Eon Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. Sensus USA Inc.

741 F. Supp. 2d 783, 2010 WL 3199630, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83442
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 11, 2010
Docket6:09-cv-116
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 741 F. Supp. 2d 783 (Eon Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. Sensus USA Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eon Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. Sensus USA Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 783, 2010 WL 3199630, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83442 (E.D. Tex. 2010).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

JOHN D. LOVE, United States Magistrate Judge.

This claim construction opinion construes the disputed terms in U.S. Patent Nos. 5,388,101 (“the '101 Patent”) and 5,481,546 (“the '546 Patent”). For the reasons stated herein, the Court adopts the constructions set forth below.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Eon Corp. .IP Holdings, LLC (“Plaintiff’) alleges Defendants Sensus USA Inc. (“Sensus”) and Bell Industries, Inc. (“Bell”) (collectively, “Defendants”) infringe the '101 and '546 Patents. Co-pending before the Court is a related case, EON Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. Verizon Clinton Center Drive, 6:08-cv-385 (“the Verizon case”). The parties have presented extensive claim construction briefing.

The Court was scheduled to hold a Markman hearing in the Verizon case (“the Verizon Markman”) three months earlier than in this case. In advance of that hearing, Sensus requested, and the Court granted, leave to brief certain claim terms that were common to the two cases (Doc. Nos. 116, 121). The Court further granted Sensus leave to be heard at the Verizon Markman (Doc. No. 126). Pursuant to the Court’s orders, Sensus submitted an initial brief on claim terms in common with the Verizon case (Doc. No. 124) (“Sensus Verizon Br.”) and Plaintiff responded to it (Doc. No. 131) (“Pl.’s Verizon Resp.”). On March 3, 2010, the Court held the Verizon Markman hearing and heard argument (Case No. 6:08-cv-385, Doc. Nos. 300, 308). Following that hearing, the Court granted Sensus and Plaintiff leave to file supplemental briefing regard *786 ing the term “portable” (Doc. No. 142, 143, 147) (“Sensus Portable Br.” and “Pl.’s Portable Resp.”).

On April 23, 2010, Plaintiff filed its opening claim construction brief in this case (Doc. No. 157) (“Pl.’s Br.”). Sensus and Bell filed independent responses (Doc. Nos. 159, 162) (“Sensus Resp.” and “Bell Resp.”). Plaintiff filed a reply, jointly addressing both responses (Doc. No. 167) (“Pl.’s Reply”). On June 10, 2010, the Court held a claim construction hearing and heard argument (Doc. No. 183). Pursuant to the Court’s comments during that hearing, the Court ordered supplemental briefing regarding the reexamination file (Doc. Nos. 180, 185, 192) (“Sensus Reexam Br.” and “Pl.’s Reexam Resp.”).

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES

“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’ ” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.Cir. 2005) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed.Cir.2004)). The Court examines a patent’s intrinsic evidence to define the patented invention’s scope. Id. at 1313-1314; Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed.Cir.2001). Intrinsic evidence includes the claims, the rest of the specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13; Bell Atl. Network Servs., 262 F.3d at 1267. The Court gives claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed.Cir. 2003).

Claim language guides the Court’s construction of claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. “[T]he context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Id. Other claims, asserted and unasserted, can provide additional instruction because “terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent.” Id. Differences among claims, such as additional limitations in dependent claims, can provide further guidance. Id.

“[CJlaims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’ ” Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir.1995)). “[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’ ” Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed.Cir.2002). In the specification, a patentee may define his own terms, give a claim term a different meaning than it would otherwise possess, or disclaim or disavow some claim scope. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Although the Court generally presumes terms possess their ordinary meaning, this presumption can be overcome by statements of clear disclaimer. See SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1343-44 (Fed.Cir.2001). This presumption does not arise when the patentee acts as his own lexicographer. See Irdeto Access, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed.Cir.2004).

The specification may also resolve ambiguous claim terms “where the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1325. For example, “[a] claim interpretation that excludes a preferred embodiment from the scope of the claim ‘is rarely, if ever, correct.’ ” Glo *787 betrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 1381 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (quoting Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1583). But, “[ajlthough the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed language in the claims, particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.” Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed.Cir.1988); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.

The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim construction because a patentee may define a term during prosecution of the patent. Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (“As in the case of the specification, a patent applicant may define a term in prosecuting a patent”).

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741 F. Supp. 2d 783, 2010 WL 3199630, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83442, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eon-corp-ip-holdings-llc-v-sensus-usa-inc-txed-2010.