Erickson v. Commissioner

1992 T.C. Memo. 585, 64 T.C.M. 963, 1992 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 603
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedSeptember 30, 1992
DocketDocket No. 3688-90
StatusUnpublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 1992 T.C. Memo. 585 (Erickson v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Erickson v. Commissioner, 1992 T.C. Memo. 585, 64 T.C.M. 963, 1992 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 603 (tax 1992).

Opinion

NORMAN D. ERICKSON AND MARILYN J. ERICKSON, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Erickson v. Commissioner
Docket No. 3688-90
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 1992-585; 1992 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 603; 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 963;
September 30, 1992, Filed

*603 Decision will be entered for respondent with respect to the income tax deficiency.

Decision will be entered for petitioners with respect to the additions to tax.

For petitioners: Charles J. Reilly.
For Respondent: Cheryl A. McInroy.
CANTREL

CANTREL

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

CANTREL, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to section 7443A(b)(3) and Rules 180, 181, and 182. 1

Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioners' 1986 Federal income tax in the amount of $ 7,983, together with additions to tax under section 6653(a)(1)(A) and (B) in the respective amounts of $ 399.15 and 50 percent of the interest due on $ 4,901. After concessions, 2 the issues for decision are whether petitioners received an additional $ 50,796 of self-employment income during 1986 upon which they failed to report*604 self-employment tax, and whether petitioners were negligent within the meaning of section 6653(a)(1).

FINDINGS OF FACT

Most of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and accompanying exhibits are incorporated herein by reference.

Petitioners timely filed their 1986 tax return jointly as husband and wife. At the time the petition in this case was filed, they resided at Mt. Vernon, Maine. The primary issue revolves around petitioner husband's contractual arrangement with Union *605 Mutual Life Insurance Co., Unionmutual Stock Life Insurance Co. of America, and Unionmutual Stock Life Insurance Co. of New York (hereafter collectively referred to as Union Mutual). Accordingly, future reference to petitioner in the singular refers to petitioner husband.

Petitioner began working as an insurance agent for Union Mutual in 1963. The General Agent's Contract executed by petitioner and Union Mutual provided, inter alia, that the general agent shall be an independent contractor, that compensation shall be in the form of commissions based upon premiums paid on insurance policies written by the general agent, that the agreement shall terminate at the sole discretion of either party upon 30 days' written notice by one party to the other, and that upon termination of the agreement all records, supplies, and equipment provided wholly or in part by Union Mutual shall be deemed belonging to Union Mutual and delivered to it. For about 20 years petitioner sold Union Mutual policies and received regular commissions thereon. He also received commissions from premiums paid on renewal policies previously written by him which we refer to hereafter as renewal commissions.

In November*606 1983, Union Mutual gave petitioner 60 days' notice of its intent to terminate his General Agent's Contract. Petitioner was one of many general agents whose contracts were planned for termination as a part of Union Mutual's restructuring. In December 1983, when petitioner was 57 years of age, petitioner and Union Mutual entered into a General Agent Floored Commission Leveling Agreement II (hereafter the leveling agreement). 3 The leveling agreement provided in general that as of December 31, 1984, Union Mutual would establish a special account for petitioner into which would be paid, thereafter, all deferred first year commissions, renewal commissions, and unpaid regular commissions from policies written by petitioner on or before that date. In addition, Union Mutual was to make an initial valuation of the total amount of such commissions that would accrue in the account and based upon that valuation would make 180 monthly payments to petitioner. Every 5 years the monthly payments were to be adjusted based upon a revaluation of the amount estimated to accrue in the account. The leveling agreement guaranteed that petitioner's monthly payments would not fall below 75 percent of*607 the initial payment amount. It also provided that if petitioner survived the 180-month period, he would continue to receive a lifetime monthly payment equal to 60 percent (minus 2 percent for each year of petitioner's age less than 80) of the initial payment amount.

Petitioner's General Agent's Contract was subsequently terminated. He discontinued selling Union Mutual insurance policies and servicing existing policyholders. He left the office where he had worked. His clerical and secretarial staff were no longer available to him; they had been salaried employees of Union Mutual and were retained by the company. Petitioner turned over all of the office records, supplies, and equipment to Union Mutual. *608 In accordance with the leveling agreement reached with Union Mutual, petitioner began receiving monthly payments.

As a result of Union Mutual's termination of its general agent's contracts, a number of legal disputes arose. Petitioner did not believe he had the wherewithal to personally bring an action against Union Mutual and did not, himself, get directly involved in the disputes. The record is unclear as to the nature of the allegations raised against Union Mutual or whether any formal complaints were in fact filed in the courts. In any event, Union Mutual settled the disputes by entering into a Settlement Agreement and General Release (the settlement agreement) with all the persons whose general agent's contracts had been terminated, including petitioner.

As is relevant here, the settlement agreement, which was entered into on or about December 31, 1985, provides as follows:

WHEREAS, the parties recognize the rapidly changing nature of the life and health insurance industry and anticipate these changes will escalate; and

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Erickson v. Commissioner
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1992 T.C. Memo. 585, 64 T.C.M. 963, 1992 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 603, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/erickson-v-commissioner-tax-1992.