25CA0029 Estate of Heidel 12-11-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0029 Mesa County District Court No. 24PR30187 Honorable Gretchen B. Larson, Judge
In re the Estate of Gary Kaye Heidel, deceased.
Desda Daniell Casey,
Appellant,
v.
Michele Aschbacher, Kersten Heidel, Camille Rowell, and Michael Rowell,
Appellees.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Tow and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 11, 2025
Desda Daniell Casey, Pro Se
Killian, Davis, & Richter, P.C., J. Keith Killian, Damon Davis, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellees ¶1 In this probate case, Desda Daniell Casey1 appeals the district
court’s order concluding that the estate of her deceased father, Gary
Kaye Heidel, had no legal interest in a settlement arising out of a
wrongful death suit concerning the death of his longtime significant
other, Catherine Rowell. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Catherine and Gary (the couple) began their relationship in
1992 and lived together off and on until 2016, when Catherine died
while incarcerated at the Rio Blanco County Jail. After Catherine’s
death, Gary asserted that he was Catherine’s common law husband
and filed a wrongful death action against the Rio Blanco County
Sheriff’s Office, the appointed sheriff, and individual sheriff’s
deputies (collectively, RBSO), in federal district court asserting
federal and state claims based on alleged violations of Catherine’s
constitutional rights (the federal case). See Heidel v. Mazzola, 851
F. App’x 837 (10th Cir. 2021). Catherine’s children — Michele
Aschbacher, Camille Rowell, Kersten Heidel, and Michael Rowell
1 To avoid confusion between those who share a last name, we refer
to parties in this opinion by their first names. We intend no disrespect in doing so.
1 (collectively, Catherine’s children) — and her estate joined the
federal case as plaintiffs. See id. The federal district court entered
summary judgment in favor of the RBSO on Catherine’s children
and Gary’s federal claims but dismissed the state law claims
without prejudice. See id. at 839-40.
¶3 Catherine’s children and Gary then filed a wrongful death
action against the RBSO in Adams County Case No. 20CV30602,
which was later transferred to Rio Blanco County Case No. 20CV1
(the state case).2 Gary also asserted that he was Catherine’s
common law husband in the state case.
¶4 Gary died during the pendency of the state case. About a year
after Gary’s death, Catherine’s children — who were the remaining
plaintiffs in the state case — reached a settlement agreement with
the RBSO. As part of the settlement agreement, Catherine’s
children agreed to initiate a probate case for Gary’s estate to have
the district court determine whether Gary’s estate had any rights to
2 We take judicial notice of the court records in the Adams County
and Rio Blanco County cases. See Harriman v. Cabela’s Inc., 2016 COA 43, ¶ 64 (noting that appellate courts “can ‘take judicial notice of the contents of court records in a related proceeding’” (quoting People v. Sa’ra, 117 P.3d 51, 56 (Colo. App. 2004))).
2 the settlement funds. Catherine’s children thus commenced the
underlying probate proceeding by filing a petition to determine
heirship and interests in property. In the petition, Catherine’s
children asserted in relevant part that Gary’s estate didn’t have an
interest in the settlement funds because the couple wasn’t common
law married.
¶5 Desda, who is Gary’s child, was named as an interested party
in the probate case. Catherine’s children notified her of the probate
proceedings as required by section 15-12-1303, C.R.S. 2025.
Desda filed a responsive pleading disputing Catherine’s children’s
claim that the couple wasn’t common law married. Desda asserted
that, because the federal case and state case had already
determined that the couple was common law married, Catherine’s
children’s assertion otherwise was barred by issue preclusion and
claim preclusion.
¶6 The court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition. During
the hearing, the court received evidence regarding whether (1) there
was a prior determination that the couple was common law
married, such that Catherine’s children were precluded from
arguing otherwise; and (2) the couple’s past actions and
3 representations could support a finding that the couple was
common law married if there was no such prior determination. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under
advisement and subsequently issued a written order (the judgment).
¶7 The court concluded that, because there wasn’t a prior final
judgment on Gary’s claim of a common law marriage, Catherine’s
children’s challenge to the existence of a common law marriage
between the couple wasn’t barred by issue or claim preclusion. The
court also determined that Desda hadn’t proved by a preponderance
of the evidence that the couple was common law married. And
because the couple wasn’t common law married, the court
concluded that Gary’s estate had no interest in the settlement
agreement.
¶8 Desda now appeals, arguing that the court erred by
concluding that claim preclusion doesn’t apply and that the couple
wasn’t common law married. Although Desda labeled her argument
as one of “claim preclusion,” whether Gary and Catherine were
common law married is not a claim but, rather, an issue integral to
the claims in the federal case. Because she is self-represented, we
broadly construe her argument as invoking the doctrine of issue
4 preclusion to ensure that she isn’t denied review of her argument.
See Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5. She also asserts the court
abused its discretion by not considering or giving “legal weight” to
certain evidence. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree and
therefore affirm the judgment.
II. Catherine’s Children’s Challenge to the Existence of a Common Law Marriage Isn’t Barred by Issue Preclusion
A. Issue Preclusion Legal Principles
¶9 Issue preclusion “prevents the re-litigation of discrete issues,
rather than causes of action,” meaning “once a particular issue is
finally determined in one proceeding, parties to this proceeding are
barred from re-litigating that particular issue again in a second
proceeding, even when the actual claims for relief in the two
proceedings are different.” Foster v. Plock, 2017 CO 39, ¶ 13.
¶ 10 To bar litigation of an issue in a subsequent judicial
proceeding, the party asserting issue preclusion must prove four
elements, including the existence of a final judgment on the merits
from a prior proceeding. See id. A judgment is “final” when it “ends
the particular action in which it is entered, leaving nothing further
for the court pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine
5 the rights of the parties involved in the proceeding.” BDG Int’l, Inc.
v. Bowers, 2013 COA 52, ¶ 24 (quoting Stillings v. Davis, 406 P.2d
337, 338 (Colo. 1965)). If a party fails to prove one of the elements,
their argument for issue preclusion necessarily fails. See Wolfe v.
Sedalia Water & Sanitation Dist., 2015 CO 8, ¶ 16 (noting that all
four elements must be proved for issue preclusion to apply).
¶ 11 Issue preclusion is a question of law that we review de novo.
Bristol Bay Prods., LLC v. Lampack, 2013 CO 60, ¶ 17.
B. Analysis
¶ 12 Desda asserts that the issue of whether the couple was
common law married was already “decided” by the courts in the
federal case and the state case. We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 13 To support her argument, Desda asserts that the issue was
previously litigated in the federal case because Catherine’s children
acknowledged and signed responses to interrogatories that affirmed
Gary was Catherine’s common law husband. She asserts that
Catherine’s children’s acknowledgment in the federal case “formed
the basis” for the state case. Thus, she argues that the district
court erred when it treated as not yet resolved the question of
whether the couple was common law married. However, Desda’s
6 arguments about the effect of the federal and state cases are
misplaced.
¶ 14 While Catherine’s children may have affirmed that Gary was
Catherine’s common law husband during the discovery phase of the
federal case, the federal court dismissed that case and never issued
a final judgment. See Heidel, 851 F. App’x at 839-40. Said
differently, Catherine’s children’s acknowledgment during discovery
doesn’t constitute a final judgment. See Bowers, ¶ 24. Thus, the
legal question of whether the couple was common law married was
never decided in the federal case and, therefore, lacked a final
judgment as required under issue preclusion. See id.; Foster, ¶ 13.
¶ 15 Gary died during the pendency of the state case and his estate
wasn’t substituted as a party. Catherine’s children later reached a
settlement with the RBSO after Gary’s death. The court then stayed
proceedings in the state case pending the outcome of the probate
case underlying this appeal, so there hasn’t been a final judgment
in the state case that determined the couple was common law
married.
¶ 16 The court’s judgment in the probate case was the first time
that any court had entered a final judgment determining whether
7 the couple was common law married. Thus, the proceedings in the
state case didn’t bar Catherine’s children’s challenge to Desda’s
contention that the couple was common law married. Accordingly,
Desda’s assertion that issue preclusion bars Catherine’s children’s
challenge necessarily fails. See Wolfe, ¶ 16.
¶ 17 Desda makes two additional arguments in support of her
assertion that the court erred by not giving preclusive effect to the
prior litigation. First, she asserts that Catherine’s children could’ve
challenged the common law marriage while Gary was alive and that
their challenge after his death is “procedurally improper.” However,
Desda never raised this argument during the probate proceeding, so
we don’t consider it further. See Colo. Div. of Ins. v. Statewide
Bonding, Inc., 2022 COA 67, ¶ 73 (“Arguments never presented to,
considered by, or ruled upon by a trial court may not be raised for
the first time on appeal.”).
¶ 18 Second, she asserts that the designation of “widower” on
Gary’s death certificate3 is “legally significant” because section
3 Desda didn’t submit Gary’s or Catherine’s death certificates as
part of the record on appeal. However, we take judicial notice of the court file in Mesa County Case No. 24PR30187, which contains both death certificates. See Harriman, ¶ 64.
8 25-2-110, C.R.S. 2025, requires that a decedent’s marital status be
“properly established” and accurately reflected on the decedent’s
death certificate. But section 25-2-110 doesn’t require that a
decedent’s marital status must be “properly established.” Rather,
that section simply requires that the personal data for a death
certificate — including a decedent’s marital status — be provided by
“the next of kin or the best qualified person or source available.”
§ 25-2-110(3)(a); see also Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t Reg. 2.1(J), 5
Code Colo. Regs. 1006-1 (recognizing marriage as a “vital event”
that must be incorporated into official records, including death
certificates).
¶ 19 Furthermore, a death certificate doesn’t “end[] the particular
action” or “completely determine the rights of the parties involved.”
Bowers, ¶ 24 (quoting Stillings, 406 P.2d at 338). Thus, a death
certificate isn’t a final judgment, and we reject Desda’s argument
that the marital status on Gary’s death certificate conclusively
established that the couple was common law married.
9 III. The Court Didn’t Abuse Its Discretion in Determining Whether the Couple Was Common Law Married
A. Common Law Marriage Legal Principles
¶ 20 A couple may establish a common law marriage by their
mutual consent or agreement “to enter the legal and social
institution of marriage, followed by conduct manifesting that
mutual agreement.” Hogsett v. Neale, 2021 CO 1, ¶ 49. The key
inquiry in determining whether a common law marriage has been
established is whether “the parties mutually intended to enter a
marital relationship,” meaning they intended “to share a life
together as spouses in a committed, intimate relationship of mutual
support and mutual obligation.” Id.
¶ 21 To determine whether a couple mutually consented to
establish a common law marriage, the court considers the totality of
the circumstances. See id. at ¶ 50. As part of the court’s totality of
the circumstances analysis, it looks to a nonexhaustive list of
factors evidencing their mutual intent to enter into a marital
relationship, including whether the couple has (1) cohabitated; (2) a
reputation in the community as spouses; (3) shared financial
responsibility; (4) shared symbols of commitment; (5) adopted each
10 other’s surnames; and (6) referenced each other as spouses. See id.
at ¶¶ 55-56.
¶ 22 A person seeking to have a court recognize a common law
marriage must prove the mutual intent of the parties to the
purported marriage by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at
¶ 17; see also § 13-25-127, C.R.S. 2025 (“[T]he burden of proof in
any civil action shall be by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
¶ 23 We review the court’s factual findings for clear error, meaning
we must accept the court’s factual findings unless the findings have
no record support. In re Estate of Yudkin, 2021 CO 2, ¶ 16; Parocha
v. Parocha, 2018 CO 41, ¶ 11. We then review the court’s
conclusion based on those findings that no common law marriage
existed for an abuse of discretion. Yudkin, ¶ 16; Rains v. Barber,
2018 CO 61, ¶ 8 (noting that a court abuses its discretion when its
ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it
misapplies the law).
B. Additional Background
¶ 24 The court concluded that Desda failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the couple agreed to enter into
the legal contract of marriage or engaged in conduct manifesting the
11 intent to be married. Specifically, the court found that Desda failed
to introduce any evidence that the couple
• celebrated a certain day as their anniversary;
• wore wedding rings;
• held themselves out to the community as husband and
wife; and
• had shared financial responsibilities, such as joint bank
or credit accounts, joint property ownership, or joint tax
returns.
¶ 25 Conversely, the court considered the evidence and determined
that it didn’t weigh strongly in favor of — or weighed against — the
conclusion that the couple manifested a mutual intent to be
married. For example, the court found that the couple lived
together on and off during their relationship but that “mere
cohabitation does not trigger marital rights or show an intent to be
married.” And while Catherine’s last name was listed as “Heidel” in
certain documents, the court noted that the decision to take a
partner’s last name isn’t necessarily indicative of a common law
marriage, and the court didn’t receive any evidence that Catherine
had legally changed her last name. Similarly, the court found that,
12 while the couple may have shared a child — Kersten — “in today’s
society, having a child . . . is not indicative of an intent to enter into
a marriage contract.” Furthermore, the court received evidence that
Gary had previously referred to Catherine as his “girlfriend” or “live
in girlfriend” in legal documents and that Catherine’s obituary
referred to Gary as her “life partner,” rather than her husband.
¶ 26 The court found that Gary signed an affidavit of common law
marriage (the affidavit) after Catherine’s death, but placed little
weight on it because, at the time he signed it, Gary had a financial
incentive to indicate that Catherine was his wife.
C. Analysis
¶ 27 Desda asserts that the court misapplied the standard set forth
in Hogsett when it determined that the couple wasn’t common law
married. We see no abuse of discretion.
¶ 28 The court considered the totality of the couple’s circumstances
to determine whether the couple had mutually consented to
establish a common law marriage, as evidenced by its consideration
of approximately eleven of the nonexhaustive factors set forth in
Hogsett, ¶¶ 55-56. The court considered several factors that could
indicate the couple’s intent to be common law married, including
13 Catherine’s use of Gary’s last name, the couple’s cohabitation, and
their shared child. But it weighed those factors against other
evidence and determined that the evidence as a whole didn’t
demonstrate the couple’s mutual intent to be married. While it is
true that Gary signed the affidavit and affirmed that he was
Catherine’s common law husband, such evidence is only indicative
of Gary’s intent and doesn’t establish the couple’s mutual consent
or agreement. Thus, as required by Hogsett, ¶ 49, the court
appropriately considered the evidence presented to it to determine
whether the couple’s conduct manifested their mutual agreement to
establish a common law marriage.
¶ 29 Notably, Desda failed to include transcripts from the
evidentiary hearing, so we must presume that the record supports
the judgment. See In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 13
(noting that if an appellant asserts that a trial court’s findings or
conclusions are unsupported or contrary to the evidence, “the
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence
relevant to such finding or conclusion,” and, if the appellant fails to
provide the transcript, then we must presume the record supports
the judgment (citation omitted)). And, in any event, the record
14 before us supports the court’s judgment, so we won’t disturb it.
See In re Estate of Owens, 2017 COA 53, ¶ 22 (noting an appellate
court won’t reweigh evidence).
IV. The Court Didn’t Abuse Its Discretion When It Weighed the Evidence
A. Applicable Legal Principles
¶ 30 The Colorado Rules of Evidence guide a court’s determination
of the admissibility of evidence. See CRE 401 (defining relevant
evidence); CRE 402 (stating that relevant evidence is generally
admissible unless certain exceptions apply). Hearsay statements
aren’t admissible unless they fall under an applicable exception.
See CRE 801(c) (defining “hearsay” statements); CRE 802 (noting
general inadmissibility of hearsay statements); CRE 803 (outlining
hearsay exceptions regardless of the availability of the declarant);
CRE 804 (outlining hearsay exceptions when the declarant is
unavailable).
¶ 31 “It is the trial court’s duty to determine the relevance and
admissibility of evidence.” Curry v. Brewer, 2025 COA 28, ¶ 30.
And in a common law marriage case, the court is the fact finder, so
15 it determines whether evidence is credible and what weight to afford
the evidence. See Hogsett, ¶ 50.
¶ 32 We review a court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove, 2012 CO 31, ¶ 7.
¶ 33 As relevant here, Desda asserts that the court erred when it
“wrongfully dismissed critical documentary evidence and sworn
testimony” and didn’t provide “legal weight” to (1) the affidavit;
(2) Gary’s death certificate; (3) evidence of the couple’s public
representations as husband and wife; and (4) a letter to the court
from Desda’s mother, Shawna Casey. Desda also argues that the
court “failed to apply CRE 803(14) and CRE 804.” We reject her
assertions for four reasons.
¶ 34 First, the court expressly considered the affidavit. However, as
noted above in Part III.C, the court concluded that the timing of the
affidavit and Gary’s financial incentive to sign it outweighed any
evidence that the affidavit established a common law marriage. As
the fact finder, it was the court’s duty to determine the credibility
and weight of the affidavit, see Hogsett, ¶ 50, which is exactly what
the court did here.
16 ¶ 35 Second, the court received into evidence a copy of Gary’s death
certificate. While the court didn’t make written findings about the
weight it afforded to the statement on Gary’s death certificate that
he was a “widower,” it received evidence demonstrating that it was
Desda’s decision to label Gary’s marital status as “widower” on his
death certificate. See § 25-2-110(3)(a). The court also received into
evidence Catherine’s death certificate, which lists Catherine’s
marital status as “divorced” and doesn’t list Gary as her spouse.
The court was thus required to resolve the conflicting evidence by
considering its credibility and determining whether it weighed for or
against the conclusion that the couple was common law married.
See People in Interest of Ramsey, 2023 COA 95, ¶ 23 (resolving
conflicts in the evidence is “solely within the province of the fact
finder”); Hogsett, ¶ 50. And because we don’t have the hearing
transcripts, we presume the record supports the judgment. See
Dean, ¶ 13.
¶ 36 Third, contrary to Desda’s assertion otherwise, the court did
consider documentary evidence related to Catherine’s use of Gary’s
last name. This evidence included a receipt that Catherine signed
as “Cathy Heidel” and a pamphlet from Catherine’s funeral, which
17 listed Catherine’s last name as “Rowell Heidel” and said that Gary
was Catherine’s “life partner.” However, as discussed in Part III.C,
the court appropriately considered the credibility of that evidence
and weighed it against other, conflicting evidence that it received,
which was within the court’s province as the fact finder. See
Ramsey, ¶ 23.
¶ 37 Fourth, Desda argues that Shawna’s letter was “written
testimony” that detailed the couple’s marital behavior. Desda
argues that the court failed to afford the letter “legal weight.” The
court declined to admit Shawna’s letter into evidence because it was
hearsay. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. See CRE 801(c); Mullins v. Med. Lien
Mgmt., Inc., 2013 COA 134, ¶ 52. Desda offered Shawna’s letter for
the truth of the statements it contained — i.e., that the couple
behaved as spouses. Shawna’s letter therefore falls squarely within
the definition of hearsay.
¶ 38 Desda appears to assert that the court should have
determined the letter was admissible under CRE 803(14) or CRE
804. CRE 803(14) is an exception to the hearsay rule that allows
records of documents that establish or affect an interest in property
18 to be admitted. Desda doesn’t explain why Shawna’s letter was
admissible under this rule, and we therefore decline to consider this
argument further. See Barnett v. Elite Props. of Am., Inc., 252 P.3d
14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010) (declining to consider a bald legal assertion
presented without argument or development).
¶ 39 Desda doesn’t explain what portion of CRE 804 she believes
Shawna’s letter is admissible under. Regardless, we acknowledge
that CRE 804(b)(4)(B) allows a court to admit hearsay statements of
family history. However, the admissibility of such statements is
limited to factual information like “date[s] of birth, marriage, death,
and the fact and degree of family relationships.” People v. Raffaelli,
701 P.2d 881, 884 (Colo. App. 1985). This rule doesn’t authorize
the admission of hearsay statements purporting to explain the
circumstances or events underlying such family history facts. See
id. at 884-85. Thus, to the extent Desda argues that Shawna’s
letter was admissible under CRE 804(b)(4)(B), we reject that
argument. To the extent Desda argues that Shawna’s letter was
admissible under a different portion of CRE 804, her argument is
undeveloped, and we don’t consider it further. See Barnett, 252
19 P.3d at 19. The court thus didn’t abuse its discretion by refusing to
admit Shawna’s letter into evidence.
V. Disposition
¶ 40 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LUM concur.