HOFFMAN, Judge:
Appellants in this declaratory judgment action contend that the lower court erred in concluding that appellee Kenneth P. Fleagle was not a “victim” as defined by the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act1 and thus not entitled to basic loss benefits provided by that Act. Appellants additionally raise several related contentions involving the rights and liabilities of the parties. For the reasons which follow, we reverse the order of the court below.
The facts are not in dispute and may be summarized as follows. On June 17,1976, appellee Kenneth P. Fleagle was [313]*313employed as a transmission mechanic by appellee L. B. Smith, Inc. On that day a patrol car driven by appellant Donald L. Tappan, a police officer employed by appellant Borough of Camp Hill, struck and injured Mr. Fleagle as he was crossing his employer’s parking lot to retrieve a car which he intended to drive into the garage for service. Mr. Fleagle and his wife, appellee Pauline Fleagle, instituted a trespass action against Mr. Tappan and the Borough of Camp Hill to recover for personal injuries sustained in the accident. While that action was pending, appellants2 brought this declaratory judgment action against the Fleagles, West American Insurance Company (the insurer of the Fleagles’ personal automobile), Mr. Fleagle’s employer, and PMA Insurance Company (the employer’s workmen’s compensation carrier, which had paid benefits for Mr. Fleagle’s medical expenses and lost wages resulting from the accident). The lower court entered an order which provided, inter alia, that Mr. Fleagle was not entitled to basic loss benefits pursuant to the No-fault Act. Appellants then took this appeal.
Section 201 of the No-fault Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.201, provides in part: “If the accident resulting in injury occurs in this Commonwealth, any victim ... is entitled to receive basic loss benefits in accordance with the provisions of this act.” (Emphasis added). Section 103 of the No-fault Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.103, defines “victim” as “an individual who suffers injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle . .. . ” (Emphasis added). Section 103 further states:
“Maintenance or use of a motor vehicle” means maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle, including, incident to its maintenance or use as a vehicle, occupying, entering into, or alighting from it. Maintenance or use of a motor vehicle does not include:
(A) conduct within the course of a business of repairing, servicing, or otherwise maintaining motor vehicles unless the conduct occurs off the business premises ....
[314]*314Thus, Mr. Fleagle was not a “victim” under the No-fault Act if his injuries “ar[ose] out of ... conduct within the course of a business of repairing, servicing, or otherwise maintaining motor vehicles .... ”
In Dull v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 278 Pa.Super. 569, 420 A.2d 688 (1980) our Court stated:
In construing the statutory definition of “victim,” we begin by ascertaining the intent of the legislature. The purpose of the No-fault Act is “to establish at reasonable cost ... a Statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims . ... ” 40 P.S. § 1009.102(b). [Citations omitted]. The Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1901 et seq., which provides that “[w]ords and phrases shall be construed ... according to their common and approved usage,” id. § 1903, also provides that statutes such as the No-fault Act “shall be liberally construed to effect their objects and to promote justice.” Id. § 1928(c). However, “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Id. § 1921(b). In Heffner v. Allstate Insurance Co., 265 Pa.Super. 181, 401 A.2d 1160 (1979), our Court stated: “Historically, the courts of this Commonwealth have ... found coverage for the insured in close or doubtful insurance cases. The tendency has been that if we should err in ascertaining the intent of the legislature ..., we should err in favor of coverage for the insured.” Id., 265 Pa.Super. at 187, 401 A.2d at 1162-63 (footnote omitted).
Id., 278 at 572, 420 A.2d at 689.
Although appellants concede that at the time of the accident Mr. Fleagle’s employer was in the “business of repairing, servicing, or otherwise maintaining motor vehicles” and that Mr. Fleagle was in the course of his employment, they argue that his injuries did not “aris[e] out of ... conduct within the course of [the motor vehicle repair] business.” We agree. The only connection between Mr. Fleagle’s injuries and the repair business is the fact that the [315]*315accident occurred while he was present on the business premises. The accident did not occur while he was servicing an automobile; rather, it occurred when he was struck by a police car as he was walking on the parking lot. Accordingly, the accident was in no way associated with Mr. Fleagle’s duties as a mechanic. Moreover, there is no indication whatsoever in the record that the police car was on the premises to be serviced. Thus, the connection between Mr. Fleagle’s injuries and the repair business is tenuous at best. Under these circumstances, construing the statutory language to effect the purpose of the No-fault Act, we conclude that Mr. Fleagle’s injuries did not “aris[e] out of . .. conduct within the course of a business of repairing, servicing, or otherwise maintaining motor vehicles .. . . ” Consequently, Mr. Fleagle satisfies the No-fault Act definition of “victim” and thus is entitled to basic loss benefits.
Appellants next contend that basic loss benefits under the Act are payable by appellee West American Insurance Company. Section 204 of the No-fault Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.-204, establishes priorities for the payment of basic loss benefits. Section 204(a)(2) states: “The security for the payment of basic loss benefits applicable to an injury to ... an insured is the security under which the victim ... is insured .... ” See Schimmelbusch v. Royal-Globe Insurance Co., 247 Pa.Super. 28, 32, 371 A.2d 1021, 1023 (1977) (“If a claimant carries insurance, subparagraph (2) directs that the claim must be presented to that insurer.”). Accordingly, because West American Insurance Company is the insurer of the Fleagles’ personal automobile, it is obligated to pay Mr. Fleagle’s basic loss benefits.3
Appellants next contend that appellee PMA Insurance Company, the workmen’s compensation carrier of Mr. Fleagle’s employer does not have a right of subrogation to [316]*316any recovery by Mr. Fleagle from appellants Donald L. Tappan and Borough of Camp Hill for workmen’s compensation benefits paid or payable to Mr. Fleagle. In Brunelli v. Farelly Brothers, 266 Pa.Super. 23, 402 A.2d 1058 (1979), an employee who was driving his employer’s motor vehicle within the scope of his employment was injured in a collision with another motor vehicle.
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HOFFMAN, Judge:
Appellants in this declaratory judgment action contend that the lower court erred in concluding that appellee Kenneth P. Fleagle was not a “victim” as defined by the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act1 and thus not entitled to basic loss benefits provided by that Act. Appellants additionally raise several related contentions involving the rights and liabilities of the parties. For the reasons which follow, we reverse the order of the court below.
The facts are not in dispute and may be summarized as follows. On June 17,1976, appellee Kenneth P. Fleagle was [313]*313employed as a transmission mechanic by appellee L. B. Smith, Inc. On that day a patrol car driven by appellant Donald L. Tappan, a police officer employed by appellant Borough of Camp Hill, struck and injured Mr. Fleagle as he was crossing his employer’s parking lot to retrieve a car which he intended to drive into the garage for service. Mr. Fleagle and his wife, appellee Pauline Fleagle, instituted a trespass action against Mr. Tappan and the Borough of Camp Hill to recover for personal injuries sustained in the accident. While that action was pending, appellants2 brought this declaratory judgment action against the Fleagles, West American Insurance Company (the insurer of the Fleagles’ personal automobile), Mr. Fleagle’s employer, and PMA Insurance Company (the employer’s workmen’s compensation carrier, which had paid benefits for Mr. Fleagle’s medical expenses and lost wages resulting from the accident). The lower court entered an order which provided, inter alia, that Mr. Fleagle was not entitled to basic loss benefits pursuant to the No-fault Act. Appellants then took this appeal.
Section 201 of the No-fault Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.201, provides in part: “If the accident resulting in injury occurs in this Commonwealth, any victim ... is entitled to receive basic loss benefits in accordance with the provisions of this act.” (Emphasis added). Section 103 of the No-fault Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.103, defines “victim” as “an individual who suffers injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle . .. . ” (Emphasis added). Section 103 further states:
“Maintenance or use of a motor vehicle” means maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle, including, incident to its maintenance or use as a vehicle, occupying, entering into, or alighting from it. Maintenance or use of a motor vehicle does not include:
(A) conduct within the course of a business of repairing, servicing, or otherwise maintaining motor vehicles unless the conduct occurs off the business premises ....
[314]*314Thus, Mr. Fleagle was not a “victim” under the No-fault Act if his injuries “ar[ose] out of ... conduct within the course of a business of repairing, servicing, or otherwise maintaining motor vehicles .... ”
In Dull v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 278 Pa.Super. 569, 420 A.2d 688 (1980) our Court stated:
In construing the statutory definition of “victim,” we begin by ascertaining the intent of the legislature. The purpose of the No-fault Act is “to establish at reasonable cost ... a Statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims . ... ” 40 P.S. § 1009.102(b). [Citations omitted]. The Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1901 et seq., which provides that “[w]ords and phrases shall be construed ... according to their common and approved usage,” id. § 1903, also provides that statutes such as the No-fault Act “shall be liberally construed to effect their objects and to promote justice.” Id. § 1928(c). However, “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Id. § 1921(b). In Heffner v. Allstate Insurance Co., 265 Pa.Super. 181, 401 A.2d 1160 (1979), our Court stated: “Historically, the courts of this Commonwealth have ... found coverage for the insured in close or doubtful insurance cases. The tendency has been that if we should err in ascertaining the intent of the legislature ..., we should err in favor of coverage for the insured.” Id., 265 Pa.Super. at 187, 401 A.2d at 1162-63 (footnote omitted).
Id., 278 at 572, 420 A.2d at 689.
Although appellants concede that at the time of the accident Mr. Fleagle’s employer was in the “business of repairing, servicing, or otherwise maintaining motor vehicles” and that Mr. Fleagle was in the course of his employment, they argue that his injuries did not “aris[e] out of ... conduct within the course of [the motor vehicle repair] business.” We agree. The only connection between Mr. Fleagle’s injuries and the repair business is the fact that the [315]*315accident occurred while he was present on the business premises. The accident did not occur while he was servicing an automobile; rather, it occurred when he was struck by a police car as he was walking on the parking lot. Accordingly, the accident was in no way associated with Mr. Fleagle’s duties as a mechanic. Moreover, there is no indication whatsoever in the record that the police car was on the premises to be serviced. Thus, the connection between Mr. Fleagle’s injuries and the repair business is tenuous at best. Under these circumstances, construing the statutory language to effect the purpose of the No-fault Act, we conclude that Mr. Fleagle’s injuries did not “aris[e] out of . .. conduct within the course of a business of repairing, servicing, or otherwise maintaining motor vehicles .. . . ” Consequently, Mr. Fleagle satisfies the No-fault Act definition of “victim” and thus is entitled to basic loss benefits.
Appellants next contend that basic loss benefits under the Act are payable by appellee West American Insurance Company. Section 204 of the No-fault Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.-204, establishes priorities for the payment of basic loss benefits. Section 204(a)(2) states: “The security for the payment of basic loss benefits applicable to an injury to ... an insured is the security under which the victim ... is insured .... ” See Schimmelbusch v. Royal-Globe Insurance Co., 247 Pa.Super. 28, 32, 371 A.2d 1021, 1023 (1977) (“If a claimant carries insurance, subparagraph (2) directs that the claim must be presented to that insurer.”). Accordingly, because West American Insurance Company is the insurer of the Fleagles’ personal automobile, it is obligated to pay Mr. Fleagle’s basic loss benefits.3
Appellants next contend that appellee PMA Insurance Company, the workmen’s compensation carrier of Mr. Fleagle’s employer does not have a right of subrogation to [316]*316any recovery by Mr. Fleagle from appellants Donald L. Tappan and Borough of Camp Hill for workmen’s compensation benefits paid or payable to Mr. Fleagle. In Brunelli v. Farelly Brothers, 266 Pa.Super. 23, 402 A.2d 1058 (1979), an employee who was driving his employer’s motor vehicle within the scope of his employment was injured in a collision with another motor vehicle. The employer’s workmen’s compensation carrier argued that it was subrogated to any recovery by the employee from the tortfeasors. Our Court held that under the No-fault Act “neither the employee-victim nor the workmen’s compensation insurer, his would-be subrogee, has a cause of action against the third party tortfeasor for the sum paid or payable to the employee as workmen’s compensation benefits.” Id. 266 Pa.Super. at 28, 402 A.2d at 1060-61. Accordingly, even if the Fleagles are successful in their tort action, the workmen’s compensation carrier has no subrogation rights.
Appellants contend last that the damages recoverable by the Fleagles in their tort action are limited to any economic losses in excess of basic loss benefits recoverable under the No-fault Act and non-economic losses as provided by the No-fault Act. We agree. Pursuant to section 301(a)(4) of the No-fault Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.301(a)(4), a tortfeasor is liable for economic losses to the extent they exceed basic loss benefits paid to the victim. See Brunelli v. Farelly Brothers, supra at 27, 402 A.2d at 1060. Additionally, a tortfeasor is liable for non-economic losses if any of the conditions stated in section 301(a)(5) of the No-fault Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.301(a)(5), is present.
To summarize, we hold that Mr. Fleagle is entitled to basic loss benefits under the No-fault Act; those benefits are payable by appellee West American Insurance Company; appellee PMA Insurance Company does not have any subrogation rights for workmen’s compensation benefits paid or [317]*317payable to Mr. Fleagle; and the damages recoverable by the Fleagles in their tort action against appellants Donald L. Tappan and Borough of Camp Hill are limited to any economic losses in excess of basic loss benefits recoverable under the No-fault Act and non-economic losses as provided by the No-fault Act.
Order reversed.
PRICE, J., files a dissenting opinion.