Estate of Bates CA1/2

Opinion

Filed 8/19/26 Estate of Bates CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

Estate of MARY ESTHER BATES, Deceased.

TYEHIMBA KOKAYI, as Administrator of the Estate A174159

Petitioner and Respondent, v. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RP21094469)

DUSTAN WRIGHT Objector and Appellant.

Dustan Wright, who is self-represented, appeals an order entered by the probate court on June 5, 2025, granting the estate administrator’s petition to eject him from possession of a single family home located at 845 Athens Avenue in Oakland, California belonging to the deceased, Mary Bates (hereafter, the Bates residence).

This is Wright’s second appeal in a long-running dispute arising from Wright’s and others’ occupancy of the Bates residence following her death that has involved multiple parties and generated multiple lawsuits. We previously affirmed a judgment of dismissal in a civil action for damages and foreclosure of a mechanics lien Wright brought against the estate

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administrator and others. (Karewicz v. Wright (Jan. 28, 2025, A170145) [nonpub. opn.].) In that appeal, we found Wright’s briefing “unfocused and difficult to understand” (ibid.), and the same is true here.

We will affirm the order granting the administrator’s petition to recover possession of the Bates residence.1 BACKGROUND

On April 18, 2025, the administrator of Mary Bates’s estate, Tyehimba Kokayi (hereafter, the administrator), filed a verified petition against Wright to recover possession of the Bates residence. The petition alleged the property belongs to the estate, Wright and others had been squatting unlawfully there for 13 years, and Wright had been “h[olding] the property hostage” from the estate and Bates’s heirs by filing multiple lawsuits in propria persona and yet had lost them all, including the prior appeal. It also alleged Wright had filed a petition in the probate case claiming damages against the administrator and to remove him as administrator, and his petition had been denied. It alleged he “now seeks to start the process all over again by filing another case (25CV112257) against the same parties” and “is a vexatious litigant.” The petition alleged specifically that on March 3, 2025, Wright had filed “a new complaint in Alameda case number 25CV112[2]57 against Petitioner and other parties, including the same

1 The notice of appeal also specifies an order entered on June 17, 2025, but the record contains no such order. In addition, Wright states in his brief that “[t]he subsequent order that is under appeal” is the writ of possession issued by the clerk on July 14, 2025, but his notice of appeal did not specify that order and so we lack jurisdiction to review it (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2); see, e.g. DeZerega v. Meggs (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 28, 43), and in any event his briefing contains no discernible argument concerning the writ. For these reasons, we address only the probate court’s June 5, 2025 ruling on the ejectment petition.

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parties that he sued” previously. It alleged that, “[a]s of the date of this Petition, [Wright] has not vacated the Estate Real Property and continues to obstruct Petitioner from gaining possession” of the property. The petition sought an order compelling Wright and other occupants to surrender possession of the Bates residence and related relief.

Wright filed a response opposing the petition on only two grounds: (1)

he argued the petition had not been filed and served properly in violation of Probate Code section 851; and (2) he asked the court to abate the petition under Probate Code section 854 until his newly filed civil case (No. 25CV112257) concluded. Section 854 states: “If a civil action is pending with respect to the subject matter of a petition filed pursuant to this chapter this part and jurisdiction has been obtained in the court where the civil action is pending prior to the filing of the petition, upon request of any party to the civil action, the court shall abate the petition until the conclusion of the civil action. This section shall not apply if the court finds that the civil action was filed for the purpose of delay.” (Italics added.) Wright’s opposition was supported by no evidence other than a proof of service on the administrator for the summons and complaint in the newly filed action. His opposition described that case as one for “quiet title by adverse possession.”

In reply, the administrator argued the petition should not be abated because Wright’s newly filed civil case was a “sham” that had been filed for the purpose of delay, to evade prior adverse rulings.

Wright did not attend the hearing. The probate court granted the petition, in an order entered June 5, 2025, rejecting Wright’s only two arguments. It ruled that “all notices required by law have been given” and “there is no evidence Petitioner violated Probate Code section 851” regarding proper service. It also found

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that Wright’s previously filed action (No. 25CV112257) “was filed for the purpose of delay, therefore abatement pursuant to Probate Code section 854 does not apply.” It “f[ound] and confirm[ed] that . . . [Wright] has no rights of ownership and/or possession to” the Bates residence; ordered Wright and all other occupants to vacate and surrender possession of the Bates residence to the administrator within 15 days; ordered the issuance of a writ of possession commanding the sheriff to eject Wright from the premises; and issued related ancillary relief and monetary relief.

Wright subsequently filed a motion to vacate the June 5, 2025 order under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, supported by a declaration under oath and a voluminous request for judicial notice. But he then filed his notice of appeal before the motion to vacate was heard, and subsequently the trial court denied his motion without reaching the merits on the ground that the filing of his appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to consider vacating the order.

DISCUSSION

We repeat what we said in Wright’s prior appeal about what an appellant must do in order to present a proper argument for us to consider.

We presume that the trial court’s ruling is correct, and it is an appellant’s burden to persuade us of an error. (See Grappo v. McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1006 [calling such framework “[t]he most fundamental principle of appellate review”].) To do this, “ ‘an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.’ ” (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146 (United Grand Corp.).) “Mere suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority other than general abstract principles do not properly present grounds for appellate review.”

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(Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078.) We are not required to develop an appellant’s argument for him and thus disregard conclusory arguments that either lack citation to any relevant legal authority or fail to spell out the appellant’s reasoning (or both). (United Grand Corp., at p. 153.) In short, when an appellant fails to “convince us, by developing his arguments, stating the law, and calling out relevant portions of the record, that the trial court committed reversible error,” the appellant’s argument is insufficient to demonstrate error. (See Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 893, 910.) Furthermore, the only issues we are required to consider are those clearly identified in an argument heading. If there are other arguments for reversal buried somewhere in the appellant’s opening brief they are forfeited because we aren’t required to ferret them out (even if, without any appropriately informative headings, we could). (See United Grand Corp., at p. 153; Tsakopoulos Investments, LLC v. County of Sacramento (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 280, 310.)2 Here, as in the prior appeal, Wright has not affirmatively shown any error.

To the extent we understand his arguments, most appear to concern issues he did not raise in opposition to the petition which, as noted, he opposed on only two grounds. We agree with the administrator that all such

We also do not consider any new arguments contained in an 2

appellant’s reply brief (and here, there are several). (See United Grand Corp., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 157-158.) “ ‘Fairness militates against allowing an appellant to raise an issue for the first time in a reply brief because consideration of the issue deprives the respondent of the opportunity to counter the appellant by raising opposing arguments about the new issue.’ ” (Id. at p. 158.)

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other issues (which defy precise identification) are forfeited. Generally, “ ‘the failure to preserve a point below constitutes a [forfeiture] of the point. [Citation.] This rule is rooted in the fundamental nature of our adversarial system: The parties must call the court’s attention to issues they deem relevant.’ ” (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 698.) “ ‘ “An argument or theory will . . . not be considered if it is raised for the first time on appeal.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 699; accord, Avalos v. Perez (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 773, 776-777.) Furthermore, an appellant must affirmatively demonstrate that it preserved an argument in the trial court— including by citing to the record showing exactly where the objection was made, or else explain why the issue can be raised for the first time on appeal. When an appellant does neither, we may deem the issue forfeited. (See Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 798-802 (Dietz).)

Wright argues that he didn’t forfeit any issues because he later filed a motion to vacate the court’s June 5, 2025 ruling. But he has made no attempt to show that his subsequent motion raised any of these new issues, as is his burden. (See Dietz, supra, 177 Cal. App.4th at p. 800 [appellant who “fail[ed] to provide a single record citation demonstrating that it raised in the trial court any of the numerous contentions” in opening brief held to have forfeited them all; “[t]his court has no obligation to cull the lengthy record [and] ascertain the procedural context in which [appellant] may have raised these claims in the trial court”].) Furthermore, even if he had shown this, Wright cites no authority that his subsequent motion was sufficient to preserve those new issues in connection with the probate court’s earlier June 5, 2025 ruling on the petition. At most, any new issues he raised in his

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motion to vacate that order would be reviewable on appeal from the court’s August 13, 2025 ruling denying his motion, but no such appeal is before us.3 Turning then to the two issues Wright raised below, we perceive no intelligible argument challenging the probate court’s ruling that there was no violation of Probate Code section 851’s notice and service requirements.

As for whether the petition should have been abated under Probate Code section 854 in favor of the already pending civil case, Wright does argue the probate court erred. But here again, we discern no intelligible argument that it erred in finding that Wright’s previously filed civil action “was filed for the purpose of delay, [and] therefore abatement pursuant to Probate Code section 854 does not apply.” At most, Wright attacks on several grounds what he characterizes as “testimony” by the administrator’s counsel at the hearing; but counsel did not testify at the hearing—he presented oral argument. Wright does not address the legal standard under section 854 for determining whether a previously filed civil action “was filed for the purpose of delay,” the parties’ respective evidentiary burdens on this issue or the applicable standard of review. He thus fails to demonstrate that the uncontested allegations of the verified petition (which he did not dispute or in any way contest) were not legally sufficient to sustain a ruling that abatement in favor of the civil action was not mandatory.

Finally, we have discretion to address an issue for the first time on appeal for pure questions of law (see Avalos v. Perez, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th

3 “An order denying a motion to vacate an appealable judgment is generally not appealable if such appeal raises only matters that could be reviewed on appeal from the judgment itself,” but such a ruling is appealable when the motion “raise[d] issues which are not disclosed or could not be disposed of on appeal from the judgment itself.” (Rooney v. Vermont Investment Corp. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 351, 358, 359.)

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at p. 777), and we exercise that discretion here to comment briefly on one matter. Wright asserts that the probate court awarded damages in an amount well in excess of the statutory maximum under Civil Code section 3334, which generally limits damages for wrongful occupation of real property to “the value of the use of the property for the time of that wrongful occupation, not exceeding five years next preceding the commencement of the action or proceeding to enforce the right to damages, the reasonable cost of repair or restoration of the property to its original condition, and the costs, if any, of recovering the possession.” (Italics added.) He asserts the probate court erroneously awarded damages for the reasonable rental value of the Bates residence ($83.33 per day) calculated from June 1, 2012 (or, approximately $400,000), rather than from five years before the petition was filed (or, approximately $152,077).

The court’s order is ambiguous. Paragraph 8 orders Wright “to pay Petitioner $83.33 per day as fair market rent from June 1, 2012, to the date possession of [the Bates residence] is surrendered to Petitioner.” But Paragraph 9 states in relevant part, “The Court finds pursuant to Civil Code section 3334, the detriment caused by [Wright’s] wrongful occupation of [the Bates residence] is deemed to include the value of the use of the property for the time of that wrongful occupation, not exceeding five years next preceding the commencement of the action or proceeding to enforce the right to damages,” thereby incorporating the statutory limitation. (Italics added.) Nothing in this opinion is intended to preclude Wright from utilizing whatever procedural vehicles may be appropriate on remand to seek clarification concerning the probate court’s intentions regarding the date that fair rental damages begin to accrue.

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DISPOSITION

The June 5, 2025 order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs.

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STEWART, P. J.

We concur.

RICHMAN, J.

MILLER, J.

Estate of Bates (A174159)