Currie, J.
Testator bequeathed to his wife “the share of my estate which she would receive under the law if I died intestate.” The trial court has in effect construed this language as if it read: “Such homestead rights in my homestead and right of dower in my remaining real estate as she would [221]*221receive if she elected to take under the law instead of this will.” It will be noted that the trial court’s construction provides for the widow receiving no part of the personal property of the deceased. However, the petition for probate alleges that the personal estate only had a value of $1,500. Therefore, it is possible that the personal estate will be entirely consumed in the payment of funeral expenses, administration expenses, and debts.
The wording of the residuary clause of testator’s will indicates that he considered there was a residue of his estate left undisposed of by the bequest and devise to his wife which would go to his three sisters. This is so because the residuary clause is not made contingent upon any failure of the bequest to the wife, such as occasioned by her prior death. Furthermore, the surrounding circumstances such as the short period the parties had lived together and the institution of divorce proceedings and the filing of the counterclaim (which filing of the counterclaim occurred approximately one month prior to the drafting of the will), would also tend to indicate that he did not intend that his wife should receive his entire estate.
If we consider the testimony of the attorney who drafted the will, it is apparent that the wording of the bequest to the wife was the result of mistake, as the attorney did not intend to provide that the wife should take the share of the estate which she would receive under the intestacy laws of the state, but only that part of the estate which she would receive if she elected to take under the law, instead of under the will.
The problem which confronts us on this appeal, therefore, is not whether the construction placed upon the will by the learned trial judge is in accordance with the intent of the testator, but rather whether such attempted construction would amount to a reformation of the will.
The well-accepted general rule is that courts, in construing wills, do not have power to reform the same even in the case of an obvious mistake on the part of the testator, as they do [222]*222in the case of such instruments as contracts and deeds. 4 Page, Wills (lifetime ed.), p. 583, sec. 1604; 57 Am. Jur., Wills, p. 273, sec. 375; and Anno. 94 A. L. R. 26, at page 65. It makes no difference that the mistake was occasioned by the oversight or inadvertence of the draftsman of the will. 57 Am. Jur., Wills, p. 680, sec. 1046; Anno. 94 A. L. R. 26, at page 70.
This general rule is well stated in O’Hearn v. O’Hearn (1902), 114 Wis. 428, 432, 90 N. W. 450, as follows:
“The dominating rule in construing wills is that the intention of the testator is to be ascertained from the words used, in the light of all surrounding circumstances, and that intention given effect. In re Donges’ Estate, 103 Wis. 497, 79 N. W. 786. The court cannot reform the will by changing its language or add provisions not written therein. It can only construe the instrument as written. Sherwood v. Sherwood, 45 Wis. 357.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It seems clear that testator’s words “share of my estate which she would receive under the law if I died intestate” cannot be construed to mean “share of my estate which she would receive under the law if she elected to take under the law instead of under the will,” without transgressing the above-stated rule that a court cannot reform a will by changing its language but can only construe the language as written.
The opinion of this court in the case of Will of Pfeiffer (1939), 231 Wis. 117, 118, 285 N. W. 432, is illustrative of a true construction of language of a will, as distinguished from reformation. Testator in that case also was survived by a widow but no. issue, and by his will he bequeathed to his wife “all that part of my estate which would legally go to her according to the statutes provided therefor” and then he bequeathed the residue in seven equal parts to other relatives. Mr. Justice Nelson, in the opinion of the court, pointed out that there were two sets of statutes making [223]*223provision for a widow, viz., one being the statute determining the widow’s rights to the estate in the event of the husband dying without a will, and the other being the statute which governs the rights of the widow to the estate in the event the husband dies testate but she elects to renounce the will and take under the law. The conclusion reached was that testator’s words “according to the statutes provided therefor” had reference to the last-mentioned statute governing a widow’s rights in the event of her election to take under the law instead of under the will rather than to the intestacy statutes.
The facts in Will of Pfeiffer, supra, are readily distinguishable from the case at bar. The words used by testator “according to the statutes provided therefor” in the Pfeiffer Case, in describing the bequest to his widow, were ambiguous in that they could refer to either of two sets of statutes. In the instant case testator Gray’s words “under the law if I died intestate” are not ambiguous, and in order to give them any other meaning than their plain import would require changing such words, and in so- doing a court would be reforming the will rather than construing it.
Counsel for respondents cite the case of Will of Bresnehan (1936), 221 Wis. 51, 53, 265 N. W. 93, as supporting the conclusion reached by the trial court in the case at bar. Testator in that case was survived by his widow, and by John Bresnehan, whom he thought to be his legally adopted son. By his will testator bequeathed and devised to his widow “all that part of my estate to which she is entitled under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Wisconsin, the same as though no will had been by me made.” He then bequeathed his homestead, subject to the homestead and dower rights of his widow, to his adopted son, John Bresnehan, and also bequeathed one third of the residue to John Bresnehan and two thirds to his sister. The adoption proceedings in the matter of the adoption of John Bresnehan were jurisdic-[224]*224tionally defective because of the fact that the wife of testator had not joined in the petition for adoption. The estate was insolvent so the appeal centered on the question of the disposition of the homestead. This court held that it was testator’s intention to give to his wife her dower and homestead interests in the homestead, which is the interest she would have received under the law if the adopted son had been legally adopted and her husband had died without a will.
The construction of the will reached by this court in the Bresnehan Case was based upon the intent of the testator as gathered from within the four corners of the will itself. It was clear that testator considered John Bresnehan to be his adopted son because he so referred to him as such in the will. The share that the widow was entitled to receive in the homestead under the intestacy laws of the state, assuming John Bresnehan to be a legally adopted son, was her right to the enjoyment oí the homestead so long as she lived and did not remarry, and that clearly was all that the testator intended she should take.
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Currie, J.
Testator bequeathed to his wife “the share of my estate which she would receive under the law if I died intestate.” The trial court has in effect construed this language as if it read: “Such homestead rights in my homestead and right of dower in my remaining real estate as she would [221]*221receive if she elected to take under the law instead of this will.” It will be noted that the trial court’s construction provides for the widow receiving no part of the personal property of the deceased. However, the petition for probate alleges that the personal estate only had a value of $1,500. Therefore, it is possible that the personal estate will be entirely consumed in the payment of funeral expenses, administration expenses, and debts.
The wording of the residuary clause of testator’s will indicates that he considered there was a residue of his estate left undisposed of by the bequest and devise to his wife which would go to his three sisters. This is so because the residuary clause is not made contingent upon any failure of the bequest to the wife, such as occasioned by her prior death. Furthermore, the surrounding circumstances such as the short period the parties had lived together and the institution of divorce proceedings and the filing of the counterclaim (which filing of the counterclaim occurred approximately one month prior to the drafting of the will), would also tend to indicate that he did not intend that his wife should receive his entire estate.
If we consider the testimony of the attorney who drafted the will, it is apparent that the wording of the bequest to the wife was the result of mistake, as the attorney did not intend to provide that the wife should take the share of the estate which she would receive under the intestacy laws of the state, but only that part of the estate which she would receive if she elected to take under the law, instead of under the will.
The problem which confronts us on this appeal, therefore, is not whether the construction placed upon the will by the learned trial judge is in accordance with the intent of the testator, but rather whether such attempted construction would amount to a reformation of the will.
The well-accepted general rule is that courts, in construing wills, do not have power to reform the same even in the case of an obvious mistake on the part of the testator, as they do [222]*222in the case of such instruments as contracts and deeds. 4 Page, Wills (lifetime ed.), p. 583, sec. 1604; 57 Am. Jur., Wills, p. 273, sec. 375; and Anno. 94 A. L. R. 26, at page 65. It makes no difference that the mistake was occasioned by the oversight or inadvertence of the draftsman of the will. 57 Am. Jur., Wills, p. 680, sec. 1046; Anno. 94 A. L. R. 26, at page 70.
This general rule is well stated in O’Hearn v. O’Hearn (1902), 114 Wis. 428, 432, 90 N. W. 450, as follows:
“The dominating rule in construing wills is that the intention of the testator is to be ascertained from the words used, in the light of all surrounding circumstances, and that intention given effect. In re Donges’ Estate, 103 Wis. 497, 79 N. W. 786. The court cannot reform the will by changing its language or add provisions not written therein. It can only construe the instrument as written. Sherwood v. Sherwood, 45 Wis. 357.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It seems clear that testator’s words “share of my estate which she would receive under the law if I died intestate” cannot be construed to mean “share of my estate which she would receive under the law if she elected to take under the law instead of under the will,” without transgressing the above-stated rule that a court cannot reform a will by changing its language but can only construe the language as written.
The opinion of this court in the case of Will of Pfeiffer (1939), 231 Wis. 117, 118, 285 N. W. 432, is illustrative of a true construction of language of a will, as distinguished from reformation. Testator in that case also was survived by a widow but no. issue, and by his will he bequeathed to his wife “all that part of my estate which would legally go to her according to the statutes provided therefor” and then he bequeathed the residue in seven equal parts to other relatives. Mr. Justice Nelson, in the opinion of the court, pointed out that there were two sets of statutes making [223]*223provision for a widow, viz., one being the statute determining the widow’s rights to the estate in the event of the husband dying without a will, and the other being the statute which governs the rights of the widow to the estate in the event the husband dies testate but she elects to renounce the will and take under the law. The conclusion reached was that testator’s words “according to the statutes provided therefor” had reference to the last-mentioned statute governing a widow’s rights in the event of her election to take under the law instead of under the will rather than to the intestacy statutes.
The facts in Will of Pfeiffer, supra, are readily distinguishable from the case at bar. The words used by testator “according to the statutes provided therefor” in the Pfeiffer Case, in describing the bequest to his widow, were ambiguous in that they could refer to either of two sets of statutes. In the instant case testator Gray’s words “under the law if I died intestate” are not ambiguous, and in order to give them any other meaning than their plain import would require changing such words, and in so- doing a court would be reforming the will rather than construing it.
Counsel for respondents cite the case of Will of Bresnehan (1936), 221 Wis. 51, 53, 265 N. W. 93, as supporting the conclusion reached by the trial court in the case at bar. Testator in that case was survived by his widow, and by John Bresnehan, whom he thought to be his legally adopted son. By his will testator bequeathed and devised to his widow “all that part of my estate to which she is entitled under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Wisconsin, the same as though no will had been by me made.” He then bequeathed his homestead, subject to the homestead and dower rights of his widow, to his adopted son, John Bresnehan, and also bequeathed one third of the residue to John Bresnehan and two thirds to his sister. The adoption proceedings in the matter of the adoption of John Bresnehan were jurisdic-[224]*224tionally defective because of the fact that the wife of testator had not joined in the petition for adoption. The estate was insolvent so the appeal centered on the question of the disposition of the homestead. This court held that it was testator’s intention to give to his wife her dower and homestead interests in the homestead, which is the interest she would have received under the law if the adopted son had been legally adopted and her husband had died without a will.
The construction of the will reached by this court in the Bresnehan Case was based upon the intent of the testator as gathered from within the four corners of the will itself. It was clear that testator considered John Bresnehan to be his adopted son because he so referred to him as such in the will. The share that the widow was entitled to receive in the homestead under the intestacy laws of the state, assuming John Bresnehan to be a legally adopted son, was her right to the enjoyment oí the homestead so long as she lived and did not remarry, and that clearly was all that the testator intended she should take.
Respondents’ brief cites authorities which hold that one of the canons of construction to be observed in construing a will is that the whole will must be considered in an attempt to correlate all provisions of it. In keeping with such principle it is urged that it is evident from the residuary clause of Bert L. Gray’s will that he intended his sisters to share in some part of his estate, and therefore the court should so construe the will as to give effect to this residuary clause.
The Pennsylvania court in Peterson's Estate (1913), 242 Pa. 330, 89 Atl. 126, had before it for construction a will wherein the testatrix made an outright bequest to her husband followed by a residuary clause inconsistent with such bequest. In considering the effect of such residuary clause the court stated (242 Pa. 340, 89 Atl. 129) :
“The fact that there is a residuary clause can in no wise limit or detract from what had been previously given in the [225]*225will; nor can such residuary clause have the effect of putting a construction on a previous clause of the will in order to create a residue.”
In Johnson v. Linstrom (1904), 92 Minn. 8, 99 N. W. 212, testator died leaving a wife, but no issue. In his will he stated that his wife “shall have such share and part of my estate, both real estate and personal property, as she may be entitled to under the statutes of the state of Minnesota, as the same may provide, at the date of my decease.” The will also contained a residuary clause by which the residue was bequeathed to a sister and a brother. At the time the will was made the intestacy laws of Minnesota provided that in the case of a husband who died leaving a widow but no issue the surviving wife was entitled to a life estate in the homestead and a one-third interest in the remaining real estate. After making the will, but prior to the death of testator, the statutes were changed so as to give the widow the whole estate in case of intestacy. The court held that the will spoke' as of the time of death and stated (92 Minn. 10, 99 N. W. 213) :
“The fact that the testator assumed that there would be a residue is not sufficient to overcome the explicit declaration in the preceding section.”
The decision of Dealy v. Keatts (1930), 157 Miss. 412, 128 So. 268, is also in point on this question. In that case the testatrix provided in her will for the sale of two cottages and out of the proceeds one tenth was given to her church “and the rest divided between the two granddaughters of my husband, Dr. J. R. Phillips (Mattie and Daisy Andrews) and the balance to Brother George’s children.” There clearly was an inconsistency because, if the nine-tenths balance of the proceeds were divided between the granddaughters, there would be nothing left to go to the brother’s children. The Mississippi supreme court upheld the trial court’s decision [226]*226that the brother’s children took nothing. In its opinion the court said (157 Miss. 419, 420, 128 So. 270) :
“The difficulty is that it [the will] provides for the disposal of a residue without creating one. It is not for the court, at all hazards, to furnish property in order that named individuals may take under a will. If the testator exhausts his estate in a legal manner, although he mentions another to take a residue, the latter fails in the face of the fact that no residue exists. ... We cannot alter its meaning, nor supply words when it does not appear that they were omitted unintentionally; nor can we strike out words which have meaning or give the words used another and different meaning than that to which their use in the connection is applied. . . . The remainder over to include the children of ‘Brother George’ fails because of the lack of property to which it could be applied, and not from any ambiguity or repugnancy in the will of the testatrix.”
We are constrained to conclude that the bequest and devise made by testator to his wife Mildred Gray, couched as it was in language giving her that share of the estate "which she would receive under the law if I died intestate,” was not ambiguous. Therefore, it was error for the trial court to admit over objection that part of the testimony of the attorney who drafted the will which related to the conversation which took place between testator and himself. Such conversation was offered for the purpose of contradicting and varying express language of the will, and not to explain it, and therefore was inadmissible. As stated by the author of the exhaustive annotation on the subject of the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in the construction of wills appearing in 94 A. L. R. 26, at page 31:
-“The general principle is well settled that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to vary, contradict, or add to the terms of a will, or to show a different intention on the part of the testator from that disclosed by the language of the will.”
[227]*227Without such testimony of the scrivener there would be no basis for construing the will so as to attain the result reached by the trial court. While the surrounding circumstances existing at the time of the execution of the will would render it highly unlikely that the testator would have desired his wife to take his entire estate, and the residuary clause of the will itself establishes that testator intended there would be a residue to be received by his three sisters, nevertheless, the courts are without authority to reform and remake the will and cut down the bequest and devise to the widow so as to leave a residue to pass under the residuary clause.
The adherence in this case to the rule, that courts have no authority in the guise of construing a will to reform the same so as to correct a mistake, results in an outcome that the members of the court who join in this majority opinion wish could be avoided, because it means that testator’s estate will be distributed in a manner not in accord with his true intent. However, we consider it would be establishing an extremely dangerous precedent not to adhere to this well-recognized rule and thereby let down the bars so as to permit explicit language of a will to be varied by extrinsic evidence (in this instance parol testimony).
By the Court. — Order reversed and cause remanded with directions to enter an order construing the will so as to bequeath and devise the entire estate to the widow Mildred Gray.