Eric Rodney Hill v. Warden Eric Rickard, F.C.I. Otisville; Ms. Myrna Bridges, Associate Warden F.C.I. Otisville; F.C.I. Otisville

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 4, 2026
Docket1:26-cv-00901
StatusUnknown

This text of Eric Rodney Hill v. Warden Eric Rickard, F.C.I. Otisville; Ms. Myrna Bridges, Associate Warden F.C.I. Otisville; F.C.I. Otisville (Eric Rodney Hill v. Warden Eric Rickard, F.C.I. Otisville; Ms. Myrna Bridges, Associate Warden F.C.I. Otisville; F.C.I. Otisville) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eric Rodney Hill v. Warden Eric Rickard, F.C.I. Otisville; Ms. Myrna Bridges, Associate Warden F.C.I. Otisville; F.C.I. Otisville, (S.D.N.Y. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ERIC RODNEY HILL, Plaintiff, -against- 26-CV-0901 (KMW) WARDEN ERIC RICKARD, F.C.I. ORDER OF DISMISSAL OTISVILLE; MS. MYRNA BRIDGES, WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD ASSOCIATE WARDEN F.C.I. OTISVILLE; F.C.I. OTISVILLE, Defendants. KIMBA M. WOOD, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently confined at F.C.I. Otisville and is proceeding pro se, brings this action under the court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide adequate treatment for his prostate cancer and interfering with his incoming and outgoing mail. By Order dated February 6, 2026, ECF No. 5, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the following reasons, the Court dismisses the complaint, with 45 days’ leave to replead. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

1 On April 15, 2024, Plaintiff was barred, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), from filing any new action IFP while incarcerated. See Hill v. Government for the State of New York, No. 24-CV-0371 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2024). Plaintiff sought to proceed IFP in this action and set forth allegations that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury when he filed the complaint. Accordingly, on February 6, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP. who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Although the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obligated to construe pro se pleadings

liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). But the “special solicitude” courts provide to pro se litigants, id. at 475 (citation omitted) has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and

draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court need not accept, however, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint.2 Plaintiff alleges “Defendants committed crimes against” him from October 2023 to the present. Although he provides virtually no details, he asserts that Defendants have “allowed [his] prostate cancer to worsen and spread” for two and a half years and that he is “bleeding from his penis.” (ECF No. 1, at 5.)

Plaintiff adds that “Defendants are watching and allowing [him] to slowly bleed to death.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff also states that 85% of his “incoming and outgoing legal mail has been destroyed,” but he does not attribute that fact to any named Defendant or any other person. (Id.) Plaintiff also does not specify whether the destroyed mail was legal mail or general correspondence, or whether the mail was related to a pontentially valid cause of action. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks two million dollars in “actual damages,” along with punitive damages. (Id. at 5.)

DISCUSSION A. Private Prosecution Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed crimes against him. In making those allegations, Plaintiff appears to seek the criminal prosecution of Defendants. Neither Plaintiff nor the Court can direct prosecutors to initiate a criminal proceeding against anyone, because prosecutors possess discretionary authority to bring criminal actions, and they are “immune from control or interference by citizen or court.” Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457

2 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation appear as in the complaint unless noted otherwise. F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1972). “The decision to prosecute is solely within the discretion of the prosecutor.” Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1981). Plaintiff lacks standing to cause the federal criminal prosecution of the Defendants. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618-619 (1973).

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to file a criminal action, the Court dismisses the complaint for lack of standing and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (“If [a] plaintiff[ ] lack[s] Article III standing, a [federal] court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear [his] claim.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). B. Medical Care Claims Under the Eighth Amendment Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by allowing Plaintiff’s prostate cancer to “worsen and spread.” (ECF No. 1, at 5.) Because Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by employees of the federal government, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which is “the federal analog to suits

brought against state officials under [ ] 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009).3 To state a claim for relief under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege facts that plausibly show that: (1) the challenged action was attributable to an officer acting under color of federal law, and

3 Federal courts have analogized Bivens claims to those brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

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Bluebook (online)
Eric Rodney Hill v. Warden Eric Rickard, F.C.I. Otisville; Ms. Myrna Bridges, Associate Warden F.C.I. Otisville; F.C.I. Otisville, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eric-rodney-hill-v-warden-eric-rickard-fci-otisville-ms-myrna-nysd-2026.