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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6
7 PATRICK L. ESLICK, NO. 2:21-CV-0282-TOR 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 9 v. MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 10 STATE OF WASHINGTON AND GRANTING CITY DEFENDANTS’ JASON P. AEBISCHER, and CITY MOTION FOR SUMMARY 11 OF MOSES LAKE AND TRAVIS JUDGMENT RUFFIN AND JOSE PEREZ, 12 Defendants. 13
14 BEFORE THE COURT are Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 15 Judgment (ECF No. 43) and City Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 16 (ECF No. 50). These matters were submitted for consideration with oral argument 17 on June 9, 2022. Plaintiff Patrick L. Eslick, proceeding pro se, appeared on behalf 18 of himself. Kirk A. Ehlis appeared on behalf of City Defendants. Taylor M. 19 Hennessey appeared on behalf of State Defendants. The Court has reviewed the 20 record and files herein, considered the parties’ oral arguments, and is fully 1 informed. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 2 Judgment (ECF No. 43) is DENIED, and City Defendants’ Motion for Summary
3 Judgment (ECF No. 50) is GRANTED. 4 BACKGROUND 5 This matter relates to events following a traffic stop in July 2019. The
6 following facts are not in dispute, except where noted. 7 Sometime between 1:00AM and 2:00AM on July 29, 2019, Plaintiff was 8 pulled over in Moses Lake, Washington for driving without his headlights turned 9 on. ECF Nos. 43-1 at 2, ¶ 2; 51 at 2, ¶ 1. After an interaction with Defendants
10 Officer Perez and State Trooper Aebischer, Plaintiff was placed under arrest for 11 suspected driving under the influence (DUI). ECF Nos. 43-1 at 7, ¶ 15; 51 at 6, ¶ 12 23. Defendant Officer Ruffin was also on scene during the interaction; he was
13 riding along with Officer Perez as part of Officer Perez’s training. ECF No. 52 at 14 2, ¶ 5. Officer Ruffin’s role was primarily to observe Officer Perez’s interactions 15 with the public. Id. at 3, ¶ 6. Plaintiff was not ultimately charged with DUI but 16 was cited for Negligent Driving 1st Degree. ECF No. 51 at 8, ¶ 34. The citation
17 was later dismissed. ECF No. 1-1 at 49. 18 On July 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed a tort claim with the Washington Department 19 of Enterprise Services, Office of Risk Management, for alleged tortious conduct
20 stemming from the July 2019 traffic stop. Id. at 50. Plaintiff did not properly file 1 a tort claim with the City of Moses Lake. ECF No. 50 at 9, ¶ 38. On September 2 24, 2021, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint in this matter, asserting state and
3 federal law violations. ECF No. 1. On December 22, 2022, the Court dismissed 4 Defendants Grant County and Commissioner Gigliotti from the action, finding 5 Plaintiff had failed to state claims against those defendants. ECF No. 34. The
6 remaining defendants include the State of Washington, State Trooper Aebischer, 7 the City of Moses Lake, and Moses Lake Police Officers Ruffin and Perez 8 (collectively “Defendants”). 9 In the present motions, Plaintiff seeks partial summary judgment as to the
10 remaining Defendants’ liability for claims asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 11 and 1985, 18 U.S.C. § 2, and various state laws; Defendants City of Moses Lake, 12 Officer Ruffin, and Officer Perez (“City Defendants”) seek summary judgment as
13 to all claims asserted against them. ECF Nos. 43, 50. Defendants State of 14 Washington and Trooper Aebischer (“State Defendants”) have responded to both 15 motions and reserve the right to file their own motion for summary judgment in the 16 future. ECF Nos. 47, 57.
17 DISCUSSION 18 I. Legal Standard 19 The Court may grant summary judgment in favor of a moving party who
20 demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the 1 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling 2 on a motion for summary judgment, the court must only consider admissible
3 evidence. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2002). The 4 party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing the 5 absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
6 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to identify 7 specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. 8 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla 9 of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be
10 evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252. 11 For purposes of summary judgment, a fact is “material” if it might affect the 12 outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. at 248. Further, a dispute is
13 “genuine” only where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find in 14 favor of the non-moving party. Id. The Court views the facts, and all rational 15 inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. 16 Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). Summary judgment will thus be granted
17 “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 18 an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the 19 burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
20 1 A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 2 A cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be maintained “against
3 any person acting under the color of law who deprives another ‘of any rights, 4 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United 5 States.” Southern Cal. Gas Co., v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885 (9th Cir.
6 2003) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The rights guaranteed by § 1983 are “liberally 7 and beneficently construed.” Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991). 8 Plaintiff seeks summary judgment as to Defendants’ liability arising under 9 § 1983 for civil rights violations including failure to train, false arrest, and due
10 process violations. ECF No. 1 at 16–17, at 21–25. State Defendants oppose 11 Plaintiff’s motion on the grounds that they are not “persons” for the purposes of a 12 § 1983 claim. ECF No. 47 at 7. City Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to
13 establish the existence of an official policy or custom, or a failure to train City 14 employees, that leads to civil rights violations. ECF No. 44 at 7–9. City 15 Defendants also move for summary judgment on all claims asserted against them 16 arising under § 1983. ECF No. 50 at 6–15.
17 1. State Defendants 18 As an initial mater, it is well settled that states, state agencies, and state 19 officials acting in their official capacities are not susceptible to suits under 42
20 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept.
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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6
7 PATRICK L. ESLICK, NO. 2:21-CV-0282-TOR 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 9 v. MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 10 STATE OF WASHINGTON AND GRANTING CITY DEFENDANTS’ JASON P. AEBISCHER, and CITY MOTION FOR SUMMARY 11 OF MOSES LAKE AND TRAVIS JUDGMENT RUFFIN AND JOSE PEREZ, 12 Defendants. 13
14 BEFORE THE COURT are Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 15 Judgment (ECF No. 43) and City Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 16 (ECF No. 50). These matters were submitted for consideration with oral argument 17 on June 9, 2022. Plaintiff Patrick L. Eslick, proceeding pro se, appeared on behalf 18 of himself. Kirk A. Ehlis appeared on behalf of City Defendants. Taylor M. 19 Hennessey appeared on behalf of State Defendants. The Court has reviewed the 20 record and files herein, considered the parties’ oral arguments, and is fully 1 informed. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 2 Judgment (ECF No. 43) is DENIED, and City Defendants’ Motion for Summary
3 Judgment (ECF No. 50) is GRANTED. 4 BACKGROUND 5 This matter relates to events following a traffic stop in July 2019. The
6 following facts are not in dispute, except where noted. 7 Sometime between 1:00AM and 2:00AM on July 29, 2019, Plaintiff was 8 pulled over in Moses Lake, Washington for driving without his headlights turned 9 on. ECF Nos. 43-1 at 2, ¶ 2; 51 at 2, ¶ 1. After an interaction with Defendants
10 Officer Perez and State Trooper Aebischer, Plaintiff was placed under arrest for 11 suspected driving under the influence (DUI). ECF Nos. 43-1 at 7, ¶ 15; 51 at 6, ¶ 12 23. Defendant Officer Ruffin was also on scene during the interaction; he was
13 riding along with Officer Perez as part of Officer Perez’s training. ECF No. 52 at 14 2, ¶ 5. Officer Ruffin’s role was primarily to observe Officer Perez’s interactions 15 with the public. Id. at 3, ¶ 6. Plaintiff was not ultimately charged with DUI but 16 was cited for Negligent Driving 1st Degree. ECF No. 51 at 8, ¶ 34. The citation
17 was later dismissed. ECF No. 1-1 at 49. 18 On July 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed a tort claim with the Washington Department 19 of Enterprise Services, Office of Risk Management, for alleged tortious conduct
20 stemming from the July 2019 traffic stop. Id. at 50. Plaintiff did not properly file 1 a tort claim with the City of Moses Lake. ECF No. 50 at 9, ¶ 38. On September 2 24, 2021, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint in this matter, asserting state and
3 federal law violations. ECF No. 1. On December 22, 2022, the Court dismissed 4 Defendants Grant County and Commissioner Gigliotti from the action, finding 5 Plaintiff had failed to state claims against those defendants. ECF No. 34. The
6 remaining defendants include the State of Washington, State Trooper Aebischer, 7 the City of Moses Lake, and Moses Lake Police Officers Ruffin and Perez 8 (collectively “Defendants”). 9 In the present motions, Plaintiff seeks partial summary judgment as to the
10 remaining Defendants’ liability for claims asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 11 and 1985, 18 U.S.C. § 2, and various state laws; Defendants City of Moses Lake, 12 Officer Ruffin, and Officer Perez (“City Defendants”) seek summary judgment as
13 to all claims asserted against them. ECF Nos. 43, 50. Defendants State of 14 Washington and Trooper Aebischer (“State Defendants”) have responded to both 15 motions and reserve the right to file their own motion for summary judgment in the 16 future. ECF Nos. 47, 57.
17 DISCUSSION 18 I. Legal Standard 19 The Court may grant summary judgment in favor of a moving party who
20 demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the 1 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling 2 on a motion for summary judgment, the court must only consider admissible
3 evidence. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2002). The 4 party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing the 5 absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
6 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to identify 7 specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. 8 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla 9 of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be
10 evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252. 11 For purposes of summary judgment, a fact is “material” if it might affect the 12 outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. at 248. Further, a dispute is
13 “genuine” only where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find in 14 favor of the non-moving party. Id. The Court views the facts, and all rational 15 inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. 16 Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). Summary judgment will thus be granted
17 “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 18 an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the 19 burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
20 1 A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 2 A cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be maintained “against
3 any person acting under the color of law who deprives another ‘of any rights, 4 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United 5 States.” Southern Cal. Gas Co., v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885 (9th Cir.
6 2003) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The rights guaranteed by § 1983 are “liberally 7 and beneficently construed.” Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991). 8 Plaintiff seeks summary judgment as to Defendants’ liability arising under 9 § 1983 for civil rights violations including failure to train, false arrest, and due
10 process violations. ECF No. 1 at 16–17, at 21–25. State Defendants oppose 11 Plaintiff’s motion on the grounds that they are not “persons” for the purposes of a 12 § 1983 claim. ECF No. 47 at 7. City Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to
13 establish the existence of an official policy or custom, or a failure to train City 14 employees, that leads to civil rights violations. ECF No. 44 at 7–9. City 15 Defendants also move for summary judgment on all claims asserted against them 16 arising under § 1983. ECF No. 50 at 6–15.
17 1. State Defendants 18 As an initial mater, it is well settled that states, state agencies, and state 19 officials acting in their official capacities are not susceptible to suits under 42
20 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). 1 Here, the State of Washington and Trooper Aebischer acting in his official capacity 2 are state actors and are therefore not “persons” susceptible to suit under § 1983.
3 Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment regarding State Defendants’ liability 4 under § 1983. Consequently, the Court will address Plaintiff’s remaining § 1983 5 claims only as to Defendants City of Moses Lake and Officers Perez and Ruffin.
6 2. City of Moses Lake—Failure to Train 7 Plaintiff alleges Defendant City of Moses Lake failed to properly train its 8 law enforcement officers in DUI and arrest procedures, leading to Officers Ruffin 9 and Perez violating Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ECF
10 Nos. 43 at 13–16; 1 at 21–25, ¶¶ 4.18–4.27. Defendants assert Plaintiff has not 11 established a failure to train claim under § 1983. ECF No. 50 at 6–8. 12 “In order to set forth a claim against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
13 a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s employees or agents acted through an 14 official custom, pattern or policy that permits deliberate indifference to, or violates, 15 the plaintiff’s civil rights; or that the entity ratified the unlawful conduct.” Shearer 16 v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 942 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1135 (W.D. Wash. 2013)
17 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978)). As such, a 18 policy, practice, or custom can be established in three ways: (1) an employee acts 19 pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy, (2) an employee acts pursuant to a
20 1 longstanding practice or custom, or (3) an employee acts as a final policymaker. 2 Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2004).
3 Absent a formal governmental policy, a plaintiff must show a “longstanding 4 practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local 5 governmental entity.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting
6 Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47 (9th Cir. 1992)). “Liability for 7 improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must 8 be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that 9 the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino, 99
10 F.3d at 918; see also Meehan v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 11 1988) (finding two incidents insufficient to establish custom). 12 Additionally, in limited circumstances, a local government’s failure to train
13 its employees on their legal duties not to violate citizens’ rights may rise to the 14 level of a policy or custom for the purposes of a § 1983 claim. Connick v. 15 Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). However, “[a] municipality’s culpability for a 16 deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to
17 train.” Id. To succeed on a § 1983 claim alleging a failure to train, the challenged 18 action must amount to “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom 19 the untrained employees come into contact.” Id. (internal brackets and citation
20 omitted). 1 Deliberate indifference is a high standard that requires proof of a municipal 2 actor’s disregard for a known or obvious consequence of his action. Id. Thus,
3 when local government policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a 4 particular omission in their training program causes employees to violate citizens’ 5 constitutional rights, the local government may be deemed deliberately indifferent
6 if the policymakers continue to retain the same training program. Id. 7 Here, Plaintiff’s failure to train claim is premised on two of his own 8 experiences with the Moses Lake Police Department: the July 2019 traffic stop and 9 an incident that occurred in March 2015. ECF Nos. 43 at 13–16; 1 at 21, ¶ 4.19.
10 City Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to establish an official policy or custom 11 used by the City of Moses Lake that permits deliberate violations of citizens’ 12 constitutional rights. ECF No. 50 at 8. City Defendants further argue Plaintiff has
13 failed to meet the heightened standard required to establish deliberate indifference 14 because Plaintiff has presented no facts indicating there is a pattern or practice of 15 violating constitutional violations that would put the City of Moses Lake on notice 16 of a need to further train its law enforcement officers. Id.
17 The Court agrees. Based on the evidence in the record, Plaintiff has failed to 18 establish a pattern or practice of “sufficient duration, frequency and consistency” 19 to succeed on a § 1983 claim for a failure to train. Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918.
20 Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that the Moses Lake Police Department’s 1 training program regularly leads to civil rights violations, or evidence that the City 2 of Moses Lake had knowledge of past or ongoing constitutional violations arising
3 from an inadequate training program. Rather, Plaintiff cites only to his own 4 interpretation of the recorded conversation between Officers Perez and Ruffin and 5 Trooper Aebischer during the 2019 traffic stop to conclude their training was
6 inadequate, and to an incident that occurred in March 2015. ECF Nos. 43-2 at 2–6; 7 1 at 21, ¶ 4.19. The latter reference is nearly devoid of any facts or context, and 8 therefore, it is difficult to determine whether that incident is even relevant to 9 Plaintiff’s claim. In any event, one or even two isolated experiences, and
10 Plaintiff’s own interpretation of the events, are insufficient to establish a failure to 11 train under § 1983. Meehan, 856 F.2d at 107. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for 12 summary judgment is denied and the Court finds City Defendants are entitled to
13 summary judgment as a matter of law. 14 3. Officer Perez—False Arrest, Qualified Immunity 15 Plaintiff alleges Officer Perez confined him against his will and without 16 probable cause in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
17 ECF No. 1 at 16–17, ¶¶ 4.1–4.3; 43 at 7. City Defendants argue Officer Perez is 18 entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 because Plaintiff’s arrest was lawful. 19 ECF No. 44 at 5–7. City Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds
20 that Plaintiff’s claim is time barred. ECF No. 50 at 9–15. 1 “Arrest by police officers without probable cause violates the Fourth 2 Amendment’s guarantee of security from unreasonable searches and seizures,
3 giving rise to a claim for false arrest under § 1983.” Caballero v. City of 4 Concord, 956 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1992). However, such claims are subject to 5 the applicable statute of limitations. “State law governs the statute of limitations
6 period for § 1983 suits and closely related questions of tolling.” Douglas v. Noelle, 7 567 F. 3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). A cause of action accrues from the date the 8 plaintiff knew or should have known the factual basis for the claim. Allen v. State, 9 118 Wash. 2d 753, 758 (1992). In Washington, the statute of limitations for a
10 § 1983 claim premised on false arrest is two years. RCW 4.16.100(1). However, 11 the statute of limitations will toll under certain circumstances. Relevant here, the 12 statute of limitations tolls for sixty days once a tort claim is filed with the agent of
13 the local government entity to be sued. RCW 4.96.020(4). 14 The actions giving rise to Plaintiff’s false arrest claim occurred on July 29, 15 2019. ECF No. 43 at 2. Thus, under Washington law, Plaintiff must have 16 commenced his § 1983 false arrest claim by July 29, 2021, unless he first filed a
17 tort claim with the City of Moses Lake. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not 18 properly file a tort claim with the City of Moses Lake. ECF Nos. 50 at 10; 60 at 19 13–15. Plaintiff argues he attempted to file his tort claim with the City of Moses
20 Lake but the City did not accept the filing. ECF No. 60 at 13–14. Plaintiff did not 1 submit any evidence of the claim he allegedly filed. Moreover, a failure to comply 2 with the filing requirements cannot overcome the statutory prerequisite to filing
3 suit against the City. Consequently, when Plaintiff commenced this action on 4 September 24, 2021, the statute of limitations, which began to run on July 29, 5 2019, had expired. Plaintiff’s claim for § 1983 liability premised on false arrest is
6 barred by Washington’s two-year statute of limitations. City Defendants are 7 entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The Court need not reach the 8 issue of qualified immunity. 9 B. 42 U.S.C. § 1985
10 Plaintiff alleges Officers Perez and Ruffin and Trooper Aebischer engaged 11 in a conspiracy to falsely arrest and unlawfully imprison Plaintiff in violation of 42 12 U.S.C. § 1985. ECF No. 43 at 2. City Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to
13 establish a race or class-based animus for the alleged conspiracy and move for 14 summary judgment on the same grounds. ECF Nos. 44 at 11–12; 50 at 15–16. 15 State Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion for the same reason. ECF No. 47 at 10. 16 Section 1985 provides three causes of action. See Deleo v. Rudin, 328 F.
17 Supp. 2d 1106, 1112–13 (D. Nevada 2004). Plaintiff does not specify in the 18 Complaint which cause of action he is pursuing. However, based on the alleged 19 facts, it appears Plaintiff is asserting a claim under § 1985(3), which provides a
20 cause of action against one or more conspirators who deprive an individual of 1 equal protection of the laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 2 1026, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court has held that “the language
3 of § 1985(3) . . . must be limited to cases alleging some racial or class-based 4 invidious discrimination.” Id. (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 5 (1971)).
6 Defendants argue Plaintiff has not alleged any facts or provided any 7 evidence that the law enforcement officers involved were motivated by race-based 8 or class-based discrimination. ECF Nos. 50 at 16; 47 at 10. Plaintiff appears to 9 assert he was subjected to class-based discrimination when Defendants categorized
10 him as “an impaired driver.” ECF No. 60 at 11–12. Plaintiff does not cite to any 11 authority, and the Court is not aware of any, that recognizes categories of drivers 12 as a protected class. Plaintiff does not provide any other evidence from which a
13 trier of fact could reasonably find Plaintiff was discriminated against based on 14 membership in a protected class. Consequently, Plaintiff is not entitled to 15 summary judgment on the issue and the Court finds City Defendants are entitled to 16 summary judgment as a matter of law.
17 C. 18 U.S.C. § 2 18 City Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim under 18 19 U.S.C. § 2, arguing the statute does not create a private cause of action. ECF No.
20 50 at 17. Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants’ argument. 1 Title 18 of the United States Code contains criminal statutes, which do not 2 ordinarily provide private causes of action. “[C]ourts may infer such private
3 causes of action for damages from . . . criminal statutes only when such inference 4 is consistent with the evident legislative intent, and of course, with the effectuation 5 of the purposes intended to be served [by] the Act.” Savini Constr. Co. v. Crooks
6 Bros. Constr. Co., 540 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1974) (internal quotation marks 7 and citation omitted). Section 2 is a general criminal statute establishing criminal 8 liability for those who act as principals in the commission of a crime. 18 U.S.C. § 9 2. There is no legislative intent indicating 18 U.S.C. § 2 could be used to assert a
10 private cause of action. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment 11 as a matter of law. 12 D. State Law Claims
13 Plaintiff asserts several state law claims including infliction of emotion 14 distress, unlawful imprisonment, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. ECF No. 15 1 at 25–27. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. 16 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A federal court may
17 exercise original jurisdiction over cases involving a question of federal law or 18 between parties of diverse citizenship. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. A federal court 19 may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent claims “that are so
20 related to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form 1 part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, if a district 2 court has dismissed all of the claims over which it has original jurisdiction, it may
3 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a related claim. 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1367(c)(3). 5 Having dismissed the federal claims asserted against City Defendants, and
6 considering the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, the 7 Court declines to exercise supplement jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims 8 asserted against the City of Moses Lake and Officers Perez and Ruffin. See 9 Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988), superseded by statute
10 on other grounds as stated in Stanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 11 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 12 (1966)).
13 ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 14 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 43) is 15 DENIED. 16 2. City Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 50) is
17 GRANTED. 18 3. The federal claims asserted against Defendants City of Moses Lake, 19 Travis Ruffin, and Jose Perez are DISMISSED with prejudice. Any
20 l state law claims asserted against these Defendants are DISMISSED 2 without prejudice. 3 4. Defendants City of Moses Lake, Travis Ruffin, and Jose Perez are 4 terminated from the docket. 5 The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and Judgment 6|| accordingly and furnish copies to counsel. 7 DATED June 9, 2022.
ae IM, 0. Kes 9 NMSA THOMAS O. RICE <> United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR