Eon Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. Verizon Clinton Center Drive Corp.

736 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 2010 WL 3199628, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82219
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 11, 2010
Docket1:08-cv-00385
StatusPublished

This text of 736 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (Eon Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. Verizon Clinton Center Drive Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eon Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. Verizon Clinton Center Drive Corp., 736 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 2010 WL 3199628, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82219 (E.D. Tex. 2010).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

JOHN D. LOVE, United States Magistrate Judge.

This claim construction opinion construes the disputed terms in U.S. Patent Nos. 5,388,101 (“the '101 Patent”) and 5,481,546 (“the '546 Patent”) (collectively, “the patents-in-suit”). Plaintiff Eon Corp. IP Holdings, LLC (“Plaintiff’) alleges Defendant Verizon Clinton Center Drive Corp. (“Defendant”) infringes the '101 and '546 Patents. 1 The parties have presented *1055 their claim construction positions (Doc. Nos. 270, 274, 281). Also before the Court is claim construction briefing from Plaintiff and Sensus USA Inc. (“Sensus”), a defendant in the related case Eon Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. Sensus USA Inc., No. 6:09-cv-116, on certain terms common to the two cases (Case No. 6:09-cv-116, Doc. No. 124,131). 2 On March 3, 2010, the Court held a claim construction hearing and heard argument (Doc. Nos. 300, 308). The Court issued a provisional claim construction order on May 17, 2010 (Doc. No. 323). For the reasons stated herein, the Court adopts the constructions set forth below.

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES

“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’ ” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2005) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safan Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed.Cir.2004)). The Court examines a patent’s intrinsic evidence to define the patented invention’s scope. Id. at 1313-1314; Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed.Cir.2001). Intrinsic evidence includes the claims, the rest of the specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13; Bell Atl. Network Servs., 262 F.3d at 1267. The Court gives claim terms them ordinary and customary meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2003).

Claim language guides the Court’s construction of claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. “[T]he context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Id. Other claims, asserted and unasserted, can provide additional instruction because “terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent.” Id. Differences among claims, such as additional limitations in dependent claims, can provide further guidance. Id.

“[CJlaims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’ ” Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995)). “[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’ ” Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed.Cir.2002). In the specification, a patentee may define his own terms, give a claim term a different meaning than it would otherwise possess, or disclaim or disavow some claim scope. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Although the Court generally presumes terms possess their ordinary meaning, this presumption can be overcome by statements of clear disclaimer. See SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, *1056 1343-44 (Fed.Cir.2001). This presumption does not arise when the patentee acts as his own lexicographer. See Irdeto Access, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed.Cir.2004).

The specification may also resolve ambiguous claim terms “where the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1325. For example, “[a] claim interpretation that excludes a preferred embodiment from the scope of the claim ‘is rarely, if ever, correct.’ ” Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2004) (quoting Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1583). But, “[although the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed language in the claims, particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.” Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed.Cir.1988); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.

The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim construction because a patentee may define a term during prosecution of the patent. Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“As in the case of the specification, a patent applicant may define a term in prosecuting a patent”). The well established doctrine of prosecution disclaimer “preclud[es] patentees from recapturing through claim interpretation specific meanings disclaimed during prosecution.” Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed.Cir.2003). The prosecution history must show that the patentee clearly and unambiguously disclaimed or disavowed the proposed interpretation during prosecution to obtain claim allowance. Middleton, Inc. v. 3M Co., 311 F.3d 1384, 1388 (Fed.Cir.2002). “Indeed, by distinguishing the claimed invention over the prior art, an applicant is indicating what the claims do not cover.” Spectrum Int’l v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372

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736 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 2010 WL 3199628, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82219, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eon-corp-ip-holdings-llc-v-verizon-clinton-center-drive-corp-txed-2010.