Vespaziani v. Insana

462 A.2d 669, 501 Pa. 612, 1983 Pa. LEXIS 634
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 11, 1983
Docket33 W.D. Appeal Docket, 1982
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 462 A.2d 669 (Vespaziani v. Insana) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vespaziani v. Insana, 462 A.2d 669, 501 Pa. 612, 1983 Pa. LEXIS 634 (Pa. 1983).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

FLAHERTY, Justice.

Plaintiff Vespaziani sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident occurring in the course of his employment by East *614 ern Express, Inc. Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, § 101 et seq., as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1 et seq., Eastern’s insurance carrier, Transport Insurance Company (herein Transport), has paid to Vespaziani over $31,000 in workmen’s compensation “work loss” benefits. In addition, Vespaziani instituted an action in trespass against Pete Insana individually and Pete Insana Auto Body Repair and Towing and Richard Insana under the provisions of the No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, Act of July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, No. 176, § 101 et seq., 40 P.S. § 1009.101 et seq. Transport petitioned for leave to intervene as use-plaintiff, based on its claim to subrogation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Section 319, 77 P.S. § 671. The Court of Common Pleas of Washington County denied Transport’s petition, whereupon Transport appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed, Vespaziani v. Insana, 293 Pa.Superior Ct. 117, 437 A.2d 1234 (1981). We granted allocatur to address the question of the effect of the No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act on the employer’s claim to subrogation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

The Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act, Section 319, provides for an employer’s, hence the employer’s insurer’s, claim to subrogation to the extent of compensation payable. Section 319 provides in pertinent part:

Where the compensable injury is caused in whole or in part by the act or omission of a third party, the employer shall be subrogated to the right of the employe, his personal representative, his estate or his dependents, against such third party to the extent of the compensation payable under this article by the employer.

77 P.S. § 671.

Were this not a vehicular negligence case, Transport could assert its statutory subrogation interest to recover from a third party the amount of its liability for workmen’s compensation benefits. However, this case presents the question whether the No-Fault Act’s partial abolition of tort liability for injury arising from a motor vehicle accident has modified the employer’s claim of subrogation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

*615 In order to address this question, a review of the basic organization of the pertinent articles of the No-Fault Act is required. Article II addresses the obligation of a no-fault “obligor,” i.e., insurer, under the Act. Under Article II, the no-fault obligor is required to provide “basic loss benefits” without any inquiry regarding fault. Basic loss benefits are defined as benefits payable for the “net loss” sustained, 40 P.S. § 1009.103. Section 206(a) of Article II concerns the calculation of “net loss.” Under this section, workmen’s compensation benefits are to be deducted from the victim’s “loss” in determining the amount payable by the no-fault obligor:

[A]ll benefits or advantages . . . that an individual receives or is entitled to receive from social security . . . workmen’s compensation, any State-required temporary, nonoccupational disability insurance, and all other benefits . . ., shall be subtracted from loss in calculating net loss.

40 P.S. § 1009.206(a) (emphasis supplied). Thus, the rights of the insured to basic loss benefits from the no-fault obligor are controlled by these net loss provisions providing for payment of benefits from the no-fault obligor to compensate loss not covered by primary collateral sources, e.g. social security or workmen’s compensation.

Article III of the No-Fault Act addresses tort liability, including that of third parties. Section 301(a)(4) enacts a partial abolition of tort liability but enumerates specific exceptions to such abolition:

(a) Partial abolition. — Tort liability is abolished with respect to any injury that takes place in this State in accordance with the provisions of this act if such injury arises out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, except that:
(4) A person remains liable for any loss which is not compensated because of any limitations in accordance with Section 202(a), (b), (c) or (d) of this Act [limits of mandatory payment by no-fault obligor, i.e. “basic loss benefits”].

*616 40 P.S. § 1009.301(a)(4) (emphasis supplied). “Loss” under the Act is defined as “accrued economic detriment resulting from injury” 40 P.S. § 1009.103. The No-Fault Act compensates work loss to a maximum of $15,000. 40 P.S. § 1009.-202(b)(2). Accordingly, in a non scope-of-employment vehicular accident, a work loss in excess of $15,000 is recoverable from the tortfeasor with no recovery for the first $15,000. 1 Where, however, the injury occurs in the scope of employment, the first $15,000 of work loss suffered by the injured will be composed of both workmen’s compensation benefits and no-fault benefits.

The No-Fault Act, in Section 206(a), coordinates workmen’s compensation benefits with no-fault benefits, providing that no-fault benefits shall be paid to the injured for the “net loss” suffered beyond that compensated by the workmen’s compensation benefits. Since the Workmen’s Compensation Act provides, in the typical case, that sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the wages of the injured employee shall be compensated, § 306(a), 77 P.S. § 511 et seq., the “net loss” typically will be the remaining thirty-three and one-third percent of the wages 2 of the injured employee. Therefore, by combining these benefits, the injured employee receives full compensation for his work loss: typically, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the first $15,000 of that loss, i.e., $10,000, will be paid to the injured employee by the workmen’s compensation carrier and thirty-three and one-third percent of that loss, i.e., $5,000 will be paid to the injured employee by the no-fault obligor.

Section 301(a)(4) of the No-Fault Act precludes recovery from a third party tortfeasor for the first $15,000 of work *617 loss suffered. The contribution by the workmen’s compensation carrier to the first $15,000 of work loss, typically $10,000 is, therefore, compensation paid which cannot be recouped by the workmen’s compensation carrier since there will be no recovery from the third party tortfeasor which represents this first $15,000.

These basic provisions of the No-Fault Act have been interpreted by the Superior Court so as to deny workmen’s compensation carriers statutory subrogation to an employee’s third-party tort recovery under the No-Fault Act, even with respect to contributions beyond the first $15,000 of work loss benefits. Vespaziani v. Insana, 293 Pa. Superior Ct.

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Bluebook (online)
462 A.2d 669, 501 Pa. 612, 1983 Pa. LEXIS 634, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vespaziani-v-insana-pa-1983.