Erik Selfridge v. City of North Las Vegas; City of North Las Vegas Animal Protection Services

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 ERIK SELFRIDGE, Case No. 2:26-CV-01349-GMN-EJY

5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.

7 CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS; CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS ANIMAL 8 PROTECTION SERVICES,

9 Defendants.

10 11 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 12 and Civil Rights Complaint. ECF Nos. 1, 1-1. Plaintiff’s IFP is complete and granted below. For 13 the reasons stated below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice, with one 14 opportunity to amend. 15 I. Screening Standard 16 When reviewing a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff, the Court must identify any 17 cognizable claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which 18 relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 19 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim is 20 established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). When a court dismisses a complaint under 21 § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend with directions to cure its deficiencies unless 22 it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Cato 23 v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). In making this determination, the Court treats 24 all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint as true, and the court construes them in the 25 light most favorable to the plaintiff. Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). 26 That is, pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 27 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards 1 Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must plead more than mere 2 labels and conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation 3 of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. In addition, a reviewing court should “begin 4 by identifying … [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled 5 to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions 6 can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. 7 “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 8 determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a 9 complaint states a plausible claim for relief ... [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 10 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 11 Finally, all or part of a complaint may be dismissed sua sponte if the plaintiff’s claims lack 12 an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are 13 untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a 14 legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations 15 (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); McKeever 16 v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 17 Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “No State shall ... deprive any 18 person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const., Amend. XIV § 1. This 19 clause guarantees the government provide procedural due process when it dispossesses an individual 20 of a liberty or property interest. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965). To state a claim 21 for procedural due process, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the 22 Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government, and (3) lack of process.” Portman 23 v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993). The amount of process required varies 24 depending on the circumstances; however, courts generally rely on the following factors: the private 25 interest that will be impacted by the government’s actions; the risk of an erroneous deprivation and 26 the probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and the government's interest. 27 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). 1 II. Discussion 2 Plaintiff asserts Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the City of North Las 3 Vegas and City of North Las Vegas Animal Protection Services alleging that seven unweaned 4 puppies and their mother were taken from him in violation of NRS 574.500. ECF No. 1-1 at 4. 5 Plaintiff says he attempted to obtain relief in the North Las Vegas Municipal Court and the Eighth 6 Judicial District Court but both courts dismissed his claims. 7 Initially, the Court notes that NRS 574.500 does not provide for a private right of action. 8 That is, the statutory language neither states nor implies private-right-creating language 9 demonstrating an intent to establish a private right of action. NRS 574.500(2). “[I]f the statutory 10 language itself does not display an intent to create a private remedy, then a cause of action does not 11 exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how 12 compatible with the statute.” Abcarian v. Levine, 972 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting, in 13 part, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (further citations omitted). Further, the statute 14 prohibits separating a mother and unweaned dogs “until it is 8 weeks of age or accustomed to taking 15 food or nourishment other than by nursing, whichever is later.” NRS 574.500(2). To this end, 16 Plaintiff says the mother and puppies were taken together. ECF No. 1-1 at 4 (the “City of North Las 17 Vegas seized seven unweaned puppies and their mother ….”). Thus, on its face, it does not appear 18 there was a violation of the statute. 19 To sue the City of North Las Vegas or one of its subdivisions such as Animal Protection 20 Services, Plaintiff must state a claim under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). A 21 plaintiff asserting a constitutional claim against a municipality like the City of North Las Vegas 22 under Monell must, at a minimum, allege: (1) the plaintiff had “a constitutional right of which he 23 was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to 24 his constitutional right; and (4) the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” 25 Gordon v. County of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 973 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation 26 omitted). Further, before a Monell claim will proceed to litigation, a plaintiff must allege one of 27 three liability theories. Thomas v. County of Riverside, 763 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014) (per 1 defendant) may be held liable when it acts “pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy.” Id. 2 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004). Alternatively, a 3 municipal entity may be held liable for a “longstanding practice or custom” that violates a 4 constitutional right. Thomas, 763 F.3d at 1170 (citation omitted). Finally, North Las Vegas may be 5 liable under Section 1983 when “‘the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an 6 official with final policy-making authority’ or such an official ‘ratified a subordinate’s 7 unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.’” Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 8 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 9 1992), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th 10 Cir. 2016). Plaintiff states no facts establishing an express, officially adopted policy, a longstanding 11 practice or custom, or an act committed by or ratified by a final policy making authority that violates 12 a constitutionally protected right. Instead, Plaintiff pleads facts related to a single event that is 13 insufficient to state a claim under Monell. City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985) 14 (“[p]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under 15 Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional 16 municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker.”). 17 The Court also finds Plaintiff does not establish a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment 18 rights based on the allegations asserted. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 19 Amendment, “No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 20 of law.” U.S. Const., Amend. XIV § 1. This clause guarantees that the government will provide 21 procedural due process when it dispossesses an individual of a liberty or property interest. 22 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965). To state a claim for procedural due process, a 23 plaintiff must show: “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation 24 of the interest by the government, and (3) lack of process.” Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 25 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993). The amount of process due varies depending on the circumstances; 26 however, courts generally rely on the following factors: the private interest that will be impacted by 27 the government’s actions; the risk of an erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional 1 319, 334-35 (1976). Plaintiff identifies no process to which he was due before the seizure of the 2 puppies and mother dog occurred. Plaintiff also fails to address the factors considered when 3 determining the amount of process due. For these reasons, Plaintiff does not state a Fourteenth 4 Amendment due process claim in his currently pleaded Complaint. 5 Finally, Plaintiff pleads insufficient facts to allow the Court to determine whether the alleged 6 seizure was potentially in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff offers no facts 7 addressing whether the dogs were in his home when they were seized; if the seizure was from 8 Plaintiff’s home, whether Animal Protection Services had a warrant to enter the home for purposes 9 of a search and potential seizure; whether there may have been exigent circumstances that would 10 allow for entry into the home without a search warrant; and if the seizure was not from Plaintiff’s 11 home, what Fourth Amendment right belonging to Plaintiff was violated. Thus, as presently pleaded, 12 Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable Fourth Amendment violation. 13 III. Order 14 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma 15 pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) must be filed on the 17 docket. 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed without prejudice and 19 with one opportunity to amend. 20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint he must 21 do so no later than June 30, 2026. The amended complaint must be titled “AMENDED 22 COMPLAINT” and must include factual allegations sufficient to state a claim against the City of 23 North Las Vegas, the proper defendant, under the Monell standard stated above. Plaintiff must allege 24 sufficient facts demonstrating an express policy, longstanding practice or a violation of the Fourth 25 or Fourteenth Amendment committed by or ratified by a final policy making authority. 26 27 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that failure to comply with the substance of this Order will 2 result in a recommendation that this matter be dismissed with prejudice. 3 Dated this 5th day of June, 2026. 4

5 ELAYNA J. YOUCHAH 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27