i]n considering a proposed voluntary expansion ... the Commission ... may require *207 design changes to ensure that some portion of the expansion capacity be allocated to new shippers,” may reasonably be read to assert authority in the Commission to condition a Certificate upon an increase in the capacity above that proposed by the sponsor of the pipeline. Therefore, we conclude neither § 157.36 nor § 157.37 is facially invalid and accordingly deny the petitions for review.

I. Background

In 1976, the Congress enacted the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act (ANG-TA), in which it found there was a “natural gas supply shortage” and encouraged the “expeditious construction” of a pipeline to carry natural gas from Alaska to the “contiguous States of the United States.” See Pub.L. No. 94-586, § 2, 90 Stat. 2903, 15 U.S.C. § 719. When, 28 years later, the hoped for pipeline still had not been constructed, the Congress passed the ANG-PA, which is meant to encourage construction by offering certain government loan guarantees. § 116, 15 U.S.C. § 720n. The ANGPA also requires that we expedite review of any final order of the Commission made under the authority of that Act, § 107(a)(1), (c), 15 U.S.C. § 720e, and that the Commission expedite consideration of any application for a Certificate, § 103(c), 15 U.S.C. § 720a. This case concerns regulations the Commission promulgated to govern its issuance of an initial Certificate to build and a subsequent Certificate to expand an Alaska Pipeline.

Under the ANGPA, the Commission is required to promulgate regulations for the conduct of an “open season” designed to “promote competition in the exploration, development, and production of Alaska natural gas.” § 103(e)(2)(B). A potential Alaska Pipeline project sponsor must, during the “open season,” allow potential gas producers to bid for the right to ship a specified quantity of gas through the proposed pipeline. 18 C.F.R. § 157.33. The sponsor then may seek a “certificate of public convenience and necessity” under the NGA, which Certificate the Commission is to issue if it finds the sponsor “able and willing” to perform a service “required by the present or future public convenience or necessity!.]” NGA § 7(c), (e). The Commission may attach “such reasonable terms and conditions [to the Certificate] as the public convenience and necessity may require.” NGA § 7(e). Of particular relevance here, the Commission may require a “natural-gas company” to “extend or improve” or to “establish physical connection of its transportation facilities” with another’s facilities but may not “compel the enlargement of transportation facilities for such purposes.” NGA § 7(a).

The petitioners, which lease from the State of Alaska land with about 90 to 95 percent of that State’s proven natural gas reserves, intend jointly to apply for a Certificate to build and operate an Alaska Pipeline. Before doing so, however, the petitioners seek review of two regulations promulgated by the Commission pursuant to ANGPA § 103(e)(2), namely, 18 C.F.R. §§ 157.36 and 157.37, that the petitioners read as asserting an authority they say the Commission does not have, to condition the issuance of a Certificate upon the project sponsor increasing the capacity of its proposed pipeline or of a later proposed expansion thereof.

II. Analysis

Before we reach the merits of this facial challenge to the validity of §§ 157.36 and 157.37, we consider whether the issue is ripe for judicial review. Though the Commission did not raise the issue, “The question of ripeness goes to our subject matter jurisdiction, and thus we can raise the issue sua sponte at any time.” Duke City Lumber Co. v. Butz, 539 F.2d 220, 221 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1976).

*208 A. Ripeness

To determine whether a controversy is ripe, we must consider both the “fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967).

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501 F.3d 204, 378 U.S. App. D.C. 205, 174 Oil & Gas Rep. 766, 37 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20195, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 17913, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/exxon-mobil-corp-v-federal-energy-regulatory-commission-cadc-2007.