1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 ERA PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, Case No.: 22-CV-804 JLS (MSB)
11 Plaintiff, ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION TO 12 v. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND (2) REMANDING FOR LACK 13 ALEXANDRA MCCORMACK, and OF SUBJECT MATTER 14 DAIDEN B. AHERN, JURISDICTION Defendants. 15 (ECF No. 2) 16
17 18 19 Presently before the Court is Defendants Alexandra McCormack and Daiden B. 20 Ahern’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 21 (“Mot.,” ECF No. 2). Defendants, proceeding pro se, removed this unlawful detainer 22 action from the Superior Court of California, County of Imperial, to the United States 23 District Court for the Southern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (“Not. 24 of Removal,” ECF No. 1 at 1–3). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES 25 Defendants’ Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to § 1915(a) and REMANDS this action to 26 the Superior Court of California, County of Imperial, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 27 /// 28 /// 1 BACKGROUND 2 Defendants are tenants in a residential property located in El Centro, California, 3 which is managed by Plaintiff ERA Property Management (“Plaintiff). Ex. A. (“Compl.”), 4 ECF No. 1 at 7–8.1 When Defendants’ written one-year lease agreement for the property 5 terminated, the leasing arrangement converted to a month-to-month lease. Id. at 8. On 6 April 4, 2022, Plaintiff allegedly served Defendants with a 3-day notice to pay rent or quit. 7 Id. at 8–9. Plaintiff then filed the present unlawful detainer action on April 15, 2022. Id. 8 at 7–10. Defendants filed a demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint, which the Superior Court 9 did not sustain. ECF No. 1 at 11. Defendants then removed the action to this Court on the 10 basis of federal question jurisdiction and filed a Motion to Proceed IFP. See generally Not. 11 of Removal; Mot. 12 IN FORMA PAUPERIS MOTION 13 I. Legal Standard 14 All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 15 United States, other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. 28 16 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay the filing fee only 17 if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). See 18 Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). A federal court may authorize 19 the commencement of an action without the prepayment of fees if the party submits an 20 affidavit, including a statement of assets, showing that she is unable to pay the required 21 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 22 As section 1915(a)(1) does not itself define what constitutes insufficient assets to 23 warrant IFP status, the determination of indigency falls within the district court’s 24 discretion. See Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Section 25 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion in determining 26 27 28 1 All citations to electronically filed documents refer to the blue pagination numbers assigned by the 1 whether the affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement of indigency.”), reversed on other 2 grounds by 506 U.S. 194 (1993). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient 3 where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of 4 life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins v. E.I. 5 Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). “One need not be absolutely 6 destitute to obtain benefits of the [IFP] statute.” Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 7 725 (9th Cir. 1960). “Nevertheless, a plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty ‘with 8 some particularity, definiteness[,] and certainty.’” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. 9 II. Analysis 10 Defendant Alexandra McCormack (“Defendant”) submitted an affidavit in support 11 of Defendants’ request that the federal filing fee be waived. See generally IFP Mot. 12 Defendant avers that she has not, in the past twelve months, received any money from 13 employment, rent payments, life insurance, workers compensation, welfare services, child 14 support, or gifts, among other sources. Id. at 2. Defendant claims she is not currently 15 employed but also states she is employed as an independent contractor. Id. Defendant 16 claims that her only source of income is “Medi-Cal,” but she did not detail the amount of 17 money she receives from Medi-Cal as required on the application. Id. Defendant claims 18 she does not have a savings or checking account, an automobile, or any valuable property 19 or assets. Id. at 2–3. Defendant also answered “N/A” when asked to list any debts. Id. 20 at 3. Because Defendant indicated she has no assets or sources of income, the application 21 requires that she “must explain the sources of funds for [her] day-to-day expenses,” id. at 22 3 (emphasis in original); however, Defendant simply wrote “N/A.” Id. 23 Based on the lack of information provided, the Court is unable to analyze 24 Defendants’ indigency. Defendant did not provide any dollar amounts or explanations 25 related to any sort of income, assets, debts, or expenses in her IFP application. See 26 generally id. Consequently, the Court cannot accurately assess how the filing fee affects 27 Defendants’ monetary situation. Furthermore, it is unclear whether Defendant is 28 unemployed or employed as an independent contractor. See id. at 2. Given the foregoing, 1 Defendant has failed to “allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness[,] and 2 certainty.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Proceed 3 IFP is DENIED. 4 SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 5 The Court has an independent obligation to screen all actions for subject matter 6 jurisdiction. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990); see also 7 Christopher v. Reaching Fourth Ministries, No. 17-CV-00726-BAS-BLM, 2017 WL 8 11421538 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2017). In cases “brought in a State court of which the district 9 courts of the United States have original jurisdiction,” defendants may remove the action 10 to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Because the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited, 11 a civil action is removable so long as the district court has been granted original jurisdiction 12 under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or 28 U.S.C. § 1332. E.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 ERA PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, Case No.: 22-CV-804 JLS (MSB)
11 Plaintiff, ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION TO 12 v. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND (2) REMANDING FOR LACK 13 ALEXANDRA MCCORMACK, and OF SUBJECT MATTER 14 DAIDEN B. AHERN, JURISDICTION Defendants. 15 (ECF No. 2) 16
17 18 19 Presently before the Court is Defendants Alexandra McCormack and Daiden B. 20 Ahern’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 21 (“Mot.,” ECF No. 2). Defendants, proceeding pro se, removed this unlawful detainer 22 action from the Superior Court of California, County of Imperial, to the United States 23 District Court for the Southern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (“Not. 24 of Removal,” ECF No. 1 at 1–3). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES 25 Defendants’ Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to § 1915(a) and REMANDS this action to 26 the Superior Court of California, County of Imperial, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 27 /// 28 /// 1 BACKGROUND 2 Defendants are tenants in a residential property located in El Centro, California, 3 which is managed by Plaintiff ERA Property Management (“Plaintiff). Ex. A. (“Compl.”), 4 ECF No. 1 at 7–8.1 When Defendants’ written one-year lease agreement for the property 5 terminated, the leasing arrangement converted to a month-to-month lease. Id. at 8. On 6 April 4, 2022, Plaintiff allegedly served Defendants with a 3-day notice to pay rent or quit. 7 Id. at 8–9. Plaintiff then filed the present unlawful detainer action on April 15, 2022. Id. 8 at 7–10. Defendants filed a demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint, which the Superior Court 9 did not sustain. ECF No. 1 at 11. Defendants then removed the action to this Court on the 10 basis of federal question jurisdiction and filed a Motion to Proceed IFP. See generally Not. 11 of Removal; Mot. 12 IN FORMA PAUPERIS MOTION 13 I. Legal Standard 14 All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 15 United States, other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. 28 16 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay the filing fee only 17 if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). See 18 Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). A federal court may authorize 19 the commencement of an action without the prepayment of fees if the party submits an 20 affidavit, including a statement of assets, showing that she is unable to pay the required 21 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 22 As section 1915(a)(1) does not itself define what constitutes insufficient assets to 23 warrant IFP status, the determination of indigency falls within the district court’s 24 discretion. See Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Section 25 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion in determining 26 27 28 1 All citations to electronically filed documents refer to the blue pagination numbers assigned by the 1 whether the affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement of indigency.”), reversed on other 2 grounds by 506 U.S. 194 (1993). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient 3 where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of 4 life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins v. E.I. 5 Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). “One need not be absolutely 6 destitute to obtain benefits of the [IFP] statute.” Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 7 725 (9th Cir. 1960). “Nevertheless, a plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty ‘with 8 some particularity, definiteness[,] and certainty.’” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. 9 II. Analysis 10 Defendant Alexandra McCormack (“Defendant”) submitted an affidavit in support 11 of Defendants’ request that the federal filing fee be waived. See generally IFP Mot. 12 Defendant avers that she has not, in the past twelve months, received any money from 13 employment, rent payments, life insurance, workers compensation, welfare services, child 14 support, or gifts, among other sources. Id. at 2. Defendant claims she is not currently 15 employed but also states she is employed as an independent contractor. Id. Defendant 16 claims that her only source of income is “Medi-Cal,” but she did not detail the amount of 17 money she receives from Medi-Cal as required on the application. Id. Defendant claims 18 she does not have a savings or checking account, an automobile, or any valuable property 19 or assets. Id. at 2–3. Defendant also answered “N/A” when asked to list any debts. Id. 20 at 3. Because Defendant indicated she has no assets or sources of income, the application 21 requires that she “must explain the sources of funds for [her] day-to-day expenses,” id. at 22 3 (emphasis in original); however, Defendant simply wrote “N/A.” Id. 23 Based on the lack of information provided, the Court is unable to analyze 24 Defendants’ indigency. Defendant did not provide any dollar amounts or explanations 25 related to any sort of income, assets, debts, or expenses in her IFP application. See 26 generally id. Consequently, the Court cannot accurately assess how the filing fee affects 27 Defendants’ monetary situation. Furthermore, it is unclear whether Defendant is 28 unemployed or employed as an independent contractor. See id. at 2. Given the foregoing, 1 Defendant has failed to “allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness[,] and 2 certainty.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Proceed 3 IFP is DENIED. 4 SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 5 The Court has an independent obligation to screen all actions for subject matter 6 jurisdiction. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990); see also 7 Christopher v. Reaching Fourth Ministries, No. 17-CV-00726-BAS-BLM, 2017 WL 8 11421538 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2017). In cases “brought in a State court of which the district 9 courts of the United States have original jurisdiction,” defendants may remove the action 10 to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Because the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited, 11 a civil action is removable so long as the district court has been granted original jurisdiction 12 under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or 28 U.S.C. § 1332. E.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 13 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The party invoking the removal statute bears the burden 14 of establishing that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists. Emrich v. Touche Ross & 15 Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988). Moreover, courts “strictly construe the removal 16 statute against removal jurisdiction.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) 17 (citing Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988)); Takeda v. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. 18 Co., 765 F.2d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 1985). Therefore, “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected 19 if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 20 (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)). 21 Accordingly, the Court examines Defendants’ Notice of Removal sua sponte for federal 22 question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction. 23 A. Federal Question Jurisdiction 24 Federal courts are granted federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 when 25 a cause of action arises under federal law. E.g., Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 26 149, 152 (1908). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal question jurisdiction 27 exists only when the face of the plaintiff’s complaint is “based upon [federal law].” 28 Louisville & N. R. Co., 211 U.S. at 152. Accordingly, defenses that implicate federal law 1 can never be the basis for federal question jurisdiction. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 2 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (explaining that “it is now settled law that a case may not be removed 3 to federal court on the basis of a federal defense”). 4 As the parties seeking removal, Defendants must demonstrate that this Court has 5 subject matter jurisdiction. Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921); 6 see also Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988). Even though 7 the Court must “liberally construe[]” pro se pleadings, Defendants have not met their 8 burden of establishing this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 9 97, 106 (1976). The face of Plaintiff’s Complaint only asserts a state law cause of action 10 for unlawful detainer against Defendants. See generally Compl. Plaintiff’s Complaint is 11 not based upon federal law, as unlawful detainer actions are governed solely by California 12 law. See generally id; see also Ralph Partners II, LLC v. Tate, No. 18-CV-03030-LB, 13 2018 WL 3213974, at 1 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2018) (explaining that unlawful detainer actions 14 do not arise under federal law). Therefore, this action does not involve or implicate any 15 federal question. 16 Defendants’ contention that the Superior Court violated their civil rights by not 17 sustaining their demurrer is not sufficient to establish federal question jurisdiction. See 18 Not. of Removal ¶ 10. The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents the Court from exercising 19 jurisdiction over allegations that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it. See 20 Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 490 n.16 (1983) (explaining 21 that district courts may not directly review state-court decisions even if federal law is 22 implicated). The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents a federal district court from acting as 23 a de facto appellate court for state-court decisions. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476, 486. 24 Because Defendants are contesting the legality of the state court’s decision not to sustain 25 their demurrer, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars this action from being heard in federal 26 court. See Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 80, 82–83 (1878) (differentiating the review 27 of legal decisions from the review of a separate case with new facts). Even if the Court 28 were to construe Defendants’ argument that their civil rights were violated as a defense to 1 || Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court cannot base federal question jurisdiction solely on 2 || defenses that implicate federal law. Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 393. Therefore, the Court 3 || does not have federal question jurisdiction over this matter. 4 B. Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction 5 Federal courts are granted diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 when the 6 || amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, and when there is complete diversity amongst the 7 parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see also Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806) (regarding 8 ||the complete diversity requirement). It is plainly stated in the Complaint that the amount 9 ||demanded does not exceed $10,000. Compl. at 7. Because the amount in controversy 10 |/claimed by the plaintiff governs, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) is not satisfied. E.g., St. Paul 11 || Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938). Furthermore, Defendants have 12 ||pled no facts establishing complete diversity amongst the parties. See generally Not. of 13 ||Removal. Accordingly, there is no diversity jurisdiction regardless of the citizenship of 14 || the Parties. 15 CONCLUSION 16 For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Proceed 17 || IFP (ECF No. 2), and REMANDS this action to the Superior Court of California, County 18 || of Imperial for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As this concludes the litigation in this 19 || matter, the Clerk of the Court SHALL CLOSE the file. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 ||Dated: July 11, 2022 . tt f Le 22 on. Janis L. Sammartino 73 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28