Evanston Insurance Company v. Murphy

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Evanston Insurance Company, No. CV-19-04954-PHX-MTL

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Tracey Portee Murphy, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Before the Court is the Motion for Protective Order filed by non-party Ryan 16 McCarthy. (Doc. 112.) For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied 17 in part.1 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 As relevant to the pending motion,2 non-party Ryan McCarthy is an attorney at the 20 law firm Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, PLC. He defended Pearce Lincoln Properties LLC 21 (“Pearce Lincoln”), Par-Tech Limited Partnership (“Par-Tech”), and Art’s Fisheries II, 22 LLC (“Arts Fisheries”), in connection with the underlying wrongful death matter in the 23 Superior Court of Arizona for Maricopa County (the “Underlying Action”). See Murphy v. 24 Pearce Lincoln Props., LLC, No. CV2019-001932 (Ariz. Super. Ct. July 1, 2020). Mr. 25

26 1 Mr. McCarthy requested oral argument. Both parties have submitted legal memoranda and oral argument would not have aided the Court’s decisional process. See Partridge v. 27 Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998); see also LRCiv 7.2(f); Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). 28 2 The Court has previously provided general background information on this case. (See Docs. 74, 100.) It need not repeat the same here. 1 McCarthy’s clients owned and operated the property at which Arthur Murphy, Jr. was 2 fatally shot on April 6, 2017. An associate attorney, Sam Arrowsmith, who is no longer 3 affiliated with Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, was also counsel to these entities. 4 Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Evanston Insurance Company (“Evanston”) filed its 5 complaint for declaratory relief in the present action on August 13, 2019. (Doc. 1.) It 6 initially named Mr. McCarthy’s clients as defendants; they have since been dismissed. 7 (Doc. 47.) 8 On November 25, 2019, the adverse parties in the Underlying Action entered into a 9 Damron agreement.3 It assigned a $9 million stipulated judgment against the insureds, 10 including Mr. McCarthy’s clients, to Tracee Portee Murphy (“Murphy”), a defendant and 11 counter-claimant in the present action. 12 Evanston issued a subpoena for Mr. McCarthy’s deposition on July 17, 2020. (Doc. 13 72.) On July 31, Mr. McCarthy’s counsel sent a letter to Evanston’s counsel asserting, in 14 part, that they had not received the deposition “topics, questions, or subject matter.” (Doc. 15 112-1 at 7.) Mr. McCarthy’s counsel intended “to object to any line of questioning that 16 seeks to violate the attorney-client privilege, work-product privilege, or ER 1.6, Arizona 17 Rules of Professional Conduct.” (Id.) On August 20, Evanston’s counsel sent an outline of 18 anticipated deposition topics. Counsel also met and conferred that same day. (Id. at 12.) 19 Evanston’s counsel deposed Mr. McCarthy on September 14, 2020. Although Mr. 20 McCarthy answered multiple questions during the deposition, his counsel asserted 21 privilege objections in response to 19 questions. Those objections are the subject of the 22 23 3 Under Arizona law, a Damron agreement is a “settlement agreement between an insured and an injured party in circumstances where the insurer has declined to defend a suit against 24 the insured. In such an agreement, the insured agrees to liability for the underlying incident and assigns all rights against the insurance company to the injured party.” Quihuis v. State 25 Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 911, 912 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2014). Damron agreements do 26 not “create coverage that the insured did not purchase. . .To the contrary, [the insurer] is liable for the stipulated judgment only if the judgment constituted a liability falling within 27 its policy.” Colorado Casualty Ins. Co. v. Safety Control Co., 230 Ariz. 560, 567, 288 P.3d 28 764, 771 (Ct. App. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted).” 1 present motion. Following the deposition, Evanston’s counsel asserted that the privilege 2 objections were improper. (Doc. 112 at 6.) The parties have since conferred “multiple 3 times.” (Id.) 4 Mr. McCarthy filed the present motion on October 30, 2020. (Doc. 112.) He 5 attached, as Exhibit 10 to the motion, a numbered list of the 19 questions to which his 6 counsel asserted privilege objections. (Doc. 112-1 at 63.) The motion is now fully briefed. 7 (Docs. 121, 125.) Murphy also filed a joinder in support of the motion. (Doc. 118.) 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD 9 Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs discovery of non-parties 10 by subpoena. Rule 45 provides, in relevant part, that a party may command a non-party to 11 testify at a deposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). The scope of discovery “through a 12 subpoena under Rule 45 is the same as the scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26(b).” 13 Intermarine, LLC v. Spliethoff Bevrachtingskantoor, B.V., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1217 14 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Under Rule 26(b), a party may obtain discovery “regarding any 15 nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the 16 needs of the case considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount 17 in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, 18 the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense 19 of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The 20 limitations set forth in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) apply to discovery served on non-parties. See 21 Amini Innovation Corp. v. McFerran Home Furnishings, Inc., 300 F.R.D. 406, 409 (C.D. 22 Cal. 2014). 23 A district court has “broad discretion” to permit or deny discovery. Hallett v. 24 Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). The “discovery process in theory should be 25 cooperative and largely unsupervised by the district court.” Sali v. Corona Reg. Med. Ctr., 26 884 F.3d 1218, 1219 (9th Cir. 2018). Nonetheless, a party from whom discovery is sought 27 may move for a protective order to prevent annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 28 undue burden or expense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). The party seeking a protective order 1 bears the burden of persuasion to show “good cause” for its issuance. U.S. E.E.O.C. v. 2 Caesars Entm’t, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 428, 432 (D. Nev. 2006). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 Mr. McCarthy moves for a protective order shielding himself, and all other attorneys 5 and staff associated with Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, from attempts to gather privileged 6 information. As noted, he has provided 19 deposition questions to which his counsel 7 objected on the basis of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. (Doc. 112 8 at 8; 112-1 at 64-68.) Evanston responds that Mr. McCarthy should be required to answer 9 the questions for various reasons. The Court addresses these arguments in turn. 10 A. Attorney-Client Privilege 11 Mr. McCarthy identifies five deposition questions—designated as numbers 5, 6, 9, 12 10, and 16—to which his counsel asserted an attorney-client privilege objection. Evanston 13 responds that the objections “at dispute were pursuant to the work-product doctrine, not 14 attorney-client privilege. Accordingly, only the protections of the work-product doctrine 15 will be discussed here.”4 (Doc. 121 at 2-3.) This is not accurate. 16 As identified in his motion, Mr. McCarthy’s counsel invoked the attorney-client 17 privilege in the following portions of his deposition: 18 Q: And were you -- did you have information that Art’s 19 Fisheries had done business with Soul Brothers for a number of years involving prior events? 20 MR. RAPPAZZO: I’m just going to object there real quick. 21 Gary, if you are asking about attorney-client privileged information or communications he had with his client, I’m 22 going to instruct him not to respond. Maybe you can rephrase 23 it. . . . 24

25 4 The Court notes that Evanston provided a copy of the deposition transcript as Exhibit A 26 to its response. Evanston’s response states that “[f]or the Court’s convenience, all 18 of the work-product objections interposed by McCarthy’s counsel have been highlighted in 27 yellow in the attached Exhibit A.” (Doc. 121 at 2.) Only some of the questions identified 28 by Mr. McCarthy are highlighted. This is Mr. McCarthy’s motion, and the Court will address the questions he has raised. 1 Q: Okay. We will get to that. . . . All right. Let me -- so a couple of other general questions. So you were ultimately retained to 2 represent the three defendants: Art’s Fisheries, Pearce Lincoln, 3 and Par-Tech. And my question is, did you obtain a written waiver of any conflict or potential conflict from them? 4 MR. RAPPAZZO: I’m gonna object to the extent that’s calling 5 for communications he had with his clients, Gary. It’s privileged. 6 MR. HAMBLET: It’s not. A waiver of a conflict, I don’t think 7 that’s privileged. MR. RAPPAZZO: It’s attorney-client communication. 8 . . . 9 Q: Was Deans & Homer or -- or Indian Harbor Insurance 10 Company a client of yours? 11 MR. RAPPAZZO: That’s attorney-client privilege. It’s a duty of confidentiality, Gary. I’m sorry, he can’t respond to that. 12 . . . 13 Q: And the first one is that defendants failed to provide metal 14 detectors or security staff to arriving guests for weapons or other threats. Did you have any information in your file one 15 way or another as to whether that was true? 16 MR. RAPPAZZO: I’m just going to object to the extent it’s calling for attorney-client privilege communications that he 17 may have had with his clients. 18 . . .

19 Q: Okay. Why not just try the case or settle the case within 20 your 9 million policy limits? MR. RAPPAZZO: Form and foundation. You are asking for 21 attorney-client potentially and work product privilege response 22 there. 23 (Doc. 121-1 at 65-67.5) These responses invoke the attorney-client privilege. Mr. McCarthy 24 emphasizes in his reply that because Evanston did not address the attorney-client privilege 25 argument, it has waived any objection. (Doc. 125 at 2-3.) See LRCiv 7.2(i); E.E.O.C. v. 26 Walgreen Co., No. CIV 05-1400 PCTFJM, 2007 WL 926914, at *1 n.2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 27

28 5 These questions were labeled as numbers 5, 6, 9, 10, and 16 in Exhibit 10 to Mr. McCarthy’s motion, respectively. 1 2007) (deeming plaintiff’s failure to respond to an argument as consent to the granting of 2 a motion on this ground). The Court agrees that Evanston failed to address this argument. 3 Nonetheless, the Court will consider whether Mr. McCarthy’s counsel properly raised the 4 attorney-client privilege objection before issuing a protective order. 5 Federal courts look to state law to determine the applicability of evidentiary 6 privileges in diversity actions. See Fed. R. Evid. 501. Under Arizona law, “an attorney shall 7 not, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the 8 client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment.” 9 A.R.S. § 12–2234(A). The party asserting the privilege has the burden of making a prima 10 facie showing that it applies to a specific communication. See State ex. rel. Babbitt v. 11 Arnold, 26 Ariz. App. 333, 336 (1976). The proponent must show that “1) there is an 12 attorney-client relationship, 2) the communication was made to secure or provide legal 13 advice, 3) the communication was made in confidence, and 4) the communication was 14 treated as confidential.” Clements v. Bernini in & for Cty. of Pima, 471 P.3d 645, 651 ¶ 8 15 (Ariz. 2020). A court has broad discretion in reviewing an assertion of privilege. State 16 Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 13 P.3d 1169, 1174 (Ariz. 2000). 17 First, the Court notes that the objections at issue were procedurally proper. Rule 18 30(c)(2) permits objections, “whether to evidence, to a party’s conduct, to the officer’s 19 qualifications, to the manner of taking the deposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2). Such 20 objection “must be stated concisely in a nonargumentative and nonsuggestive matter.” Id. 21 Further, a “person may instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve 22 a privilege. . .” Id. A review of the deposition transcript indicates no procedural issues with 23 Mr. McCarthy’s counsel’s objections. 24 The Court now turns to the merits of the objections. Mr. McCarthy has demonstrated 25 the existence of an attorney-client relationship with Pearce Lincoln, Par-Tech, and Art’s 26 Fisheries. Mr. McCarthy represented these entities at the time of his deposition and 27 “continues to represent them” at present. (Doc. 112 at 3.) He “has not, at any point, had 28 consent to discuss any privileged topics and/or to respond to any of the questions that drew 1 privilege objections during his deposition.” (Id. at 9.) Further, Mr. McCarthy has asserted 2 that the topics at issue involved communications that were “performed confidentially, with 3 an expectation of confidentiality, and without disclosure to third parties (such as 4 Evanston).”6 (Doc. 112 at 10.) The Court agrees, generally, that the topics at issue would 5 invoke privileged communications. For example, the answer to the question, “Why not just 6 try the case or settle the case within your 9 million policy limits?” would conceivably entail 7 attorney-client privileged communications and strategies. (Doc. 112-1 at 67.) 8 The Court finds one exception. Mr. McCarthy’s counsel objected to what is 9 identified as question 9: “Was Deans & Homer or -- or Indian Harbor Insurance Company 10 a client of yours?” (Doc. 112-1 at 66.) Generally, the “identity of an attorney’s client” and 11 the nature of the fee arrangement between an attorney and his client are not privileged. In 12 re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 803 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1986), opinion corrected, 817 F.2d 13 64 (9th Cir. 1987). Mr. McCarthy provides no reason to stray from this general rule. 14 Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. McCarthy’s counsel properly objected to four 15 questions (numbers 5, 6, 10, and 16) because their answers would involve attorney-client 16 privileged material. Question number 9, regarding whether “Deans & Homer” or “Indian 17 Harbor Insurance Company” were clients, did not involve privileged material.7 18 B. Work-Product Doctrine 19 Mr. McCarthy argues that the remaining questions at issue—designated as numbers 20 1–4, 7, 8, 11–15, and 17–19—are protected by the work-product doctrine. Evanston argues 21 that “an attorney’s thought processes regarding a settlement agreement are not work 22 23 6 In addition to A.R.S. § 12–2234(A), Rule 1.6(a) of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct states that a “lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of 24 the client unless the client gives informed consent. . . .” 7 Question 6 involved whether Mr. McCarthy obtained a conflict waiver as to his three 25 clients. Evanston’s counsel asserted during the deposition that this was not a privileged 26 communication. The attorney-client privilege and conflicts of interest are “distinct [rules] and regulate different ethical principles.” Ragasa v. Cty. of Kauai, No. CV 14-00309 27 DKW-KJM, 2016 WL 11597768, at *8 (D. Haw. July 6, 2016). Seeing no further argument 28 from Evanston, and the possibility that this question would involve privileged material, the Court will grant a protective order as to question 6. 1 product,” that the protection has been waived, and that the need for the information 2 outweighs the protection. (Doc. 121 at 2.) The Court agrees with Evanston that the 3 questions at issue do not involve protectable work product. 4 Federal law governs the application of the work-product doctrine, which protects 5 from discovery documents and tangible things that are prepared by or for a party or its 6 representative “in anticipation of litigation.” See City of Glendale v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. 7 Co. of Pittsburgh, No. CV-12-380-PHX-BSB, 2013 WL 1797308, at *11 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8 29, 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A). The party invoking work-product protection bears 9 the burden of proof. Conoco Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 687 F.2d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 1982). 10 In the context of depositions, “the work product doctrine operates in a very limited 11 way.” Schreib v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 304 F.R.D. 282, 287 (W.D. Wash. 2014) 12 (quotations and citation omitted). It specifically “protects against questions which 13 improperly tend to elicit the mental impressions of the parties’ attorneys.” Id. Courts have 14 “consistently held” that the work product doctrine does not shield from deposition “the 15 facts that the adverse party’s lawyer has learned, or the person from whom he has learned 16 such facts, or the existence or nonexistence of documents, even though the documents 17 themselves may not be subject to discovery.” Pastrana v. Local 9509, Commc’ns Workers 18 of Am., AFL–CIO, No. CIV. 06CV1779 W AJB, 2007 WL 2900477, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 19 28, 2007) (citation omitted). 20 1. Relevance 21 Mr. McCarthy first argues that questions regarding his evaluation of the Underlying 22 Action have “no relevance to the pending coverage action” under Rule 26(b)(1). (Doc. 12 23 at 19.) He states that his “evaluation and personal view of ‘reasonableness’ as it relates to 24 the value of the wrongful death claims for a spouse and eleven children are irrelevant to 25 the pending coverage dispute.” (Id.) The Court notes that this argument is not necessarily 26 related to whether protectable work product exists, but will address it nonetheless. 27 Rule 26(b) is “liberally interpreted to permit wide-ranging discovery of information 28 even though the information may not be admissible at the trial.” Bible v. Rio Properties, 1 Inc., 246 F.R.D. 614, 617 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (citation omitted). “Relevant information for 2 purposes of discovery is information ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 3 admissible evidence.’” Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th 4 Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Evanston has taken the position in this case that the Damron 5 agreement was fraudulent and “collusive because McCarthy elected to ‘lie down’ instead 6 of mounting a defense.” (Doc. 121 at 7; see also Doc. 26 at 8; Doc. 69 at 5.) The Court 7 finds that the questions to which Mr. McCarty’s counsel objected on work-product 8 grounds—including, for example, “You weren’t concerned that you didn’t want to be seen 9 as approving the form of this [Damron] agreement?”—could possibly lead to the discovery 10 of admissible evidence. The Court will not issue a protective order on grounds that the 11 remaining questions are irrelevant to this case. See Columbia Cmty. Credit Union v. 12 Chicago Title Ins. Co., No. C09-5290 RJB, 2010 WL 11561789, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 13 21, 2010) (permitting a line of questioning in a deposition because it was “arguably relevant 14 and should be allowed under the broad scope of discovery”). 15 2. Applicability 16 In its response, Evanston argues that Mr. McCarthy’s motion “fails to address the 17 application of the work-product doctrine to the material at hand.” (Doc. 121 at 2.) The 18 Court largely agrees. Mr. McCarthy’s motion does state that the “questions that drew 19 objections during McCarty’s deposition targeted information that is at the heart of 20 McCarthy’s litigation strategy. The questions pertain to both the [Underlying Matter] and 21 the pending federal litigation initiated by Evanston.” (Doc. 112 at 11.) Nonetheless, the 22 Court is not convinced that Mr. McCarthy has met his burden to prove that the work- 23 product protection applies to the questions at issue. Conoco Inc., 687 F.2d at 728. 24 Although neither party addresses this argument, the Ninth Circuit has held that Rule 25 26(b)(3), “on its face, limits its protection to one who is a party . . . to the litigation in which 26 the discovery is sought.” In re Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 892 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1989). 27 See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (“Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and 28 tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another 1 party or its representative”) (emphasis added); C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice 2 and Procedure § 2024 (3d ed.) (“Documents prepared for one who is not a party to the 3 present suit are wholly unprotected by Rule 26(b)(3) even though the person may be a party 4 to a closely related lawsuit in which he will be disadvantaged if he must disclose in the 5 present suit.”). Neither Mr. McCarthy nor his clients are parties to the present suit.8 For 6 this independent reason, the Court will not grant a protective order as to the purportedly 7 work-product protected information. See Loustalet v. Refco, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 243, 247 8 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (“Because Wymer is not a party to the present suit, documents prepared 9 on his behalf are wholly unprotected despite the fact that he was a party in closely related 10 lawsuits.”). 11 The Court also finds that Mr. McCarthy has not demonstrated that the underlying 12 materials were prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation. As noted, the 13 work-product protection applies to those documents “prepared in anticipation of 14 litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). In circumstances in which a document serves more 15 than one purpose, “that is, where it was not prepared exclusively for litigation, then the 16 ‘because of’ test is used.” United States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2011). 17 Dual-purpose documents are deemed prepared “because of” litigation if “in light of the 18 nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can be 19 fairly said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.” In re 20 Grand Jury Subpoena, 357 F.3d 900, 907 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Here, Evanston 21 argues that Mr. McCarthy’s “opinions and thought processes leading to a settlement 22 agreement, in this case a Damron Agreement, cannot logically qualify as ‘trial preparation 23 materials.’” (Doc. 121 at 3.) 24 The Court recently addressed a similar issue in this case. Evanston previously 25 moved the Court to compel the production of documents subpoenaed from an investigator, 26 Keith Tolhurst, and his firm. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Murphy, No. CV-19-04954-PHX-MTL,

27 8 As noted, although Pearce Lincoln, Par-Tech, and Art’s Fisheries were previously parties 28 to the present case, they were dismissed on April 15, 2020. (Doc. 47.) This was five months before Mr. McCarthy’s September 14, 2020 deposition. 1 2020 WL 4429022 (D. Ariz. July 31, 2020); (Doc. 69). Murphy’s counsel had hired Mr. 2 Tolhurst to locate Mr. Canty “in order to negotiate a Damron agreement between the 3 adverse parties in the Underlying Action.” Id. at *1. Murphy argued, in response, that the 4 material was shielded from discovery as protectable work product. The Court agreed with 5 Evanston, concluding, “[a]s documents related to the Damron settlement agreement, not 6 made in anticipation of litigation, they would be discoverable.” Id. at *3; Doc. 74 at 5. 7 The same is true here. Although Mr. McCarthy asserts that Evanston seeks his “case 8 evaluations, litigation strategy, [and] motivations,” (Doc. 112 at 11), he has not 9 demonstrated that the questions at issue relate to documents that “can be fairly said to have 10 been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.” In re Grand Jury 11 Subpoena, 357 F.3d at 907 (emphasis added). A number of the deposition questions 12 directly relate to the Damron agreement and resulting stipulated judgment. As examples, 13 Evanston’s counsel asked Mr. McCarthy, “And what’s the basis for your agreeing that [the 14 stipulated judgment] was fair and reasonable?” and “[D]id you consider that sufficient 15 information to evaluate whether $9 million was a reasonable amount?” (Doc. 121-1 at 68.) 16 There “is no federal privilege preventing the discovery of settlement agreements and 17 related documents.” Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., 18 253 F.R.D. 521, 523 (C.D. Cal. 2008). See also Redding v. ProSight Specialty Mgmt. Co., 19 Inc., No. CV 12-98-H-CCL, 2014 WL 11412743, at *6 (D. Mont. July 2, 2014) 20 (“Furthermore, the Court doubts whether this document was prepared in anticipation of 21 litigation or for trial, since it clearly was prepared in anticipation of settlement.”). 22 Accordingly, for all of these reasons, Mr. McCarthy has not met his burden to demonstrate 23 that the questions at issue involve protectable work product. 24 3. Other Arguments 25 The parties also dispute whether Mr. McCarthy waived the work-product doctrine. 26 Because Mr. McCarthy has not met his burden to prove that the testimony at issue involves 27 work-product protected material, it is not necessary to consider Evanston’s “burden in 28 proving any exception to work-product protection—whether through waiver or 1 || otherwise—because [Mr. McCarthy] has not met [his] burden of proving that it is indeed work product.” Evanston Ins. Co., 2020 WL 4429022, at *3. Thus, the Court will not grant || a protective order as to the questions objected to on the basis of the work-product doctrine. 4] IV. CONCLUSION 5 Accordingly, 6 IT IS ORDERED granting the Motion for Protective Order by Non-Party Attorney 7\| Ryan McCarthy (Doc. 112) to the extent that the attorney-client privilege objections raised 8 || during Mr. McCarthy’s deposition to questions 5, 6, 10, and 16 (Doc. 112-1 at 65-68) are 9|| sustained. Ryan McCarthy, Sam Arrowsmith, and any attorneys or staff affiliated with Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, PLC shall not be required to respond to these questions in any 11 || form. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the Motion in all other respects. 13 Dated this 23rd day of November, 2020. 14 Wicked T. diburde Michael T. Liburdi 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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