Ex Parte Jesse Hoyt

Supreme Court

Ex Parte Jesse Hoyt

38 U.S. 279, 10 L. Ed. 161, 13 Pet. 279, 1839 U.S. LEXIS 435

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedMarch 18, 1839

StatusPublished

Cited by32 cases

This text of 38 U.S. 279 (Ex Parte Jesse Hoyt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ex Parte Jesse Hoyt, 38 U.S. 279, 10 L. Ed. 161, 13 Pet. 279, 1839 U.S. LEXIS 435 (1839).

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Opinions

Mr. Justice Story

delivered the opinion of the Court.—

This is the case of a motion made by the collector of New York for a mandamus to be directed to the district judge of the southern district of New York, under -the following circumstances. The collector, on the 2 6 th of. December last, made a motion in a certain causé of . seizure then depending before the said judge, that the clause of the common monition,' issued in that cause, by which (according to the corrimon practice in such cases,) the marshal is- directed to detain the goods attached by virtue of the said monition in his custody, until the further order of the Court, be quashed and stricken out; on the ground that the said clause is repugnant to the sixty-ninth section of the act of 1799, ch. 128, entitled, “An act to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage;” or that the said monition be so reformed and' amended, that the said gOods remain in the'custody of the said collector, or such perso'n as he shall appoint for [290]*290that .purpose, until the proceedings commenced for the-forfeiture of the said goods shall be determined, and it be judicially ascertained, whether the same have been forfeited or not, as required by the said sixty-ninth section of the act. The district judge after a full hearing pronounced an elaborate opinion, reviewing the whole series of laws on the subject, and refused to grant the motion. The present motion is for a mandamus to compel him to vacate the order denying the original motion of the collector.

We are of opinion that this is, in no' just sense, a case for a writ of mandamus. This Court has authority giveri to it by the thirteenth section of the judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20 to issue writs of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law to any Courts appointed under the authority of the United States. The., present application is not warranted by any such principles and usages of law. It is neither more nor less than an application for' an order to TeYerse the. solemn judgment of the district judge, in a matter clearly within, the .jurisdiction of the Court, and to substitute another judgment in its stead. Now a writ of mandamus is -not a proper process to correct an-erroneous judgment or decree rendered in an inferior Court. That is properly matter which is .. examinable uponr a writ of error or an appeal, (as the case may require,) to the proper appellate tribunal. Neither can this Court issue the writ upon the ground that it is necessary for the exercise of its own appellate jurisdiction; for the proper appellate jurisdiction, if any in this case, is direct and immediate to'the Circuit Court for the southern district of New York'. It has been repeatedly declared by_ this Court that it will not, by mandamus, direct a judge what judgment to enter in a suit; but only will require him to proceed to render judgment. The case of the Life and Fire Insurance of New York vs. Adams in 8 Peters’ Rep. 291; and 9 Peters’ Rep. 573, is directly in point.

- But, as there appears to have -been some diversity of construction in the different districts of tire United States, of the laws on this subject, and as it is a matter ,of general ‘ concern throughout all the commercial districts, and' applicable to the daily practice of the Courts, and the .point has been fully argued, we think it right to say, that we are-of -opinion that the construction of the laws of the United States, maintained by- the district judge in his opinion, is the correct one,, to wit, that by -the sixty-ninth section of the collection act of 1799, ch. 128, the goods, wares, and merchandise seized under that act are to be put into and remain in the custody of the collector, or such other persons as he shall appoint'for that purpose, no longer than until the proper proceedings are had under the eighty- ’ nipth section of the same act to ascertain whether they are forfeited or not; and that as soon as the marshal seizes the same goods under the proper procesá of the Court, the marshal is entitled to the sole and exclusive custody thereof, subject to the future Orders of ifie Court.

The motion for the mandamus is denied.

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Mr. Justice Story

delivered the opinion of the Court.—

This is the case of a motion made by the collector of New York for a mandamus to be directed to the district judge of the southern district of New York, under -the following circumstances. The collector, on the 2 6 th of. December last, made a motion in a certain causé of . seizure then depending before the said judge, that the clause of the common monition,' issued in that cause, by which (according to the corrimon practice in such cases,) the marshal is- directed to detain the goods attached by virtue of the said monition in his custody, until the further order of the Court, be quashed and stricken out; on the ground that the said clause is repugnant to the sixty-ninth section of the act of 1799, ch. 128, entitled, “An act to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage;” or that the said monition be so reformed and' amended, that the said gOods remain in the'custody of the said collector, or such perso'n as he shall appoint for [290]*290that .purpose, until the proceedings commenced for the-forfeiture of the said goods shall be determined, and it be judicially ascertained, whether the same have been forfeited or not, as required by the said sixty-ninth section of the act. The district judge after a full hearing pronounced an elaborate opinion, reviewing the whole series of laws on the subject, and refused to grant the motion. The present motion is for a mandamus to compel him to vacate the order denying the original motion of the collector.

We are of opinion that this is, in no' just sense, a case for a writ of mandamus. This Court has authority giveri to it by the thirteenth section of the judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20 to issue writs of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law to any Courts appointed under the authority of the United States. The., present application is not warranted by any such principles and usages of law. It is neither more nor less than an application for' an order to TeYerse the. solemn judgment of the district judge, in a matter clearly within, the .jurisdiction of the Court, and to substitute another judgment in its stead. Now a writ of mandamus is -not a proper process to correct an-erroneous judgment or decree rendered in an inferior Court. That is properly matter which is .. examinable uponr a writ of error or an appeal, (as the case may require,) to the proper appellate tribunal. Neither can this Court issue the writ upon the ground that it is necessary for the exercise of its own appellate jurisdiction; for the proper appellate jurisdiction, if any in this case, is direct and immediate to'the Circuit Court for the southern district of New York'. It has been repeatedly declared by_ this Court that it will not, by mandamus, direct a judge what judgment to enter in a suit; but only will require him to proceed to render judgment. The case of the Life and Fire Insurance of New York vs. Adams in 8 Peters’ Rep. 291; and 9 Peters’ Rep. 573, is directly in point.

- But, as there appears to have -been some diversity of construction in the different districts of tire United States, of the laws on this subject, and as it is a matter ,of general ‘ concern throughout all the commercial districts, and' applicable to the daily practice of the Courts, and the .point has been fully argued, we think it right to say, that we are-of -opinion that the construction of the laws of the United States, maintained by- the district judge in his opinion, is the correct one,, to wit, that by -the sixty-ninth section of the collection act of 1799, ch. 128, the goods, wares, and merchandise seized under that act are to be put into and remain in the custody of the collector, or such other persons as he shall appoint'for that purpose, no longer than until the proper proceedings are had under the eighty- ’ nipth section of the same act to ascertain whether they are forfeited or not; and that as soon as the marshal seizes the same goods under the proper procesá of the Court, the marshal is entitled to the sole and exclusive custody thereof, subject to the future Orders of ifie Court.

The motion for the mandamus is denied.

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Bluebook (online)

38 U.S. 279, 10 L. Ed. 161, 13 Pet. 279, 1839 U.S. LEXIS 435, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ex-parte-jesse-hoyt-scotus-1839.

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