Vencil Prewitt v. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
This text of 330 F.2d 93 (Vencil Prewitt v. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Appellant Vencil Prewitt seeks review of the order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky sustaining the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare holding that he was not entitled to disability benefits under the Social Security Act. (Title 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.)
The appellant, hereinafter called claimant, was severely injured in an automobile accident on February 20, 1960. His claim for benefits arises out of the injuries sustained in that accident. On *94 October 13, 1960, the claimant made application to the Bureau of Old Age and Survivors Insurance of the Social Security Administration for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. This application was denied on January 26, 1961, and subsequently an application for reconsideration was denied.
The claimant then made application for a hearing before a hearing examiner of the Social Security Administration. A hearing was conducted pursuant to this application by examiner L. Steele Trotter. The examiner disallowed the claim in a decision of October 30, 1961, and the Appeals Council declined to review the decision. The claimant then brought the action in the District Court which is now before us on appeal.
The scope of review of the District Court is limited to a transcript of the record upon which the administrative agency made its findings and decision. The district judge may remand the case to the Secretary for rehearing. Findings of fact made by the Secretary through his administrative agency are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. (Section 405(g), Title 42, U.S.C.)
The only issue before the Social Security Administration was whether the claimant had established the degree of disability 1 required for the allowance of insurance benefits. It is conceded that he met all other requirements. The issue before the district judge was whether the findings and decision of the Secretary denying disability benefits were supported by substantial evidence.
We look first to the medical reports since the allowance of disability benefits is conditioned on medically determined impairments. No oral medical evidence was taken in the hearing before the examiner. The claimant submitted reports of four physicians, Dr. William C. Roland, 2 the orthopedic surgeon who attended the claimant at the time of the accident, Dr. Alec Spencer, 3 the family physician, Dr. Harvey Chenault, 4 a neuro *95 surgeon, and Dr. James S. Rich, 5 who submitted an x-ray report. The examiner-characterized these medical reports as meager and the district judge said they were not extensive. We agree with these appraisals of the reports.
Dr. Roland described the injury as of the date of the accident as follows: “He had been injured in an automobile wreck and suffered a supracondylar fracture of the left femur. Open reduction was carried out 3/16/60, after attempted closed reduction was unsuccessful, and the patient was discharged 4/5/60.” This is a meager description of bodily injuries to a man who was in a serious automobile accident in which his wife was badly injured and one man was killed.
The claimant has only a third grade education. He cannot read and can barely write his own name. In his early life he worked on a farm. For ten years before his injury he worked as a master carpenter. No one contends that the claimant can pursue his regular trade as a carpenter.
In view of the claimant’s physical condition and his obvious inability to pursue his normal work, his case ought not be decided on inadequate medical testimony. The hearing examiner advised the claimant at the time he was ready to start the hearing that he (the claimant) was entitled to be represented by a lawyer. This man was then fifty miles away from home. With his limited education and his limited financial means it should not be expected that he would be able to procure legal representation at that time. We think the examiner was fair but he was in the position of being both judge and advocate.
Medical evidence ought to show the practical effect of Dr. Roland’s report with reference to the degrees of flexion that the claimant has. It ought to show the degree of disability of the claimant and what limitations it imposes on his physical activities. There should be findings of fact consonant with the opinions of this court hereinafter cited. The claimant should be given an opportunity to develop his medical testimony with the assistance of legal counsel.
The examiner in his decision makes an inadequate findings of fact upon which to base a conclusion, so important to the claimant. The examiner says, "it would seem entirely possible for him to engage in some light activity requiring his carpentry skill.” (Emphasis added.) This is the crucial point in this case and it should not rest on supposition. “ ‘If there are other kinds of work which are available and for which the claimant is suited, it is the defendant’s burden to adduce some evidence from which a finding can be made that he can do some type-work; actually, not apparently. * * * Here, the Referee has made no such finding, %ohatsoever, based on evidence.’,r Rice v. Celebrezze, 315 F.2d 7, 17, C.A. 6; and Jones v. Celebrezze, 321 F.2d 192, 198, C.A. 6. The examiner concludes, “It is the opinion of this hearing examiner that this claimant’s impairments have not reached a point of severity to preclude substantial gainful activity.” This is a mere conclusion based on no adequate findings of fact.
In Kerner v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 916,. 921, C.A.2, the court said: “Mere theoretical ability to engage in substantial' gainful activity is not enough if no reasonable opportunity for this is available.” Two issues are involved: “What can applicant do, and what" employment opportunities are there for a man who can do- *96 only what applicant can do?” Id. See also Hall v. Flemming, 289 F.2d 290, C.A. 6, and Hall v. Celebrezze, 314 F.2d 686, C.A. 6 (second appeal); Erickson v. Ribicoff, 305 F.2d 638, C.A. 6; Jarvis v. Ribicoff, 312 F.2d 707, C.A. 6; Rice v.
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330 F.2d 93, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 5817, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vencil-prewitt-v-anthony-j-celebrezze-secretary-of-health-education-and-ca6-1964.