Ex Parte Price

741 S.W.2d 366, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 98, 1987 Tex. LEXIS 395, 1987 WL 2040

• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Decided: December 2, 1987
• Docket: C-5372
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

RAY, Justice.

This original habeas corpus proceeding arises out of a judgment holding John Wiley Price in violation of a permanent injunction orally rendered on May 2, 1986. The permanent injunction, however, was not reduced to writing and signed until May 9, 1986, after the allegedly contemptuous conduct occurred on May 3, 1986 and after a motion for contempt was filed on May 6, 1986. We hold that the judgment of contempt is void insofar as it is based upon the May 2, 1986 oral order purporting to render a permanent injunction, and order relator Price discharged. In view of this holding, it is unnecessary to address the remainder of Price’s statutory and constitutional arguments.

On April 30, 1986, Paul Ragsdale, a candidate for reelection as state representative, filed an action seeking temporary and permanent injunctive relief and damages against the Progressive Voter’s League, John Wiley Price, and other individuals, based on alleged violations of Chapter 251 of the Texas Election Code. The petition alleged that the League was a “political committee” within the meaning of § 251.001(15) of the Code and was therefore required to designate a campaign treasurer before it could conduct any political activities.¹ An ex parte temporary restraining order was signed the same day, which, inter alia, enjoined the League and Price from:

Issuing, mailing or in any way distributing political slate cards, announcements, recommendations or campaign materials of any kind in support for or in opposition to candidates for public office ...

At a hearing on May 2, 1986, the court announced from the bench that it was granting a 30 day “permanent injunction,” to expire of its own terms without further order of the court, and that it was continuing the terms of the temporary restraining order “as a permanent injunction.”

The permanent injunction was not reduced to writing and signed until May 9, 1986. In the meantime, on May 6, Rags-dale filed a motion for contempt based on the May 2nd oral order. Since the permanent injunction had not yet been reduced to writing, this motion depended heavily on the original temporary restraining order in alleging that the Progressive Voter’s League and Price had engaged in contemptuous conduct on election day, May 3, by distributing or causing to be distributed certain “Voters’ Guides” — slate cards recommending certain candidates. After a hearing on May 23, the court held Price in contempt of the May 2nd oral order in that he gave to “some young person” green slate cards bearing the legend “Progressive Voters League Official Voters’ Guide.” The court assessed a punitive sentence of 96 hours in jail.

In this court, Price alleges various violations of his rights of freedom of speech, press and political association, as well as his rights to equal protection and due process of law, under both the Texas and Federal constitutions. Among other things, he asserts that the May 2nd oral “permanent injunction” is overbroad and vague in violation of both his First Amendment rights, and of his due process rights under Ex Parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.1967).

In order for a party to be held in contempt for disobeying a court decree, the decree must spell out the terms of compliance in clear, specific and unambiguous terms so that such person will readily know what duties and obligations are imposed on him. Ex Parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex.1967). A corollary to this rule is that a party who is committed to jail for constructive civil contempt should be able to find somewhere in the record the written order which meets Slavin’s requirements. It is this written order, signed by the court and entered upon the minutes, which evidences a parties’ rights and duties. “Oral orders are poor substitutes for the requirement of one final judgment.” Ex Parte Padron, 565 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tex.1978). See also Ex Parte Wilkins, 665 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.1984). Here, the permanent injunction was not reduced to writing until after the allegedly contemptuous election day conduct occurred, and after a motion for contempt had been filed based on the May 2nd oral order and the prior temporary restraining order. Thus, Price had no operative written order to consult concerning what were his obligations and duties on election day, and moreover, no way to test the validity of that order before it became moot.

In addressing another aspect of constructive contempt, we have held that due process requires both a written judgment of contempt and a written order of commitment, although the trial court may cause a contemnor to be detained for a short reasonable time while the judgment of contempt and an order of commitment are prepared for the court’s signature. Ex Parte Barnett, 600 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. 1980). We are unwilling to extend that “grace period” to the instant situation, however, or to hold as a matter of law that the delay here was reasonable. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the delay in reducing the permanent injunction to writing was necessary, and its reasonableness should not be presumed. Nor can the contempt judgment be alternatively based on the temporary restraining order. See Ex Parte Gordon, 584 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.1979). For the reasons set out above, we hold that Price could not be held in contempt of the oral order dated May 2, 1986. Accordingly, relator is ordered discharged.

SPEARS, J., concurs with opinion. GONZALEZ, J., concurs with opinion joined by KILGARLIN, J. MAUZY, J., concurs with opinion.

1 . Section 251.002(f)(1), (2) of the Code provides that it is unlawful for a political committee to make a contribution or expenditure in support for or in opposition to a candidate, unless the committee’s designation of a campaign treasurer was filed thirty days before the election. Contributions and expenditures are defined at § 251.001(4) and (5).