Enrique Carrillo Gregorio v. Christopher J. Larose, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: December 17, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-03322
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 ENRIQUE CARRILLO GREGORIO, Case No. 25-cv-03322-BAS-BJW

14 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 15 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (ECF No. 1) 16 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, et al., 17 Respondents. 18 19 20 Petitioner Enrique Carrillo Gregorio filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 21 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming he was improperly detained without bond pending 22 adjudication of his immigration petition. (ECF No. 1.) He requests that he be released on 23 his own recognizance. (Id.) The Government has responded, arguing: (1) 8 U.S.C. §§ 24 1252(g) and 1252(b)(9) strip this Court of jurisdiction; and (2) Petitioner is ineligible for 25 bond and subject to mandatory detention as an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. 26 § 1225(b)(2). (ECF No. 6.) Petitioner filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 7.) For the reasons 27 stated below, the Court GRANTS the Petition and orders that Petitioner be given a bond 28 hearing within 14 days of today’s date. 1 I. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 3 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). “The traditional function of the 4 writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 5 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he or 6 she is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 7 The writ is available to non-citizens detained within the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis, 8 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 9 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 10 Petitioner has lived in the United States since 2000. (Petition (“Pet.”) ¶ 25, ECF No. 11 1.) He has three United States citizen children and works as a landscaper. (Id.) In 2014, 12 he was detained. (Pet. ¶ 26.) Petitioner filed for cancellation of removal and asylum and 13 was released on his own recognizance with a Notice to Appear. (Pet. ¶¶ 26, 28.) He was 14 also issued employment authorization. (Id.) Petitioner continued to follow all of the 15 conditions of his release until an Immigration Judge administratively closed the case. 16 (Pet. ¶ 29.) 17 On November 12, 2025, Petitioner was rearrested without explanation. (Pet. ¶ 31.) 18 He now seeks release on his own recognizance as he was back in 2014. Respondents argue 19 that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and that 20 the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the Petition. The Court disagrees on both grounds. 21 III. ANALYSIS 22 A. Jurisdiction 23 Respondents argue that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and 1252(b)(9) strip this Court of 24 jurisdiction to proceed. Section 1252(g) states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear 25 any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the 26 Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders 27 against any alien under this chapter.” 28 1 The general rule is to “‘resolve any ambiguities in a jurisdiction-stripping statute 2 [such as Section 1252(g)] in favor of the narrower interpretation,’ and by the ‘strong 3 presumption in favor of judicial review.’” Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989, 4 995 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2018)). 5 Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled Section 1252(g) applies only to three discrete actions: 6 commencing proceedings, adjudicating cases, or executing removal orders. Reno v. Am.- 7 Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). “Instead of ‘sweep[ing] in 8 any claim that can technically be said to arise from the three listed actions,’ the provision 9 ‘refers to just those three specific actions themselves.’” Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 995 10 (alteration in original) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018)). “There 11 are of course many other decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation 12 process . . .” that are not one of these three. See Reno, 525 U.S. at 482 (listing possibilities). 13 Section 1252(g) “does not prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they 14 are in some fashion connected to removal orders.” Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 997. 15 In this Petition, Petitioner is not contesting the commencement or adjudication of 16 removal proceedings against him, nor is he raising an issue with respect to the execution 17 of removal. His detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) may be during, but is 18 nonetheless independent of, the removal proceedings. Thus, this Court is not stripped of 19 jurisdiction by Section 1252(g). 20 Section 1252(b)(9) states, “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact, 21 including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising 22 from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United 23 States . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” 24 “[C]laims that are independent of or collateral to the removal process do not fall 25 within the scope of § 1252(b)(9).” J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016). 26 Thus, in Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019), the Supreme Court held Section 1252(b)(9) 27 inapplicable when the petitioners were not asking for review of an order of removal, were 28 not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek removal, and were 1 not challenging any part of the process by which removability would be determined. Id. at 2 402 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294). 3 Here, Petitioner does not challenge the Government’s authority to remove him from 4 the United States in this Petition. Instead, he challenges his classification under Section 5 1225(b)(2) instead of Section 1226(a) and the BIA’s decision that immigration judges lack 6 authority to provide a bond under Section 1225(b)(2). Thus, Section 1252(b)(9) does not 7 provide a jurisdictional bar. 8 B. Applicability of Section 1225(b)(2) Versus Section 1226(a) 9 The primary disagreement between the parties is whether Petitioner is now, after 10 living in the United States for twenty-five years and administrative closure of his case 11 eleven years ago, subject to discretionary release pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or, as the 12 BIA has ruled in Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, subject to mandatory detention 13 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). This Court agrees with the multitude of cases that have 14 concluded that applying Section 1225 in this situation “(1) disregards the plain meaning of 15 section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) 16 would render a recent amendment to section 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent 17 with decades of prior statutory interpretation and practice.” Lepe v. Andrews, __F. Supp. 18 3d__, 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (citing cases). 19 “We begin, as always, with the text.” Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U.S. 385, 20 391 (2017). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to an applicant “seeking admission” to the 21 United States, whereas Section 1226(a) applies to individuals who have been arrested “on 22 a warrant issued by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2)(A), 1226(a). 23 “Seeking,” as noted by other courts, “means ‘asking for’ or ‘trying to acquire or gain.’” 24 Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *5 (citing Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 25 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/seeking). “And the use of a present 26 participle, ‘seeking,’ necessarily implies some sort of present-tense action.” Id. (citation 27 modified). As noted by the Southern District of New York: 28 1 [S]omeone who enters a movie theater without purchasing a ticket and then proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily 2 then be described as “seeking admission” to the theater . . . . Even if that 3 person, after being detected, offered to pay for a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as “seeking admission.” 4 5 Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). Respondents point 6 to Section 1225(a)(1), which states, “[a noncitizen] present in the United States who has 7 not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . shall be deemed for purposes of 8 this chapter an applicant for admission.” However, if Section 1225 was intended to apply 9 to all applicants for admission, “there would be no need to include the phrase ‘seeking 10 admission’ in the statute.” Id. at 488; see also Vasquez-Garcia v. Noem, __ F. Supp. 3d 11 __ , 2025 WL 2549431, at *6 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“Only those who take affirmative acts, like 12 submitting an application for admission, are those who can be said to be ‘seeking 13 admission’ within § 1225(b)(2)(A).”); accord Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 14 Sec., __F.4th__, 2025 WL 3552514, at *9 (7th Cir. Dec. 11, 2025) (reasoning “while a 15 noncitizen arrested in the Midwest might qualify as ‘an alien present in the United States 16 who had not been admitted,’” he is not “an ‘applicant for admission’ who is ‘seeking 17 admission’”). 18 Furthermore, Respondents’ interpretation ignores the statutory scheme. “It is a 19 fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their 20 context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Lepe, 2025 WL 21 2716910, at *6 (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). 22 “Section 1225 ‘authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into 23 the country,’ whereas section 1226 ‘authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens 24 already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.’” Id. (quoting 25 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287). This is reinforced by the title of Section 1225: “Inspection by 26 immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for 27 hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225. “‘Inspection’ is a process that occurs at the border or other 28 1 ports of entry.” Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *6 (citing Posos-Sanchez v. Garland, 3 F.4th 2 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 2021)). 3 Petitioner, under the plain meaning of the statute, is not seeking admission to the 4 United States. He has been living in the United States for twenty-five years, eleven of 5 those years with the implicit approval of the Department of Homeland Security, which 6 released him on his own recognizance and provided him with employment authorization. 7 To the extent the addition of Section 1225(a) renders the two statutes ambiguous or 8 unclear as to which section applies, the Court turns to principles of statutory construction. 9 See Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1256 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“[E]ven when 10 a statute is ambiguous or internally contradictory, courts must ‘use every tool at their 11 disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.’” (quoting Loper Bright Enters. v. 12 Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024))). “[A] statute should be construed so that effect is 13 given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or 14 insignificant.” Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1258 (quoting Corley v. United States, 556 15 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)). 16 Section 1226 carves out a statutory category of non-citizens who, despite being 17 arrested while already in the country, may not be released because of their criminal or 18 terrorist activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). If, as Respondents argue, all non-citizens arrested 19 while already in this country are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, there would 20 be no need to carve out an exception for those who had committed criminal or terrorist 21 activities. See Rosado v. Figueroa, No. CV 25-2157-DHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 22 2337099, at *9 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025) (reasoning that if Section 1225’s “mandatory 23 detention provisions apply to all noncitizens present in the United States who have not been 24 admitted, it would render superfluous provisions of § 1226 that apply to certain categories 25 of inadmissible noncitizens”); Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1258 (noting that if the court 26 were to adopt a reading of Section 1225 advanced by the BIA, it would render significant 27 portions of Section 1226(c) meaningless). To avoid rendering Section 1226(c) completely 28 meaningless, the Court finds non-citizens arrested on a warrant in the interior of the United 1 States are subject to discretionary release on bond under Section 1226(a), not mandatory 2 detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). 3 In addition, “the longstanding practice of the government—like any other 4 interpretive aid—can inform a court’s determination of what the law is.” Rosado, 2025 5 WL 2337099, at *10 (citation modified) (quoting Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 386). “Until 6 this year, DHS has applied section 1226(a) and its regime of discretionary release and 7 review of detention to the vast majority of noncitizens allegedly in this country without 8 valid documentation—a practice codified by regulation.” Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, __F. 9 Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 2741654, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (citation modified); see 10 also Inspection & Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 11 1997). 12 Against this backdrop, Congress adopted the Laken Riley Act, adding Section 13 1226(c)(1)(E), which mandates detention for additional categories of criminal aliens. 14 “When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real 15 and substantial effect.” Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1259 (quoting Stone v. I.N.S., 514 16 U.S. 386, 397 (1995), abrogated on other grounds by Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 261 17 (2025)). “When Congress adopts a new law against the backdrop of a ‘longstanding 18 administrative construction,’ courts ‘generally presume the new provision should be 19 understood to work in harmony with what has come before.’” Id. (quoting Monsalvo 20 Velazquez v. Bondi, 604 U.S. 712, 725 (2025)). 21 The longstanding practice of DHS applying Section 1226 to those arrested in the 22 interior of the United States supports the finding that this practice was the best reading of 23 the statute. This conclusion is particularly true because adopting Respondents’ 24 interpretation would result in the recently enacted Laken Riley Act being completely 25 meaningless and unnecessary. 26 Statutory interpretation supports that Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), 27 applies to Petitioner’s immigration detention. Because the BIA’s decision binding 28 Immigration Judges incorrectly provides that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention 1 |} with no individualized bond determination, Petitioner is being held in violation of federal 2 Hence, his Petition is GRANTED. 3 |}1IV. CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons stated above, Petitioner Enrique Carrillo Gregorio’s Petition for Writ 5 ||of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. The Court issues the following writ: 6 The Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Enrique Carrillo Gregorio 7 (A#208 308 183) with a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge within 14 days of today’s date. 8 9 || The Clerk of the Court shall close the case. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 12 || DATED: December 17, 2025

14 Hd¢n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge 15 United States District Court

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