Erwin Rice v. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare

315 F.2d 7, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 5798
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedMarch 22, 1963
Docket14893_1
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 315 F.2d 7 (Erwin Rice v. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Erwin Rice v. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 315 F.2d 7, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 5798 (6th Cir. 1963).

Opinion

McALLISTER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Appellant seeks review of the order of the district court, sustaining the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, and holding that the findings of the Administrator that appellant was not entitled to disability benefits under the Social Security Act, Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq., are supported by substantial evidence.

Appellant contends that his own testimony and the evidence of three physicians show that he is entitled to disability benefits. The evidence opposed to the foregoing contention is found in the report of Dr. W. C. Roland, who stated that he could not “conscientiously arrive at any diagnosis which would indicate the presence of permanent partial disability.” It appears, however, that, regardless of Dr. Roland’s report, the ap-pellee concluded, in the language of the Hearing Examiner, that the evidence showed the claimant was subject to limitation of motion and physical distress and that as a result, he was unable to resume his previous occupation as a stationary engineer or engage in any other similar employment. Nevertheless, ap-pellee found that appellant’s impairments were not of sufficient severity to preclude him from engaging in substantial gainful activity.

The issue then is whether, considering the evidence of appellant’s disability, there is substantial evidence to sustain appellee’s findings that such disability was not of sufficient severity to keep him from engaging in substantial gainful activity, and that he was not, therefore, entitled to disability benefits.

The evidence disclosed that on July 7, 1957, appellant, while working for the Union Carbide Chemicals Company, fell on an oil-covered portion of a cement floor, but continued on the job until August 7, 1957, when, at the age of 53, he stated, he became unable to engage in any further work. He subsequently prevailed upon the company to give him a lighter job at which he started working on January 11, 1958; but he had to stop this work on February 9, 1958, because of pain in his hip.

At the time he applied for disability benefits on May 12, 1958, he was suffering from diabetes, hypertension, and arthritis. The diabetes was controlled by drugs, but appellant’s diet was greatly restricted because of that disease. The hypertension was characterized as moderate. The arthritis could be treated by cortisone, but appellant cannot take cortisone, because it raises his blood pressure, and his hypertension forbids such treatment.

Appellant testified that he had been employed at the Union Carbide Chemicals Company as a stationary engineer from 1941 up to the time of the accident on July 7, 1957. Afterward, he was kept on for awhile, and given lighter work from January 11, 1958, to February 9, *9 1958, as mentioned above. During this past period of lighter work, he was engaged at the company in cheeking one engine in the diathermic department, and walked around the building checking the equipment on the outside. Appellant stated that he suffered “pain and agony.” Most of the pain was in his legs and hip and back. He states he cannot even tie his shoes; he walks with a cane “because my knees want to buckle on me”; he cannot get into a bath tub; his wife has to assist him in and out of the bath tub, and in and out of bed, because of his disability ; he cannot walk a block, without shortness of breath.

Appellant did not finish the third grade at school. Before being stationary engineer at the Union Carbide Chemicals Company, he was employed as a guard at the plant during the early years of the war. Before being a guard, he did repair work, and odd jobs, such as cutting grass; and he worked at plumbing, which he just “picked up” by himself. It is a mark of his popularity among the people of his home town, that while he was a guard at the plant, he was elected as an alderman of the City of Catlettsburg, Kentucky, and served in that capacity for six years; that afterward, while he was performing the duties of stationary engineer at the Union Carbide Company, he was elected Mayor and served eleven years in that capacity; but he became inactive as Mayor within a few weeks of the accident, and gave up the office a few weeks later.

Dr. Paul A. Bryan treated appellant beginning on February 7, 1957, on May 12, 1958 and through January 1960. His diagnosis was diabetes, hypertension, and traumatic arthritis of the left hip and knee. On May 12, 1958, Dr. Bryan stated that he had been treating appellant weekly since February 7, 1958; that he had advised appellant not to work; that appellant’s cardiac functional capacity was Class 4, meaning that there was a complete limitation of physical activity; that appellant suffered acute respiratory attacks on moderate exertion, and cardiac impairment of dyspnea, or difficult and painful breathing, on moderate exertion. On August 15, 1958, Dr. Bryan, in his medical report filed with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, stated that appellant was unable to walk without a cane; that he was dizzy and weak at times; that the flexion of his left knee and left hip was limited to 45% each, and this, with resistance and pain. He further reported that appellant “is entirely unable to work. He will probably never be able to do active work, and is probably totally and permanently disabled therefrom.”

On July 15, 1959, Dr. Bryan filed a further certificate to the same effect; and on January 27, 1960, Dr. Bryan made an affidavit for presentation to the Social Security Administrator, that appellant was suffering from diabetes and traumatic arthritis caused, in Dr. Bryan's opinion, by a fall whereby his left hip was injured; that “affiant has treated this patient for the aforesaid arthritis from the same dates and times as the diabetes mellitus; that in affiant’s opinion, this patient’s arthritic condition will continue to become progressively worse unless proper treatment and care are provided; that in summary, this patient suffering from diabetes and traumatic arthritis, will be and is unable to do any work; that affiant believes that this patient is totally and permanently disabled in that as it pertains to his ability to perform or to fulfill the position of employment.”

Dr. R. D. Eastridge examined appellant on August 11, 1958, at the request of Dr. Bryan. Dr. Eastridge conducted no laboratory tests, nor did he obtain X rays or an electrocardiogram. He reported that appellant had traumatic arthritis of the left hip and lumbosacral spine, and also diabetes which was regulated. He stated appellant was taking analgesics (pain relievers) for frequent but not regular arthritic pain. Dr. East-ridge found moderately elevated blood pressure, but no heart abnormality, no edema (swelling of the ankles), and no angina (sharp chest pain usually associated with heart disease) due to the *10 fact that he was a diabetic. It was found that there was limitation of motion and traumatic arthritis at the left hip and in the lumbosacral spine as well as an atrophy (shrinking) of the muscles of the left leg. Pain on movement of the hip and lower spine was also discovered. However, his neurological examination produced no findings except for a faulty gait, and described appellant as “ambulatory about house on cane.” Dr. East-ridge found a normal vital (breathing) capacity and no deformity of the chest, nor any emphysema. He also found that walking resulted in dyspnea, or difficult and painful breathing.

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Bluebook (online)
315 F.2d 7, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 5798, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/erwin-rice-v-anthony-j-celebrezze-secretary-of-health-education-and-ca6-1963.