OPINION
JOHNSON, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which PRICE, WOMACK, KEASLER, HERVEY, HOLCOMB, and COCHRAN, JJ., joined.
An indictment returned in 1992 charged applicant with two counts of burglary of a habitation. Tex. Penal Code § 30.02. Both counts arose from the same incident, but involved different complainants.1 The first count charged applicant with burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft, while the second count charged applicant with burglary of a habitation with intent to commit sexual assault. Applicant plead not guilty.
The state presented evidence at the guilt phase of the trial that applicant entered the complainants’ home by removing a screen and climbing through an open window. Once inside, applicant stole money from one complainant and, in another room in the home, grabbed the leg of the other complainant while she slept, and then fled the scene.2 A jury convicted applicant on both counts of burglary of a habitation. A habitual offender, applicant was sentenced to two concurrent terms of twenty-five years’ imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division. Tex. Penal Code § 12.42. No appeal was taken.
This Court filed and set applicant’s application for habeas corpus. The issue before us is whether convicting applicant of two counts of burglary of a habitation, each with a different complainant but arising from a single unlawful entry, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.3 Applicant argues that the gravamen of the burglary offense is the unlawful entry of a habitation and that once such entry is made, the burglary offense is complete. Applicant concludes that his conviction on two counts of burglary of a habitation arising out of the same entry constitutes multiple punishments for the same offense,4 and that such punishment is contrary to the legislative intent of [336]*336the burglary statute and a violation of the United States Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.... ” U.S. Const, amend. V. The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the Fifth Amendment offers three separate constitutional protections: (1) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989); Lopez v. State, 108 S.W.3d 293, 295-96 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). The instant case, as applicant correctly claims, implicates the third of these guarantees, protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.
This Court has pointed out that “[a] defendant suffers multiple punishments in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause when he is convicted of more offenses than the legislature intended.” Ervin v. State, 991 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)(citing Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985)). However, the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes few, if any, limitations on the legislative power to establish and define offenses. Ex parte Hawkins, 6 S.W.3d 554, 556 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)(citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977)). The legislature, therefore, determines whether offenses are the same for double-jeopardy purposes by defining the “allowable unit of prosecution.” Id. (citing Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978)). The legislature also decides whether a particular course of conduct involves one or more distinct offenses under a given statute. Id. Consequently, the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause’s protection against multiple punishments under the burglary statute depends on ascertaining the allowable unit of prosecution.
Citing Ex parte Gonzalez,5 the state distinguishes between “conduct-oriented” and “possession-oriented” statutes in determining the allowable unit of prosecution in a burglary of a habitation. The state concludes, without citation to any specific authority, that burglary of a habitation is a conduct-oriented statute, thereby making the complainant, rather than the unlawful entry, the allowable unit of prosecution. The state argues that double jeopardy is not implicated because the offenses for which applicant was convicted occurred in separately occupied parts of the same house and involved two different complainants. The state’s reliance on this position is misplaced.
The plain meaning of the version of Tex. Penal Code § 30.02(a) that was in effect at the time applicant committed the offenses indicates that a person commits the offense of burglary of a habitation if, without the effective consent of the owner, he:
(1) enters a habitation, or a building (or any portion of a building) not open to the public, with intent to commit a felony or theft; or
(2) remains concealed, with intent to commit a felony or theft, in a building or habitation; or
[337]*337(3) enters a building or habitation and commits or attempts to commit a felony or theft.6
Chapter 30 of the Penal Code is titled “Burglary and Criminal Trespass.” Chapter 30 is part of Title 7 of the Penal Code, “Offenses Against Property.” As applicant suggests, the gravamen of a burglary is the entry without the effective consent of the owner and with the requisite mental state. DeVaughn v. State, 749 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). This Court has found that, when a burglary is committed, the harm results from the entry itself. Richardson v. State, 888 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). The offense is complete once the unlawful entry is made, without regard to whether the intended theft or felony is also completed. Id.
The allowable unit of prosecution for an assaultive offense is each complainant. See Phillips v. State, 787 S.W.2d 391, 394-95 (Tex.Crim.App.1990)(assault); Ex parte Rathmell,
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OPINION
JOHNSON, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which PRICE, WOMACK, KEASLER, HERVEY, HOLCOMB, and COCHRAN, JJ., joined.
An indictment returned in 1992 charged applicant with two counts of burglary of a habitation. Tex. Penal Code § 30.02. Both counts arose from the same incident, but involved different complainants.1 The first count charged applicant with burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft, while the second count charged applicant with burglary of a habitation with intent to commit sexual assault. Applicant plead not guilty.
The state presented evidence at the guilt phase of the trial that applicant entered the complainants’ home by removing a screen and climbing through an open window. Once inside, applicant stole money from one complainant and, in another room in the home, grabbed the leg of the other complainant while she slept, and then fled the scene.2 A jury convicted applicant on both counts of burglary of a habitation. A habitual offender, applicant was sentenced to two concurrent terms of twenty-five years’ imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division. Tex. Penal Code § 12.42. No appeal was taken.
This Court filed and set applicant’s application for habeas corpus. The issue before us is whether convicting applicant of two counts of burglary of a habitation, each with a different complainant but arising from a single unlawful entry, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.3 Applicant argues that the gravamen of the burglary offense is the unlawful entry of a habitation and that once such entry is made, the burglary offense is complete. Applicant concludes that his conviction on two counts of burglary of a habitation arising out of the same entry constitutes multiple punishments for the same offense,4 and that such punishment is contrary to the legislative intent of [336]*336the burglary statute and a violation of the United States Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.... ” U.S. Const, amend. V. The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the Fifth Amendment offers three separate constitutional protections: (1) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989); Lopez v. State, 108 S.W.3d 293, 295-96 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). The instant case, as applicant correctly claims, implicates the third of these guarantees, protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.
This Court has pointed out that “[a] defendant suffers multiple punishments in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause when he is convicted of more offenses than the legislature intended.” Ervin v. State, 991 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)(citing Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985)). However, the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes few, if any, limitations on the legislative power to establish and define offenses. Ex parte Hawkins, 6 S.W.3d 554, 556 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)(citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977)). The legislature, therefore, determines whether offenses are the same for double-jeopardy purposes by defining the “allowable unit of prosecution.” Id. (citing Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978)). The legislature also decides whether a particular course of conduct involves one or more distinct offenses under a given statute. Id. Consequently, the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause’s protection against multiple punishments under the burglary statute depends on ascertaining the allowable unit of prosecution.
Citing Ex parte Gonzalez,5 the state distinguishes between “conduct-oriented” and “possession-oriented” statutes in determining the allowable unit of prosecution in a burglary of a habitation. The state concludes, without citation to any specific authority, that burglary of a habitation is a conduct-oriented statute, thereby making the complainant, rather than the unlawful entry, the allowable unit of prosecution. The state argues that double jeopardy is not implicated because the offenses for which applicant was convicted occurred in separately occupied parts of the same house and involved two different complainants. The state’s reliance on this position is misplaced.
The plain meaning of the version of Tex. Penal Code § 30.02(a) that was in effect at the time applicant committed the offenses indicates that a person commits the offense of burglary of a habitation if, without the effective consent of the owner, he:
(1) enters a habitation, or a building (or any portion of a building) not open to the public, with intent to commit a felony or theft; or
(2) remains concealed, with intent to commit a felony or theft, in a building or habitation; or
[337]*337(3) enters a building or habitation and commits or attempts to commit a felony or theft.6
Chapter 30 of the Penal Code is titled “Burglary and Criminal Trespass.” Chapter 30 is part of Title 7 of the Penal Code, “Offenses Against Property.” As applicant suggests, the gravamen of a burglary is the entry without the effective consent of the owner and with the requisite mental state. DeVaughn v. State, 749 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). This Court has found that, when a burglary is committed, the harm results from the entry itself. Richardson v. State, 888 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). The offense is complete once the unlawful entry is made, without regard to whether the intended theft or felony is also completed. Id.
The allowable unit of prosecution for an assaultive offense is each complainant. See Phillips v. State, 787 S.W.2d 391, 394-95 (Tex.Crim.App.1990)(assault); Ex parte Rathmell, 717 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Tex.Crim.App.1986)(voluntary manslaughter). Burglary, however, is not an assaul-tive offense; rather, its placement within Title 7 indicates that the legislature determined burglary to be a crime against property. Thus, the complainant is not the appropriate allowable unit of prosecution in a burglary, rather, the allowable unit of prosecution in a burglary is the unlawful entry. Applicant’s convictions violate double jeopardy because he was punished multiple times for a single unlawful entry.
When a defendant is convicted of two offenses that are the “same” for double-jeopardy purposes, our case law tells us that the conviction for the “most serious” offense is retained and the other conviction is set aside. Landers v. State, 957 S.W.2d 558, 559-60 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Landers states that the “most serious” offense is determined by the degree of the felony, range of punishment and sentence imposed, with rules of parole eligibility and good-conduct time as a tie-breaker. Id. These criteria were taken from an older case involving such a choice in a case of misjoinder (Penal Code § 3.01 before September 1, 1987). Ex parte Peña, 820 S.W.2d 806 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Misjoin-der is no longer an issue because of legislative action.
At issue in Landers, however, was not misjoinder, but the choice between convictions when one charged offense is a lesser — included offense of the other charged offense. The facts of Landers further complicated the issue, as the appellant had been charged with a second-degree felony, theft of a vehicle, and a lesser-included third-degree felony, unauthorized use of a vehicle (UUMV), but was convicted of Class A misdemeanor theft and UUMV.
There is significant overlap in the Lan-ders criteria; in general, if the degree of [338]*338felony is the same, the range of punishment will be the same. Too, rules of parole eligibility and good-conduct time are outside the purview of this court and tend to be fluid. Are we to consider the rules as they were promulgated at the time of the offense, the time of sentencing, or the time of our review? In addition, the grant (and loss) of good-conduct time is discretionary and is more related to the conduct of the inmate while incarcerated than the seriousness of the offense of conviction.
Determining which offense is “most serious” may be difficult and may not always be objective. Both murder and burglary of a habitation with intent to commit a felony other than a theft are first-degree felonies and have the same range of punishment, yet many, if not all, citizens would say that murder is a more serious offense than burglary. The range of punishment may be enhanced with proof of prior convictions, and such enhancements can be applied to all non-state-jail felonies. If the indictment alleges aggravated robbery and felony driving while intoxicated with an allegation that a deadly weapon was used, and both are subject to an enhanced punishment of 25 to 99 years or life, which is the “most serious”? Is the “most serious” offense to be judged by the offenses alleged or by the offenses of conviction? Who determines the seriousness of the offense? Judges may look at the indictment and conclude that the charged second-degree felony is more serious than the charged third-degree felony, then be faced with a jury punishment verdict of 2 years’ incarceration on the second-degree felony and 10 years’ on the third-degree felony. Such a verdict would seem to indicate that the jury found the third-degree felony to be the “most serious.”
Our case law grants great discretion to the finder of fact. See e.g., Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex.Crim.App.2005)(suppression motion); Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 819 (Tex.Crim.App.2003)(application for writ of habeas corpus); Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 865-66 (Tex.Crim.App.2000)(decision to admit of exclude scientific evidence). We now extend that discretion to the determination of the “most serious” offense and hold that the “most serious” offense is the offense of conviction for which the greatest sentence was assessed. To the extent that Landers holds that other factors, such as the degree of the felony, range of punishment, and rules governing parole eligibility and awarding of good-conduct time, shall be used in that determination, it is overruled.
The remaining question is the determination of the “most serious” offense when, as here, the degree of the offense of conviction and the term of years assessed by the fact finder are the same. At the time of the offenses in this case, both offenses of conviction were first-degree felonies. The jury assessed the same term of years for each conviction and assessed no fines, but restitution of $122.00 was ordered in the judgment for the burglary with intent to commit theft. We have held that restitution is punishment: “As punishment, restitution attempts to redress the wrongs for which a defendant has been charged and convicted in court.” Cabla v. State, 6 S.W.3d 543, 546 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)(citing Martin v. State, 874 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)).7 In these circumstances, the punishment assessed makes the burglary with [339]*339intent to commit theft the “most serious” offense.8
Having found that two burglary convictions based on the same unlawful entry violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution and that, in this case, the burglary with intent to commit theft is the “most serious” 'offense, we deny applicant’s claim relating to his conviction for burglary with intent to commit theft and grant his claim for relief from the jeopardy-barred conviction for burglary with intent to commit sexual assault.
KELLER, P.J., filed a concurring opinion.
MEYERS, J., dissents.