Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Shoney's, Inc.

536 F. Supp. 875, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11074, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 156
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Alabama
DecidedJanuary 27, 1982
DocketCiv. A. CV 81-G-0509-S
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 536 F. Supp. 875 (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Shoney's, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Shoney's, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 875, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11074, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 156 (N.D. Ala. 1982).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GUIN, District Judge.

This cause arose from a charge of employment discrimination filed by Charles A. Firth with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on April 1, 1980. In his charge, Mr. Firth claimed that he was terminated as kitchen manager at the Fifth Quarter Restaurant 1 in retaliation for protesting the discharge of a female, Christi Pollock, as head waitress. After the charge was investigated and conciliation failed, the EEOC instituted this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. The case is presently before the court on motion by the defendant, Shoney’s, Inc. (Shoney’s), for summary judgment.

After considering the submissions and arguments of counsel, the depositions of the charging party and of other witnesses, and applicable law, the court concludes that this is an appropriate case for summary judgment. Although the court is generally reluctant to grant summary judgment in a Title VII case, the court is convinced that such is appropriate in this particular case. Support for granting a summary judgment in such a case is found in Rosser v. Laborers’ International Union of North America, Local Number 438, 616 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1980), in which the Fifth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of a Title VII defendant.

The evidence before the court does not take the posture of the much maligned battle of affidavits; instead, the evidence is comprised of the sworn and cross-examined deposition testimony of the charging party and others, as well as answers to interrogatories. The record is very complete indeed and it is virtually incomprehensible that much more additional evidence would be presented to the court at trial. Based thus upon an extensive and virtually complete record, the court concludes that there exists no genuine issue of material fact, and that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law for the reasons stated herein.

The thrust of the EEOC’s claim is that Charles Firth was terminated in retaliation for complaining that his girlfriend’s termination was the result of sex discrimination. The evidence before the court, however, demonstrates that the EEOC cannot meet the first element of a prima facie case for retaliation. As stated by the EEOC in its brief to the court, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), a plaintiff must (1) establish statutorily protected expressions, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between the protected expression and the adverse action. *877 Smalley v. Eatonville, 640 F.2d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 1981); Whatley v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 632 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1980). The EEOC asserts that Firth protested an employment practice which he reasonably believed to be illegal. The evidence, however, is to the contrary.

The uncontradicted evidence, supplied primarily through the deposition of Charles Firth himself, shows that Firth never complained or suggested to anyone with Shoney’s that the Pollock discharge was illegal, unlawful, or in violation of Title VII. His expressions consisted of complaints that his girlfriend had been fired while other managers’ girlfriends had not. His own testimony regarding the complaints he made do not support even an inference that he protested Pollock’s discharge as any form of an unlawful employment practice. His very generalized complaints were that he was not being treated fairly in that other managers could date waitresses who worked at the restaurant. There is nothing in his own testimony of what he said that would put Shoney’s on notice that he was protesting an illegal employment practice. 2

The testimony of Jim Walker, first assistant manager at the Fifth Quarter and longtime close friend of Charles Firth, and the testimony of Mr. Rooker, manager of the Fifth Quarter at the time in question, further support the conclusion that Firth never intimated that Pollock’s discharge was illegal or discriminatory; instead, his repeated complaint, as related by these men, was that he was not treated fairly in that he could not date a waitress employed by the restaurant. 3

The EEOC tried to show that Firth did make statutorily protected expressions by quoting from two entirely separate sections of Firth’s deposition. The EEOC set out in brief a quotation wherein Firth stated his complaint that preferential treatment was given him because of his management status. In an attempt to link Firth’s complaint about the managerial preference to sex discrimination, the EEOC then leaps to page 72 of the deposition where Firth was asked by an EEOC attorney what he meant and felt when he signed the EEOC charge. There is no evidence whatsoever that Firth’s “feelings” about the consideration of sex in the Pollock discharge were ever communicated to Shoney’s, or that such feelings were even held by him prior to signing the charge. What he may have “felt” or “meant” when he signed the EEOC charge after consultation with EEOC personnel sheds no light on the nature of his verbal complaints to Shoney’s. 4

The evidence before the court convincingly demonstrates that Mr. Firth’s complaints which he made known to Shoney’s did not rise to the level of expressions protected by § 704(a); that is, he did not verbalize any opposition to an unlawful employment practice. Further, Title VII does not prohibit preferential treatment of management personnel over employees, which was the clearest complaint ever voiced by Firth to anyone at the Fifth Quarter. The only inference supportable by all the evidence before the court is that Firth did not engage in any statutorily protected expressions and, therefore, the EEOC has failed to *878 establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge in violation of § 704(a). Summary judgment is thus due to be granted in favor of Shoney’s.

Shoney’s entitlement to summary judgment also finds support in an alternative ground. Assuming that the inference could be drawn that Firth did complain of discriminatory treatment of Pollock because of her sex, and that the EEOC could establish a prima facie case, the defendant has a valid defense which supports its termination of Firth and which has not been shown to be a pretext.

As the Fifth Circuit has made clear, not all activity in opposition to unlawful employment practices is protected under § 704(a). Rosser v. Laborers’ International Union of North America, Local Number 438, 616 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1980),

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Bluebook (online)
536 F. Supp. 875, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11074, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 156, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/equal-employment-opportunity-commission-v-shoneys-inc-alnd-1982.