Estate of Louis A. Billotti v. Bruce Springsteen

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1674-24

ESTATE OF LOUIS A. BILLOTTI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, JON LANDAU MANAGEMENT, INC., and SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT,

Defendants-Respondents.

Submitted September 14, 2026 – Decided September 15, 2026 Before Judges Sabatino and Berdote Byrne.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L-1405-23.

Kilcommons Law, PC, attorney for appellant (Kevin M.

Kilcommons, of counsel and on the brief).

Ansell Grimm & Aaron, PC, attorneys for respondents (Brian E. Ansell, of counsel and on the brief; Kristine M. Bergman, on the brief).

PER CURIAM In this case, the estate of a deceased classic car collector sued musician Bruce Springsteen and other defendants in the Law Division, seeking extra compensation arising out of decedent's provision of his 1967 Pontiac GTO for two photo shoots at Springsteen's house.

Although defendants paid decedent the charges that had been agreed upon when the photo shoots were arranged, the estate contends that decedent had been orally promised additional money if the photos were eventually used on an album cover. Shortly after the second photo shoot, decedent passed away of unrelated causes. Months later, photos of Springsteen with decedent's Pontiac appeared on an album cover and in various promotional merchandise.

In an amended complaint, the estate brought claims against defendants for negligent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment. The claims were factually grounded upon "double hearsay" statements that decedent allegedly made to his son and others, recounting the supposed oral assurances made to him for additional payment.

The trial court ruled the hearsay statements had not been shown to be sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible under N.J.R.E. 804(b)(6) (the hearsay exception for certain statements by deceased declarants). In addition, the court

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granted defendants summary judgment, finding the record failed to present genuine material issues of fact that could establish viable claims under either of plaintiff's legal theories.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

The pertinent facts and procedural history can be succinctly stated as follows. In or about the fall of 2021, two photographers successively contacted decedent Louis A. Billotti, a dry cleaner who in the past had allowed one or more of his collection of vintage cars to be used as props by film artists and others. Billotti agreed to bring his Pontiac to a photo shoot to a designated location in Monmouth County on two occasions: the first one on September 14, 2021, and the second with a different photographer on October 18, 2021.

Decedent agreed to a price of $750 for the first photo session and $450 for the second session. The arrangements for both photo shoots were made informally by decedent with the respective photographers via text messages and phone calls; there were no signed, written contracts. It is undisputed that decedent was paid those sums.

Plaintiff's version of the facts is based on hearsay statements that decedent, who died in May 2022 from COVID due to unrelated exposure, made

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to his son Louis M. Billotti, who is now the executor and sole beneficiary of the estate, and to others.

According to what decedent allegedly recounted, he didn't learn that Springsteen was the person who was going to be photographed with his car until after he arrived at the first shoot. As described by the son at his deposition, decedent claimed that, at some point during that session, he and Springsteen had a private conversation. In that conversation, decedent allegedly asked Springsteen what would happen if a photo of the car was used on an album. Springsteen allegedly responded that he has "people who deal with that," and implied that they would draft a contract to pay decedent additional money. Decedent further claimed that an unidentified agent of Springsteen at the photo shoot "promised him [such] a contract."

Initially, the executor filed a self-represented civil action in the Law Division against Springsteen and "Jon Landau Inc" essentially alleging the breach of an oral promise. After the estate retained counsel, it amended the complaint to name as defendants Springsteen, Jon Landau Management, Inc., and Sony Music Entertainment, plus fictitiously named persons and companies. 1 The amended complaint did not plead a breach of contract claim. Instead, the

1 These fictitiously named parties were never identified.

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complaint rested on the two above-mentioned alternative legal theories: (1) negligent misrepresentation (Count One) and (2) unjust enrichment (Count Two).2 During the pretrial period, the trial court, over plaintiff's objection, bifurcated discovery to preclude financial discovery from defendants about their revenues from the album and associated merchandise. Several depositions were taken, including those of third-party witnesses identified by plaintiff as people with knowledge of decedent's alleged account of the supposed assurances. However, none had firsthand personal knowledge of any such assurances, and several testified that decedent did not tell them he had been promised a contract or additional compensation.

The defense presented several affidavits refuting plaintiff's factual claims.

They included an affidavit by Springsteen, in which he initially denied recalling meeting decedent or having any private conversation with him. At his later

2 Notably, plaintiff did not assert a claim of promissory estoppel, a theory which customarily would allow the recovery of only reliance (but not expectancy) damages based on "definite and substantial detriment" to a plaintiff resulting from dependency upon a "clear and definite promise." See Toll Bros., Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington Cnty., 194 N.J. 223, 253 (2008) (delineating the elements of promissory estoppel); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 cmt. d (A.L.I. 1981) (distinguishing promissory estoppel remedies from breach-of-contract remedies).

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deposition, Springsteen acknowledged, on further reflection, that some conversation with decedent had taken place, but he denied making any promises or assurances of future payment.

After discovery ended, defendants moved for two rulings: (1) to exclude as double hearsay decedent's alleged statements to his son and others relaying the statements about extra compensation that supposedly had been made to decedent, and (2) summary judgment.

On the evidentiary issue, plaintiff argued the alleged statements are admissible under the hearsay exception set forth in N.J.R.E. 804(b)(6) for "trustworthy" statements by deceased declarants. As the proponent of that hearsay, plaintiff bears the burden of showing trustworthiness. The trial court ruled that decedent's statements about the vague promises or assurances of additional compensation were self-interested and not trustworthy.

The court went on to analyze substantively the two legal claims and concluded that neither is viable, even viewing the record in a light most favorable to plaintiff. The court accordingly granted summary judgment in an oral opinion and order issued on January 3, 2025, and this appeal ensued.

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II.

Our appellate review is guided by several well-established principles.

First, with respect to the trial court's evidentiary ruling, we are obligated to give it "substantial deference and will not overturn such a ruling unless it constitute[s] a clear abuse of discretion." Hrymoc v. Ethicon, Inc., 254 N.J. 446, 463 (2023); see also Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 499 (1999).

Second, an appellate court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment "de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court." In re Est. of Jones, 259 N.J. 584, 594 (2025) (citing Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022)). Under this standard, "[t]he appellate court considers 'whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.'" Ibid. (quoting Padilla v. Young Il An, 257 N.J. 540, 547 (2024)) (emphasis added); see also Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); R. 4:46-2(c).

A.

We begin with the court's hearsay ruling. "Hearsay consists of three classic elements: (1) a 'statement;' (2) 'other than one made by the declarant

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while testifying at the [present] trial or hearing;' and (3) offered in evidence for its truth, i.e., 'to prove the truth of the matter asserted' in the statement." James v. Ruiz, 440 N.J. Super. 45, 59 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting N.J.R.E. 801(c)) (alteration in original). "The long-standing policy disfavoring the admission of hearsay in Anglo-American courts, as codified in New Jersey, instructs that '[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by [the evidence] rules or by other law.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J.R.E. 802) (emphasis and alteration in original). "The hearsay prohibition 'ensure[s] the accuracy of the factfinding process'" by excluding those statements that are inherently untrustworthy. Neno v. Clinton, 167 N.J. 573, 579 (2001) (quoting State v. Engel, 99 N.J. 453, 465 (1985)).

It is abundantly clear that all three elements of the hearsay definition are present here. The assertions in question were all statements allegedly made by declarants at previous times and are offered by plaintiff for their truth in an effort to establish that oral assurances of extra compensation were, in fact, made.

We next must analyze the potential applicability of hearsay exceptions.

The alleged statements made by Springsteen or a supposed agent to decedent, which were then communicated by decedent to his son and perhaps other persons, comprise multiple (or "double") hearsay, or hearsay-within-hearsay. Under N.J.R.E. 805, "[h]earsay within hearsay is not excluded by the rule

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against hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule." This means that when a hearsay statement itself contains another hearsay statement, "the embedded hearsay must independently fall within one of the exceptions set forth in N.J.R.E. 803 or 804 to be admissible." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.B., 231 N.J. 354, 367 (2017) (citing N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. N.T., 445 N.J. Super. 478, 497 (App. Div. 2016)). However, "[w]here there is no applicable exception . . . the embedded statements must be excluded." Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, cmt. on N.J.R.E. 805 (2026) (citing A.B., 231 N.J. at 367-68).

Taking the statements here in two-step chronological order, the oral assurances allegedly made by Springsteen or his supposed agent to decedent at the photo session arguably satisfy the hearsay exceptions for statements by a party-opponent or a party-opponent's agent. See N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1) ("the party- opponent's own statement, made either in an individual or representative capacity"); N.J.R.E. 803(b)(3) ("statement by a person authorized by the party- opponent to make a statement concerning the subject"); N.J.R.E. 803(b)(4) ("statement by the party-opponent's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment"). For the purposes of this opinion, we

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need not resolve whether, apart from Springsteen, the unnamed declarant(s) was or were actually an agent of Springsteen or the co-defendant entities. Our premise is simply that Rule 803(b), and its justification for using hearsay statements by or on behalf of an adversary, would appear to apply to the first step of the double-hearsay analysis.

That brings us to the critical second tier of communications, i.e., what Louis A. Billotti, who is now deceased, allegedly said to his son (and perhaps to other people) about the assurances he claimed to have received. This level of hearsay implicates N.J.R.E. 804(b)(6) ("Trustworthy Statements by Deceased Declarants"), which recites the following hearsay exception:

In a civil proceeding, a statement made by a person unavailable as a witness because of death if the statement was made in good faith upon declarant's personal knowledge in circumstances indicating that it is trustworthy.

[N.J.R.E. 804(b)(6) (emphasis added).]

"Basically, this Rule reflects the judgment that if a statement is trustworthy and the declarant cannot be called because of his death, the gain of evidential value of the statement outweighs the loss of ability to cross-examine." Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, cmt. 6 on N.J.R.E. 804.

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"A trial court must make particularized findings of good faith, personal knowledge and trustworthiness prior to the admission of evidence of this nature under [Rule 804(b)(6)]." DeVito v. Sheeran, 165 N.J. 167, 194 (2000) (citing Jeter v. Stevenson, 284 N.J. Super. 229, 233 (App. Div. 1995)). To admit such hearsay, the court must find "'a probability that the statement is trustworthy from the flavor of the surrounding circumstances.'" Id. at 195 (quoting Beckwith v. Bethlehem Steel, 185 N.J. Super. 50, 63 (Law Div. 1982)) (alteration in original).

In evaluating trustworthiness, courts have considered such factors as "whether the statement was made under oath; the duration of time between the event and the statement; whether the declarant had firsthand knowledge; and the credibility of the declarant." DeVito, 165 N.J. at 195-96 (citing 2 McCormick on Evidence § 324 (5th ed.1999)); see also Est. of Hanges v. Met. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 386 (2010) (reiterating these factors from DeVito).

The proponent has the burden of establishing the trustworthiness of the decedent's statements, by offering "evidence of the manner in which the

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statement was given." Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, cmt. 6 on N.J.R.E. 804 (citing Ramos v. Cmty. Coach, 229 N.J. Super. 452, 458 (App. Div. 1989)).3 Here, decedent was not under oath when he told others about his alleged conversations at the photo shoot. The exact timing of his declarations is unclear. We will presume, for the sake of discussion, that decedent had "firsthand knowledge" of the alleged conversations at the site, since he took part in them. The parties disagree about other facets of the analysis, particularly good faith, credibility, and overall trustworthiness. Plaintiff contends that decedent's hearsay must be deemed trustworthy, claiming decedent told these things not only to his son but also to other persons. Those individuals included an attorney who had performed legal work for decedent in the past and that attorney's daughter, among others.

3 By contrast concerning the burden, cf. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) (the business record hearsay exception) ("A statement contained in a writing or other record of acts, events, conditions, and, subject to Rule 808, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time of observation by a person with actual knowledge or from information supplied by such a person, if the writing or other record was made in the regular course of business and it was the regular practice of that business to make such writing or other record. This exception does not apply if the sources of information or the method, purpose or circumstances of preparation indicate that it is not trustworthy") (emphasis added); Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, cmt. 1 on N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) (noting that this "additional language expressly permitting the judge to exclude the record if the record is 'untrustworthy' is not an affirmative duty placed on the record's proponent"). In comparison, N.J.R.E. 804(b)(6) contains no such phrasing.

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However, when asked about this subject at her deposition, the attorney denied hearing decedent make such specific assertions:

Q. Did [decedent] tell you that Mr. Springsteen, himself, ever promised [decedent] any future payments for the use of his car in the photo shoot?

A. Future payment, no.

Q. Did he tell how he was paid for the photo shoot?

A. No. I will tell that he was – [decedent] was shrewd.

So, he didn't do anything for free. So, somehow I knew there was payment made, but we didn't talk about amounts. We didn't talk about future payments. I didn't – I think I was running to court. It was literally five minutes. I looked at the picture and said that looks great. Bruce looks good. The end.

Q. And he never told you Mr. Springsteen, himself, personally promised him anything; correct?

A. No.

Q. He never told you anybody promised him anything;

correct?

A. No.

Q. Future payments?

A. No.

Q. Okay. And I would assume he didn't ask you to do anything on his behalf to confirm any future contract or payment relating to use of his vehicle at the photo shoot; is that fair?

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A. Yes. I want to say that it was fairly quickly he became sick medically, so I don't know the time frame, but my recollection is he got sick [with COVID] pretty quickly after that conversation.

Q. Okay. But, the answer to my question is no, he never asked you to do anything to memorialize any rights of future payment; correct?

A. No.

Q. And you never advised him to do anything to memorialize any possibility of a future payment; is that fair?

A. No. No, I never did it, yes.

Q. And you never did anything on his behalf to memorialize any potential claim for future payment from the use of that car; correct?

A. Yes.

[(Emphasis added).]

At her own deposition, the attorney's daughter (who was also her secretary) did not corroborate specific statements by decedent, but did note that in a conversation she once had with decedent in the fall of 2021 he had alluded to the fact that "there was significant money to be had because the car was going to be a part of every . . . piece of merchandise for this album and so he gave me the impression that he believed it to be a lot of money."

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The record also contains an affidavit by a person described as an "extremely close" friend of decedent, who stated that:

At no time did [decedent] ever express any belief that he was going to make additional money if his car was used on the Springsteen album cover or on merchandise. [Decedent] never told me that Bruce Springsteen or anyone else associated with Bruce Springsteen ever promised [him] a contract, or that he believed he was going to receive any more money in the future from the use of the car on the album or t-

shirts and the like. [Decedent] was a simple guy and just really enjoyed the experience he had with Bruce Springsteen and was looking forward to seeing his car on his album cover.

[(Emphasis added).] 4

Another longtime friend stated in an affidavit that decedent never informed him "that he was promised a contract by Bruce Springsteen or anyone else at the photo shoots." This affiant stated that, "[o]n the contrary," it was he "who brought up to [decedent] the idea of getting a contract put together to send to the Springsteen people."

After sifting through these attestations and other items in the record, the trial court concluded that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the decedent 's

4 To counter the affidavit, decedent's son testified at his deposition that although the affiant was "extremely close" with his father, there were "some problems with him and his wife at the hospital with my dad" that explained his unwillingness to assist in plaintiff's case.

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hearsay statements were sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible under N.J.R.E. 804(b)(6). Among other things, the court noted in its oral ruling:

First and foremost, it is double hearsay.

What . . . plaintiff intends to rely on here or has relied on and has been engaged in discovery for . . . . [o]ne year on liability since November 21, 2023. All these depositions and everything else, and all these transcripts that I've reviewed that are connected to this summary judgment application, and there is not a single person that can identify who the alleged speaker was that allegedly made a communication to decedent.

So, we have an unknown speaker in October 2021, making unknown representations to allegedly decedent in October 2021. [5]

It's – there's no elements of trustworthiness to that, saying that some person who we have no idea said it, who – who it was, and can't prove who it was because there's no record evidence of anything, allegedly made a promise to provide a future contract with unknown terms in October 2021.

There's just simply no competent evidential material in this record to support that any type of promise of a future contract would be provided.

The [c]ourt finds no exceptions to the hearsay rule, on top of it, that would permit an unknown – communication by an unknown speaker to decedent in . . . October 2021, who is then – and then – and decedent

5 At the time of the motion hearing, the court and counsel were apparently under the impression that the alleged assurances of future payment were made at the October 2021 photo shoot rather than the September 2021 photo shoot. The differences of date are inconsequential to our analysis.

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allegedly communicated contents of that communication to his son or [the attorney], both of which are hearsay communications.

....

In short, the contention . . . being raised by decedent's estate that there was a promise that a future contract with unknown royalties to be provided is simply without any supported record evidence. It's based on double hearsay, with the initial communication from an unknown person.

[(Emphasis added).]

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the court erred in its hearsay analysis and that we should reverse it. We are unpersuaded, however, that the court abused its discretion in making this evidentiary ruling.

We appreciate that decedent's son would be naturally inclined to believe that his late father's assertions about what was said to him at the photo shoot were accurate and trustworthy. In that regard, we note the son's contention that he checked his late father's mail routinely to see if he had been mailed a proposed contract from defendants. We also recognize the trial court made no finding of bad faith on the part of the decedent. In addition, we are mindful that N.J.R.E. 804(b)(6) does not require corroboration of the decedent's hearsay statements as a predicate to their admissibility, "[a]lthough 'lack of corroboration may affect

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the weight to be given' . . . by the fact-finder." Est. of Grieco v. Schmidt, 440 N.J. Super. 557, 566 (App. Div. 2015).

Even so, we do not conclude that the trial court's application of the hearsay rules was "'"so wide off the mark that a manifest denial of justice"'" resulted. Rodriguez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 237 N.J. 36, 57 (2019) (quoting Griffin v. City of E. Orange, 225 N.J. 400, 413 (2016)). As the trial court rightly noted, the details of the surrounding circumstances of the alleged conversation(s) were vague. Decedent did not identify by name any agent who spoke with him about payment at the site. There were no eyewitnesses who overheard the supposed conversations about payment.

Moreover, as we will explore more in Part II(B), infra, the content of the alleged assurances of future payment was indeterminate and non-specific. Decedent took no action to engage his attorney or to memorialize with a confirmatory message the alleged oral promise. The affidavits and deposition testimony of close friends of decedent presented by the defense cast considerable doubt upon the probative value of plaintiff's contentions. It is also conceivable that decedent may have misheard or misunderstood whatever conversations took place. And because these are hearsay contentions,

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defendants never had a chance to question or cross-examine decedent about their accuracy and veracity.

In sum, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proving a probability of trustworthiness under N.J.R.E. 804(b)(6). We therefore affirm the ruling.6 B.

We now turn to the court's grant of summary judgment, applying the standards of appellate review noted above. We consider each of plaintiff's legal theories in turn.

1.

Plaintiff claims in Count One the estate is entitled to money damages based on an allegation that defendants or their agents negligently mispresented

6 We discern no need to remand the issue for a Rule 104 evidentiary hearing. Although plaintiff requested such a hearing in the trial court, plaintiff has not renewed that request in his appellate briefs, apparently being satisfied to rely on the existing record. See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2026) ("It is, of course, clear that an issue not briefed is deemed waived"); see also Telebright Corp. v. Dir., N.J. Div. of Tax'n, 424 N.J. Super. 384, 393 (App. Div. 2012). Plaintiff's briefs do not proffer what additional dispositive evidence of trustworthiness it anticipates would emerge at such a hearing.

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to decedent that he would be paid additional compensation if his photographed Pontiac was used on an album cover or other promotional materials.

Under our case law,7 "[a] 'negligent misrepresentation constitutes "[a]n [(1)] incorrect statement, [(2)] negligently made and [(3)] justifiably relied on, [and] [(4)] may be the basis for recovery of damages for economic loss . . . sustained as a consequence of that reliance."'" Singer v. Beach Trading Co., 379 N.J. Super. 63, 73-74 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting McClellan v. Fiet, 376 N.J. Super. 305, 317 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 334 (1983))); see also Cadre v. ProAssurance Cas. Co., 468 N.J. Super. 246, 273-74 (App. Div. 2021).

"The element of reliance is the same for fraud [as it is for] negligent misrepresentation," although, "[b]ecause negligent misrepresentation does not require scienter as an element, it is easier to prove than fraud." Kaufman v. i- State Corp., 165 N.J. 94, 109-10 (2000); see also Gennari v. Weichert Co.

7 See also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Economic Harm § 5 (A.L.I. 2020) ("An actor who, in the course of his or her business, profession, or employment, or in any transaction in which the actors has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their reliance upon the information, if the actor fails to use reasonable care in obtaining or communicating it") (emphasis added). We note this reliance formula does not authorize expectancy damages.

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Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 610 (1997) (articulating the elements of common law fraud).

To begin with, this particular legal theory is improvident because plaintiff's amended complaint and arguments seek far more than reliance damages. Instead, Count One of the amended complaint seeks "compensatory and consequential damages" from defendants. Paragraphs 9 through 14 of Count One allege that the album and tour were commercially successful and that defendants sold substantial merchandise and promotional items with the Pontiac images. The complaint further alleges that plaintiff was denied "remuneration" in the form of a promised contract. These claims fundamentally are seeking expectancy, benefit-of-the-bargain damages, not the limited out-of-pocket expenditures recoverable for negligent misrepresentation. Kaufman, 165 N.J. at 109 (authorizing recovery of "economic loss . . . sustained as a consequence of [a plaintiff's] reliance"); cf. Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245 N.J. 326, 330-31 (2021) (explaining the distinction between backward-looking reliance damages and forward-looking expectancy damages). Moreover, as we have noted, plaintiff has not pled a claim for breach of contract, a theory that, if proven, could authorize expectancy damages.

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That observation aside, we concur with the trial court's summary dismissal of the negligent misrepresentation claim. Even viewing the record in a light most favorable to plaintiff, there is no genuine issue of material fact upon which to sustain a viable claim of misrepresentation. As we noted above, plaintiff has failed to identify the agent(s) who supposedly assured decedent of future compensation. The record is also bereft of details as to the specific compensation that Springsteen or any agents would have offered decedent in extra compensation if a hypothetical contract had been drafted and tendered. The promise, if any, was hazy and indefinite.

Nor has plaintiff quantified or specified any out-of-pocket reliance damages. Plaintiff argues in his brief that he returned to the Springsteen property in October 2021 "in reasonable reliance upon the statement that he would receive additional monies, including monies . . . from the sale of merchandise." Plaintiff does not identify any expenses that he incurred by returning to the property a second time. We presume that such expenses (such as gasoline, car washing, etc.) would have been modest at best, and for which he received compensation. Nor does plaintiff claim the market value of the Pontiac, which he inherited from his father, diminished after it appeared on the celebrity's album cover; if anything, the car likely became more of a collector's

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item. No "economic loss" has been specified showing how decedent was made worse off by taking part in the photo shoots. Singer, 379 N.J. Super. at 73-74 (requiring economic loss).

We further conclude that plaintiff's claim of negligent misrepresentation would not have been viable even if the court had deemed the double hearsay we discussed in Part II(A), supra, admissible. As the trial court found, despite more than a year of discovery, plaintiff failed to marshal sufficient evidence "to support the contention that there was a representation . . . that a future contract would be provided with terms—of royalties or future compensation." At most, plaintiff relies on self-serving contentions of the decedent, which are "clearly insufficient to create a question of material fact for purposes of a summary judgment motion." Martin v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 346 N.J. Super. 320, 323 (App. Div. 2002) (emphasis added).8

8 See also Petersen v. Twp. of Raritan, 418 N.J. Super. 125, 132 (App. Div. 2011) (noting that "'[b]are conclusions in the pleadings, without factual support in tendered affidavits, will not defeat a meritorious application for summary judgment'") (quoting U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 67 N.J. Super. 384, 399-400 (App. Div. 1961)) (alteration in original). "'[U]nsubstantiated inferences and feelings' are not sufficient to support or defeat a motion for summary judgment." Petersen, 418 N.J. Super. at 132 (quoting Oakley v. Wianecki, 345 N.J. Super. 194, 201 (App. Div. 2001)) (alteration in original); Merchs. Express Money Ord. Co. v. Sun Nat'l Bank, 374 N.J. Super. 556, 563 (App. Div. 2005) (noting that claims should not go to a jury

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Based on our de novo review, we therefore affirm the entry of summary judgment on Count One.

2.

Plaintiff's claims of unjust enrichment in Count Two were likewise properly dismissed on summary judgment.

"'The doctrine of unjust enrichment rests on the equitable principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.'" Goldsmith v. Camden Cnty. Surrogate's Office, 408 N.J. Super. 376, 382 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Assocs. Com. Corp. v. Wallia, 211 N.J. Super. 231, 243 (App. Div. 1986)); see also Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 1 (A.L.I. 2011) ("A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in restitution") (emphasis added). Unjust enrichment is a remedy that may be imposed when there is "no express contract providing for remuneration . . . ." Caputo v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 300 N.J. Super. 498, 507 (App. Div. 1997).

The unjust enrichment doctrine applies where a plaintiff shows that it "expected remuneration from the defendant at the time it performed or conferred

based on pure speculation); Hoffman v. AsSeenOnTV.Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 425-26 (App. Div. 2009) (similarly applying this principle).

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a benefit on defendant and that the failure of remuneration enriched defendant beyond its contractual rights." VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994) (citing Assocs. Com. Corp., 211 N.J. Super. at 244; see also Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 288 (2016). Accordingly, "[t]o prove a claim for unjust enrichment, a party must demonstrate that the opposing party '[(1)] received a benefit and that [(2)] retention of that benefit would be unjust.'" Thieme, 227 N.J. at 288 (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 110 (2007)).

Here, there was a benefit paid to decedent for the use of his car in the two photo shoots: the combined total of $1200 he agreed to receive when the arrangements were made through the photographers. Those were the only contract bargains that were ever struck. The trial court reasonably concluded that plaintiff did not establish a right to be paid more than that, in the absence of evidence to substantiate clear and definite terms of a hypothetical agreement for services that had already been performed. The alleged promise was for a mere gratuity, since the photos were already taken and decedent apparently would not have any further consideration to provide. 9

9 We note that plaintiff has not made any claims of copyright or trademark infringement or other claims of a taking of intellectual property, which presumably would be cognizable in federal court.

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Plaintiff argues that his ability to prove an economic injustice was hampered by the pretrial ruling by a different judge that precluded him from obtaining financial discovery from defendants and from delving into their revenues from album and merchandise sales. We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in forestalling disclosure of such proprietary information before plaintiff first presented a viable factual basis for recovery of any money damages. Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 148 N.J. 524, 559 (1997) (generally applying an abuse-of-discretion standard of appellate review to discovery rulings).

Given the circumstances and the paucity of plaintiff's evidence, the trial court had a sound basis to grant summary judgment of the unjust enrichment claim in Count Two. That is not to rule out that a different motion result might have been warranted with stronger evidence, or that we would condone inequitable conduct if it were substantiated with adequate competent proofs. Based on the scant record that was developed here, however, the trial court's decision must be affirmed.

In sum, whatever aspirations decedent may have had to be paid more money than the agreed-upon sums, the alleged promises were insufficiently evidenced and legally untenable. The lawsuit was appropriately dismissed.

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Affirmed.

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