Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner

90 T.C. No. 14, 90 T.C. 171, 1988 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 14
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedFebruary 2, 1988
DocketDocket No. 33581-84
StatusPublished
Cited by43 cases

This text of 90 T.C. No. 14 (Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. No. 14, 90 T.C. 171, 1988 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 14 (tax 1988).

Opinion

COHEN, Judge:

Respondent determined the following deficiencies in petitioner’s corporate income tax:

Tax year ended Deficiency
10/25/75... $3,023,566
10/28/78... 2,697,565
10/27/79... 32,892,249
10/25/80... 114,534,187

After concessions, the primary issue for decision is whether petitioner must recognize $452,681,864 of long-term capital gain as a result of Mobil Oil Corp.’s 1980 acquisition of one of petitioner’s subsidiaries. If that issue is decided against petitioner, we must also decide whether the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution requires application of sec. 633(f) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2281, to the transaction before us.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Many of the facts have been stipulated, and the facts set forth in the stipulation are incorporated in our findings by this reference. Esmark, Inc., and affiliated companies (petitioner) had its principal offices in Chicago, Illinois, when its petition was filed.

The Esmark Exchange

Petitioner was a Delaware corporation organized as a holding company, which directly or indirectly held a number of operating subsidiaries. The various businesses carried on by petitioner’s subsidiaries were divided into five broad segments or categories consisting of: (1) Foods; (2) chemicals and industrial products; (3) energy; (4) personal products; and (5) high fidelity and automotive products.

The food segment consisted of Swift & Co. (Swift) and related subsidiaries that engaged in packing fresh meats and the manufacture and sale of processed foods. Swift represented petitioner’s most longstanding business and was the business for which petitioner was most widely known.

The energy segment consisted of Vickers, a holding company, and its three principal operating subsidiaries: Vickers Petroleum Corp. (VPC), Doric Petroleum, Inc. (Doric), and TransOcean Oil, Inc. (TransOcean). Vickers owned all of the issued and outstanding stock of VPC and TransOcean. VPC, in turn, owned all of the issued and outstanding stock of Doric until September 18, 1980, when the Doric stock was transferred to Vickers.

During the latter part of 1979 and the early part of 1980 petitioner experienced a serious liquidity problem. This problem was primarily the result of (i) the sharp rise in crude oil prices during the 1979 “energy crisis” that greatly increased VPC’s inventory costs, (ii) the continued poor performance of Swift, (iii) record high short-term interest rates that increased the cost of inventory and other short-term financing, and (iv) an agreement to purchase the assets of Tridan Corp. for $45 million.

Petitioner’s management also believed that petitioner’s stock was undervalued. Petitioner’s common stock was publicly traded on the New York stock exchange with a trading range of between $23.75 and $35.50 per share during the 12 months prior to April 24, 1980. By early 1980, petitioner’s management had determined that petitioner’s stock price did not reflect the underlying or “breakup” value of the company’s separate assets, as such value was calculated by investment bankers to be $55 to $71 per share, more than twice the $25.50-per-share closing price of petitioner’s common stock on April 24, 1980. The market value of petitioner’s energy assets, in particular, had appreciated greatly during the period in question.

Petitioner’s management attributed the failure of petitioner’s stock price to reflect the underlying value of its assets to the public market’s perception of petitioner as primarily a food company dominated by Swift, a company that had been a poor financial performer for several years. Petitioner’s management believed that the disparity or “spread” between the trading value of petitioner’s stock and the underlying value of its assets made the company an attractive target for a takeover at a price that was less than could be realized for the shareholders if petitioner was “broken up.”

As an initial response to petitioner’s financial problems, Donald P. Kelly, petitioner’s president and chief executive officer (Kelly), informally proposed to petitioner’s board of directors at its April 24, 1980, meeting that petitioner borrow $300 million by issuing to a foreign investor subordinated debentures that would be convertible into petitioner’s common stock. A portion of the proceeds were to be used to acquire petitioner’s shares through a tender offer. Petitioner’s board of directors responded unfavorably to Kelly’s proposal but asked management to pursue various restructuring alternatives, including a sale of the energy segment.

At the May 1980 board of directors meeting, Kelly presented a restructuring plan which included a reorganization of Swift and a sale of the energy segment to be followed by a self-tender for 50 percent of petitioner’s outstanding shares. The board responded favorably to this plan and instructed Kelly to develop more definite proposals for the June 1980 meeting.

At its next meeting on June 26, 1980, the board formally approved proceeding with the restructuring program outlined by Kelly in May. The program included the following elements: (1) The closing of certain units of Swift’s fresh meats division and the disposition of the remaining fresh meats units, (2) the disposition of certain of petitioner’s minor businesses, (3) the disposition of all of the energy segment, and (4) the redemption by petitioner of approximately 50 percent of its stock if the energy segment were sold for cash.

Each plan for the restructuring of petitioner which included a disposition of the energy segment also included a contraction of petitioner’s capital structure by a major redemption of petitioner’s shares because (1) the energy segment was a very large segment of petitioner’s ongoing business with very heavy capital requirements, and its disposition would substantially reduce its need for working and investment capital; (2) an accompanying redemption of shares was necessary to avoid making petitioner a “sitting duck” for an outside acquirer who could deprive petitioner’s shareholders of existing value; and (3) it would permit its shareholders, especially those who had invested in petitioner because of its energy assets, to redeem or sell their stock at the value of the underlying assets.

Shortly after the June meeting and prior to any solicitation of bids for the energy segment, petitioner’s management, in consultation with its tax and financial advisers, began to analyze the various forms of transactions that would accomplish petitioner’s dual goals of disposing of its energy segment and redeeming 50 percent of its outstanding stock. One of the options it considered was the “tender offer/redemption” format ultimately used. Such a format had been used and reported in the press in a public transaction several months earlier involving a subsidiary of I.U. International. Under such a tender offer/redemption format, a third party would acquire petitioner’s stock in a public tender offer, and petitioner would distribute the stock of Vickers in redemption of the tendered shares.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
90 T.C. No. 14, 90 T.C. 171, 1988 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 14, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/esmark-inc-v-commissioner-tax-1988.